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ABSTRACT 
The theory of social representations, originally formulated by Moscovici, is critically 
examined. It is argued that earlier critiques have not fully appreciated the complexity 
of the issues involved in Moscovici's attempt to explain social phenomena in terms of 
psychological mechanisms. These complex issues are the relationship between the 
individual and the social, and the implications of this relationship for the logic of social 
scientific enquiry. It is argued that Moscovici's formulation does not constitute a 
departure from the normative functionalist theories of Durkheim and Parsons, and is 
similarly over-reliant upon the internalisation of normative values to explain the 
relationship between the individual and the social. This normative emphasis implies 
consensus, and inevitably results both in an inadequate account of agency, and an 
inadequate approach to the observation of social phenomena. These problems are 
particularly apparent when dealing with issues relating to social change. 
Giddens' structuration theory provides a more sophisticated analysis of the structuring 
of social action, and a fuller appreciation of the issues concerned. Giddens' work 
acknowledges the inherently contextual nature of social scientific enquiry, and provides 
a means to assess more recent attempts to develop the notion of social representation. 
It is seen that the inherently normative character of social representation, and also that 
of social psychological theories of identity, appear to preclude any possibility of 
relating social phenomena to psychological mechanisms, at least in terms of these 
approaches. 
A consideration of the issues of nationalism and national identification demonstrates 
the relative weakness of social psychological contributions to an understanding of 
these phenomena, in comparison to approaches from other areas of social science. 
This is because the inherently dynamic and political aspects of social action in general 
are more readily apparent when considering nationalism and national identification, 
aspects which theories based upon normative consensus have difficulty 
accommodating. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The theory of social representations, originally formulated by Moscovici, attempts to 
explain social phenomena in terms of psychological mechanisms. However, this 
apparently straightforward objective implicates issues of formidable depth and 
complexity. In this thesis the very notion of social representation is critically evaluated 
through an appreciation of these complex issues, namely the relationship between the 
individual and the social, and the implications of this relationship for the logic of social 
scientific enquiry. 
The thesis begins with an examination of an initial series of critical exchanges that 
influenced the development of Moscovici's theory. It is argued that Moscovici does 
not deal effectively with these critiques, and that attempts to refinine his formulation 
are replete with contradiction and inconsistency. While these initial critiques are of an 
undoubtedly high calibre, there is a failure to identify the source of confusion as the 
relationship between the individual and the social and the implications for social 
scientific enquiry, and consequently a failure to appreciate the complexity of the issues 
involved. 
Analysis of the initial critical exchanges continues in chapter two. It is seen that 
Moscovici's formulation does not constitute a departure from the normative 
functionalist theories of Durkheim and Parsons. This forces a reconsideration of the 
distinctiveness of Moscovici's contribution. The fundamental failing is the attempt to 
explain the relationship between the individual and the social through the 
internalisation of normative values. Such a formulation fails to provide an adequate 
account of agency. The normative emphasis inevitably implies a notion of consensus 
and consequent difficulty in dealing with variation in the interpretation of normative 
values. A further consequence is a unitary conception of social phenomena and a 
corresponding notion of essentially unproblematic observation. These problems are 
highlighted when attempting to explain issues of social change. 
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The next chapter focusses upon the work of Giddens. The critical debate that 
Giddens' work has generated is helpful when considering the relationship between the 
individual and the social and the logic of social scientific enquiry. The significance of 
Giddens' formulation is to transcend the dualisms of action and structure by providing 
a sophisticated analysis of the issues involved. This involves acknowledging the 
strengths and shortcomings of both action-oriented and structure-oriented approaches, 
and integrating these concerns through a notion of the duality of structure. A major 
conclusion of Giddens' theory of structuration is an acknowledgment of the inherently 
contextual nature of social scientific enquiry. Giddens' does not attempt to provide a 
unified programme of research; this is not feasible given the issues concerned. Instead, 
Giddens' insights are best used to appreciate clearly the nature of the issues involved in 
the formulation and interpretation of social scientific work. 
The sophisticated understanding gained from Giddens' work provides a strong basis 
for assessing more recent attempts to develop the notion of social representation, and 
the attempt to explain social phenomena in terms of psychological mechanisms more 
generally. This is the focus of chapter four. It is seen that a failure to appreciate the 
implications of their inherently normative formulations similarly afflicts social 
psychological theories of identity as well as social representations. Normative 
consensus is assumed as a fundamental pre-requisite for social interaction, yet is then 
treated as empirically independent. The failure to appreciate this circularity limits 
attempts to theorise the social context and also ensures the continued production of 
apparently confirminatory empirical research. Consequently, it must be acknowledged 
that theoretical refinement is not forthcoming through the accumulation of empirical 
data. 
Chapter five considers the issues of nationalism and national identification. This 
allows comparison of contributions from other areas of the social sciences, and also 
draws attention to the inherently political nature of social identification and social 
action more generally. On the basis of this comparison, social psychological 
approaches do not appear to provide substantial contributions to the analyses of these 
phenomena. These limitations are further illustrated in the findings of a empricial study 
considering these phenomena from a social psychological perspective, to be found in 
the Appendix. 
It is concluded that attempts to explain social phenomena in terms of psychological 
mechanisms, at least in terms of social representation or social identity, are not viable. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
SOCIAL REPRESENTATION THEORY - INITIAL CRITICAL EXCHANGES 
Introduction. 
Social Representation Theory (SRT) is accepted as a major theoretical perspective in 
social psychology. The theory has developed from work originally carried out by 
Serge Moscovici in France during the 1960's and 70's, though it was only in the early 
1980's that Moscovici's ideas were first presented in the English language. It was in 
the collection edited by Fan and Moscovici titled "Social Representations" in 1984 
that Moscovici gave the first comprehensive account of his theory. Since that time 
SRT has generated much empirical work and has been the subject of much critical 
analysis and debate. 
It is difficult to provide a simple definition of social representations. Moscovici himself 
has argued that is necessary to retain a "ill-defined, intuitive" formulation in order to 
capture the complex, many faceted nature of the phenomena (Moscovici, 1984b, 
p. 957). Nevertheless the description below gives at least an initial idea: 
"Social representation (are) a set of concepts and explanations originating in daily life 
in the course of inter-individual communications. They are equivalent, in our society, 
of the myths and belief systems in traditional societies; they might even be said to be 
the contemporary version of common sense. " (1981, p. 181). 
Due to the large literature generated by SRT, much use is made of secondary sources 
in understanding the fundamental aspects of the theory. Indeed, Wagner has argued 
that "(n)owadays there is no need to introduce the very basic notions of the approach. " 
(1996, p. 95). Particularly following the publication of the Farr and Moscovici volume, 
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the theory provoked a number of critical evaluations of an exceptionally high calibre 
that were extremely influential in the shaping the development of SRT. In order to 
appreciate the many complex arguments implicated in the concept of social 
representation it is useful to trace the development of the theory through these early 
debates. This provides the necessary foundation for a critical appreciation and 
evaluation of SRT. 
With this in mind, this chapter will present a detailed review of these initial critical 
exchanges. Beginning with Moscovici's chapter in the Farr and Moscovici edited 
volume as an introduction, a total of six critical papers covering the period 1984 to 
1988, will be discussed in detail along with Moscovici's responses. These papers were 
chosen both for the strength of the critical arguments presented and for the response 
they each provoked from Moscovici. As mentioned, the first paper discussed is 
Moscovici's comprehensive introduction to the theory, "The phenomenon of social 
representations" (1984a). This is followed by Harre's paper, "Some reflections on the 
concept of `social representation' " (1984), and Moscovici's response to Harre, "The 
myth of the lonely paradigm: a rejoinder" (1984b). The next exchange involves Potter 
and Litton's, "Some problems underlying the theory of social representations" (1985), 
and Semin's, "The `phenomenon of social representation' :a comment on Potter and 
Litton" (1985), followed by Moscovici's brief response. Parker's, "Social 
representations: social psychology's (mis)use of sociology" (1987), McKinlay and 
Potter's, "Social representations: a conceptual critique" (1987) and Moscovici's 
response, "Answers and questions" (1987) comprise the next exchange. The final 
critical exchange involves Jahoda's, "Critical notes and reflections on `social 
representations' " (1988), and Moscovici's lengthy response, "Notes toward a 
description of social representations" (1988). Each of the papers that comprise this 
final exchange are presented in detail, as Jahoda's skilful critique is challenged by what 
amounts to an attempt to reformulate the notion of social representations in the face of 
its initial critical reception. 
It will be seen that from its initial presentation (Moscovici, 1984a), the theory is 
subject to detailed analysis. However, it will be seen that the arguments by Potter and 
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Litton and Semin are particularly damaging. After this, it is only in his response to 
Jahoda (1988) that Moscovici attempts to provide a comprehensive reformulation to 
refute these initial arguments. With this in mind, much use is made of direct quotation 
particularly in Moscovici's initial presentation (1984a) and in his reformulation (1988). 
This is necessary to capture the many aspects of Moscovici's discussion and is 
absolutely. essential for later critical commentary. It is also necessary to point out that 
Moscovici often uses the shortened "representation" interchangeably with "social 
representation". When paraphrasing, the term that Moscovici used in that particular 
instance will be used. 
The phenomenon of social representations; S. Moscovici (1984a) 
Moscovici explains that social representations are "specific phenomena which are 
related to a particular mode of understanding and communicating -a mode which 
creates both reality and common sense. " (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 17). Social 
representations are specific ways of communicating and understanding what we 
already know: "They occupy, in effect, a curious position, somewhere between 
concepts, which have as their goal abstracting meaning from the world, and 
introducing order into it, and percepts, which reproduce the world in a meaningful 
way. " (1984a, p. 17). They have two facets, iconic and symbolic "which are as 
interdependent as the two faces on a sheet of paper. " (1984a, p. 17). In this way every 
image is equated with an idea and vice versa; different mental mechanisms are 
activated in each instance. 
Social representations constitute the social environment as ideas and unquestioned 
realities, though they have a dynamic nature, "What is most striking to the 
contemporary observer is their mobile and circulating character; in short, their 
plasticity. We see them, more, as dynamic structures, operating on an assembly of 
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relations and of behaviours which appear, and disappear, together with those of the 
representations. " (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 18). 
Due to the rapid pace of current society, particularly the continual output of the mass 
media, there is not enough time for new ideas to become sedimented. Thus, it is 
necessary to link purely abstract sciences with our concrete activities, "In other words, 
there is a continual need to re-constitute `common sense'.? ' (1984a, p. 19). In this way 
it is argued that social collectivities could not function if social representations were 
not formed; the theoretical and ideological are transformed into shared realities which 
constitute a separate category of phenomena. Social representations embody ideas in 
collective experiences and in behavioural interactions, "once the content is diffused and 
has become accepted, it constitutes an integral part of ourselves, of our intercourse 
with others, of our way of judging them, and of interacting with them; it even defines 
our place in the social hierarchy, and our values. If the word `neurosis' were to 
disappear, and to be replaced by the word `disorder', such an event would have 
consequences far beyond its mere significance in a sentence, or in psychiatry. It is our 
inter-relations, and our collective thought, which are involved and transformed. " 
(Moscovici, 1984a, p. 11). 
Thus social representations respond to our need for a certain coherence. As Moscovici 
explains, "the theory of social representations.. . takes as 
its point of departure the 
diversity of individuals, attitudes and phenomena... Its aim is to discover how 
individuals and groups can construct a stable, predictable world out of such diversity. " 
(1984a, p. 44). 
Conventionalising and prescriptive aspects. 
Moscovici acknowledges that there an element of both autonomy and constraint in 
every environment. Thus, "representations have precisely two roles" (p. 7) : they 
8 
conventionalise the world and they are prescriptive. With regard to their 
conventionalising role, Moscovici explains 
"Nobody's mind is free from the effects of prior conditioning which is imposed by his 
representations, language and culture.... We can see only that which underlying 
conventions allow us to see, and we remain unaware of these conventions.... 
[However, ] We may, with an effort, become aware of the conventional aspect of 
reality, and thus evade some of the constraints which it imposes on our perceptions and 
thoughts. " (1984a, p. 8). 
Representations are prescriptive in that "they impose themselves with upon us with an 
irresistible force. This force is a combination of a structure which is present even 
before we have begun to think, an of a tradition that decrees what we should think. " 
(1984a, p. 9, emphases in original. ) Thus, Moscovici explains, a representation is not 
"directly related" to our manner of thinking, but what we think depends on such 
representations (p. 10). 
All interaction presupposes representations and all information received is under the 
control of representations. Social representations are important for understanding 
social change as it is through representations that the behaviour of individuals is 
influenced. "Such representations, thus, appear to us almost as material objects, insofar 
as they are the product of our actions and communications. " (1984a, p. 12). By being 
shared by all, they constitute a social reality "sui generis" (p. 13). The less we are 
aware of them , the greater their 
influence. Representatives of science, cultures and 
religion create and transmit representations: "Once created, however, they lead a life of 
their own, circulate, merge, attract and repel each other, and give birth to new 
representations while old ones die out. " (1984a, p. 13). 
However, Moscovici also stresses the active involvement of individuals through his 
notion of the "thinking society": "individuals and groups, far from being passive 
receptors, think for themselves, produce and ceaselessly communicate their own 
specific representations and solutions to the questions they set themselves. In the 
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streets, in cafes, offices, hospitals, laboratories, etc., people analyze, comment, concoct 
spontaneous, unofficial, `philosophies' which have a decisive impact on their social 
relations, their choices, the way they bring up their children, plan ahead and so forth. 
Events, sciences and ideologies, simply provide them with `food for thought'. " (1984a, 
p. 16). 
The rise of scientific thought is seen as a consequence of the rapid pace of change in 
modern societies. Moscovici argues that until this century there was a common 
language for science and common sense. Now, however, there is no obvious relation 
between the "non-verbal" language of science, mathematics and logic, and the 
language of everyday experience. Language is in decline due to the power of science, 
and though it has lost its relation to theory, "it maintains its relation to representations, 
which is all that it has left. " (1984a, p. 18). The language of representation is located 
halfway between the language of logic which is concerned with abstract symbols, and 
the language of observation which deals with pure facts. Thus, Moscovici states, 
science used to make common sense less common, now common sense is science made 
common (p. 29). 
Consensual and reified universes. 
Moscovici argues that in primitive societies, there was a distinction between sacred and 
profane forms of knowledge and activity. The sacred was kept apart from purposeful 
activity, reserved for ritual, whereas the profane was used in a more utilitarian fashion. 
All knowledge presupposed a division of reality based on these "separate, opposed 
worlds. " (1984a, p. 20). In modern societies, the sacred and profane have been 
replaced by a more basic distinction between consensual and reified universes, 
categories that are unique to our culture, and whose boundary splits both collective 
and physical reality in two (p. 22). 
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Consensual 
Moscovici explains that "In the consensual universe, society is a visible, continuous 
creation, permeated with meaning and purpose, possessing a human voice, in accord 
with human existence and both acting and reacting like a human being. In other 
words, man here is the measure of all things. " (1984a, p. 20). Thus each individual has 
an equal right to express their opinions and to speak in the name of the group an under 
its aegis. Through linguistic conventions, a `whole complex" of ambiguities and 
conventions are maintained which enable an implicit stock of images and ideas to be 
shared. Social representations are phenomena of the consensual universe, "the specific 
nature of such representations expresses the specific nature of the consensual universe 
of which they are the product and to which they pertain exclusively. " (1984a, p. 23). 
The consensual universe is a sanctuary against "friction or strife". Beliefs and 
interpretations are confirmed and corroborated rather than contradicted. The dynamic 
of relationships is based on familiarisation; phenomena are perceived and understood in 
relation to previous experiences or paradigms, "As a result, memory prevails over 
deduction, the past over the present, response over stimuli, and images over 
`reality'..... Before seeing or hearing a person we have already judged him; classified 
him and created an image of him. So all the enquiries we make and our efforts to 
obtain information only serve to confirm this image. " (1984a, p 26-7). 
Reified 
By contrast, the reified universe is a system of different roles and classes where 
members are not equal. The degree of participation in the reified universe is dependent 
on competence judged according to established rules and regulations. "We are bound 
by that which binds the organisation and which corresponds to a sort of general 
acceptance and not to any reciprocal understanding, to a sequence of prescriptions and 
not to a sequence of agreements. " (1984a, p. 22). The mode of knowledge in the 
reified universe is science; the objective is to produce impartial information about 
phenomena outside our awareness. This information is independent of values and 
desires, and we must react toward it impartially and submissively. 
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Moscovici states that social representations should be seen as an `environment' in 
relation to the individual or the group. In this way, the purpose of all representations 
is "to make something unfamiliar, or unfamiliarity itself, familiar. " (1984a, p. 24, 
emphases in original). Thus Moscovici makes a sharp distinction between social 
representations and science, "science is successfully occupied in demolishing most of 
our current perceptions and opinions.. . In other words, 
its object is to make the 
familiar unfamiliar. " (1984a, p. 23, emphases in original). 
The tension between the unfamiliar and the familiar is always resolved in favour of the 
familiar in the consensual universe. Thus Moscovici states that in social thinking, "the 
conclusion has priority over the premise" and in social relations "the verdict has 
priority over the trial. " (1984a, p. 27). In contrast science moves from premise to 
conclusion; due process has priority over the verdict. 
Moscovici notes that the greatest psychic distress is caused through tension between 
the reified and the consensual. Moscovici argues that ideologies facilitate the 
transmission from one universe to another, especially from the consensual to the 
reified. Moscovici explains that every ideology involves two elements: content derived 
from below and a scientific aura from above. The task is to link the form of thought of 
individuals and the social content of those thoughts. It is worth noting that when 
describing his study on psychoanalysis, Moscovici states that the flow is from the 
reified to the consensual, involving a shift from one cognitive level to another. This 
suggests that transmission is not simply a one-way process. Moscovici's comments 
regarding ideologies will be discussed in more detail later. 
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Processes. 
Anchoring 
Social representations involve two mechanisms, Anchoring and Objectification, both 
based on "memory and foregone conclusions" (1984a, p. 29). Moscovici explains that 
anchoring strives to reduce strange ideas to ordinary categories and images, and so set 
them in a familiar context. Moscovici explains that there is no thought or perception 
without anchor. Social representations are a system of categorisation, though this 
categorisation or classification (Moscovici uses both terms) is not neutral; through it 
we reveal our particular theories and confine it to a set of behaviours and rules. "To 
categorise something amounts to choosing a paradigm from those stored in memory 
and establishing a positive or a negative relation with it. " (1984a, p. 3 1). 
Moscovici claims that our responses toward something depend on whether we 
"generalise" or "particularise". When we generalise we select a feature at random and 
use it as the criterion for inclusion to a category; the feature becomes "co-extensive" 
with members of the category. Moscovici gives the examples of "Jew", "mental 
patient", "play", and "aggressive nation". In contrast, particularising involves 
considering the object as a divergence from the prototype, while also attempting to 
detect the feature, motivation or attitude that makes it distinct. Moscovici explains 
how the choice between the two is made: "The tendency to classify either by 
generalisation or particularisation is not, by any means, a purely intellectual choice but 
reflects a given attitude toward the object, a desire to view it as normal or aberrant. " 
(1984a, p. 33). 
According to Moscovici, when we classify the unfamiliar, we need to define it as 
conforming to, or diverging from, the norm, thus every classification "presupposes a 
position or point of view based on consensus. " (1984a, p. 37). Moscovici maintains 
that although it is impossible to classify without simultaneously naming, these are 
distinct activities. Naming an object places it within the "identity matrix" of our 
culture; thus " those who speak and those who are spoken of are forced into an 
identity matrix which they have not chosen and over which they have no control. " 
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(1984a, P. 35). In this way, what was unidentified is given a social identity, so for 
example a scientific concept becomes part of common speech. Pre-existing 
representations are modified, and objects about to be represented are modified even 
more, and so acquire a new existence. 
Objectification 
Objectification strives to turn something abstract into something "almost concrete", to 
transfer something that is in the mind to something that exists in the physical world, a 
process Moscovici describes as far more active than anchoring and involves two 
stages. As Moscovici explains, "To objectify is to discover the iconic quality of an 
imprecise idea or being, to reproduce a concept in an image". (1984a, p. 38). A 
"figurative nucleus" is a "complex of images that visibly reproduces a complex of 
ideas. " (1984a, p. 38). Society selects those concepts to which it concedes figurative 
powers, according to its beliefs and to the pre-existing stock of images. That is why, 
Moscovici explains, the libido remains abstract even though it is a major component of 
psychoanalytic theory; unlike the conscious and unconscious, the popular image of 
which is one on top of the other, the libido cannot be so easily accommodated. Once a 
figurative nucleus has been adopted it facilitates communication concerning the 
concept. 
The second stage occurs when the image is wholly assimilated, where what is 
perceived replaces what is conceived. Once popularised, the `figurative paradigm" 
may be detached from its "original milieu" and achieve a certain independence. "Thus, 
when the image linked to a word or idea becomes detached and is let loose in a society 
it is accepted as reality. " (1984a, p. 39). Eventually the distinction between the image 
and reality is "obliterated"; the image is no longer a sign and becomes a replica of 
reality. Thus the original notion or entity "loses its abstract and arbitrary character and 
acquires an almost physical, independent existence. " (1984a, p. 40). In this way, those 
who use it see it as a natural phenomenon. Thus images become elements of reality 
rather than elements of thought. In this way Moscovici argues, a representation can 
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detach from a groups' subjectivity, from its interactions and therefore from time; it 
gains permanence and stability. 
Comparison with other theories. 
Moscovici acknowledges that the notion of collective representations has been present 
in sociology, particularly in the work of Durkheim. Moscovici explains that he adopts 
the terms "social" representation in preference to "collective" representation to 
distinguish his dynamic, fluid concept from Durkheim's more static conception. 
Moscovici argues that for sociology collective representations have been seen as 
explanatory devices, essentially irreducible. In contrast, it is the job of social 
psychology to examine the structure and dynamics of representations. Also, 
Moscovici states that Durkheim's "collective representations" referred to a whole 
range of intellectual forms, "any notion of idea, emotion of belief was included" 
(1984a, p. 17); whereas by the term social representation, Moscovici argues, refers to a 
specific phenomenon. 
Moscovici also notes similarities between his theory and ethnomethodology, in that 
they both attempt to expose social norms and conventions, and acknowledge that 
reality is composed of generally shared rules and conventions. However, Moscovici 
argues that these social regularities cannot be understood independently, but require an 
understanding of the theories on which they are based. Moscovici explains that 
construction flows mainly from the reified to the consensual, everything else is 
subordinated. Conversations shape and are shaped by social representations; it is 
through social representations that they achieve a life of their own. 
Similarly Moscovici criticises social psychology for maintaining an "overly scientific" 
perspective, in which thinking is dealt with simply in terms of information processing. 
Moscovici argues that we are seen to react to stimuli in an environment that is taken as 
given. However, as Moscovici has explained, the social environment is not given, but 
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depends on classification. Our reactions are related to common definitions. In this 
way social representations can be seen to define reality. Where reality is concerned 
"representations are all that we have"; we never receive information undistorted by 
representations (1984a, p. 5). 
Observation. 
Moscovici argues that it is best to observe social representations during periods of 
social upheaval. During these times, there occur "revolutions of common sense" 
where taken for granted understandings may be more visible. Representations can be 
seen as independent variables in that they determine the character of a stimulus and its 
response, however they still require explanation. As described earlier, pre-established 
images determine our choice and restrict our range of reactions; we react to the 
category not the stimulus. The specific aspect an object assumes depends on the 
responses associated with it before defining it. Moscovici states that in laboratory 
settings it can be proved that representations shape behaviour. Representations 
whether inherited or fabricated ourselves, can change our attitudes. 
Moscovici argues that naturalistic observation is preferable in the study of social 
representations. That is not to say that Moscovici denies the importance of 
experimental studies; however, ", only a careful description of social representations, 
of their structure and their evolution in various fields, will enable us to understand 
them and that a valid explanation can only be derived from a comparative study of such 
descriptions. " (1984a, p. 68). 
Moscovici explains that it is necessary to examine the symbolic aspect of our 
relationships and the consensual universes we inhabit. `By saying that representations 
are social we are mainly saying that they are symbolic and possess as many perceptual 
as so-called cognitive elements. And that is why we consider their content to be so 
important and why we refuse to distinguish them from psychological mechanisms as 
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such... . After all, how we think is not distinct from what we think. Thus we cannot 
make a clear distinction between the regularities in representations and those in the 
processes that create them. " (1984a, p. 66-7). 
It is necessary to convey that social representations are historical phenomena. Social 
psychological processes express a groups' collective norm and internal links. They are 
firstly social and public processes that gradually become interiorised to psychic 
processes. Their study would constitute a science of consensual universes in evolution 
(1984a, p. 69). 
Some reflections on the concept of "social representation": R. Harre (1984) 
Harre (1984) argues that despite Moscovici's arguments to the contrary, Social 
Representations do not constitute a truly "social" approach. Harrd believes that Social 
Representations research deals with aggregated individual responses rather than group- 
level phenomena and thus represents a version of individualism. Harre's arguments 
mark a first appearance for a concern repeatedly expressed in critiques of SRT, for a 
more precise explanation of the relationship between the content and mechanisms of 
social representations. 
Harre contrasts two approaches to group-level phenomena. The first is `collective', 
where the importance of association is stressed. Collective groups are characterised by 
real, structured relations between members, such as the employees of a company. Here 
attributes may be ascribed to the group as if to a supra-individual entity, even though 
the attribute may not be a feature of any particular individual. Harre associates this 
type of approach with the collective groups of Durkheim. The second approach to 
group-level phenomena is "distributive", where the influence of "the social" is 
restricted to its influence on individual actors. Here, attributes are seen to be 
distributed amongst group members. Harre argues that the distributive sense of group 
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is "in the last analysis a version of individualism" (1984, p. 931). This type of approach 
Harre associates with the "taxonomic" groups of Tajfel, where groups are brought 
together at the "behest of the psychologist... . 
ideal entities whose reality is conceived 
extensionally as sets of similar individuals" (1984, p. 931). Harre argues that a 
collective sense of groups emphasises how social relations are displayed and 
maintained whereas a distributive sense explains phenomena in terms of individual 
attributes or needs. 
Harre argues that a distributive sense of groups is inadequate as truly collective aspects 
of social phenomena are emergent properties and thus cannot be explained simply in 
terms of the attributes of individuals. To illustrate, Harre considers the attributes of 
weight and organisation of an army unit. It is possible to treat the combined weight of 
the unit in a distributive manner as the contribution each member makes to the whole is 
easily observable. However, this is not the case with a truly collective attribute such as 
the group's organisation. Here the attribute is a property of the collective and cannot 
simply be partialled out amongst group members. 
Harre further illustrates his point by considering a notion of scientific rationality. By 
adopting a distributive sense of groups, scientific rationality would be explicable in 
terms of attributes shared by individual scientists, such as their superior logic. 
However by adopting a collective sense of groups, scientific rationality would be seen 
as a social process not attributable to individual members but ascribed to the totality. 
Attention may then be directed toward understanding how the social conventions differ 
between scientists and other groupings with respect to the phenomena. 
Harre argues that social representations research involves groups in only a distributive 
sense and thus are not fully social. The social representation is actually an aggregate 
of explicitly elicited individual versions distributed throughout a group. This, claims 
Harre, fails to capture the truly collective aspects of social phenomena. If 
representations were to be treated as truly collective phenomena they would not rely 
on the aggregation of explicit, individual versions. The representation may be implicit 
in the actions of group members 'and embodied in social practices which may 
18 . 
reproduce states of affairs that appear to embody the theory. There may not be an 
explicit version available to be elicited from individuals. For example, Harre argues 
that previous research has demonstrated that the process of nick-naming "defines and 
serves to promulgate locally valid standards of appearance and behaviour" (1984, 
p. 935). This aspect is not explicitly intended by participants and therefore would not 
be identified by aggregating individual responses. 
However, Harre does not propose that analysis be restricted to collective groups, 
though for taxonomic groups it is necessary to consider how public practices are 
linked to social representations. To do this Harre defines the collective aspects of a 
practice as its `cognitive content' which may be determined by its effect. However, 
this cognitive content is a collective phenomenon and so cannot simply be distributed 
amongst individuals. The cognitive content is actually a feature of the belief systems of 
the investigators, though it may be ascribed to the collectivity as though to a supra- 
individual as a `useful fiction'. This is useful for explanatory purposes to relate the 
effects of a practice to a group. 
However, this cognitive content cannot simply be related to individuals. Harre argues 
that this is unlike the cognitive content ascribed to a collective group such as a team, 
where it is clear how members beliefs are connected. It is possible to relate a collective 
sense of representation to a group as though to a supra-individual. However it would 
not be legitimate to assume that such a representation is distributable and thus simply 
relatable to the mental processes of individual group members. Harre concludes that 
Social Representations are distributive rather than collective phenomena and thus 
represent a form of individualism similar to that found in the work of Tajfel. 
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The myth of the lonely paradigm: a reioinder; S. Moscovici (1984b) 
In his response to Harre, Moscovici takes the opportunity to provide a detailed 
description of SRT before explicitly engaging with Harre's arguments. This is perhaps 
understandable as the theory was still new to the English language social psychological 
literature. However, Moscovici does not provide a detailed examination of Harre's 
arguments. Moscovici appears to treat Harre's concerns about the feasibility of 
relating collective aspects of social phenomena to individual mental processes as 
primarily a methodological issue. 
Moscovici defends his use of taxonomic groups by arguing that "such aggregates exist 
and indicate a certain state of association and interaction amongst individuals" (1984b, 
p. 958). Dissemination of representations is epidemic, unlike in more homogenous, 
traditional societies where there was less differentiation and an individual could speak 
for a group. Moscovici states that there is a practical reason for using taxonomic 
groups, because the social representations studied have been social objects about 
which people have strong feelings. The study of taxonomic groups allows a more 
"objective stance" to be taken by not being concerned solely with a single structured 
group's own representation (1984b, p. 958). Moscovici points out that it is also 
possible to study the Social Representations of structured groups through the content 
analysis of their publications. Moscovici also argues that the villages that Jodolet 
(1983) observed constituted a structured group; thus Jodolet's study of representations 
of mental illness in farming communities dealt only with structured groups (Moscovici, 
1984b, p. 960-1). 
Moscovici argues that in his study of psychoanalysis, it was necessary to consider 
collective groups as well as distributive or taxonomic groups. To acknowledge how 
science is disseminated, it is necessary to understand the interiorisation process 
whereby for example, the concepts of psychoanalysis have "become part of everyone's 
mind" (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 960). Moscovici argues that it is necessary to understand 
the change in attitudes. 
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There is a flaw in Harre's argument that facilitates Moscovici claim that the issue is 
primarily a methodological concern. This is the distinction between collective and 
distributive groups. In his discussion, Harre states that the cognitive content of a 
practice may be ascribed to a group as'a useful fiction; for a collective group it is clear 
how members beliefs are related to the cognitive content, whereas for a distributive 
group it is not clear how members beliefs are connected. By considering Jodolet's 
groups as structured, or collective, Moscovici is able to preserve the notion that the 
`cognitive content' of practices was unproblematically related to the internal, mental 
mechanisms of the villagers. Thus the issue has become one to do with the 
identification of groups. Harre's argument that there are aspects of social phenomena 
that cannot easily be related to the internal, mental mechanisms of individuals may now 
be considered to be a methodological issue. This is because Harre himself argues that 
in principle social phenomena can be related to the mental mechanisms of individuals. 
However, there is an interpretative act on the part of the investigator when dealing 
with the collective group in the same way as that involved when ascribing a `useful 
fiction" to a group whether collective or distributive. This issue is part of a wider 
discussion relating to the observation of social phenomena which will be discussed 
more fully later. For the moment it is enough to note that this notion of the collective 
group (incorrectly) maintains the idea that it is possible, at least in some circumstances, 
to relate the collective aspects of social phenomena to internal mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, Moscovici does acknowledge the necessity of elaborating more clearly 
the mechanisms involved in the interiorisation process. It is in response to Harre's 
arguments that Moscovici first defends the lack of precision in the formulation of 
Social Representations by arguing that they are "all embracing and ill-defined, and are 
best grasped intuitively" (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 957). Moscovici makes similar 
entreaties throughout the Social Representation literature. 
Of more interest is an apparent shift by Moscovici concerning the relationship between 
the content and mechanisms of Social Representations. In his chapter in the Farr and 
Moscovici volume, Moscovici states, "We consider their content and refuse to 
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distinguish them from psychological mechanisms... after all how we think is not distinct 
from what we think. Thus we cannot make a clear distinction between the regularities 
in representations and those in the processes that locate them. " (Moscovici, 1984a, 
p. 66-7). 
However, in a section that appears earlier in the paper than the explicit consideration 
of Harre's arguments, Moscovici describes social representations thus, "Its 
predominant interest is in the contents of the "mind. " These contents make up the raw 
material of our thoughts and communications... It is only by taking a specific content in 
all its wealth of nuances as our starting point that we can hope to derive general 
principles or mechanisms" (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 946, emphases in original). 
This shift in emphasis is significant particularly in the context of subsequent 
amendments by Moscovici in the course of these initial critical exchanges. For the 
moment it appears that Moscovici acknowledges the need for conceptual elaboration in 
the face of Harre's critique. However, he is not unduly concerned; the ill-defined 
nature of social representations is only seen to be a temporary situation. Theoretical 
precision is considered to be forthcoming, an outcome of the accumulation of 
descriptive accounts from which general mechanisms will be derived. 
Some problems underlying the theory of social representations; J. Potter and I. 
Litton, (1985) 
Potter and Litton's paper of 1985 is extremely important to an understanding of the 
evolution of SRT. The main thrust of Potter and Litton's critique rests on the issue of 
consensus, or sharedness of social representations. They draw on a number of 
empirical studies of social representations to question the assumption of a common 
representation within a group. They contend that the intra-group similarity and inter- 
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group variation found in these studies may be an artefact of analytic procedures. They 
also argue that it is necessary to reconcile the context-specific nature of 
representations implied in the individuals' potential for transformation, with the notion 
of a common representation. 
Potter and Litton argue that in studies it is assumed that shared representations are 
necessary to establish group identity. However it is not clear that respondents actually 
identify with the analytic, group categories used by researchers. So, for example, in 
Hewstone et al's study (1982) it is not clear whether respondents are thinking of 
themselves in terms of the analytic categories "private schoolboy" or "comprehensive 
schoolboy". to which they are ascribed, when they are producing their responses. The 
more important, general point is that it should not be assumed that they are. 
Respondents could be thinking in terms of a grouping that cuts across that of the 
researcher, such as academically-oriented, or sports-oriented, perhaps. If this were to 
be the case, then it would not be expected that there would be a common 
representation within the category identified by the researcher as salient. It has to be 
clear that respondents identify with analytic, group categories. 
Potter and Litton point out that no attempt is made to investigate broader social 
divisions that may be relevant with regard to the representation. It is simply assumed 
that members of particular categories as defined by the researcher will hold a common 
representation. Potter and Litton correctly advise that satisfying one index of 
membership need not determine an individual's position on other indices. They argue 
that in the studies of Hewstone et al (1982), Herzlich (1973) and Di Giacomo (1980), 
no attempt was made to investigate intra-group differences. Furthermore, reported 
intra-group similarity may be an artefact of analytic procedures. Individual responses 
were simply aggregated within groups with no attempt made to examine the 
distribution of aspects of the common representation. 
This leads onto a more fundamental issue concerning the identification of social 
representations. Potter and Litton's argument that the observers' analytic categories 
are unproblematically applied is relevant not only to the assumption of consensus 
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across groups as already described, but more basically to the categorisation of 
responses from a single subject. Potter and Litton complain that researchers attempt 
to report "the" social representation of a particular group. However, this is at odds 
with contextual variation implied in the potential for individual transformation of Social 
Representations, a point at times stressed by Moscovici. With the potential for so 
much variability, it is not clear why a social representation should be assumed to be 
shared, nor what that sharedness would constitute. 
Potter and Litton provide empirical support for this concern through a detailed analysis 
of a number of research interviews (collected in the aftermath of a civil disturbance, in 
the St. Paul's area of Bristol. ) Potter and Litton argue that respondents can alter the 
meaning of particular words in the course of an interview and are quite capable of 
reporting a point of view that they may not necessarily hold. Potter and Litton make a 
distinction between the `Use' of a particular category by respondents when they act on 
the world, and `Mention' where they simply report a point of view. They also point 
out that a distinction may be made between `Use in general', where respondents may 
report a general view that they hold, and `Use in practice' which corresponds to a 
particular situation. 
The general point to be made is that individuals may be creative in their use of 
language. To assume that the meaning of words elicited from respondents corresponds 
to the meanings attributed by researchers is problematic. This is not just because 
researchers may simply fail to grasp the implications of a particular word, but because 
respondents themselves may alter the meanings of words as they use them. Potter and 
Litton speculate that this may not appear concerning if Social Representation are taken 
to be enduring group attributes, as is the case in the studies mentioned. They trace the 
problem to an unproblematic, neutral view of language whereby discourse is taken to 
correspond to some hypothetical internal state. Potter and Litton point out that the 
use of language is much more fluid and contingent. They argue that empirical studies 
of Social Representations cannot accommodate this context specificity. Thus, it is not 
legitimate to claim to report "the" social representation held by a particular individual 
or group. 
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Potter and Litton maintain that the identification of social representations is not 
unproblematic. It is not clear that the social representations identified by researchers 
correspond to the representations "held" by individuals and therefore any connection 
with internal mechanisms is compromised. Potter and Litton relate this problem to a 
fundamental flaw in the conceptualisation of social representations. They argue that 
context specificity is at times stressed by Moscovici, such as when talking of the 
transformation that individuals make to Social Representations, yet at other times is 
dismissed, such as when talking of "consensual universes". No means is provided for 
reconciling these two opposing concerns. 
Potter and Litton conclude by stating that to study the transformative capabilities of 
individuals, it is better to dispense with the notion of social representation altogether 
and study "linguistic repertoires". A linguistic repertoire is a recurrently used system 
of terms. Research would be oriented toward the use of different linguistic repertoires 
in functionally different situations. These regular features could then be related to 
individuals' understanding of a situation. For Potter and Litton, the concept of 
linguistic repertoires offers a number of advantages over that of social representations. 
Potter and Litton argue that by restricting analysis to identifiable features of discourse 
rather than involving hypothetical internal mechanisms, it is possible to both analyse 
data without presupposing the nature of groups or the relationship between groups, 
and to draw a clear distinction between a linguistic repertoire and its uses. Potter and 
Litton maintain that this is necessary to account for context specificity: there is not 
necessarily an identity between social representation and social categorisation. 
The `phenomenon of social representation': a comment on Potter and Litton; G. 
Semin (1985) 
Semin (1985) is broadly in agreement with Potter and Litton regarding the deficiencies 
in the conceptualisation of social representations. Semin argues that the major 
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problem is the assumption of consensus or sharedness: although Moscovici may wish 
to shift the level of analysis from the individual to the social, the processes he outlines, 
anchoring and objectification, are not consistent with that aim. Semin states that there 
is no "conceptual armoury" to link the "contents of society" to social psychological 
mechanisms (1985, p. 93). This is a similar point to that made by Harre, that social 
representations do not provide a means for relating the collective aspects of social 
phenomena to internal mechanisms. Semin states that what is required is a 
".. conceptualization of joint symbolic interaction, namely the co-ordination of social 
action through reference to pre-established symbolic media and the dialectic that is 
involved in their reproduction and transformation. " (Semin, 1985, p. 93). 
Simply stated, Semin is arguing that social representations do not adequately 
conceptualise the relationship between the individual (through the co-ordination of 
social action) and social phenomena. Semin further states that this is because the 
conceptual elaboration required to shift analysis to the collective is such a major 
undertaking. 
However, Semin argues that Potter and Litton's linguistic repertoires do not represent 
an advance in terms of explicating the dynamic relationship between the individual and 
the social. Semin concludes that increased indexicality does not provide a solution; 
there is a need for conceptual elaboration, not simply descriptive elaboration. 
Linguistic repertoires do not provide a means for understanding the dynamics of 
collective beliefs. 
Semin argues that the processes of social representation are conceived in terms of 
information processing. Thus, though they appear ambiguous with respect to the level 
at which they may be interpreted, social representations simply represent another 
version of methodological individualism whereby "collective" phenomena are actually 
aggregated individual phenomena. This is due to the failure to link convincingly the 
contents and mechanisms of social representation. Semin concludes that social 
representations do not constitute a departure, either empirically or conceptually from 
mainstream social psychology. 
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Comment on Potter and Litton: S. Moscovici (1985 
Moscovici's response to these criticisms is distinctive in the context of these debates in 
that it is by far the most brief, taking up only two pages. It is clear that some degree of 
reformulation will be necessary to deal with the criticisms levelled at social 
representations. Moscovici acknowledges the notion of levels of consensus via the 
figurative nucleus of a representation, though again provides little in the way of 
theoretical precision. However, of more interest are a number of revisions that 
Moscovici makes. These are made with little acknowledgement of their relation to 
statements Moscovici had previously made. Nevertheless they are of great importance 
to an understanding of the evolution of social representations. The first concerns the 
relationship between images and language, the second the relationship between 
contents and processes. 
Moscovici again defends the vagueness of his formulation by arguing that the 
alternative would be the `unrelated, lonely paradigms" that characterise social 
psychology. He berates Potter and Litton for being overly concerned with control and 
replication, reiterating his expectation of clarity and precision as an outcome. In 
response to Potter and Litton's notion of linguistic repertoires Moscovici distinguishes 
between the figurative and abstract aspects of Social Representations. Moscovici 
stresses the importance of figurative aspects arguing that "sometimes images are 
thought of as reality" (1985, p. 91). Moscovici then suggests that each representation 
consists of a number of levels, at the centre of which is the figurative nucleus which 
consists of an image and some information. Moscovici further stresses the importance 
of figurative aspects by arguing that this nucleus can breed new meanings. Thus 
consensus is dynamic and holistic, and "there is not a precise consensus at each level. " 
(Moscovici, 1985, p. 92). 
Moscovici argues that Potter and Litton's proposal to restrict analysis to discourse is 
unacceptable as "all that is image does not pass into language" (Moscovici, 1985, 
p. 92) . This is slightly at odds with an earlier assertion concerning social 
representation, that "They have two facets, iconic and symbolic... . In this way every 
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image is equated with an idea and vice versa. " (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 17). This is not a 
direct contradiction, as equating an image with an idea does not imply an identity 
between image and idea. In fact to argue that, would be to collapse any distinction 
between iconic and symbolic aspects. However now Moscovici moves from a position 
where image and idea were unproblematically related to one where it is now necessary 
to provide more detail of the relationship, for example how adequately language 
captures the image with regard to a particular Social Representation. In effect, there 
are another set of processes to explain. 
A more significant revision is that concerning the relationship between contents and 
processes. This amounts to outright contradiction. Consider the progression in 
Moscovici's account of this relationship as he describes social representations: 
"We consider their content and refuse to distinguish them from psychological 
mechanisms.... After all, how we think is not distinct from what we think. Thus we 
cannot make a clear distinction between the regularities in representations and those in 
the processes that locate them. " (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 66-7, my emphases. ) 
"Its predominant interest is in the contents of the "mind". These contents make up the 
raw material of our thoughts and communications... . It 
is only by taking a specific 
content in all its wealth of nuances as our starting point that we can hope to derive 
general principles or mechanisms" (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 946, emphases in original). 
"... the content of thinking and talking matters less than the formal aspects of thought 
and language. " (Moscovici, 1985, p. 91. My emphases. ) 
This contradiction is explicable given the contexts in which the statements were made. 
As described earlier, Harre questioned the feasibility of explaining the collective 
aspects of social phenomena in terms of individual psychological mechanisms. 
However, Moscovici wished to maintain that the dissemination of representations 
could be understood through the interiorisation process; indeed if this were not the 
case then Social Representation would appear to have little to offer. However, it was 
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clear that Moscovici had no resources available for improving his explanation of the 
process. Thus he claimed that the predominant interest is in the contents of the mind. 
Moscovici proposed that explication of the processes, the formal elements, would be 
forthcoming through the accumulation of descriptive accounts, or the contents of 
social representations (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 946) 1. This amounts to an admission that 
his earlier position (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 66-7) at the very least required modification, 
though no acknowledgement is made of this, or of the implications of this modification 
for Moscovici's explanation of processes. 
Having then claimed that theoretical precision would be achieved through the 
accumulation of contents, Potter and Litton's critique emphasising the problematic 
nature of accumulating contents must have appeared particularly unwelcome. From an 
initial claim that content and processes could not be separated, social representations 
were shown by Harre to require more explanation of processes. This was 
acknowledged and further refinement of processes was expected through the 
accumulation of contents. However, Potter and Litton now show through their 
critique of consensus that further explanation of contents is also required. This is 
extremely problematic. In its first real exposure to critical debate, Moscovici 
theoretical claims regarding both the contents and the processes of social 
representation have each separately been shown to be inadequate. 
Moscovici responds by directly contradicting his earlier statement (Moscovici, 1984b, 
p. 946). Potter and Litton had questioned the contents of social representation, so 
Moscovici claimed that contents are of less importance than formal elements. In the 
same way, when Harre had earlier questioned the formal elements of social 
representation, Moscovici had claimed that the predominant interests were in contents. 
' This may also have been the basis for Moscovici's assertion that social representations were best 
grasped intuitively. Moscovici may have been guarding against an over-hasty rejection of social 
representations on the basis of their ill-defined nature, by arguing that theoretical precision would be 
achieved via the accumulation of contents. (Moscovici claimed that a general theory required an 
accumulation of facts, and that all the sciences that had followed this procedure had progressed. 
(1984b, p. 955). 
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However, by claiming in his response to Potter and Litton that contents were less 
important than formal elements, Moscovici implies that explanations of the formal 
elements are adequate. This, together with an acceptance of theoretical vagueness 
means that there are effectively no means for assessing the adequacy of theoretical 
formulations, as Potter and Litton rightly point out in a final rejoinder. 
As Semin states Moscovici lacks the conceptual apparatus to link the contents and 
processes of Social Representation. The problem of assuming consensus is a direct 
consequence of this and is not dealt with. Attention may have been deflected by 
Moscovici attacking the concept of linguistic repertoires. Nevertheless, Moscovici's 
reassertion of figurative aspects and his claim that consensus is dynamic and holistic, 
must both be seen as an interim measures. More precise formulations of both the 
contents and the processes of social representation are still necessary. 
`Social representations': social psvcholoev's (mis)use of sociology; 1. Parker 
1987 
Parker (1987) is in general agreement with Potter and Litton (1985) and Semin (1985). 
Parker argues that the central confusion in the conceptualisation of social 
representations concerns the role of the individual. SRT seeks to elaborate the 
"individual side of research" as a complement to the "social, `symbolic' side. " (Parker, 
1987, p. 449). However, Parker contends that Moscovici's (1985) emphasis on the 
formal aspects of thought and language rather than contents (described earlier) serves 
to endorse a reductionism, whereby the symbolic realm is reduced to individual 
processes. Parker continues that SRT does not challenge the positivism and 
individualism present in mainstream social psychology. As such, Parker concludes that 
SRT is destined to become another "lonely paradigm" (1987, p. 464). 
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Parker points out similarities in the works of both Durkheim and Weber to Moscovici's 
conceptualisation of social representations. Although it is Durkheim's work that is 
more generally associated with the social representations literature, this is in role of 
foil, to demonstrate the distinctiveness and superiority of social representations. For 
example, Durkheimian collective representations are seen to imply an aggregating, 
external force whereas individual transformation is seen as an important aspect of 
Social Representations. Parker argues that although Durkheim has loomed 
progressively larger in the Social Representations literature, Weber's emphasis on 
subjective meaning is also highly relevant to social representations. 
Parker contrasts the relationship between the individual and society as theorised by 
Durkheim and Weber. For Durkheim modern society represents an "organic 
solidarity" comprising different roles and categories. As society becomes more 
differentiated, there is more scope for individual variation and therefore freedom. 
Weber described modern society in terms of "reification", whereby human behaviour 
became more "mechanised" as bureaucratisation increased, as "the social world 
became less transparent, less open to undistorted communication. " ( Parker, 1987, 
p. 456). Whereas for Durkheim the situation is seen as positive, leading to the 
promotion of the individual, for Weber it is seen as negative, leading to the 
impoverishment of the individual. 
Moscovici's corresponding treatment of the relation between the individual and society 
is described in his distinction between the consensual and the reified realms, which 
Parker argues plays a crucial role in SRT. Both Durkheim's and Weber's positions 
described above, correspond to Moscovici's reified realm, though Moscovici appears 
to show more agreement with Weber. For Moscovici, the perils of reification can be 
resisted through the consensual universe: "we always strike a blow against `reification' 
when we converse. " (Parker, 1987, p. 456). However, the role of the individual 
implicit in this, is one of autonomy, acting against the "social", separate from society. 
Parker argues that the thrust of SRT, particularly the reified / consensual distinction, 
separates the outer world from the inner world of the individual. When a person draws 
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upon a social representation, they depart from the consensus and give an idiosyncratic 
twist to the public, shared knowledge. And it is the cognitive process of re- 
presentation that makes social representations possible. Individual representations are 
projected into the "Weberian", autonomous individual. Thus, Parker argues, the 
subject in SRT is understood as an object operating (social) cognitions. 
It is this notion that internal representations have a social nature that allows SRT to be 
conceived in terms of individual information processing and thus incorporated into a 
social cognition framework. Parker refers to this as a conceptual "sleight of hand" 
whereby rather than emphasising the social world, the focus is on the individual 
(Parker, 1987, p. 461). As Harre argued, collective, shared phenomena are assumed to 
be distributed amongst individuals. In effect, the symbolic level is seen as a simple 
addition to cognitive processes. 
Thus even though SRT claims to embrace both the social, symbolic level and the 
individual cognitive level, Parker argues that one is forced to choose between the two 
levels of explanation. Thus Parker distinguishes between "strong" and "weak" forms 
of SRT. The strong form is presented by Moscovici in his "lengthy manifesto" and his 
defence against Harre (Moscovici, 1984a, 1984b). Parker argues that here, "thinking 
is public and the emphasis is on versions of theories present in discourse which 
circulate, merge and transform each other regardless of individual action. " The weak 
form emphasises individual processes. Parker argues that here, social representations 
"slide from what Harre (1984) terms the `collective plurality' of social knowledge to a 
`distributive plurality' ": the representation is to be found in the head of the individual 
(Parker, 1987, p. 462). This makes the representation amenable to individualistic 
methods. 
Parker also notes the implications of the acknowledgement by Moscovici of levels of 
consensus (Moscovici, 1985, p. 92). Parker argues that the possibility of alternative 
versions casts doubt upon the validity of the dominant account, and thus leads to the 
notion of consensus eventually breaking down. However, researchers working in the 
weak form of the theory are insulated from this consideration by their distributive 
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understanding of social phenomena, consensus is seen as a property of the individual 
representations. Thus, they are more likely to treat it as a primarily methodological 
problem. Parker argues that the notion of consensus will continue to be applied by 
"weak form" researchers, where it may have the consequence of ruling out different, 
contradictory explanations of reality. 
Parker argues that research is more often conducted using the weak form of the 
theory. Parker also notes that this view is the one supported by Moscovici as seen in 
his then most recent statement emphasising "formal aspects" rather than "content" 
(Moscovici, 1985, p. 91). Thus, rather than marking a radical departure from 
mainstream approaches in social psychology such as attribution theory, or intergroup 
relations, SRT can be integrated within them. Parker concludes that this is why the 
theory is set to become `yet another `topic' in the discipline's "archipelago of lonely 
paradigms" (Moscovici, 1985, p. 91)" (Parker, 1987, p. 464). 
Social representations: a conceptual critique; A. McKinlay and J. Potter (1987) 
McKinlay and Potter (1987) provide a further, well-reasoned account of the 
ambiguities and contradictions involved in SRT. McKinlay and Potter's arguments 
derive from the apparently simple assertion from Moscovici that we can experience the 
world only through social representations (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 36). McKinlay and 
Potter's arguments draw out important implications from this claim that show a 
number of aspects of SRT to be problematic. These include the distinction between 
scientific knowledge and social representations, the distinction between the reified and 
consensual realms, the perception of the unfamiliar, and the relationship between the 
prescriptive and dynamic aspects of social representations. McKinlay and Potter also 
argue that these conceptual confusions can lead to a cognitive reductionism and "the 
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institutionalisation of a research tradition which produces findings whose status cannot 
be properly assessed. " (1987, p. 484). 
McKinlay and Potter describe Moscovici's various claims that social representations 
constitute reality, for example, "a representation constitutes a social reality sui 
generis" (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 12). In explaining the importance of studying social 
representations, Moscovici claims that we experience the world only through social 
representations. McKinlay and Potter argue that Moscovici does not deny a world 
beyond social representations, but this world does not directly enter into social 
relations. McKinlay and Potter rightly point out that this reality can have no content 
since we have no means to access it other than through representations. Indeed there 
should be little reason to make reference to this extra-representational reality. 
However, this is repeatedly done, resulting in considerable confusion and 
contradiction. 
Moscovici describes social representations at times as being both a veridical and an 
illusory experience (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 38). However, if all experience is mediated 
through representations, it is not clear how to differentiate between the veridical and 
the illusory. McKinlay and Potter point out that on occasion Moscovici proposes 
science as a means to differentiate. Science is seen as the standard of correctness, as 
expressing pure facts. This though carries the implication that the correctness of social 
representations would reduce to whether or not it accurately reflected objective, 
scientific knowledge. McKinlay and Potter argue that the essence of social 
representations is a rejection of any notion that social life may be fully explained by 
reference to neutral, factual information; a rejection explicitly endorsed by Moscovici 
(1984a, p. 4). In effect there are no means within the theory for ascertaining which 
social representations are "right", or veridical, from those that are `wrong", or 
illusory. 
The claim that we can experience the world only through social representations also 
has important implications for the status of science. Moscovici himself has described 
science as a form of interaction, prey to the influence of history (Moscovici, 1984a, 
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p. 28). However, if scientists must rely on social representations in the same way as 
anyone else, then science is not distinct from social representations. For the individual, 
whether layman or scientist, there are only social representations. The notion that 
science provides "pure facts" cannot be sustained. Thus the distinction between the 
reified and the consensual realms breaks down. This distinction is based upon the 
differentiation between knowledge based on social representations, the consensual 
realm, and knowledge based on non-social, objective knowledge, the reified realm. 
This must be seen as a direct implication of all experience being mediated through 
social representations. 
McKinlay and Potter also examine implications relating to the processes of social 
representation. Anchoring involves unfamiliar objects being "anchored" to existing 
social representations. However, given that all thought and perception is based on 
social representations, McKinlay and Potter argue that this would rule out a cognitive 
or perceptual process. It is not clear how anchoring operates, if not by a process of 
pre-social perception. If recourse is made to cognitive processes, given that anchoring 
is an essential element of social life, Moscovici must explain more clearly why social 
cognitions cannot be understood solely in terms of non-social processes. 
McKinlay and Potter sum up their arguments thus far: "if it is a necessary feature of 
Moscovici's theory that some people (scientists) often experience the world 
independently of social representations, and most people sometimes experience the 
world independently of social representations (in taking hold of the unfamiliar), then 
why should social scientists accept Moscovici's claim that talk of phenomena such as 
opinions and attitudes should be supplanted by talk of entities - social representations - 
which are in some way essentially social? " (McKinlay and Potter, 1987, p. 482). 
McKinlay and Potter argue that it is a consequence of these confusions regarding the 
processes of social representation, and the reified and consensual distinction, that these 
aspects, despite being central to SRT, rarely feature strongly in empirical research. 
Moscovici's ideas are used selectively, a practice aided by Moscovici's defence of 
vagueness as a virtue. McKinlay and Potter argue that there is a danger that this 
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conceptual confusion will lead to the institutionalisation of a research tradition whose 
findings cannot properly be assessed. 
McKinlay and Potter conclude by pointing out a further confusion in SRT. At times 
Moscovici describes social representations as strongly prescriptive. For example 
Moscovici claims that social representations "impose themselves upon us with an 
irresistible force" in such a way that "nobody's mind is free from the effects of the 
prior conditioning which is imposed by his representations. " (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 10). 
However, Moscovici also claims that social representations are both changeable and 
open to individual influence. In the first claim, individuals are determined by their 
representations, there is no scope for individual influence; in the second they are full 
participants in the production of representations, yet there is no notion of prescription 
or constraint, the individual is free to produce whatever representations they wish. 
Moscovici does he provide any guidance for choosing between these two contrasting 
aspects of representation, nor any means for assessing the extent of each. Indeed, 
Moscovici doesn't appear aware of the contradiction. 
To conclude, McKinlay and Potter point out a number of conceptual confusions 
inherent in SRT. As a result of these, the status of social representations is uncertain. 
Also, the status of empirical findings based on a theory containing such fundamental 
contradictions is similarly uncertain. 
Answers and questions; S. Moscovici. (1987) 
Moscovici (1987) provides only the briefest considerations to the criticisms of Parker 
and McKinlay and Potter. Moscovici only refers to small aspects of each critique, 
preferring to provide further vague defences of SRT. In response to Parker, 
Moscovici states that he is flattered by the comparison with Weber. However, 
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Moscovici dismisses the main body of Parker's arguments, that SRT does not 
represent an alternative to the dominant paradigm in social psychology, by simply 
stating that SRT is too metaphysical to be accepted as the dominant paradigm. He 
continues that if the individualistic mainstream were capable of accepting a more social 
framework they would have done so sooner with respect to dissonance theory. 
Moscovici also argues that the theory is not individualistic since all individual 
processes are bound up with the social; indeed, the notions of "individual" and 
"individualistic" are themselves social representations. Moscovici then goes on to 
describe different representations of the individual and to speculate on the historical 
periods that generated them. 
However, Moscovici does state that social representations are collective phenomena 
with common features of no single individual. This indicates at least an awareness of 
charges of methodological individualism: Moscovici is arguing that social 
representations are not reducible to individual representations. However, he provides 
no adequate means for relating these "collective phenomena" to individual processes. 
Thus the thrust of Parker's arguments, as to why SRT represents another form of 
methodological individualism, are ignored. 
Similarly in the case of McKinlay and Potter, Moscovici describes their argument thus, 
"that we can dispense with social representations if we accept the existence of the 
"non-familiar. " " (Moscovici, 1987, p. 519). The issue of the `unfamiliar' is then dealt 
with by Moscovici describing the unfamiliar as something that is not entirely unknown, 
but as having only some unfamiliar feature. The refied / consensual distinction is 
defended on the grounds that it prevents social psychology being exclusively focused 
on interpersonal relations. (Moscovici, 1987, p. 520). The issue of prescription, or 
social constraint, is also hardly considered. Moscovici states that social 
representations are concerned with exchange rather than coercion, the latter being a 
feature of collective representations rather than social representations. 
Moscovici does go on to describe a new means to distinguish social representations 
from science, that of "fiduciary" versus "legalistic" truth: ".. social representations have 
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a fiduciary truth value which manifests our mutual trust in terms both of information 
content and of judgements. This type of truth is diametrically opposite to the legalistic 
truth of science, which keeps asking for proof and replications and which has more 
confidence in rules than in people. " (Moscovici, 1987, p. 518, emphases in original). 
Moscovici then goes on to speculate that this may be why social representations are 
more difficult to change, are biased toward verification and impervious to falsification. 
However Moscovici makes no attempt to respond to the conceptual confusion 
surrounding the assertion that all experience is mediated through social 
representations, the main thrust of McKinlay and Potter's argument. 
Both Parker's and McKinlay and Potter's papers are well-argued and indicate severe 
problems in the formulation of SRT. However, while Parker notes the links between 
Moscovici and Weber, he fails to emphasise problems with the Durkheimian 
formulation that are shared by Moscovici. For example, Parker indicates Moscovici's 
desire for a more "Weberian" concern for social understanding. This is in opposition 
to Durkheim's more constraining notion of collective representations. However, 
Parker does not mention Moscovici's description of social representations as 
"imposing themselves with an irresistible force". This is certainly similar to 
Durkheim's notions, as pointed out by McKinlay and Potter. Also, Parker does not 
note the paradox in his presentation of Durkheim, whereby under conditions of organic 
solidarity there is more scope for individual expression, yet at the same time the 
individual must face the "entirely constraining" force of representations. In brief, 
Parker does not consider that Moscovici's presentation of Durkheim is inaccurate and 
mis-leading; and is an attempt to argue for the distinctiveness of social representations, 
that cannot be sustained. 
Also, while Parker notes the important implications that an acceptance of levels of 
consensus entails, he does not relate this acceptance to Moscovici's reversal in his 
concern for form rather than contents. That the "dominant account" may be called into 
question, as noted by Parker, is extremely important. It raises the whole issue of how 
social representations may be said to be identified. Parker fails to state that the 
breakdown of consensus shows the issue of identification of representations to be a 
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fundamentally theoretical issue, not simply a methodological concern. Parker's 
apparent support for the claim that social representations can exist independently of 
individuals is a consequence of a failure to deal effectively with the issue. This issue 
concerns the logical status of social representations and will be examined in more detail 
later. 
McKinlay and Potter also present their arguments well. Their pursuit of the 
implications of an apparently simple assertion, that all experience is mediated through 
social representations, is particularly well argued. However, while McKinlay and 
Potter note that aspects of SRT are used very selectively in empirical research, they do 
not link the conceptual confusions with the possibility of cognitive reductionism, as 
Parker does to great effect. Also, McKinlay and Potter do note the inconsistency 
between the prescriptive "irresistible force" and the emphasis on transformation. 
However, they do not recognise this issue, concerning the nature of social constraint, 
as central to any understanding of social representations influencing behaviour in any 
way. This may have been because the issue of social constraint is also unresolved in 
the discourse analytic approach favoured by McKinlay and Potter, thus they may have 
been less disposed to draw attention toward it. 
Moscovici responses to the critiques of Parker and McKinlay and Potter cannot be 
seen as adequate. Moscovici only mentions brief aspects of each critique in isolation, 
yet still fails to provide a rigorous response. His introduction of another means of 
marking the distinctiveness of social representations, that of fiduciary and legalistic 
truth, is no less vague and speculative than his previous arguments. It appears that 
Moscovici has yet to provide the theoretical precision expected in previous papers. 
Moscovici's means of dealing with criticism, by either ignoring it or dealing with it in 
an extremely selective manner, has little to commend it theoretically. However, it is 
effective in buying Moscovici time to prepare a more rigorous formulation of SRT 
with which to answer criticisms. 
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Critical notes and reflections on `social representation'; G. Jahoda (1988) 
Jahoda (1988) provides a comprehensive examination of SRT. Jahoda makes 
extensive use of direct quotation to identify internal inconsistencies and doubts 
concerning the logical status of social representations. Jahoda's arguments offer 
another perspective on problems raised in some form in critiques already discussed, 
particularly those of Parker (1987) and McKinlay and Potter (1987). 
The inconsistencies Jahoda identifies include the description of social representations 
as having both a restricted scope and being all-embracing, and as being prescriptive yet 
also emphasising the active role of individuals. The doubts concern the distinctiveness 
of social representations, both logically and through the failure to identify distinct 
processes. This is reflected in contradictions concerning the relationship of social 
representations to a number of phenomena, including ideology, culture and science; 
and the nature of both individual processes and empirical work. Jahoda concludes that 
SRT should either drop its many unsubstantiated claims and continue as a more generic 
label for a wide variety of social psychological work, or undergo intensive 
reformulation in an effort toward theoretical precision. 
Prescriptive and transformative aspects. 
Jahoda describes the contradiction apparent in the description of social representations 
as strongly prescriptive, while at other times emphasising the active involvement of 
individuals. Moscovici argues that social representations "impose themselves upon us 
with an irresistible force" (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 9), yet also that "individuals, far from 
being passive receptors, think for themselves, produce and ceasely communicate their 
own specific representations.. " (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 16). Jahoda describes this as the 
problem of reflexivity, of how one is able to evade the "irresistible force". Moscovici 
only acknowledgement of this problem is to simply state that "We may, with effort, 
become aware of some of the conventional aspects of reality, and thus evade some of 
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the constraints... " (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 8). However, Moscovici does not elaborate 
on what this "effort" would entail. This leads Jahoda to argue that through this 
determination of individual thought Moscovici is, perhaps inadvertently, resurrecting a 
notion of "group mind" 2. Indeed Moscovici does describe social representations as 
being autonomous, leading and active and independent existence, thus reinforcing the 
notion of an `irresistible force'. (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 13). 
Durkheim. 
Jahoda identifies problems concerning the distinctions Moscovici draws between social 
representations and Durkheim's collective representations. Moscovici argues that 
Durkheim's notion was too global, embracing every kind of intellectual form, whereas 
social representations have a more restricted scope. Yet Moscovici also argues that 
social representations are all-embracing, for example: "every kind of cognition, to be 
communicable, must be converted into a social representation. " (Moscovici, 1983, 
p. 7). Also, Moscovici complains that Durkheim treats representations as irreducible, 
explanatory devices whereas it is the job of the social psychologist to penetrate the 
structure and dynamics of social representations (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 16). However, 
Jahoda points out that later in the same chapter Moscovici categorically states: "as far 
as social psychology is concerned, social representations are independent variables, 
explanatory stimuli" (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 61. emphases in original). Jahoda does not 
go into detail about the implications of these apparent contradictions for SRT, 
2 Also, Jahoda argues "group mind" is present in the notion of the consensual realm: "In the 
consensual universe, society is a visible, continuous creation, permeated with meaning and purpose, 
possessing a human voice, in accord with human existence and both acting and reacting like a human 
being. " (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 20). Jahoda argues that here, society is treated as a reification. Jahoda 
wishes to know how to identity the "voice of society". Also, given that social representations are not 
uniform but vary across social groups, Jahoda asks what the relationship between social 
representations and this voice is (Jahoda, 1988, p. 198). 
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preferring to simply describe them as the first of a series of problems concerning the 
logical status of social representations. 
The distinctiveness of social representations. 
Jahoda notes that the unwillingness of Moscovici to provide a formal definition of 
social representations is not, in itself, problematic. However, to examine the nature of 
social representations Jahoda considers the relationship of social representations to 
ideology and culture, which is problematic. When considering the influence of the 
media in his study of psychoanalysis, Moscovici describes three phases: the scientific 
phase, which refers to a new theory; the representational phase, which involves the 
diffusion throughout society and the creation of social representations; and the 
ideological phase wherein the representation is appropriated by some social group or 
institution and "is logically reconstructed so that a product created by the society as a 
whole, can be enforced in the name of science. Thus every ideology has two elements: 
a content, derived from below, and a form from above that gives common sense a 
scientific aura. " (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 58). 
On the basis of this passage, Jahoda argues there appears to be an "extensive overlap" 
between the meanings of "social representation", "common sense" and "ideology"; and 
a distinction between them and "science". 
This is in contrast to a passage earlier in the same chapter where Moscovici states: "At 
the same time we see more clearly the true nature of ideologies which is to facilitate 
the transition from the one world to the other, that is to cast consensual into reified 
categories and to subordinate the former to the latter. Hence, they have no specific 
structure and can be perceived either as representations, or as sciences" (Moscovici, 
1984a, p. 23). 
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Jahoda argues that in this passage there does not appear to be the sharp distinction 
between social representations and ideology on the one hand, and science on the other, 
as was evident in the previous passage. 
It appears that Jahoda is arguing that when describing the relationship in the more 
abstract terms of the reified and the consensual, ideologies have a non-specific status; 
whereas when seeking to explain a specific case, such as psychoanalysis the distinction 
from science is emphasised. Jahoda points out that in a later paper (Moscovici's 
response to Harre, 1984b), the transition of Marxism from social scientific theory to 
social representation is described, yet no mention is made of ideology. Jahoda argues 
that this is because Marxism could not be made to fit into the sequence of scientific to 
representational to ideological, i. e. that Marxism was not held by everyone and then 
appropriated by groups who called themselves Marxists. 
Jahoda also notes that Moscovici treats culture as an active agent separate from social 
representations, such as when stating that our thinking is organised "both by our social 
representations and our culture. " (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 8). Jahoda argues that culture 
cannot be distinct from social representations, as shared representations would appear 
to be a central aspect of culture. If they are distinct, Jahoda states that a more explicit 
analysis of the relationship between the two is required. 
The distinctiveness of social representational processes. 
Concepts and percepts 
Moscovici describes social representations as occupying ".. a curious position, 
somewhere between concepts... and percepts.. " (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 17). However, 
Jahoda argues, if concepts are likely to be based on folk theories taken over from the 
social environment, they are effectively social representations. Thus, the relationship 
with percepts is unexplained. Jahoda argues that in actual functioning, the heuristic 
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separation of concepts and percepts becomes blurred, thus all perceptual-cognitive 
functioning becomes equated with social representation. For example, while 
discussing anchoring, Moscovici points out that classification and category systems 
presuppose some theory (1984a, p. 31). However, in the absence of a clear explanation 
of the relationship between concepts and percepts, this can lead to a position where 
anchoring is seen to be based on pre-theoretical perceptions which are then compared 
to social representations. It is not clear that percepts can be separated from concepts 
with regard to social objects. 
Iconic and symbolic aspects 
Jahoda also takes issue with Moscovici's description of the symbolic and iconic aspects 
of social representations. When Moscovici argues that every image is equated with an 
idea and vice versa, he states: "Thus in our society, a "neurotic" is an idea associated 
with psychoanalysis, with Freud, with the Oedipus complex and, at the same time, we 
see the neurotic as an egocentric, pathological individual, whose parental conflicts have 
not yet been resolved. So on the one hand, the work evokes a science, even the name 
of the classical hero, and a concept and, on the other, it evokes a definite type, 
characterised by certain features, and a readily imagined biography. " (Moscovici, 
1984a, p. 17). 
Jahoda questions this assumed co-prescence between the iconic and symbolic. He 
argues that it would not be clear how this assumption would relate to abstract concepts 
such as democracy. Thus while one may associate a certain image with a particular 
aspect of democracy, it is unlikely that any image could cover all aspects. Thus 
Jahoda's argues against the assumption of any discrete relationship between an image 
and an idea. This leads on to Jahodas complaint regarding the weakness of the 
hypothetical example, noting that it is quite simple to reverse the relationship between 
the two components; thus the clear image may be of Freud, and the neurotic may be 
seen as an abstract type. It is not clear which aspect will be represented in image or 
concept and each component may have particular connections to other images or 
concepts. 
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Jahoda reminds us that Moscovici claims there are distinct forms of mental functioning 
associated with social representations, as opposed to those involved in scientific 
theorising and logical reasoning. However, this statement is proposed without detailed 
justification. For example, reasoning by analogy, a fundamental aspect of the 
familiarisation process and therefore of social representations in general, is a pervasive 
feature of all thought, including scientific thought. There is no reason why it should 
constitute a distinct form of mental functioning when applied to social representations. 
Also Jahoda notes, there is no reference by Moscovici to contemporary debates by 
philosophers and sociologists of science as to whether "scientific thought" could be 
considered distinct from other types of thought. Jahoda argues that the problem is that 
Moscovici makes sweeping statements about psychological processes without clearly 
considering the implications and without providing supporting evidence. In effect, 
Jahoda is agreeing with Semin (1985) that Moscovici may claim that he wishes to 
avoid a cognitive reductionism, yet his concepts are founded on cognitive processes. 
Jahoda draws a comparison between social representations and "folk models" in 
anthropology. He argues that discussion of `folk models" is carried out without any 
claims concerning distinctive psychological processes, and wonders whether such 
claims needs to be retained in SRT. 
The unfamiliar and the familiar 
Jahoda also takes issue with the nature of social representational processes. Jahoda 
questions Moscovici's assertion that the unfamiliar is threatening and so is made 
familiar to reduce the threat. Jahoda suggests that the unfamiliar may be actively 
sought out, perhaps motivated out of curiosity or an attraction to novelty, or the 
unfamiliar may simply be ignored. Jahoda argues that the assumption of a motivational 
basis for the transformation of the "strange" into social representations is 
unsubstantiated; when Moscovici talks of "anchoring", he essentially means naming 
and classification. 
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Jahoda also takes issue with Moscovici's claim that unlike the theories of predecessors 
such as Berger and Luckman (1976), SRT has been tested. Jahoda considers the 
notion of social representation as a means of making the unfamiliar familiar. Thus in 
Moscovici's study of psychoanalysis, it should be expected that those who know little 
about psychoanalysis will make the comparison with the presumably more familiar 
Catholic confession, and so render the unfamiliar familiar. However, Jahoda finds that 
of one consults the original source, it is those who are best informed about 
psychoanalysis who most frequently make the religious comparison. Indeed, Jahoda 
notes that the religious comparison is most often made by sophisticated writers on 
psychoanalysis. Thus the evidence does not provide support for Moscovici's claims. 
Jahoda provides a further example concerning familiarisation. Moscovici (1984a, 
p. 27), describes in Jodolet's study how the "mentally handicapped" people "continued 
to be seen as alien despite the fact that their presence had been accepted for many, 
many years.. ". Thus Moscovici argues that the representations held by the villagers of 
the "mentally handicapped" derived from traditional views and notions; the tension 
between the familiar and the unfamiliar was settled, "as is always the case in the 
consensual universe, in favour of the familiar" (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 27). As Jahoda 
points out, this could actually be understood as a contradiction of the familiarity thesis. 
Thus despite the long term familiarity of the "mentally handicapped", they continued to 
be seen as alien. If social representations continue to be based on traditional views and 
notions, it is unclear how familiarity is to proceed. 
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Reformulation 
Jahoda argues that due to a general vagueness and lack of precision concerning 
concepts and processes, empirical studies have no distinctively social representational 
input. Thus Jahoda states that regarding the Farr and Moscovici volume, it is the 
covers of the book which hold the studies together rather than any theoretical 
orientation; had they been reported without mention of social representations, there 
would have been little discernible difference (Jahoda, 1998, p. 204). Even studies 
formulated explicitly in terms of social representations provide little explanation for 
identifying their unit of analysis. Again, in Moscovici's study of psychoanalysis, 
Jahoda notes that numerous individual interviews are reported and discussed in terms 
of social representations. However, no attempt is made to explain why the term social 
representation is applied; it is simple taken as axiomatic. 
Jahoda concludes that reformulation of SRT is necessary, though specifies both "soft" 
and "hard" options. The soft option would be for the many unsubstantiated claims to 
be dropped and for social representations to be used heuristically as a generic label in 
social psychology, similar to the use of "developmental" in child psychology. To 
preserve a more distinctive conceptualisation would be the hard option, and would 
involve more explicit reformulation. Jahoda argues that the meaning of the term 
"social representation" requires more rigorous redefinition, to exclude some aspects 
and to determine its relationship to others, such as personal belief, science, religion, 
ideology and culture. With regard to processes, Jahoda argues that links with social 
cognition approaches should be formally recognised rather than attempting to 
circumscribe a distinctive domain. Finally, with regard to methodology, Jahoda warns 
against assuming that the genesis of social representations can be tracked, for example, 
simply on the basis of observing conversational social exchanges. Jahoda points out 
that conversations could not be observed extensively enough to account for influences 
from the structure of social relations between participants, such as age, power, prestige 
and culture. 
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Notes toward a description of social representations: S. Moscovici (1988 
There are a number of important aspects to both Jahoda's critique and Moscovici's 
response. Jahoda raises issues that have been identified in whole or in part in the 
earlier debates. These involve many aspects of social representations, including 
reconciling prescriptive and transformative aspects; relationships with science, 
ideology and culture; the nature of the processes, whether distinctive, and whether in 
fact constituting a form of individualism; and the non-distinctive nature of empirical 
research. However, Jahoda manages to bring together these many concerns in a single 
paper as well as providing his own particular perspective on these issues. 
Of more significance perhaps is that Moscovici produces a detailed response to 
Jahoda. This would appear to indicate that Moscovici has had time to reflect on the 
various criticisms levelled at SRT, as presented earlier, and has had the opportunity to 
re-evaluate aspects of his theory. As a result, Moscovici's response to Jahoda may be 
described as an attempt to reformulate the notion of social representations. It is 
important to consider Moscovici's response, in the context of both his own work and 
the critical examinations discussed previously. Thus it would appear reasonable to 
expect at least initial steps toward theoretical precision and conceptual clarification. 
However, the failure to deal effectively with Jahoda's critique indicates that Moscovici 
has a less than comprehensive grasp of the relevant issues. 
Detailed examination of Moscovici's attempt at reformulation is most easily achieved 
through extensive use of direct referencing; this allows for easy reference and enables 
further consideration of the more subtle implications öf elaboration§ or MY ndments 
made by Moscovici. 
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Prescriptive and transformative aspects of social representation. 
Jahoda notes Moscovici's failure to reconcile the "prescriptive" and 
"conventionalising" aspects of social representations. Moscovici acknowledges both 
aspects though affirms that the "guiding thread" in his research has been an interest in 
"change and creativity", or the conventionalising, transformative aspects (p. 223). 
Moscovici continues that there is no contradiction in the tendency to maintain and the 
tendency to create new things. Moscovici argues that "the two terms of the opposition 
can only be understood in relation to each other" (Moscovici, 1988, p. 223), and 
admonishes Jahoda for knowing better than to give "the impression that there is a 
simple solution to the tension between tradition and innovation" (p. 225). 
Thus it appears that Moscovici has dealt with Jahoda's argument. However, Jahoda's 
argument is not that social representations cannot possess each of the two aspects. On 
the contrary, Jahoda's argument is that Moscovici does not describe how one evades 
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the "irresistible force" of the prescriptive aspect. Jahoda refers to this as the issue of 
`reflexivity'. This concern was also raised by McKinlay and Potter (1987); similarly 
they were concerned with assessing the extent, not the existence, of each aspect. 
Moscovici's response to McKinlay and Potter was to simply re-emphasise the 
transformative aspect, hardly an adequate explanation. 
This issue of reflexivity concerns how aware one can be of both themselves and their 
conditions, and is of crucial importance when considering social representations. Its 
importance can perhaps be more readily appreciated by redescribing it more generically 
as involving the relationship between the "individual" and the "social", or the 
individual entity and the wider social reality, however conceived. This is an issue of 
fundamental concern within the social sciences. Theorisations of this relationship may 
briefly be described as ranging from the individual being entirely determined, as in 
more structurally-oriented approaches, to those where little attention is paid to social 
constraint such as in more action-oriented explanations (Giddens, 1992, p. 4). 
The relevance of this concern to social representations is apparent in its claim to 
overcome the dichotomy of the individual and the social by explicating social 
phenomena, the "contents" of social representations (whether referring to thoughts or 
behaviours), in terms of individual mental processes. Concern for the treatment of the 
relationship between the individual and the social in SRT has been readily expressed in 
each of the critical examinations described earlier, though most notably perhaps in the 
papers of Harre (1984), Semin (1985) and Parker (1987), and in Moscovici's response 
to each. 
Moscovici's detailed response to Jahoda indicates that Moscovici is presenting at least 
an initial attempt at providing an adequate "conceptual armoury", to borrow Semin's 
phrase. Thus despite Moscovici's attempt to deal with Jahoda's criticism in an offhand 
manner, it is necessary to investigate in more detail Moscovici's reformulation of social 
representations: Moscovici's treatment of the relationship between the individual and 
the social is accessible through discussion of the relationship between prescriptive and 
transformative aspects of social representations. 
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In his response to Jahoda, Moscovici not only explicitly acknowledges the importance 
of the "determinant aspect" of the content, but he recognises the tendency to neglect it 
as unacceptable: "In truth, the determinant aspect of the content tends to be 
disregarded in intellectual processes, though it deserves the greatest attention" (p. 221). 
This is in contrast, for example, to the response to McKinlay and Potter (1987) in 
which Moscovici simply stated that the issue of "group coercion" was more a feature 
of Durkheim's theory whereas he was more interested in "exchange" (Moscovici, 
1987, p. 516). While Moscovici does not acknowledge any contrast in this respect, 
through his acknowledgement of the comparative neglect of the "determinant aspect" 
it would appear that Moscovici now intends to explicitly address this issue. 
Moscovici states that social representations should be thought of as: "a network of 
interacting concepts and images .... 
its social characteristics .. 
determined by the 
interactions between individuals and / or groups .... By 
de-emphasizing each person's 
distinctive features and internal details, we can bring out the social characteristics of 
the total operation, from both the intellectual and the emotional points of view. By 
analogy we could think of social representations as being produced by a collective 
decision committee. Its members cast their votes and can express a broad range of 
opinions. Each one knows how the others have voted so that he can change his mind, 
combine opinions. The final decision is the joint effort of the participants and 
expresses a sense of the meeting. There is no need to reach an explicit consensus or to 
submit to a rite; as long as the individual initiatives are in line with the social flow, 
nothing more is needed. Each individual proposition is thus tied in with the action of 
the group, which can give it a shape that is acceptable and comprehensible for all 
concerned. In these exchanges all representations are at the interface of two realities: 
psychic reality, in the connection it has with the realm of the imagination and feelings, 
and external reality which has its place in a collectivity and is subject to group rules... 
".. (C)ertain generally accepted contents seem to keep the individual anchored in the 
collective element. Contents that are shared by a whole society lead each mind to 
draw its categories from them and these categories impose themselves on 
everyone.... We rely on these contents in many cases, even at times when they have no 
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connection with the context in which the contents apply. From this viewpoint the 
content exerts a decisive pressure on our thinking and on the way we represent events 
and behaviours, because it makes us eliminate certain alternatives by branding them as 
implausible and uninformative..... From our perspective, a representation always links a 
cognitive form with a content widely accepted by a group. " (Moscovici, 1988, p. 220- 
221). 
It appears that the prescriptive aspect of representations is explained in terms of a 
general acceptance and sharedness of collective contents. This is how the content 
exerts its "decisive pressure", by effectively placing limits on the range of acceptable 
ways of thinking and behaving. This should not be thought of simply as coercive as 
these contents are "generally accepted". However, Moscovici states that neither is it 
the case that `anything goes'. As Moscovici argues later in the paper, "There is 
nothing arbitrary in this process, since the regularities of thought, language and life in 
society all act together to delimit the possibilities. " (Moscovici, 1988, p. 231). 
From this it can be seen that Moscovici is also making an effort to deal with the issue 
of consensus. This was the issue emphasised by Potter and Litton (1985) and Semin 
(1985). Through the analogy with the collective decision committee, Moscovici 
emphasises the collective nature of representations. Allowance is made for a "broad 
range of opinions" which may be changed and combined, thus there is "no need to 
reach an explicit consensus". However, it should be noted that it is through the notion 
of a general acceptance that a "range of opinions" is recognised; tolerable if "in line 
with the social flow". 
Moscovici explains that the opposition between collective and individual as 
"irrelevant" to social representations. Moscovici argues that the contrast between 
individual and social is less significant than that between various social relations. 
Moscovici explains that "(t)here are presumably three ways in which representations 
can become social, depending on the relations between group members. " (p. 221). 
Thus social relations are the basis for a distinction that Moscovici draws between 
"hegemonic", "emancipated" and "polemic" representations. Through this distinction, 
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Moscovici is able to categorise some of the different types of representations that have 
appeared in the social representations literature. Thus "hegemonic" representations 
correspond to Durkheimian collective representations, they are shared by all members 
of a highly structured group and seem uniform and coercive; the "emancipated" with 
the sense of representation perhaps most readily associated with social representations, 
emphasising exchange and transformation, such as the studies of mental illness carried 
out by Jodolet (1983) and Herzlich (1982); and the "polemic" with more actively 
contested representations, such as the social representation of Marxism in France. 
Moscovici claims that this differentiated view of social representations corresponds 
more closely to reality than the "uniform view" of collective representation. 
Moscovici bases his claim that the opposition between the individual and the collective 
is irrelevant through the notion of general or widespread acceptance. Thus general 
acceptance is the means by which the individual is "anchored in the collective element". 
With regard to the relationship between the individual and the social, it must be noted 
that the individual appears somewhat subordinate to the group or collective, they are 
effectively bound by normative values of the group. This is expressed in a number of 
ways in the passage, with individual initiatives and propositions being "in line with the 
social flow" and "acceptable and comprehensible for all concerned", and with external 
reality being "subject to group rules". This deference to the group is also evident 
elsewhere in the paper, for example "a representation is constructive to the extent that 
it selects and relates persons, objects in such a way as to meet the stipulation of the 
group, enabling it to communicate and act in keeping with shared concepts and 
images. " (p. 230). 
It should be remembered that Moscovici previously downplayed the opposition 
between the individual and collective when arguing for the importance of 
understanding the process of "interiorisation" of representations (1984b). Similarly, 
Moscovici has argued that social psychological processes express a groups' collective 
norm and internal links; they are firstly social processes that gradually become 
interiorised to psychic processes (1984a). 
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In his response to Jahoda, Moscovici insists that social representations are at the 
interface of "psychic" and "external" realities. However, it should be noted from the 
passages presented earlier (Moscovici, 1988, p. 220-1; p. 231), that the discussion so far 
has involved the "de-emphasizing" of individual features and "internal details", in effect 
emphasising the "external reality". Even without critically assessing the arguments so 
far, it is still necessary for Moscovici to describe the interface between "psychic" and 
"external" realities, when individual features and "internal details" are emphasised. As 
Jahoda says, to simply say that thinking is derivative of social representations would be 
trivial (1988, p. 197). However, more importantly, without the incorporation of the 
internal details, the "decisive pressure" would appear to be identical to that found in 
the Durkheimian formulation that Moscovici finds so unappealing. 
To conclude, with regard to Jahoda's criticism regarding the issue of reflexivity, it may 
appear that Moscovici derogates the importance of the issue by treating it in an 
offhand manner. However, it can be seen that Moscovici does indeed recognise its 
importance and does address the issue. Moscovici denies both the need for an explicit 
consensus and the importance of the opposition between the individual and the social, 
with regard to social representations. This is explained in terms of the de-emphasising 
of the individual; the individual having accepted and internalised the normative values 
of the group or collectivity. 
Durkheim. 
This connects with another criticism Jahoda makes regarding Moscovici's criticism of 
Durkheim. Moscovici complains that for Durkheim collective representations cover a 
vast array of forms, yet as Jahoda points out, so do social representations. Moscovici 
does not explicitly respond to Jahoda on this point. However, Moscovici does re-state 
this criticism of Durkheim, and continues that for collective representations there is no 
effort to "spell out its cognitive characteristics in greater detail", thus "it is tantamount 
to concept of ideas" (Moscovici, 1988, p. 218). This indicates the importance of the 
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explication of "internal details" or "cognitive characteristics", without them social 
representations are "tantamount" to a vague notion of collective belief. 
The distinctiveness of social representations. 
Jahoda examines the distinctiveness of social representations as phenomena through 
considering Moscovici's treatment of ideology, culture and science. 
Ideolo 
Jahoda argues that sometimes ideology is seen as similar to social representations and 
dissimilar to science, and at other times it is seen as similar to both. Jahoda holds this 
as the reason why Moscovici discusses Marxism as a social representation rather than 
as an ideology: it cannot be made to fit into both frameworks, i. e. as being 
appropriated by particular groups from understandings generally held by "society", and 
as being appropriated by "society" from understandings generally held by particular 
groups. In response, Moscovici states that he could very easily have described 
Marxism as an ideology, but chose to describe it as a social representation as this was 
"more fruitful, [and] of greater scientific and even political interest" (1988, p. 227). 
However, Moscovici does not comment on Jahoda's opposing frameworks, nor 
attempt to describe Marxism in terms of each. 
Jahoda marks this inconsistency as the most significant aspect of Moscovici's 
treatments of ideology. However, Moscovici's description of stages, or phases in the 
relationship between ideology, social representations and science, is the more 
significant aspect. To recap, the ideological phase occurs after the representational 
phase and involves the appropriation of a shared representation by a particular group 
who then embellish the representation with a scientific aura, to make it more 
convincing. Moscovici's statement that ideology can be seen as representation or as 
science is not inconsistent with ideology actually being distinct from science, as Jahoda 
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claims. However, it is not clear that Marxism had a representational phase, involving it 
being shared throughout society, before being "appropriated" by Marxists. The 
sequence, science followed by representation followed by ideology, is not apparent. 
An ideology can be held by a small group and then more generally diffused, as will be 
more probable in the case of religious or political ideologies. In addition, any 
distinction between social representations and ideology is further called into question 
through Moscovici's description of Marxism as a "polemic" social representation, as 
described earlier. 
The general point to be made is that it is not apparent how an ideology may be 
distinguished from a representation. Moscovici himself declares that in the vast 
literature on ideology, it is exclusively treated as a system of representations (1988, 
p. 227). It is ironic that in refuting Jahoda's charge, Moscovici not only fails to 
differentiate between social representations and ideology, but actually reinforces the 
notion that the differentiation of social representations from ideology is not warranted. 
Culture 
Similarly, Moscovici does not answer Jahoda's charge that culture may only be 
understood as representations, other than through a general insistence that social 
representations refer to specific phenomena. Moscovici does state that culture 
provides a framework for all thinking and behaviour (1988, p. 232). However, it is not 
then clear how culture may be understood other than as representations. Indeed 
Moscovici states that he treated Marxism as a social representation, because it was 
better to treat it as "a part of the culture, or the ways of thinking and acting of a large 
number of people in their everyday life. " (Moscovici, 1988, p. 227). These "ways of 
thinking and acting" must surely be thought of as implicating representations. This 
also links to McKinlay and Potter's arguments: if all our experience is mediated 
through representations, culture must be thought of as representations. Thus, and in 
general support of Jahoda's arguments, it is not apparent that social representations are 
distinct phenomena with regard to culture or ideology. 
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Science 
A perhaps more significant distinction is drawn by Moscovici between social 
representations and science. Thus Moscovici states "that there is a sharp difference 
between scientific knowledge in the fields of physics, medicine, biology, economics and 
ordinary knowledge. " (Moscovici, 1988, p. 216). Jahoda argued that there was no 
evidence of distinct mental functioning separating social representations from science, 
and gave the example of analogic reasoning as pervasive to both. Moscovici does not 
explicitly acknowledge this criticism, though he does introduce a new means of 
marking the distinction. This is "the difficulty of visualizing the phenomena in 
question" (Moscovici, 1988, p. 216). Thus Moscovici asks, "can we visualize the 
genetic code, black holes, the unconscious and monetary parity? " 
It appears that Moscovici is attempting a similar strategy to the one he used against 
Potter and Litton's linguistic repertoires, that of stressing "iconic" aspects. Analogic 
reasoning may indeed be common to both science and social representations. 
However, by treating analogic reasoning as concerning only symbolic aspects, to stress 
differences relating to iconic aspects may have appeared an effective defence, hence 
the apparent importance of `visualising". The most obvious failing of Moscovici's 
argument is that analogic reasoning is relevant to iconic aspects also. Of course we 
may attempt to visualise the genetic code, black holes and the rest, most definitely, as 
Jahoda argues, through processes of analogic reasoning. In fact this notion that 
"images" are somehow distinct from "concepts" is one that Moscovici uses also when 
considering iconic and symbolic aspects of social representations. This is discussed in 
more detail below; for the present it is enough to state that it is not apparent that there 
is any basis for making this distinction, and the assumption that there is has led to a 
number of conceptual confusions. 
By not explicitly acknowledging Jahoda's criticism, Moscovici avoids engaging in a 
direct discussion of analogic reasoning, and thus can continue to claim the "differences 
in intellectual processes" (Moscovici, 1988, p. 216) between science and social 
representations, without effectively explaining what they are. It should be remembered 
that Moscovici also avoided discussing McKinlay and Potter's (1987) arguments 
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regarding the distinction between science and social representations. As described 
earlier, McKinlay and Potter cited Moscovici's earlier statement, that scientists also 
used social representations, to question the distinction drawn. Moscovici's statement 
was consistent with others by Moscovici claiming that all thinking is mediated by social 
representations; thus in Moscovici's framework, the thinking and behaviour of 
scientists, as presumably people also, must be seen as a result of social representations. 
However, while Moscovici may not explicitly acknowledge such criticisms, it appears 
he is aware of them as evidenced in attempts to reinforce his position in this regard. 
Thus he argues, "What in science generally appears as a system of concepts and facts is 
converted in the corresponding representations into a network by which a greater or 
smaller range of concepts and facts of various sorts is held together coherently. " 
(Moscovici, 1988, p. 216, emphases in original). Quite what the implication of 
distinguishing between a "system" and a "network" is, is unclear. Both refer to 
"concepts" and "facts", though in the case of the network these may be of "a greater or 
smaller range" than the other. No further explanation of differences between systems 
and networks is given, so the significance of the distinction is not apparent. 
Another noteworthy aspect of Moscovici's reaffirmation of the distinction between 
science and social representations is his mentioning of specific branches of science, 
such as physics, medicine, biology and economics. It would appear that they are more 
relevant to Moscovici's arguments concerning specific intellectual processes and 
"visualizing", although no explanation is given as to why these in particular should be 
distinguished from other branches of science. It does appear at least that when 
considering its distinctive nature, Moscovici realises that a blanket notion of "science" 
is inadequate. This is not simply to state that social representations are identical to 
science. At this stage it is enough to note that a clearer examination of the nature of 
each is warranted. 
58 
Concluding comments 
Thus it must be concluded that Moscovici has not dealt with the arguments of Jahoda 
or McKinlay and Potter regarding the distinction between social representations and 
ideology or culture, nor explained effectively a clear distinction between social 
representations and science. These issues carry great significance, both for the 
distinction between the reified and consensual realms and for the possibility of 
identifying distinct processes: if there is no clear distinction between science and social 
representations, then both realm can be seen to be dependent on social representations; 
similarly if social representations cannot be distinguished from other types of thinking, 
the notion of distinct processes collapses. The implications for the reified and 
consensual will be discussed later as they do not directly refer to Jahoda's critique. 
However, the issue of distinct processes will be discussed next. 
The distinctiveness of social representational processes. 
Concepts and percepts 
Jahoda was critical of Moscovici's claim that social representations occupy a position 
between concepts and percepts. Jahoda argues that the absence of a clear explanation 
of the relationship between concepts and percepts can lead to a situation where there is 
a non-social representation of social objects; for example in Moscovici's description of 
anchoring, it is as though a non-social representation is then compared to a social 
representation. As McKinlay and Potter (1987) point out, this leads to the idea that 
the social representations are unproblematically present in individual representations, 
which in turn can lead to a cognitive reductionism. 
Once again Moscovici does not respond directly to Jahoda's criticism. However, 
Moscovici does approach this issue when comparing social representations to 
attitudes. Moscovici argues that attitudes have social representations as their 
precondition, as " We can become favourable or unfavourable towards something only 
after we have perceived and evaluated it in a different way. " (Moscovici, 1988, p. 
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227). Moscovici uses this statement to claim that attitudes are therefore inseparable 
from social representations. 
This is curious. From Moscovici's statement, an attitude is seen as being favourable or 
not toward something, whereas it is through social representations that something is 
"perceived and evaluated". Quite how something may be perceived and evaluated 
without being seen as favourable or unfavourable (which happens after) is unclear. 
The notion that social representations intervene between concepts and percepts is 
unsustainable and leads to these types of confusion. This is a result of the mistaken 
notion that concepts must be conceived only in linguistic terms. Social representations 
must be conceived as some grouping of concepts; concepts that contain iconic as well 
as symbolic content. 
Moscovici's description of attitudes in his response to McKinlay and Potter is relevant 
also in this respect (Moscovici, 1987, p. 522). Here, Moscovici argues that there are 
"mental formations" that intervene between attitudes and social phenomena. Social 
representations are an example of these mental formations, along with myths, religion, 
science and art. What is of interest here is not only that Moscovici himself, in his later 
response to Jahoda, argues that social representations are inseparable from attitudes. 
Also, given that all thinking is mediated by representations and in the absence of any 
means of clearly distinguishing exceptions, it is not clear how social representations are 
in fact separable from myths, religion, science and art (see arguments above concerning 
the relationship between social representations, ideology, culture and science. ) Thus 
the notion of social representations constituting a distinct type of mental formation is 
unsubstantiated: each type of "mental formation" seems to be similarly based around 
some notion of analogic reasoning. 
Iconic and symbolic aspects 
Jahoda questions the assumed co-presence of the iconic and the symbolic, arguing that 
a concept is not necessarily connected to a discrete image and vice versa. Jahoda also 
objects to the "arbitrariness" of Moscovici's hypothetical example in which the word 
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neurotic is argued to evoke psychoanalysis and perhaps Freud as a concept, and an 
image of an egocentric individual: Jahoda argued that the situation could just as easily 
be reversed, with the image being of Freud and the egocentric individual as the 
concept. The confusion in the example was a result of the conceptual confusion 
regarding the relationship between the iconic and symbolic. 
Once again Moscovici does not directly comment on Jahoda's argument. However, 
Moscovici does argue for the presence of the iconic aspect. Moscovici cites a study 
by de Rosa (1987) showing that the figurative component develops independently from 
the "intellectual" aspect. Moscovici also argues that the figurative component is more 
stable and more "directly social". Moscovici stresses the importance of the figurative 
aspect by arguing that "images have the advantage of linking us to the past and of 
anticipating the shape of things to come. " (p. 222). Quite how the figurative 
component can be more directly social is not explained, though it may be that it is 
shared more consensually perhaps, though how images are conveyed through " the 
constant babble" is unclear. However, to argue that images link us to the past and 
anticipate the future, presumably more so that concepts, is hard to fathom. 
Moscovici argues that the iconic aspect was included in the definition of social 
representations because, "it enables us to understand an idea with the same vividness 
as a perception, and vice versa" (1988, p. 237). It is possible to avoid debates 
concerning the possibility of separating images from concepts in our thinking, though 
this is by no means clear, by returning to Jahoda's criticism. Jahoda is objecting to 
Moscovici's assertion that every image is equated with an idea and vice versa. It will 
be recalled that in response to Potter and Litton's (1985) proposal to substitute social 
representations for linguistic repertoires Moscovici argued that all that is image does 
not pass into language. As described earlier, if images are no longer directly equated 
with ideas and vice versa, then their relationship requires explanation: in effect there 
are another set of processes to explain. 
Moscovici's assertion, via de Rosa, that the figurative component develops 
independently implies that there is not a discrete image for each discrete concept and 
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vice versa, even given that transmission is not entire. (Indeed the notion of discrete 
concepts is at odds with the fluidity of thought implied in the transformative aspect to 
social representations. ) If it is seen to be stabler, then it is possible that the figurative 
component may not actually relate to the faster developing "intellectual aspect". There 
are no means for deciding whether it is appropriate to consider both aspects as 
referring to the same representation or not. This relates to a larger issue concerning 
the observation of social phenomena more generally, which will be discussed later. 
The present problem relates to the notion that images are distinct from concepts in 
thought. This notion was mentioned earlier with regard to difficulty in "visualising" 
marking a useful distinction between science and "ordinary knowledge". As stated, 
there is no apparent reason why analogic reasoning does not apply to the 
understanding of images as well as concepts. The notion that images could somehow 
exist without concepts and vice versa is not substantiated. With regard to the 
implications for social representations, it is necessary for Moscovici to clearly explain 
the relationship between images and concepts, and thereby explain convincingly the 
advantage in separating the two: to simply state that images are more "directly social" 
will not do. 
For the present it is enough to state that it is the notion that there is a clear distinction 
between images and concepts that is responsible for the arbitrariness of Moscovici's 
hypothetical example, as argued by Jahoda. Not only is it not clear that the word 
neurotic would invoke any particular image or any particular concept, if Freud were to 
be invoked, it is not clear whether this would be as image or concept; similarly for the 
"neurotic individual". As was the case with the notion of the image as being more able 
to link us to the past, Moscovici seems to believe that the only way to understand a 
particular issue is his way; the possibility of alternative interpretations is not 
considered. 
That Moscovici has not fully appreciated Jahoda's point is evident in that when 
describing the iconic aspect, Moscovici provides another "arbitrary" example. 
Moscovici argues that the computer "is now a dominant image, or what might be 
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called the figurative nucleus of certain representations. " (P. 222). Moscovici then 
quotes a scientific paper in which modern computers are described as "late-comers to 
the world of computation", whereas "biological computers - the brain and nervous 
system of animals and human beings - have existed for millions of years". (p. 222) The 
paper then describes how tasks such as reaching for a sandwich are computations just 
as much as for example, running video games. Moscovici argues that the 
representation "derives its meaning from the fact that the concept of the computer is 
one shared by our culture and thus can be converted from a specific device to a general 
model for the brain and nervous system. " However, it is arguably more likely that the 
brain is the more common idea or image, and that the authors of the scientific paper 
where connecting this to the less common idea or image of the computer, perhaps to 
make the unfamiliar notion of computing more familiar. This is in effect a reversal of 
Moscovici's argument. 
What is clear is that if image and concept are considered to be to some extent 
independent aspects, some analysis of the relationship is required. To this end, 
Moscovici states, "the variable extent that each aspect manifests itself depends on 
circumstances, the degree of literacy, beliefs. " (Moscovici, 1988, p. 237). This is a 
circular argument: in other words, to know whether the figurative aspect is manifested 
we must to some extent know what it is that people think. The circularity is even more 
striking if it accepted that all information is mediated by representations; in that case, 
circumstances, literacy and beliefs are all aspects of social representations. Thus not 
only is the degree to which the figurative aspect is manifested dependent on what it is 
that people think; to take the statement to its logical conclusion, the degree to which 
the figurative aspect is manifested depends on how the figurative aspect is manifested. 
Images may be empirically studied, but their relationship to concepts is not 
unproblematic: the image may not relate to the present state of conceptual 
understanding, so the image may no longer be said to be representing the same 
concept. Thus the usefulness of the distinction between the iconic and symbolic for the 
understanding of social representations is not clear: to know the extent to which each 
aspect is present in people's thinking, one must know what it is that they are thinking. 
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It appears that the confusion between the iconic and symbolic aspects derives directly 
from confusions regarding the relationship between concepts and perceps, both of 
which appear endemic to Moscovici's thought. From this it must be concluded that 
Moscovici has not dealt effectively with Jahoda's criticism regarding the co-presence 
of the iconic and the symbolic. 
The unfamiliar and the familiar 
Jahoda makes several criticisms regarding Moscovici's treatment of the unfamiliar. 
Jahoda draws on examples from Moscovici's study of psychoanalysis and Jodolet's 
study of mental illness for support. The central concern is that the assumption of a 
motivational basis for the transformation of the unfamiliar to the familiar is 
unsubstantiated. In other words Jahoda doubts Moscovici's claim that the unfamiliar is 
seen as fearful and must be "tamed" through transformation into the familiar. 
Moscovici does not comment on the examples that Jahoda provides. In response to 
Jahoda's argument that Moscovici's claim is unsubstantiated, Moscovici simply states 
that he does not consider it necessary to "list all the known facts when stating a 
proposition. " (p. 234). Moscovici then goes on to state that children's' fear of 
unfamiliar persons or objects cannot be separated from the "idea" that they have of 
them. This completely misses the point that Jahoda was making, that the "idea" that 
people hold of the unfamiliar need not be one of fear. Moscovici appears to simply 
take this for granted. 
Moscovici continues that Jahoda identifies the unfamiliar with the novel, and that this 
"does not make much sense" (p. 234). Moscovici makes this apparently contradictory 
statement in the context of defining the unfamiliar as based on affect rather than based 
on knowledge. Thus Moscovici provides two examples: "The reason why hypnosis is 
strange is not because its causes are unknown or because its effects fly in the way of 
common sense, but because of its unfamiliar, unusual, slightly magical aspects. " 
(p. 234), and "Irrespective of how detailed and down-to-earth our knowledge of 
64 
certain sexual practices, homosexuality, Li. 3, may be, it always maintains its 
strangeness, because of its forbidden character. " (p. 235). Moscovici then goes on to 
explain anchoring as the means by which we cope with a "strange" idea or perception. 
This line of argument allows Moscovici to deal with Jahoda's criticism and support 
Moscovici's response to McKinlay and Potter on the same issue, where Moscovici 
stated that the unfamiliar was not entirely unfamiliar, but had some unfamiliar feature. 
Nevertheless this line of argument is flawed. With regard to the first example, 
hypnosis has `unfamiliar, unusual, slightly magical aspects" precisely because its causes 
are to some extent unknown and its effects fly in the face of common sense. That is 
the basis on which it is seen to have "slightly magical aspects". This relates to a more 
general feature of Moscovici's method of argument: he assumes that there is only one 
possible interpretation of phenomena, his. This in turn relates to further arguments 
regarding the observation of social phenomena, which will be discussed in more detail 
later. As for the second example, that of homosexuality, regardless of its questionable 
content, it appears that Moscovici is now dealing with the unusual or non-normative. 
Moscovici criticises Jahoda for identifying the unfamiliar solely with the novel, but 
Moscovici now appears to have no means at all for dealing with the novel. 
The circularity that this entails can be illustrated by relating Moscovici's argument 
back to Jahoda original criticism of Jodolet. Thus the `mentally handicapped people' 
"continue to be seen as alien despite the fact that their presence had been accepted for 
many, many years.. " presumably because they are thought of as unusual. This does not 
explain the processes of familiarisation: the reason why some things may continue to 
be seen as unfamiliar, despite our being quite knowledgeable about them, depends on 
what it is we think about them, presumably our social representations. This does not 
support the notion of a- motivational basis for making the unfamiliar familiar, as it 
appears that "the unfamiliar" can just as often remain unfamiliar. 
In attempting to deal with criticism of what may have appeared only a small issue, 
Moscovici has shown his larger argument to be flawed. Moscovici's treatment of the 
3 "f. i. " appears to refer to "for instance". 
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unfamiliar seems to rest on a vague notion of analogic reasoning and little else: the 
unfamiliar is not always made familiar, indeed efforts may be taken to make it remain 
unfamiliar. Thus it can be seen that to argue that making the unfamiliar familiar is a 
distinct process of social representations is not supported. Moscovici has not 
demonstrated convincingly that there is a motivational basis for making the unfamiliar 
familiar, and therefore has not dealt effectively with the criticisms of Jahoda. 
Concluding comments 
Thus it must be concluded that the claim that social representations involve distinct 
mental processes is unsubstantiated. This is shown in the confusions surrounding the 
relationships between concepts and percepts, the unfamiliar and the familiar, and 
between iconic and symbolic aspects. Any explanation supporting a distinct type of 
mental process again seems based upon some notion of analogic reasoning and little 
else that can be substantiated. 
Jahoda's suggestions for refinement. 
Jahoda criticises Moscovici for claiming that SRT had been tested. In response, 
Moscovici states, "nowhere do I claim that the theory of social representations is 
already tested.. " (p. 227). Thus it appears that Jahoda has perhaps made some error of 
interpretation. However, if one seeks out the original source, one finds that Jahoda is 
indeed correct: "Indeed, works such as that of Berger and Luckman (1967) refer to a 
theory of the origins of common sense and of the structure of reality, but I believe that 
this theory, unlike my own, has not been tested. " (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 55, my 
emphases). What is surprising is not so much the change in position as much as the 
failure of Moscovici to acknowledge his earlier position. From this it can be seen that 
Moscovici has indeed claimed that SRT has been tested, thus Jahoda's claim is 
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substantiated. This leads onto a number of issues relating to the empirical status of 
social representations. 
As stated earlier, Jahoda's main argument is that empirical studies have no distinctly 
social representational input, the term "social representation" is simply taken as 
axiomatic. Moscovici describes Jahoda as offering three options: "1) giving a rigorous 
definition of representations, 2) adopting more rigorous research methods, and 3) 
returning to the well established framework of social cognition. " (Moscovici, 1988, 
p. 238). This is a misrepresentation of Jahoda's argument. As described earlier, Jahoda 
specified "soft" and "hard" options. The three options described by Moscovici refer 
only to the harder options. Thus again Moscovici misrepresents Jahoda's argument. 
Nevertheless, Moscovici's response to these options is interesting, and demonstrates 
further inconsistency and contradiction. 
A rigorous definition of social representations 
Moscovici deals with the first option by swiftly stating that social representations have 
been defined by others, "boldly" and "successfully". Moscovici states, "The first 
remedy has thus been discovered already. "(p. 239). However, Moscovici does not go 
on to describe these "bold" and "successful" definitions. Given the context of 
Moscovici's response within a body of critical evaluations and responses, that 
Moscovici could simply put to rest criticisms of the ill-defined nature of social 
representations, and would choose not to do so directly, is inexplicable and extremely 
unconvincing. At this point it is not in fact clear whether it is actually possible to 
construct a rigorous definition of social representation given its myriad inconsistencies 
and contradictions. What is clear is that Moscovici has yet to provide or even describe 
such a definition. 
However, Moscovici attempts to make it appear that he has indeed dealt swiftly with 
perhaps the most pressing of Jahoda's criticisms. In this context, the other two 
options appear rather minor, methodological quibbles. However, it must be seen that 
the "first remedy" has not been "discovered already". 
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Adopting more rigorous research methods 
With respect to the second of the options, the adopting of more rigorous research 
methods, Moscovici's response implicates a number of issues, including the use of 
social representations as independent variables, Moscovici's defence of the ill-defined 
nature of social representations, the equating of theoretical precision with rigorous 
research methods, the defence of social representations by virtue of its "prior 
existence", the axiomatic use of the label social representations, and the assumption of 
unproblematic observation of social representations. 
Moscovici restates his claim that SRT requires nurturing to "enrich its contents and 
refine its theoretical framework. " (1988, p. 239). However, as Potter and Litton 
(1985b) pointed out, given Moscovici's recurrent failure to engage fully with the 
critical evaluations provided, it is not clear how progress is to be made. This point 
may be illustrated by referring to another of Jahoda's arguments, regarding 
Moscovici's use social representations as independent variables. 
Jahoda also argues that Moscovici criticises Durkheim for using collective 
representations as "irreducible, explanatory devices", yet Moscovici himself treats 
social representations as independent variables. Moscovici does acknowledge this 
criticism explicitly: he claims to be "astonished" by it (Moscovici, 1988, p. 223). As it 
is somewhat unusual for Moscovici to provide a direct response to any criticisms, his 
reply will be considered in some detail. As previously stated, this is an issue of some 
importance as it relates to Moscovici's often mentioned defence of the ill-defined 
nature of social representations. 
Moscovici explains that explanatory concepts are likely to be abstract and ill-defined 
though may still be useful for explanatory purposes, citing gravitational force, the 
atom, the gene and social classes as examples. Moscovici states that "something" must 
be first be conceived and endowed with an explanatory power, only then is it possible 
to advance and try to "grasp the reality" of the phenomena. Thus the exact nature of 
gravity and social classes are still not understood, whereas the gene and atom "have 
yielded a large part of their physico-chemical enigma" (p. 223). Moscovici continues 
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that the structure and internal dynamics of social representations will be 
"unscrambled", once their impact on society has been recognised; just as the structure 
and dynamics of the atom were unravelled. Moscovici states that "progress can be 
made no other way" (p. 223). Thus Moscovici concludes "discontinuity on the 
theoretical level never precludes continuity on the research level, which is intended to 
gain a deeper insight into the phenomena" (p. 224). 
On the face of it, this appears to be a sound argument. Aller all, it is easy to accept the 
usefulness of concepts such as gravity, the atom, the gene and social classes. 
However, description of progress is inaccurate. The "impact" of a phenomenon is not 
ascertained in the absence of speculation about its conceptualisation. The impact is 
continually reassessed as the concept is reformulated. Moscovici gives the impression 
that the concepts such as gravity and the atom, etc. have stayed static whilst their 
impact has been measured with increasing precision. It is through this dialectic of 
assessment and reformulation that explanatory concepts are also discarded as well as 
retained. 
With regard to social representations, their impact has been recognised in that "all 
behaviour appears at the same time as a given and a product of our representing it. " 
(Moscovici, 1988, p. 214). However, it is not clear how progress is to be made. 
Moscovici does not really engage with critical evaluations of his theory. Those that 
have been reviewed in this thesis cannot simply be referred to as "hostile" or 
"negative". Virtually all have stated their appreciation for Moscovici's work, and have 
wished to engage in meaningful dialogue with Moscovici. In return Moscovici has 
appeared extremely guarded, selectively responding to various critical issues often 
misrepresenting them, if not ignoring them outright. 
For example, Moscovici appears to equate theoretical precision solely with rigorous 
research methods (Potter and Litton, 1985b). Jahoda is described as blaming SRT for 
a "more or less qualitative, shall we say, cavalier approach. " (1988, p. 239), and 
demanding more rigorous definition and research methods. But Jahoda predominantly 
describes logical flaws. That is the basis of the many inconsistencies concerning social 
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representations. It is not that more rigorous techniques will eventually reveal exactly 
why social representations are distinct from science; social representations cannot be 
distinct from science given the definitions of each (as shown in the arguments of and 
responses to McKinlay and Potter (1987) and Jahoda (1988) above. ) This is a logical 
implication, based on internal consistency more than empirical revelation. To simply 
state that ill-definition is a virtue will not do; theoretical precision is not the same as 
methodological precision. 
It is because Moscovici consistently fails to acknowledge the logical flaws in his 
formulation that he is so selective in his responses. Even so, he is often led into 
inconsistency and contradiction. A further example is Moscovici's discussion of other 
theories. Moscovici states "I have trouble understanding how the development of 
research and theories in the field of cognitions, attitudes and the analysis of common 
sense can buttress arguments against my positions - which in fact are not only mine - 
when these developments merely catch up with them. " (1988, p. 226). Moscovici 
makes much of the "prior claim" of his approach. The argument seems to be that by 
virtue of being prior, his approach has nothing to gain. This again reflects how 
Moscovici discounts the logical flaws of his approach. This notion of superiority 
simply through pre-dating is linked to Moscovici's arguments regarding determining 
the impact of explanatory concepts, in order to progress: Moscovici does not have the 
means to effect further reformulation. 
This position is unsustainable and leads Moscovici into contradiction once more. 
Moscovici dismisses claims of similarity between his approach and Durkheim's by this 
analogy: "As though referring back to Democritus dispensed one from looking at 
subsequent atomic theories and especially at the work of other atomic theorists since 
his time. " (Moscovici, 1988, p. 227). Here, Moscovici is suggesting that "prior claim" 
is no basis on which to compare theories, thereby reversing his earlier argument. 
However, Moscovici returns to his initial line of reasoning immediately after, when he 
responds directly to Jahoda's claim that empirical studies have no distinctive social 
representation input. Moscovici states that "it is a fact that the label was there prior to 
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other labels and that its presence made and continues to make a difference. " (1988, 
p. 228). Of course it is the content of a theory or argument that is of significance when 
assessing its worth, not the pre- or post-dating of alternatives. What is required is 
critical engagement to resolve theoretical issues; simplistic arguments in terms of 
"prior claim", as can be seen in these examples, are a poor substitute. Thus Moscovici 
has not responded effectively to Jahoda's criticism. 
Returning to more specific points raised by Jahoda regarding the empirical study of 
social representations, Jodolet's unsatisfactory description of the unfamiliar has already 
been discussed. Jahoda also complains that the label social representation is taken as 
axiomatic, thus individual interviews are reported and discussed in terms of social 
representations with little effort to justify the application of the term. Moscovici does 
not respond directly to this criticism, though he does perpetuate the problem by once 
again describing a single interview in terms of a social representation: "The 
interviewee started out with: `I've got this theory'. He has thus elaborated a 
representation, which has actually been circulating for some time as a rumour. In this 
sense it is a social representation, and the interview unintentionally amplifies this social 
character. " (Moscovici, 1988, p. 229). Once again, it appears that the label has been 
applied axiomatically. It is not apparent whether description in terms of social 
representations is warranted. If it is solely on the suspicion that the "theory" held by 
the interviewee had been circulated as a rumour, it is not clear what redescription in 
terms of social representations actually adds in this case. 
Finally Jahoda argues against assuming an unproblematic observation of conversational 
exchanges, as it is not clear how such an approach would deal with the influence of 
structural relations. Again, Moscovici does not explicitly respond to this criticism, 
though he does appear to acknowledge this argument. Moscovici restates his 
confidence in observational studies: "For many years to come observation stimulated 
by theory and armed with subtle analytic methods will still give us the means of 
understanding the genesis and structure of social representations in situ. "(1988, p. 
241). However, Moscovici later states that "observation, no matter how systematic it 
is, is subservient to the characteristics of the population under observation and its 
71 
special problems. " (1988, p. 244). Thus, Moscovici appears to have acknowledged 
that observation is not unproblematic. However Moscovici gives no indication of how 
these "special problems" are to be identified or addressed; a vague notion of "subtle 
analytic methods" is not sufficient. Since Moscovici has not resolved the theoretical or 
methodological issues presented to him, nor elaborated any new-found insight in this 
regard, it is not clear how the study of the genesis and structure of social 
representations "in situ" is to be accomplished. 
Returning to the well established framework of social cognition. 
For Moscovici to simply state that Jahoda suggests he tie up social representations 
with the work on social cognition is another mis-representation of Jahoda's arguments. 
As described earlier, the context of Jahoda's suggestion is the failure to demonstrate 
distinctive psychological mechanisms with respect to social representations, leading 
Jahoda to wonder whether this aspect of the theory need be retained. This is what 
prompts Jahoda suggestion that references to internal mechanisms should be tied up 
with the social cognition approach, rather than attempting to circumscribe a distinctive 
domain. 
Moscovici's insistence that social representations involve distinct psychological 
processes is asserted throughout the paper, for example "Is a representation in fact a 
distinctive psychic phenomenon? The answer to this question is decidedly yes. " (1988, 
p. 238), though in the absence of clear, supporting arguments. Moscovici supports the 
above quote by calling on the distinction between the consensual and the reified 
realms. However, Moscovici does not acknowledge any of the problems concerning 
this distinction raised by Jahoda and others, therefore this cannot be regarded as a 
clear, supporting argument. Indeed, Jahoda explicitly mentions Moscovici's tendency 
to make sweeping though unsupported statements about psychological processes 
(Jahoda, 1988, p. 202). 
Nevertheless, Moscovici's insistence on distinct psychological processes leads him to 
misrepresent a number of arguments, and thereby unwittingly undermine his own 
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position. In his response to Jahoda, Moscovici directs his argument toward 
undermining the social cognition perspective. Thus he quotes Levy-Bruhl in support, 
"After examining the hypotheses and postulates which `allow only for the intervention 
of mechanisms of the individual human mind', Levy-Bruhl listed all the arguments 
militating against their transposition to collective representations. His objection was 
that they are `social facts, like the institutions that they reflect' and, on this account, 
`have their own laws, laws that the analysis of individuals as individuals can never 
reveal' (Levy-Bruhl, 1951, p. 14). " (Moscovici, 1988, p. 241). 
As stated, Moscovici refers to Levy-Bruhl for support in undermining the social 
cognition perspective. However, Levy-Bruhl is actually arguing that collective 
representations cannot be understood in terms of "mechanisms of the human mind"; 
their laws are not amenable simply through the analysis of individuals. This is the same 
line of argument presented in earlier critiques of Moscovici, such as Harre's (1984) 
warning that the collective aspects of social phenomena cannot be understood in terms 
of distributive processes. Levy-Bruhl is arguing against the transposition of individual 
mechanisms to collective representations; this is in direct opposition to Moscovici's 
notion of distinctive mechanisms. 
Moscovici again undermines his position as he describes the social cognition approach 
in order to show its shortcomings: "There is no doubt that social recognition's are 
representations in a general way.... It is actually past experience that enables them to 
build forms, construct concepts and connect the diversity confronting them with 
schemata or frameworks already in their minds (Higgins and Bargh, 1987). We are 
thus dealing with forms of thought shaped by contents that are already available in the 
brain, that is, stereotypes of the situation or the self. Every new object is reduced to an 
old object in this way, and the unprecedented case is subsumed under a general 
category. The unstable world is stabilized, and recovers its routine appearance for the 
individual. Schemata, scripts and prototypes may be specific and concrete... . or they 
may be abstract.... They all provide a stock of learned behaviour or ideas with which to 
face the needs of daily life. These categorization processes are of great interest, 
especially those involving prototypes (Semin, 1987), because they reformulate in terms 
73 
of information theory processes that are very familiar to social psychology, first and 
foremost the process of categorization and stereotyping. " (Moscovici, 1988, p. 243). 
These processes are exactly those which Moscovici associates with social 
representations. Consider the section, "forms of thought shaped by contents that are 
already available in the brain". This is an accurate description of the prescriptive 
aspect of social representations. Consider the section, "Every new object is reduced to 
an old object in this way, and the unprecedented case is subsumed under a general 
category. The unstable world is stabilized and recovers its routine appearance for the 
individual. " This is an accurate description of Anchoring, of making the unfamiliar 
familiar. And the section "Schemata, scripts and prototypes may be specific and 
concrete... . or they may be abstract.... They all provide a stock of 
learned behaviour or 
ideas with which to face the needs of daily life" could just as easily be describing social 
representations. 
Moscovici goes on to argue that such theories are inadequate for understanding the 
construction of reality, and how social representations adjust themselves to "the 
sinuousities of a given culture". (1988, p. 243). There is some merit to this 
observation, in that the processes described do not adequately explain the creation of 
new concepts, etc. However, the processes described in social representations do not 
meet Moscovici's criteria either. Notions of social representations being somehow 
between concepts and percepts, or attempts to explain how the unfamiliar is made 
familiar do not stand scrutiny. Much of the "specific nature" of social representations 
seems to rest on vague notions of analogic reasoning, that new information or ideas are 
understood on the basis of existing information or ideas. Also, the processes that 
Moscovici describes in association with social representations are explicable in terms 
of information theory, that is why they are prone to cognitive reductionism, that the 
"social aspect" is somehow contained within the individual representation. This has 
pointed out on numerous occasions, for example Semin (1985), Parker (1987) and 
McKinlay and Potter (1987). 
74 
Moscovici also complains that social cognition models rely on an arbitrary standard 
when making judgements about people's thinking. Moscovici quotes Kruglansky and 
Azjen (1983) in support: "This amounts to the naive assumption that there exists a 
norm for thinking to which one must conform and which takes logical reasoning and 
probability as its standards. For many judgements, however, `neither normative 
models nor direct verifications seem to be available. Here the investigator's own 
judgement as to what would constitute a valid inference is frequently used as a 
standard of veridicality; and deviations from this standard are considered erroneous' 
(Kruglansky and Azjen, 1983, p. 3). " (Moscovici, 1988, p. 242). 
In the first part of this statement, Moscovici argues that a "norm for thinking" is a 
naive assumption. However, Moscovici makes frequent reference to norms for 
thinking when describing the prescriptive aspect of social representations. Moscovici 
may not take logical reasoning and probability as his standard, he refers instead to 
generally accepted contents that impose themselves; nevertheless he does subscribe to 
this "naive assumption". In fact, it is not clear how the "standard" that Moscovici 
applies, that of general acceptance, is ascertained. 
Moscovici states earlier in the paper, "When we are talking about individuals, it is 
possible to make a clearcut distinction between what is correct and what is incorrect, 
what is normal and what is abnormal. This is true because a society or scientific 
community has legitimate definitions for the criterion according to which something 
can be considered true, normal or real. The same cannot be done for groups, societies 
or culture... It presumes that one knows the true path of history, just as one knows the 
true trajectory of planets. " (Moscovici, 1988, p. 229). This is a very peculiar 
statement. Society or the scientific community are said to produce definitions that 
allow "clearcut" distinctions with regard to individuals, but these "clearcut" 
distinctions are not available for groups. That "clearcut" definitions are available to 
individuals but not to groups suggests that individuals are unrelated to groups; also 
that these definitions are individual and not social phenomena. This is also implied in 
the fact that there is no discussion of how individual transformations affect the overall 
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representation; any change is generally shared, effectively separating the individual 
from the group. 
In his criticism of social cognition Moscovici also argues that what in social cognition 
may be regarded as errors, actually reflect a different representation of reality: "In this 
light, the fundamental errors of attributing an event to a person rather than a situation 
is not an error. It is an integral part of a moral and legal view of things that makes a 
person responsible for his or her actions. " (Moscovici, 1988, p. 242-3). This appears 
to contradict the notion of clearcut definitions of what is "true, normal or real". When 
Moscovici is arguing against social cognition he takes the view that errors reflect 
different representations, while in another context he argues that the definition of what 
is true, and therefore untrue also, is clearcut. 
The entire notion of clearcut definitions implies that society or the scientific community 
have unitary, clearly observable positions on issues. This is an unlikely proposition and 
contradicts Moscovici's arguments against representations as unitary or homogenous. 
However, it is not now clear how the "true, normal or real" are ascertained. In the 
absence of clearcut definitions and of any formal guidance, it appears that investigators 
must rely, at least to some extent, on their own judgement as to what these "clearcut" 
standards are; thus it is the investigators judgement that is used as the standard of 
veridicality. This is exactly the situation that Moscovici argues against with regard to 
social cognition. 
Thus it appears that social representations are not dissimilar to the social cognition 
approach with regard to processes. Flaws in Moscovici's theorisation continually lead 
to inconsistency and contradiction which weakens any claims for the distinctiveness of 
social representations. It has not been demonstrated that social representations either 
constitute distinctive phenomena or that they have distinct cognitive characteristics, 
despite Moscovici's claims to the contrary. 
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Summing up Moscovici's response to Jahoda. 
In conclusion, it appears that Moscovici's attempt at reformulation has not been 
successful. Moscovici has not resolved problematic issues concerning social 
representations and thus has failed to respond effectively to existing criticism. Also his 
attempts to introduce concepts have proved problematic and have not increased clarity. 
Much of the central argument in SRT seems to rest on a notion of analogic reasoning, 
that existing ideas and information affect how new ideas and information are 
understood. However, attempts to provide more precise arguments lead to circularity 
and contradiction. Also, Moscovici has not demonstrated convincingly a link between 
contents and processes; that is the relationship between the contents of social 
representations and social psychological processes. The processes of social 
representations can be understood in terms of information processing and so are prone 
to a cognitive reductionism. The content of social representations involve a notion of 
general acceptance or sharedness, with group values or norms being internalised by the 
individual, and the individual seen as synonymous with the group. Thus, Moscovici has 
not demonstrated the distinctiveness of social representations. 
Conclusion. 
Each of the critical papers that have been reviewed here, have been of a very high 
calibre. The authors have identified a number of critical issues with respect to social 
representations and have argued their cases clearly and concisely. Moscovici's 
arguments do indeed appear especially replete with inconsistency and contradiction, as 
Jahoda remarks, "One could give examples.. . 
but that would be unduly repetitive. " 
(1988, p. 203). However, I would argue that few of the authors have grasped 
Moscovici's vision, and none (with the possible exception of Semin) have recognised 
its full implications. While these critical works are of undoubted importance, it is not 
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enough to simply amass these contradictions. It is necessary to appreciate why 
Moscovici has been compelled to engage in such inconsistency and contradiction. 
The fundamental concern of SRT is to link social phenomena with psychological 
processes. Moscovici has certainly been affected by the critical response to social 
representations. It is through his attempts to deal with the various criticisms directed 
at social representations that Moscovici appears to be generate even more 
inconsistency and contradiction, as seen for example in his attempts to explicate the 
relationship between contents and processes. However, this is acceptable to him in the 
pursuit of his aim. Moscovici believes he is attempting to "raise the level" of social 
psychology. That is why piecemeal criticism has appeared ineffective, any suggestion 
to narrow the scope of social representations as failing to appreciate the wider vision. 
To link social phenomena with psychological processes has become the raison d'etre of 
social representations. That is why for example Jahoda's suggestion to jettison 
reference to internal mechanisms is so unwelcome; as Jahoda himself notes, this would 
align social representations with existing approaches to collective belief, such as `folk 
representations'. That is why Moscovici appears so reluctant to address individual 
critical concerns. That social representations appears to be little more than a vague 
notion of analogic reasoning is acceptable, by Moscovici and adherents to SRT, in the 
context of the pursuit of this grand aim. 
Moscovici's objective may appear commendable, however the issues involved are 
formidable. It is the implications of these issues that have generally not been followed 
through in the critical evaluations of SRT. For example, McKinlay and Potter (1987) 
and Jahoda (1988) both note the failure to reconcile the prescriptive and 
transformative aspects of social representations, yet they do not recognise that this 
issue is a redescription of the relationship between the individual and the social. 
Similarly, the issues surrounding the assumption of consensus raised by Potter and 
Litton (1985a) and Parker's (1987) argument concerning the breaking down of the 
notion of consensus, implicate the whole issue of the observation of social phenomena. 
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These are very complex issues that are fundamental to the whole nature of social 
scientific endeavour. The authors reviewed have not indicated clearly the relation 
between their critiques and these complex concerns. Thus, inadvertently perhaps, they 
have let it appear that the concerns that they raise are resolvable given sufficient time 
and attention. At this point I will simply state that this may not actually be the case. 
Having said that, it must be stated that it does not appear that Moscovici himself has 
fully grasped the nature of the issues he is dealing with. Moscovici is often led into 
inconsistency and contradiction precisely because he fails to fully appreciate the 
implications of his arguments, as seen, for example, in his attempts to criticise social 
cognition approaches, described earlier. What is required is an analysis that 
appreciates Moscovici's concerns yet also incorporates an awareness of the complexity 
of the issues involved. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FURTHER DISCUSSION OF INITIAL CRITICAL EXCHANGES 
Introduction. 
In this chapter further commentary will be provided on the initial critical exchanges 
concerning social representations, discussed in the previous chapter. In particular, 
attention will be drawn toward the distinctiveness of social representations, the 
theorisation of the relationship between the individual and the social, and the 
implications of this theorisation for the observation of social phenomena. 
To facilitate appreciation of the scope of these issues, Moscovici's discussion of 
Durkheim is critically assessed. It is found that Durkheim's arguments are 
considerably more sophisticated than Moscovici allows, and that Moscovici's 
arguments share a great deal of similarity with those of Durkheim. A critical 
evaluation of Durkheim's work also reveals similar shortcomings to those of 
Moscovici. 
The work of Parsons is also considered, primarily through an appreciation of Giddens' 
discussion of Parsons. The incorporation of Giddens' insights are a useful device for 
swiftly introducing Parsons' considerable body of work. Furthermore, Giddens' 
arguments are relevant as they are more fully developed in the following chapter. 
Similarities are noted between Parsons' and Moscovici's work: both consider 
Durkheim as a theoretical antecedent; and both attempt to develop the notion of 
internalisation as the means to link the individual to the normative consensus. Thus it 
is argued that social representations constitute a version of normative functionalism. 
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It is further argued that a consequence of this normative emphasis is a unitary 
conception of social phenomena and a corresponding notion of essentially 
unproblematic observation. The normative emphasis inevitably implies consensus due 
to inherent limitations in dealing with the divergent interpretation of normative values. 
This results in difficulties in accounting for social conflict, and is evidenced in similarly 
unconvincing attempts at explaining social change by Durkheim, Parsons and 
Moscovici. 
It is also argued that Moscovici's misrepresentation of Durkheim becomes 
progressively greater as Moscovici attempts to promote the distinctiveness of social 
representations during the course of the initial critical exchanges. 
It is concluded that it is necessary to account for the relationship between the 
individual and society in a way that is not reliant solely upon the internalisation of 
normative values, and also to acknowledge the implications of theorising this 
relationship for the observation of social phenomena. 
The distinctiveness of social representations. 
I would agree with McKinlay and Potter (1987) that the fundamental problems 
associated with social representations, stem from the basic assertion that all our 
knowledge and understanding is mediated by social representations. However, the 
problem is not that this statement is incorrect, but that Moscovici has consistently 
failed to grasp the implications of this assertion. As a consequence, SRT is inherently 
beset by contradiction and inconsistency. ' This situation has been further exacerbated 
by Moscovici's attempts to refine his ideas in the course of critical debate without 
adequately attending to these inherent problems. ' The issues I would like to draw 
attention to are each implications of that initial assertion that have remained 
problematic. They are, Moscovici's treatment of "facts" and veridicality; the 
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observation of social representations; and the relationship between social 
representations and the individual. 
On the basis of the detailed description that appeared in the original Farr and 
Moscovici volume (1984a), it appears that Moscovici's initial idea was actually quite 
simple. The aim of the theory of social representations was to understand how 
individuals and groups construct a stable, predictable world given the "diversity of 
individuals, attitudes and phenomena" (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 44). Social 
representations were the means by which the forms of thought of individuals were to 
be linked to the social content of those thoughts (1984a, p. 52). 
Moscovici objected to the unproblematic view of the social world characteristic of 
individualistic forms of social psychology. In contrast, Moscovici argued that the 
social environment should not be taken as simply given, but as dependent on how it 
was classified by individuals (1984a, p. 4). This was the basis for the initial assertion 
that we never receive information undistorted by our representations (1984a, p. 5) This 
notion was articulated in several different ways in that initial chapter, for example 
social representations were supposed to direct our behaviour (1984a, p. 5), define 
reality (1984a, p. 5), and constitute our environment (1984a, p. 12). 
However, as an indication of how Moscovici's ideas altered over the course of these 
initial debates, it is worthwhile noting that in that initial presentation, Moscovici 
appeared to argue that social representations were not related to specific mental 
mechanisms: "Thus it is easy to see why the representation which we have of 
something is not directly related to our manner of thinking but, conversely, why our 
manner of thinking, and what we think, depend on such representations" (1984a, 
p. 10). This is perhaps surprising given the strength of Moscovici's later conviction 
that social representations do indeed constitute a "distinct psychic phenomenon" 
(1988, p. 238). Instead in this early description, Moscovici argued that the distinction 
between social representations and other types of thought, such as science and religion 
was made on the basis of making the unfamiliar familiar (1984a, p. 26), (though 
Moscovici did argue that different mechanisms were associated with ideas and images 
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(1984a, p. 17) ). Similarly, in that initial presentation Moscovici refused to distinguish 
the contents of social representations from their processes (1984a, p. 66), a position 
which again is at odds with later statements (as described earlier). 
Social representations and the individual. 
Social representations were understood to be feature of the consensual realm. The 
consensual nature of social representations were described in a number of ways in the 
initial paper. For example, social representations were described as a system of 
categorisation that was based on consensus (1984a, p. 37); that they constituted a 
reality shared by all; and that in the consensual universe representations only confirmed 
and did not contradict existing 'understanding (1984a, p. 24). Social representations 
were also taken to be internalised, not simply registered but used as a criterion for 
evaluation "this is not, as we might be tempted to believe, a simple matter of analogy 
but an actual, socially significant merging, a shifting of values and feelings. " (1984a, 
p. 26). 
Moscovici originally considered this process of internalisation, or "interiorisation" 
(1984b, p. 944) to be unproblematic. In this way a given representation could be 
apprehended both on the basis of data elicited from individuals, or at a more collective 
level, perhaps through the content analysis of publications. As described earlier, Harre 
(1984) first noted that these two approaches were not synonymous; the former 
implicated a distributive sense of phenomena (produced through the aggregation of the 
responses of individuals), whereas the social content of the representation was a 
collective property and could not simply be ascribed to individuals in such a manner. 
It was to this criticism that Moscovici responded by arguing that there were specific 
mechanisms by which to relate individual and collective levels. Nevertheless, at this 
stage the notion of consensus remained intact. 
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However, Potter and Litton's (1985a) critique showed the notion of consensus to be 
problematic, thus Moscovici's response to Harre that formal mechanisms would be 
found through the accumulation of contents was shown not to be as straightforward as 
first imagined. As described earlier, Moscovici reversed his argument in order to 
refute Potter and Litton's claims, though again it must be noted that there had been 
significant alteration from Moscovici's original position which stressed that contents 
and mechanisms could not be separated. 
The problem involves reconciling the sharedness of social representations with the 
myriad transformations that individuals may carry out. This was described earlier in 
terms of the tension between "prescriptive" and "transformative" aspects. Also 
described earlier, in response to Jahoda, Moscovici explained the prescriptive aspect of 
social representations in terms of a general acceptance and sharedness, by which the 
individual was "anchored in the collective" (1988, p. 220). It was noted earlier that 
Moscovici's discussion had involved the "de-emphasising" of individual features and 
"internal details", thus in effect emphasising "external reality". 
It appears that Moscovici considers this notion of general acceptance as sufficient 
explanation for the relationship between the collective and the individual. Moscovici 
goes on to argue that the contrast between various social relations is of more 
significance than any opposition between the collective and the individual. This is the 
basis for Moscovici's distinction between the hegemonic, emancipated and polemic 
representations discussed above. Moscovici explains: "(t)here are presumably three 
ways in which representations can become social, depending on the relations between 
group members" (1988, p. 221). 
This statement is characteristic of a greater emphasis on social relations evident in 
Moscovici's attempts at reformulation. For example, Moscovici refers approvingly to 
the similarities between social representations and Piaget's theory of child 
development: "Piaget's approach coincides very closely with the theory of social 
representations. Not only does the theory contend that prescriptions and obligations 
are woven into a vision of social relations.... but it also endeavours to bridge the gap 
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between sociology and psychology, between the collective and the individual. " (1987, 
p. 525). 
The emphasis on -social relations is also present in a greater concern for "social 
representation makers", that is "the professionals who devote their lives to them" 
(1987, p. 522). These people are of some significance to Moscovici, who argues that 
they are the counterpart to "science makers", and correspond to the "myth makers" 
and "religion makers" in other civilisations. Examples of social representation makers 
include "all those who have the task of spreading scientific and artistic knowledge, 
doctors and social workers, media and political marketing specialists. " (1988, p. 225). 
Social representations are now explained in terms of a "division of labour that grants 
them [social representations] a certain autonomy.... and are the outgrowth of a codified 
know-how that enjoys an undeniable authority. " (1988 p. 225). Similarly Moscovici 
argues that social relations are implicated in the meaning given to a representation: 
"what is represented and how it is represented is given meaning in terms of the position 
of the person who enunciates it. " (1988, p. 230). 
It is apparent that the emphasis on social relations is a response to criticisms directed 
toward the relationship between "prescriptive" and "transformative" aspects of social 
representations. This may be seen in the similarities Moscovici draws between his 
work and that of Piaget. However, there are two main problems with this new 
position. Firstly, the emphasis on the elevated position of social representation makers 
is at odds with the notion of a consensual realm. Representations are no longer 
consensual in this sense, in that the representations of some are accorded an 
"undeniable authority" over those of others. Thus Moscovici is, perhaps unwittingly, 
undermining the consensual / reified distinction and thereby the notion of the 
distinctiveness of social representations. 
Secondly, Moscovici does not have an adequate means of dealing with social relations 
(beyond unsubstantiated speculation. ) This was evident in the distinction between the 
three different types of representation discussed earlier. It was also noted earlier that 
Moscovici's means of "anchoring" the individual in the collective, be way of a "general 
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acceptance" involved a "de-emphasising" of individual features and "internal details" 
(1988, p. 220). Thus it was necessary for Moscovici to describe the interface between 
"psychic" and "external" realities in such a way that individual features and "internal 
details" were re-emphasised. Moscovici has failed to provide such a link and has 
consistently treated the internalisation of representations as unproblematic. As a result, 
the individual simply appears somewhat subordinate to, and effectively bound by, the 
normative values of the group. Thus, "social" relations are actually conceived as 
"group" relations, with the individual as subsumed within the group. Also, groups are 
taken to hold the same representation, a notion of consensus shown to be problematic 
by Potter and Litton (1985). 
Observation of social phenomena. 
Once more referring to the initial presentation of social representations, Moscovici 
argued that a representation was a system of categorisation (1984a, p. 30). However, 
when describing the process of categorisation, there was some scope for confusion 
regarding Moscovici's imprecise use of the terms "categorising", "classifying" and 
"naming". For example, even though Moscovici acknowledged that it is impossible to 
classify and not name something, he argued that there are distinct activities (1984a, 
p. 34). It is through the "naming" aspect of categorisation that the effects of social 
representations are manifested: it is through naming that an entity is placed within a 
"cultural identity matrix", acquires certain characteristics and becomes subject to a 
convention in such a way as to reflect a social attitude (1984a, p. 34-5). 
This separation of classification and naming allowed the "classification" aspect to be 
understood as unproblematic, such that individuals could be thought to initially observe 
phenomena in the same way, and then pre-existing representations would alter this 
content through the naming process. This separation is untenable and is the basis for 
the confusions surrounding both the distinction between concepts and percepts and the 
relationship between attitudes and social representations. In this initial paper, 
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Moscovici argued that the decision to treat an entity in a generalised or particular 
manner reflected a given attitude, i. e. the representation was dependent upon a "social 
attitude" (1984a, p. 33,35). Later, as described earlier, Moscovici argues that attitudes 
are dependent on social representations (1988, p. 226-7). 
It is clear that Moscovici has tended to not view the identification of representations as 
problematic. This is evident in his response to Harre, when Moscovici talks of the 
"principle of non-contradiction" as a rule with a "specific" content (1984b, p. 947). 
Individual variation is not considered. Again, it is a consequence of the separation of 
classification and naming that this example is not seen as problematic. To use Jahoda's 
phrase, social representations are taken as axiomatic, and little effort is made to justify 
any particular use of the term. Thus Moscovici states that a representation may be 
peculiar to the individual yet part of the common culture (1984b, p. 945) and that a 
representation (simply) becomes part of everyone's mind (1984b, p. 960). 
There is therefore some irony when, in response to McKinlay and Potter (1987), 
Moscovici attempts to explain why social representations are more than simply 
attitudes. Moscovici argues that representations with "nearly identical" content may 
have different emotional charges depending on their particular links of association 
(Moscovici, 1987, p. 523). Thus, Moscovici explains, we may observe a person as a 
stranger in a crowd and feel indifferent toward them, or as German or Jewish or 
English, and feel hostile toward them. Moscovici goes on to argue that social 
representations are important as they may engender different emotions. 
The irony alluded to earlier comes from the fact that Moscovici has argued that an 
entity may engender different reactions dependent on particular links of association 
despite having, what Moscovici describes as, nearly identical content. Whether the 
person is seen as a stranger in a crowd, or a member of a more specific social category, 
depends on how they are categorised. It must be seen that these different 
categorisations then are different representations. The important point to be made is 
that the same referent may be represented in different ways. This seemingly obvious 
point may have been obscured by Moscovici's notion of classification as 
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unproblematic. It is not unproblematic to simply state that representations have similar 
contents: if they have different "emotional charges" and different links of association, 
they are quite different representations. 
It is ironic that in attempting to support his position regarding a more minor point, that 
of an affective component to representation, Moscovici himself has argued that the 
whole notion of sharedness, the assumption of consensus central to social 
representations, is problematic: a seemingly common referent is not classified in a "pre- 
theoretical" manner, thus the identification of commonality or sharedness is not 
straightforward; what may appear at one level to be "nearly identical" contents may 
involve very different links of association, and therefore be very different 
representations. 
Similarly in response to Jahoda, Moscovici argues that shared categories may impose 
themselves even in unrelated contexts. However, if categories do impose themselves 
in different contexts, the contexts are related through these categories; they are not 
"unrelated". There is not simply one perspective (typically Moscovici's) to be 
accounted for. 
Also in response to Jahoda, Moscovici refers approvingly to the work of Obereysekere 
(1981, p. 169), to support Moscovici's argument that representations are "at the 
interface of two realities", psychic reality and external reality. According to 
Moscovici, Obersysekere's work shows that there is a difference between the public 
meaning of cultural symbols and the private meanings endowed on such symbols by 
people for their own private ends. Thus argues Moscovici, it is "possible to infuse a 
strong personal meaning into shared symbols which continue to be approved by a large 
part of society. " (Moscovici, 1988, p. 220-1). However, it is not apparent in what 
sense these symbols are shared other than as common referents. That they are widely 
approved does not necessarily mean that the grounds for this approval are shared, this 
is the implication of the strong personal meanings attached. It is not clear on what 
88 
basis sharedness is to be attributed' : apparent consensus may actually reflect a wide 
variety of individual variation. 
Thus the link between psychic and external realities has not actually been 
demonstrated; the link is simply assumed to exist as the result of a common initial 
referent. Once again it is ironic that Moscovici has explicitly drawn attention to the 
possibility that' there may be significant discrepancies between individual 
representations (as private meanings) and collective representations (as public 
meanings). That Moscovici appears once again to have unwittingly undermined his 
position is explicable given his assumption that social representations may be 
unproblematically observed. 
It must be stressed that the problematic nature of observation is a direct implication of 
all knowledge being mediated through representations. In this case, it should not 
simply be assumed that the researcher's perspective is the "truth". This was the 
position taken by Potter and Litton (1985) when they questioned the assumption of 
consensus. However, it appears that Moscovici continues to apply the term 
axiomatically. As a consequence of an unproblematic notion of observation, 
Moscovici often seems to consider his particular perspective as the only possibility, 
which leads to some (wildly) speculative assertions which are not adequately 
substantiated. Examples that have been presented earlier include Moscovici's 
hypothetical example of the representation of "neurotic" (1984a, p. 17); and the 
argument that the computer was a shared concept that was being used to understand 
the (presumably less familiar) concept of the brain (1988, p. 222). 
Another example is Moscovici's description of the three representations of 
individualism common to "our" culture2. Moscovici describes the "emancipated" 
' Moscovici previously rejected Potter and Litton's distinction between "using" and "mentioning" a 
representation (the former presumably involving some degree of internalisation absent in the latter. ) 
Moscovici argued that even to " mention" was to define an object in a certain way. (Moscovici, 1985, 
p. 92)., 
=Moscovici proposes this argument to refute Parker's (1987) claim that social representations are 
individualistic by claiming that this cannot be the case since "individualism" itself is a social 
representation (Moscovici, 1987, p. 520-1). The weakness of this line of argument has been discussed 
earlier. 
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individual, who has escaped the servitudes of tradition and defines themselves in 
opposition to the collectivity; the "sublimated" individual who sacrifices his desires to 
carry out the goals of the collectivity; and the "outsider" who acts selfishly and 
impersonally, ignoring values and prior relationships with others. Furthermore, 
Moscovici adds that the emancipated individual is an outgrowth of the Renaissance 
and the French Revolution; the sublimated individual as a result of the Reformation; 
and the outsider as the product of the market economy. Moscovici concludes, "(e)ach 
representation helped to shape a certain type of human being, a vision of the "self', and 
the appropriate personal qualities and motivations. " (1987, p. 521). 
Quite how these different senses of individualism were transmitted, to what extent they 
may have been held, and why they have persisted to the present, is not considered 3. It 
simply appears plausible to Moscovici that, given a contemporary perspective on these 
periods, individual self-awareness altered correspondingly. However, this assumption 
that these historical periods have resulted in distinct representations of individualism is 
unsubstantiated to say the least. For example, there is no explanation for why only 
these periods may have had this effect rather than any other;, it is not clear why it is 
only these three versions of individualism that are available in "our" culture; and the 
distinctiveness of the three categories has not been demonstrated, in particular the 
emancipated and outsider appear substantively similar. The definitions could just as 
easily be described as "individualist" (emancipated and outsider) and "collectivist" 
(sublimated), a distinction presumably relevant to a wider variety of historical periods 
than those mentioned by Moscovici. Again, Moscovici simply assumes an 
unproblematic understanding of the phenomena in question. 
A further example, similar in many respects to the three types of individualism are the 
three types of social representation that Moscovici describes in his response to Jahoda, 
based on the different social relations in each case (Moscovici, 1988, p. 221-2). The 
"hegemonic", "emancipated" and "polemic" social representations have been 
I Presumably these periods do not refer to modem societies (with the possible exception of the market 
economy which persists to the present day but may be traced back in some form for many centuries), 
so according to Moscovici's description of social representations as distinctly modern phenomena, 
these historical periods should be expected to understood in terms of homogenous, collective 
representations. 
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mentioned earlier, but will be discussed in more detail. "Hegemonic" representations 
are described as those shared by all members of a highly structured group, such as "a 
party, city or nation" (1988, p. 221); "emancipated" representations are generated by 
different sub-groups, whereby "each subgroup creates its own version and shares it 
with the others" (1988, p. 221); and "polemic" representations are determined by the 
antagonistic relations between members of society, "they are generated in the course of 
social conflict and society as a whole does not share them" (1988, p. 221). Here, 
Moscovici does in fact state that "the point of view of the observer plays an important 
part" (1988, p. 222), but makes no further comment to help substantiate the statement. 
Again, the sharedness of the representations is assumed, thus the scope for variation in 
understood solely in group terms. The issue of identifying how and to what extent a 
group may be said to share a representation is taken to be unproblematic, yet it is the 
extent of this sharedness itself that marks the distinction between the different types. 
This leads to a situation of classification by fiat, which raises serious doubts as to 
utility of the classification. For example, given the capacity for individual 
transformation, it is not clear how widely a hegemonic representation should be 
expected to manifest itself either across situations, across individuals or across time. 
In some instances the scope for individual variation will manifest itself such that the 
representation may not appear to be hegemonic, and thus could be described as 
emancipated. Similarly it is not clear when the interactions between groups should be 
regarded as antagonistic and thus change from being emancipated to polemic, or vice 
versa. 
The problem is that there Moscovici provides no means by which to specify the 
boundaries of these distinctions. One group of people may assume their representation 
to be widely held, whereas it may not only be narrowly held, but may specifically 
contradict the beliefs of others who may regard themselves as either ambivalent or 
even antagonistic to the first group. Thus to the first group of people, the 
representation may appear to be hegemonic, to the others it may appear emancipated 
or polemic. It is not clear by whose definition of "antagonism" any distinction is to be 
made. Any relationship between groups may entail a degree of antagonism; again the 
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identification of this level as one which leads to polemic representations or not, is not 
straightforward, particularly when the scope for individual variation between groups is 
taken into account. It is not clear how these distinctions are to be made. Again, this 
is not an issue if the observation of phenomena is taken to be unproblematic and the 
researches perspective is taken to reflect the "truth". 
However, not only is it not clear how these distinctions are to be made, it is also not 
clear why these distinctions should be made. Moscovici does not provide any 
explanation for why a tripartite distinction should be more appropriate than any other. 
In fact, given the scope for individual variation it is not clear what a hegemonic 
representation could possibly entail; it is simply a representation held (in whatever way 
that could possibly be understood) by a larger group, than the sub-groups implicated in 
the other types of representation. Similarly with regard to the emancipated and 
polemic distinction, some degree of antagonism in the relations between groups is 
inevitable, so a distinction made on the grounds of "antagonistic relations" or "not" 
does not appear particularly useful. It is only due to the persistence of consensuality in 
Moscovici's thought, that such a simplistic distinction as antagonistic versus non- 
antagonistic group relations could possibly be viewed as worthwhile. The distinctions 
are based upon a simplistic, unipolar dimension of consensus versus conflict, that 
Moscovici has arbitrarily divided into three parts4. It is not apparent what use 
Moscovici's distinctions could actually be put to. They are of little theoretical use due 
to their thoroughly speculative nature, and their reliance upon group level consensus; 
and in the context of a specific research enquiry such a simplistic division would be of 
little use, due to its reliance upon a notion of unproblematic observation. It would be 
more worthwhile to think in terms of simultaneous conflict and consensus. 
There is also confusion concerning Moscovici's comments regarding "facts". By 
asserting that all understanding is mediated by representations, it is not immediately 
apparent why some forms of knowledge may be accorded more importance that others 
and thus be termed "facts", given that all information is mediated through 
'This is in some respects similar to the earlier example of different types of individualism, which was 
based upon a unipolar dimension of collectivism versus individualism, that again was arbitrarily 
divided into three parts. 
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representations. Nevertheless Moscovici makes continual reference to "facts". For 
example, "We derive only a small fraction of our knowledge and information from the 
simple interaction between ourselves and the facts we encounter in the world. " 
(Moscovici, 1988, p. 215). 
Moscovici initially attempted to deal with this situation through the positing of a 
distinction between reified and consensual realms. However, as described by 
McKinlay and Potter, asserting that science is the basis for facts and truth cannot be 
reconciled with the notion that all thinking is mediated by representations, as scientists 
presumably also mediate the world through their representations. 
In fact, in that initial chapter, Moscovici argues that science was formerly based on 
common sense, whereas now common sense is science made common (1984a, p. 29). 
This change in the relationship between common sense and science was no doubt 
necessary for Moscovici to support the notion that science is distinct from social 
representations, thereby providing a means for privileging certain types of knowledge 
as science. This supposed distinction between science and social representations is the 
basis for the confusions surrounding the distinction between the consensual and the 
refied, as argued by McKinlay and Potter which show the distinction to be untenable. 
Moscovici's later attempts to distinguish science from social representations on the 
basis of a "legalistic" as opposed to a "fiduciary" truth (1987, p. 518) offer little 
improvement: rigorous thinking is not the sole province of science; similarly 
Moscovici's notion of "visualising" (1988, p. 216), was discussed earlier and shown to 
be untenable. 
That Moscovici had not appreciated the implications of all thought being mediated by 
social representations is indicated through the many examples given for the importance 
of representations. Examples include, our understandings of urban space being utterly 
determined by our representations (1984a, p. 60); our representation of illness 
influencing our behaviour (1984b, p. 95 1); that as "communists" move closer to other 
groups their representations change (1984b, p. 950-1); that social representations are 
important for an aggregate of individuals to become a social movement (1987, p. 515); 
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that each representation of money reveals a different social representation of money 
(1987, p. 517); that drug use is a given and a product of representations (1988, p. 214); 
and that representations determine the reality in which people live (1988, p. 231). If 
Moscovici had fully appreciated his initial assertion, these examples would appear 
entirely unremarkable. Every thought or intentional action is a result of one's social 
representations, given the definition of social representations as mediating our 
knowledge and understanding. 
Moscovici's discussion of Durkheim. 
As described earlier, Jahoda gave a number of reasons why social representations did 
not actually appear to be distinct from Durkheim's "collective representations" 
(Jahoda, 1988, p. 196-7). Moscovici responded by arguing that unlike social 
representations, for collective representations there is no effort to "spell out its 
cognitive characteristics in greater detail" (Moscovici, 1988, p. 218). However, now 
that it can be seen that Moscovici attempts to describe the "cognitive characteristics" 
of social representations have not been convincing, it is worthwhile examining in some 
detail how distinct Moscovici's notions are from those of Durkheim. 
Moscovici makes reference to the work of Durkheim as a theoretical antecedent, in 
particular Durkheim's concept of "collective representations". Reference to Durkheim 
was a consistent feature of Moscovici's papers in the critical exchanges discussed 
earlier 5. It is instructive to scrutinise Moscovici's appropriation of Durkheim as this 
allows important insights into the nature of Moscovici's project. 
The references to Durkheim can be seen to provide support on two fronts. One is to 
legitimate the importance of studying collective representations in general; this is done 
through an acknowledgement of Durkheim's statement of the importance of such 
S The only exception is the short, two page rejoinder to Potter and Litton's (1985a) strongly critical 
paper (Moscovici, 1985). 
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activity. The other is to legitimate the importance of studying social representations in 
particular, by stressing the progression Moscovici has made from Durkheim's original 
conception. 
However, by seeking to emphasise the distinctiveness of social representations, 
Moscovici has propagated a caricature of Durkheim's position, involving gross 
distortion and simplification. It will be seen that great similarities in the fundamental 
features of each approach. Also, it will be argued that Moscovici's conception is not 
only prone to precisely the same problems as Durkheim, but that Moscovici's 
proposed solutions are also similar to those of Durkheim. This forces a 
reconsideration of the distinctiveness of Moscovici's contribution. 
Moscovici's misappropriation of Durkheim 
Moscovici states that it is "obvious" that the concept of social representations is a 
legacy of Durkheimian thought (1984a, p. 16). Durkheim's eminence is explicitly 
acknowledged many times, for example: "Durkheim was the first to focus on the 
importance of collective representations embedded in language, our institutions and 
our customs, showing at the same time to what extent this set of representations 
constitutes social thought as a complement to individual thought. " (Moscovici, 
1984b, p. 942) 
The alignment of social representations with a respected, if overlooked, tradition is 
also made through this explicit association with Durkheim: "According to Durkheim, it 
is the explicit task of social psychology to study the nature and genesis of collective 
representations, to analyse "collective ideation, " and to take on this task as its main 
scientific objective. " (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 942) 
However, perhaps as a consequence of this proposed partialling out of responsibility 
within disciplines, the idea had not been "theoretically formulated" (Moscovici, 1987, 
p. 526). It has thus been necessary to amend Durkheim's conception by addressing its 
"intrinsic problems" (Moscovici, 1988, p. 219). Moscovici describes Durkheim's 
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position on a number of basic points, each of which allow Moscovici to provide a 
counter position to distinguish social representations from Durkheim-ian sociology. 
Moscovici's argument may be broken down into four basic assertions, which may be 
summarised as follows: 
(1) For Durkheim, collective representations have a static, coercive and homogenous 
character. They reflect Durkheim's generally static conception of society. In contrast 
social representations are more dynamic, and therefore more appropriate to rapidly 
changing modern societies. 
(2) Collective representations are distinct from, and defined in their opposition to, 
individual representations; for Moscovici this distinction is, to a large extent, irrelevant. 
Social representations seek to transcend the dichotomy of individual and social. 
(3) It is the job of social psychology to study in more detail collective representations, 
a point endorsed by Durkheim himself. 
(4) Collective representations refer to a whole range of intellectual forms, including 
science, religion, myth and categories of space and time. In contrast social 
representations are more specific, referring to a particular type of knowledge. 
Although Moscovici describes this characterisation of Durkheim's work as `well 
known" (1988, p. 218), this assertion was questioned as early as the initial Farr and 
Moscovici volume: 
"Durkheim was a careful and systematic thinker, and social representations are an 
integral part of a larger conceptual framework. I am not sure that Durkheim's image 
of society is the image entertained by the contemporary French School [i. e. those 
working in Social Representations ]... " (Deutscher, 1984, p. 75). 
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Indeed each of the arguments proposed by Moscovici to demonstrate the 
distinctiveness of social representations may be called into question. It will be seen that 
Moscovici is often very selective in his use of references when referring to Durkheim. 
As a result it can be seen that often by considering such a reference in its original 
context, its meaning appears quite different to that attributed by Moscovici. On 
occasion, this difference in meaning is apparent by analysing just a paragraph from 
which Moscovici may have selected only particular lines. To this end, to examine each 
of Moscovici's arguments requires a more detailed analysis of Durkheim's work. 
Thus, each of Moscovici's assertions will be considered in turn. 
(1) For Durkheim, collective representations have a static, coercive and homogenous 
character. They reflect Durkheim's generally static conception of society. 
Durkheim defines the "conscience collective" as "the set of beliefs and sentiments 
common to the average member of single society [which] forms a determinate system 
that has its own life. " 6 (1972, p. 77) It is "by definition, diffused throughout the 
whole society.. " and is "independent of the particular conditions in which individuals 
are placed; they pass on and it remains. " (1972, p. 77) 
This would appear to correspond to Moscovici's description. However, the 
conscience collective was a concept relevant to less Advanced, or "traditional" 
societies. These types of society were characterised by a "mechanical solidarity", 
where the individual was tied directly to society, their autonomy bounded by a strongly 
defined moral consensus. The term "mechanical" is used to indicate an analogy with 
the "mechanical structure" of simple organisms, where each cell is comparable to all 
others. 
6 Lukes (1973) points out that in translation, the French term "conscience" may refer to both 
"conscience" and "consciousness". "Thus the `beliefs and sentiments' comprising the conscience 
collective are, on the one hand, moral and religious, and, on the other, cognitive. " (p. 4). 
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Mechanical solidarity is quite different from the solidarity characteristic of modern 
societies, produced through the division of labour. Modern societies are based on a 
more "organic solidarity". The term "organic" is used to indicate an analogy with the 
"higher animals", where "each organ, in effect, has its special character and autonomy; 
and yet the unity of the organism is as great as the individuation of the parts is more 
marked. " Whereas mechanical solidarity implies that individuals resemble each other, 
organic solidarity presumes that they differ (Durkheim, 1972). Here the individual's 
attachments to the "conscience collective" are mediated by ties to other groups, such 
as those generated by the division of labour. Common understandings become more 
general. Normative understandings are not identical for different sections of a society; 
these are what Durkheim refers to as "collective representations". 
".. Essentially, social life is made up of representations. " (Durkheim, 1974, p. 55) 
"Indeed, what the collective representations convey is the way in which the group 
conceives itself in relation to objects which affect it. " (Durkheim 1974, p. 28) 
Durkheim places much emphasis on collective representations. Lukes (1973) states 
that Durkheim made little use of the "conscience collective" as the saw this as too 
static and all-embracing; and that much of Durkheim's later work can be seen as the 
systematic study of collective representations. Thus to charge Durkheim with simply 
holding a static view of society is inaccurate. 
To consider Durkheim's thought on the nature of society, particularly with reference to 
Moscovici's charges of "homogenous" and "coercive", it is necessary to briefly present 
Durkheim's definitions of "social fact" and "institution" and their relationship to 
collective representations. 
Durkheim defines a "social fact" as ", ways of acting or thinking with the peculiar 
characteristic of exercising a coercive influence on individual consciousness. " 
(Durkheim. 1982, p. 51) Social facts, are "mental", in that, they "consist of ways of 
thinking or behaving. But the states of the collective consciousness are different in 
nature from the states of the individual consciousness; they are representations of 
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another type. " (Durkheim, 1982, p. 45). Also Durkheim describes "institutions" as "all 
the beliefs and all the modes of conduct instituted by the collectivity. " Thus collective 
representations are seen as social facts (Lukes, 1973). 
However, it can be seen that Durkheim's understandings are quite sophisticated from 
the following passages: the first relates to the coercive influence of the social fact, the 
second to the charge of homogeneity. 
"The coercive power that we attribute to it is so far from being the whole of the social 
fact, that it can present the opposite character as well. Institutions may impose 
themselves upon us, but we cling to them; they compel us and we love them; they 
constrain us and we find our welfare in our adherence to them and in this very 
constraint..... There is perhaps no collective behaviour which does not exercise this 
double action upon us, and it is contradictory in appearance only. " (Durkheim, 1972, 
p. 80). 
"Because beliefs and social practices thus come to us from without, it does not follow 
that we receive them passively or without modification. In reflecting on collective 
institutions and assimilating them for ourselves, we individualise them and impart to 
them more or less personal characteristics... . There is no conformity to social 
convention that does not comprise an entire range of individual shades. " (Durkheim, 
1972, p. 70). 
Thus it can be seen that to simply describe Durkheim's collective representations as 
static, homogenous, and coercive with little further comment is a gross 
misrepresentation. In fact, on the basis of the above arguments, it appears that 
Durkheim's conception is indeed very similar to that of Moscovici. 
99 
(2) That collective representations are distinct from, and defined in their opposition to, 
individual representations. 
Again, reference must be made to the distinctions between both mechanical and 
organic solidarity. Durkheim describes these types of solidarity are "two aspects of 
one and the same reality, but nonetheless, they must be distinguished. " (Durkheim, 
1982, p. 80). 
Durkheim describes the conscience collective as leaving open a space for individual 
consciousness to allow for specific functions to be fulfilled, however individual 
consciousness is still considered merely an appendage to the collective consciousness. 
Thus, the conscience collective may be described as distinct from, and defined in their 
opposition to, individual representations. But this is not the case with collective 
representations. Durkheim makes no claim of an opposition between collective and 
individual representations. As is evident in the following quote, Durkheim simply 
states that collective representations are not reducible to individual characteristics; that 
is, they are emergent phenomena. 
"In fact, on the one hand, every individual depends more directly upon society as 
labour becomes more divided; and, on the other, the activity of every individual 
becomes more personalised to the degree that it is more specialised..... Here, then, the 
individuality of all grows at the same time as that of its parts. Society becomes more 
capable of collective action, at the same time that each of its elements has more 
freedom of action. " (Durkheim, 1982, p. 54). 
The transition from mechanical to organic solidarity constitutes a transformation of the 
social bond, leading both to an increased level of individuation, and an undermining of 
fixed, moral boundaries. Contrary to Moscovici's claim, there is not a simple 
opposition between the collective and the individual, once again there appears to be 
much similarity between Durkheim and Moscovici. 
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(3) It is the job of social psychology to study in more detail collective representations. 
Durkheim himself endorsed this point. 
Durkheim places great importance on the study of collective beliefs, describing them as 
"the vital knot of the whole society". As for example in Durkheim's account of social 
constraint, which occurs later in the same passage as that from which Moscovici's 
assertion is taken: "... this is the very essence of the idea of social constraint; for it 
merely implies that collective ways of acting or thinking have a reality outside the 
individuals who, at every moment of time, conform to it. .... 
in order that there may be 
a social fact, several individuals at the very least, must have contributed their action; 
and in this joint activity is the origin of a new fact.... since this joint activity takes place 
outside each one of us (for a plurality of consciousnesses enters into it), its necessary 
effect is to fix, to institute outside us, certain ways of acting and certain judgements 
which do not depend on each particular will taken separately.. . (one can) 
designate as 
"institutions" all the beliefs and all the modes of conduct instituted by the collectivity. 
Sociology can then be defined as the science of institutions, of their genesis and their 
functioning. " (Durkheim, 1982, p. 45). 
This seems to contradict Moscovici's claim that Durkheim considered the study of 
collective representations to be the job of social psychology. As described earlier, 
Lukes (1973) describes much. of Durkheim's later work to be concerned with 
systematic study of collective representations. With regard to Durkheim's comments 
regarding social psychology, Durkheim had actually said that "Collective psychology is 
sociology, quite simply" (1974, p. 34), and that "a special branch of sociology, which 
does not yet exist, should be devoted to research into the laws of collective ideation. " 
(1974, p. 32). It is with regard to this last point, concerning the laws of collective 
thinking, that Durkheim was referring when making the statement Moscovici draws 
upon: "Social psychology whose task it is to determine these laws, is scarcely more 
than a name, without a definite subject matter, and including all sorts of generalities, 
diverse and inexact. " (Durkheim, 1982, p. 41). 
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It appears that Durkheim is referring to social psychology as the name for a proposed 
branch of sociology whose task would be to study the "laws of ideation". This is far 
from providing an endorsement from Durkheim of what has now come to be known as 
social psychology. From this, it can be seen that for Moscovici to describe Durkheim 
as delegating the study of collective representations to social psychology is at best 
misleading. However, when also taking into account the selectivity of Moscovici's 
referencing, it appears that Moscovici is deliberately attempting to promote the 
legitimacy of social representations by illegitimate means. 
(4) Collective representations refer to a whole range of intellectual forms, including 
science, religion, myth and, categories of space and time. In contrast Social 
Representations are more specific, referring to a particular type of knowledge. 
This argument does not involve a misrepresentation of Durkheim's position as such, 
though as described earlier when discussing social representations, it does involve a 
misrepresentation of Moscovici's position. The arguments of McKinlay and Potter 
(1987) and Jahoda (1988) in particular, showed that Moscovici does not appear to 
provide a convincing argument to differentiate social representations from "other 
forms of knowledge", consequently the reified / consensual distinction is not 
sustainable. Indeed as all information is mediate through representations, "science, 
religion, myth and categories of space and time" may all be understood as social 
representations. 
With regard to social representations referring to a specific type of knowledge, 
concerns about the logical status of Social Representations expressed by Jahoda 
(1988) are relevant. In a section titled "What is not a Social Representation? ", Jahoda 
complains: "(t)he open-ended application of the term seems to provide a license to 
treat everything except the `reified universe of science' as a social representation. 
Already in Moscovici's original study of the image of psychoanalysis numerous 
individual interviews are reported, whose content is invariably discussed in terms of 
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social representations. Interesting and insightful as many of these discussions are, no 
attempt is made to justify the application of the label which is simply taken as 
axiomatic. " (Jahoda, 1988, p. 204). 
Thus, on the basis of earlier discussions, social representations do not appear to refer 
to a particular type of knowledge. Once again the distinctiveness Moscovici claims 
between his approach and that of Durkheim does not appear to be sustained. 
Conclusion 
It can be seen that Durkheim's position is far more sophisticated than it would appear 
through Moscovici's descriptions. I will later argue that this simplification of 
Durkheim became progressively more complete as Moscovici sought to defend Social 
Representations from mounting criticism. However this is not to say that Durkheim's 
position is wholly satisfactory with respect to the phenomena with which he was 
concerned. It will be argued that Moscovici's arguments do not constitute a departure 
from those of Durkheim, and are subject to similar shortcomings. To pursue this line 
of discussion requires further detailed analysis of Durkheim's work, in particular the 
expression of social constraint through the concept of the "social fact". 
Re-introducing Durkheim 
The two major concerns in Durkheim's work were to deal with social change, 
particularly the transition between traditional and modem societies; and to mark out a 
specific domain for sociology (Lukes, 1973; Giddens, 1977). In "The rules of 
sociological method" (1982), Durkheim gives the following definitions of social facts: 
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"A social fact is any way of acting, whether fixed or not, capable of exerting over the 
individual an external constraint; 
or: 
which is general over the whole of a given society whilst having an existence of its 
own, independent of its individual manifestations. " (Durkheim, 1982, p. 59). 
Durkheim did not regard these definitions as exhaustive or exclusive, but as 
preliminary definitions, to be used as a sign by which to recognise sociological 
phenomena, and so guide research. Thus Durkheim describes how the second 
definition may be understood as a reformulation of the first: "if a mode of behaviour 
existing outside the consciousness of individuals becomes general, in can only do so by 
exerting pressure on them. " (Durkheim, 1982, p. 44). 
Lukes (1973) points out the particular nature of Durkheim's use of the word "fact" 
and its translation. Luker stresses that "social facts should be understood to mean 
social phenomena, factors or forces. " Durkheim emphasised the "objective reality of 
social facts" to be a basic principle; as realities external to the individual. However, 
there are a number of ways that social facts are described as being external to the 
individual. It is in attempting to reconcile these descriptions that some of the problems 
of Durkheim's approach may be seen. 
Social facts are seen as external to the individual as they are refractory to the human 
will; that is they could not simply be altered by a "mere act of will". This was 
important to Durkheim as he wished to distinguish his position from a utilitarian 
standpoint. Briefly stated, the utilitarian position took the individual as the starting 
point of analysis; social life was seen as spontaneous and therefore entirely 
unconstraining; all human wants were seen as contained within the individual. In 
contrast to this, Durkheim's "moral individualism" took the individual to be an 
outcome of social processes. 
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Durkheim saw social facts as capable of exerting constraint, recognisable through the 
existence of pre-determined sanctions. Through the application or threat of application 
of these sanctions, individuals were obligated to act in particular ways. To capture the 
specific nature of "social" constraint as opposed to that of physical objects, Durkheim 
made a distinction between moral sanctions and mechanical sanctions. 
Mechanical sanctions followed automatically from, and were therefore necessarily 
related to, a particular action. As an example, Durkheim gives the example of drinking 
poisoned water. The sanction which would follow automatically would be falling ill. 
Individuals would therefore orient their behaviour to avoid the sanction, and in this 
example, poisoned water would not be drunk. 
In contrast, social constraint involves moral sanctions and obligations. Here the 
sanction is socially determined and has no definite connection to the action. This 
allows negotiation in the definition of an action, and also enables cultural or group 
variation to be accounted for. For example, in the case of ending the life of another, 
the action may be punished to varying degrees of severity depending on how the action 
is understood, as perhaps self-defence, neglect or as pre-meditated, and may even be 
rewarded, for example in times of war. 
However, constraint was not seen solely as an external force. In his later writings, 
Durkheim increasingly emphasised the enabling character of the moral sanction rather 
than its constraining aspect, as his conception of society became more normative. This 
was described earlier when discussing the transition to "organic solidarity". The 
constraining aspect continued to be involved in the defining of goals and normative 
standards, though normative values were seen as internalised by the individual. 
Durkheim described the externality of social facts in another sense when stating that 
that they both pre-existed and post-dated the individual. For example, domestic, or 
civic or contractual obligations are defined externally to the individual in law and 
custom; religious beliefs and practices "exist prior to the individual, because they exist 
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outside him"; language and currency as well as professional practices "function 
independently of my use of them" (Durkheim, 1982, p. 45). 
Social facts are also seen as external as they refer to externally visible components or 
expressions of action. They are external to the individual flux of individual participants 
and may be found in social statistics representing rates of births, marriages and 
suicides. These statistics afford a means to isolate certain currents of opinion, "(s)uch 
currents are plainly social facts" (Durkheim, 1982, p. 55). 
"Since each one of these statistics includes without distinction all individual cases, the 
individual circumstances which may have played some part in producing the 
phenomenon cancel each other out and consequently do not contribute to determining 
the nature of the phenomenon. " (Durkheim, 1982, p. 55). 
Further social facts are independent of the individual's conceptual apparatus, and are 
not to be confused with personal manifestations or what Durkheim refers to as 
"individual incarnations", "What constitutes social facts are the beliefs, tendencies and 
practices of the group taken collectively. But the forms that these collective states 
may assume when they are refracted through individuals are things of a different kind. " 
(Durkheim, 1982, p. 48). 
Again with regard to "individual incarnations", Durkheim states that ".. to a large 
extent each one depends also upon the psychical and organic constitution of the 
individual, and on the particular circumstances in which he is placed. Therefore they 
are not phenomena which are in the strict sense sociological. " (Durkheim, 1982, p. 49). 
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Critical evaluation of Durkheim 
There are a number of conceptual difficulties in Durkheim's formulations that are 
directly relevant to Social Representations. They are related to the various notions of 
the externality of social facts, and concern both the nature of social constraint (the 
relationship between the individual and the social) and the logic of empirical enquiry. 
For clarity these will be explored first with reference to Durkheim's work only. The 
implications for Social Representations, particularly the distinctiveness and adequacy 
of the formulation, will be examined later. 
The sense in which social facts are described as external to the individual, through 
being refractory to the human will, is problematic. As described earlier, to distinguish 
social constraint from geographical or environmental constraint, Durkheim 
differentiated moral sanctions from mechanical sanctions. Durkheim explained the 
peculiar enabling yet constraining aspect of moral sanctions through the internalisation 
of normative values, in effect, a sense of obligation or moral commitment to a norm. 
In contrast, with regard to mechanical sanctions behaviour is more utilitarian, oriented 
toward the risk inherent in the sanction; so for example in the case of the poisoned 
water, if the person is in desperate need of the water and is not certain as to its 
contamination, they may choose to drink. 
The problem for Durkheim is that he cannot incorporate a "utilitarian" approach to 
moral sanctions. It is quite conceivable for action to be oriented toward moral norms 
without implying a moral commitment. Action that appears to conform to a norm may 
not actually involve acceptance of a moral obligation, but may instead be oriented 
toward the avoidance of a sanction. For example, a person may agree to be drafted 
into the armed forces during a period of conflict to avoid the sanctions involved in not 
complying, rather than by being committed to a particular cause. Alternatively, a 
person may be morally committed to a value but may disagree with a particular 
expression of that value. For example, they may be strongly patriotic, yet disagree 
with their country's involvement in a particular conflict, and so may appear to act 
against the national interest. As Giddens (1977) explains, this may seem an obvious 
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point, but though such orientations may be of decisive importance in social life, they 
cannot be dealt with within Durkheim's conceptualisation. 
Thus the assumption that a social fact involves the internalisation of a normative value 
is problematic. Compliance may be secured among those who are indifferent, 
ambivalent or even outright opposed to a particular normative value, through the 
coercive measures some are able to apply against others. This bears directly upon 
issues of conflict and power that Durkheim, due to the normative bias in his work, 
cannot adequately deal with. 
The deficiencies of Durkheim in this respect can again be demonstrated through the 
concept of "anomie", or social disintegration. The lack of normative regulation may be 
conceived of in two ways, as a lack of definite objectives or a lack of realisable 
objectives (Giddens, 1977). In the first sense anomie refers to a situation of 
"normlessness"; with social conflict seen in terms of imperfect socialisation. In 
contrast, the lack of realisable objectives can be conceived in terms of normative strain, 
where objectives may be clearly defined, but may be mutually antagonistic. A person 
may find the norms associated with "employment" in their "social environment" to be 
in conflict with those in their "work environment"; for example, in their social 
environment employment may be valued in instrumental terms, whereas their work 
environment may involve a work ethic of commitment. Here, conflict may be seen as 
arising from divisions of interest in society. 
Durkheim generally considers anomie in the first sense, that of normlessness. 
However, when anomie is considered in the second sense by Durkheim, the lack of 
realisable objectives is seen to refer to the changeable nature of human wants rather 
than in terms of conflicting norms. This is a consequence of the reliance on the 
internalisation of values. Adherence to norms can only be understood through 
internalisation, however there are no means for dealing with degrees of internalisation 
or commitment to norms. Consequently, non-compliance can only be seen in terms of 
lack of commitment rather than as occurring through conflicting normative demands. 
Normative conflict cannot be dealt with theoretically, even though the issue of 
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normative conflict may be considered relevant. This leads to an essentially unitary 
conception of social phenomena: as internalisation is only conceived in terms of either 
having happened, or not having happened, adherence to norms is taken 
unproblematically to be the consequence of internalisation. 
This is a crucial point, for the internalisation of values is at the heart. of Durkheim's 
conceptualisation of agency; that is, of the relationship between the individual and the 
social, and it is found to be problematic. Lukes (1985) argues that Durkheim tended 
to ignore aspects of social life that he could not easily assimilate, such as interactions 
between individuals and relations between sub-social groups. Thus it can be seen that 
the relationship between groups' "specialised moralities" or collective representations 
in a situation of organic solidarity remains unclear; there is no means for dealing with 
possible conflict between those "specialised moralities". 
A consideration of social change illustrates the problematic nature of Durkheim's 
formulation. This is evident in the possibility of alternative readings of Durkheim, both 
materialist and idealist (Giddens, 1977, p. 280). A materialist reading emphasises how 
the change in infrastructure from mechanical to organic solidarity causes changes in 
moral conduct. An idealist reading would emphasise how changes in moral ideals, 
such as the growth of myths, may alter social life, (Durkheim explains how the original 
forms of collective representations may "bear the mark of their origin", but once 
formed they are partially autonomous. ) Durkheim emphasises the interplay between 
the infrastructure and the conscience collective and collective representations, but 
provides no systematic treatment of the mechanisms mediating the relationship. Thus, 
as Giddens (1977, p. 285) argues "there appear to be two independent sets of processes 
going on. " 
Also problematic is that Durkheim uses the term "individual" in different senses. He 
uses it in a specific sense to refer to any particular individual, or the "concrete 
individual"; yet also in a more general sense to refer to the "social actor", that is the 
individual as the outcome of social processes. This can be seen by considering 
Durkheim's examples of the externality of social facts to the individual. In the 
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description of externality referring to social facts as both pre-existing and post-dating 
the individual, the "concrete individual" is invoked. This can be seen in that it would 
not make sense in terms of the "social actor" given the involvement of the individual in 
the social fact, for example as described in the arguments concerning the development 
of moral individualism through organic solidarity. The problem is that Durkheim does 
not adequately describe the relationship between the concrete individual and the social 
actor; that is between the specific and the general case. The relationship may be 
assumed to be unproblematic due to reliance on the notion of internalisation which 
would tend to reinforce such a view. However, the implications of this problematic 
assumption may be illustrated by considering Durkheim's analysis of suicide. 
Durkheim's study of suicide served to illustrate his conception of sociological method 
(Giddens, 1977, p. 275). Primarily through the statistical manipulation of official 
statistics, Durkheim sought to investigate the social factors that govern the rate of 
suicide, rather than conceiving of suicide as a purely personal act. Durkheim 
acknowledges that his analysis identifies relevant social conditions, and does not allow 
one to predict specific cases, that being the task of a psychological theory. However, 
Durkheim, does allow that social conditions are likely to affect the incidence of 
"suicidal personalities". 
The recourse to a psychological theory appears legitimate as "suicidal traits" are left at 
a "pre-social" level. However, the concept of the social actor emphasises the cognitive 
and motivational personality of the individual is shaped by social learning, through the 
internalisation of moral norms. Thus there is a tension between the "pre-social" 
impulsions of the concrete individual and the moral commands of the social actor. The 
reliance on a psychological theory would only be legitimate if there were a clear 
distinction between "non-social" (presumably biological) suicides and "socially 
influenced" suicides. 
However, a relationship is assumed between the specific and the general case, or 
between the "concrete individual" and the "social actor", though by not having the 
means to sufficiently explain it, this treatment of the external nature of the social fact 
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must be seen as wanting. The "concrete individual" is not distinct from the "social 
actor", thus social facts cannot simply be said to pre-exist 'and post-date the individual. 
It is necessary to more clearly explicate how the individual is implicated in the 
perpetuation of a social fact. 
Similarly, each of the other explanations of the external nature of social facts can be 
seen as problematic. Durkheim explains the independence of the social fact from 
individual incarnations by arguing that norms are distinct from, yet govern social 
behaviour. Through the notion of individual incarnations acknowledges the notion of 
individual variation, however Durkheim does not clearly explain the relationship 
between a particular behaviour and the wider norms. This then can be seen to be a 
redescription of the problem relating the specific to the general case, or the "concrete 
individual" to the "social actor" described previously with respect to Durkheim's study 
of suicide. The only means Durkheim provides for relating the concrete individual and 
the social actor, through the internalisation of normative values, cannot deal effectively 
with this problem. 
The externality of social facts described through official statistics as beyond the flux of 
individual participants is also problematic. While there are complex arguments 
concerning whether for example, the notion of a suicide rate itself should be accepted, 
for the present purposes it is sufficient to describe a contradiction within Durkheim's 
discussion of the use of official statistics. Durkheim seeks to improve upon common- 
sense notions of suicide by providing his own definition and supporting it with official 
statistics. However, it is not clear how close Durkheim's definition corresponds to 
those used by those involved in the construction of the official statistics. Thus it is not 
clear to what extent the statistics do in fact support what Durkheim proposes the term 
to mean. 
That the use of the official statistics was seen as unproblematic relates to a basic 
conceptual confusion, whereby social facts are seen as both an element and a 
proposition of the social world. This confuses two senses of social facts as "the mode 
of thinking", and "that which is thought", respectively. Durkheim's theoretical 
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discussion seeks to establish social facts as "the mode of thinking" whereby social facts 
are taken to be features of society. However, that argument is also used to support 
social facts as "that which is thought", i. e., the content of a particular social fact. That 
may be considered legitimate when it is assumed that social facts can be neutrally and 
unproblematically observed. However, when doubt is cast as to the propositional 
content of a social fact, such as in the case of attributing Durkheim's definition of 
suicide to official statistics, Durkheim's theoretical discussion, which relates to social 
facts as "the mode of thinking" is not directly relevant. 
Thus it can be seen that Durkheim's conception of social facts, based upon both social 
constraint through the internalisation of norms and a confusion between social facts as 
"the mode of thinking" and "that which is thought" is inherently flawed. These 
problems lead to a conception of social phenomena as unitary and unproblematically 
observed, respectively. However, it is important to note that the problems regarding 
the conception of social phenomena follow as a consequence of Durkheim's 
theorisation. Thus, even though reference may be made toward individual variation 
and different levels of attachment to norms, a unitary conception of phenomena is 
implicit in the assumption of internalisation of values. Similarly, the unproblematic 
observation of phenomena is implicit given the external nature of social facts. This is 
an important point to emphasise, that even though Durkheim acknowledged the 
complex nature of social phenomena, a unitary, unproblematic conception of social 
phenomena was a consequence of fundamental flaws in his theorisation. 
Similarities between Parsons and Moscovici 
Durkheim's discussion of social facts can be seen as an attempt to theorise the 
relationship between action and structure. As described earlier, the "social" world is 
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seem as distinct from the "natural world" due to its normative character. Action is 
oriented toward norms, which are seen as properties of collectivities. 
The work of Parsons is also relevant to an investigation of social representations. 
Parsons' arguments share a number of similarities with those of Moscovici. Both 
Parsons and Moscovici consider Durkheim as a direct theoretical antecedent, and they 
each seek to explain the relationship between the individual and society through the 
internalisation of normative values. However, both also similarly mis-represent 
Durkheim by over-emphasising the consensual character of his writing, to support their 
own projects. 
Parsons attempted to transcend the individual / social distinction by investigating the 
nature of social action. This was seen as necessary to resolve what Parsons referred to 
as "the problem of order"; that is, how society is able to maintain stability given the 
diversity of individual wills. Parsons explained the purposive conduct of individuals 
through the internalisation of values. The values that constitute the normative 
consensus are also internalised as motivating elements in the personalities of actors'. 
Thus social order is achieved through the integration of values and purposes, which 
ensures a "fit" between the individual and society. 
However, as described in the discussion of Durkheim, the notion of internalised values 
as a means to link the individual with the social is problematic. With regard to 
Parsons, it can be seen that the freedom of the active individual is reduced to the 
needs-dispositions of personality. Furthermore, social conflict can only be seen in 
terms of a breakdown of the normative order resulting from a lack of motivational 
commitment to consensual norms. There is no means for dealing with conflict in terms 
of power struggles and sectional interests. Thus it is difficult to deal with the 
possibility of change in institutionalised value standards. 
7 Giddens discussion of Parsons provides a useful reference which describes the relationship between 
the internalisation of values and personality in Parsons' writing: `The main characteristics of human 
personality are "organised about the internalisation of systems of social objects which originated as 
the role-units of the successive series of social systems in which the individual has come to be 
integrated in the course of his life history" (Parsons and Bales, 1955, p. 54). ' Taken from Giddens, 
1979, p. 102. 
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These shortcomings may be illustrated through Giddens' discussion of Parsons' 
analysis, of social change (Giddens, 1995, p. 209). Despite Parsons' claims that he 
accounts for the purposive conduct of individuals, the reliance on the internalisation of 
values is based on the assumption that normative values are the most basic feature of 
social existence. Thus Parsons considers social change to be fundamentally based 
upon changes in cultural values and norms. Other factors, such as resource 
availability, are seen as exerting only a conditioning effect at best. Parsons may have 
recognised the existence of non-normative factors, but accorded them little importance 
and provided no systematic discussion of their involvement in the formation, 
maintenance and diffusion of cultural values and norms. Giddens argues that this 
amounts to an "idealist orthodoxy" (i. e. emphasising the primacy of systems of 
thought) : cultural values are seen to change independently of other structural 
elements, thus social change is effectively under the direction of cultural values. 
Consequently Parsons attempts at historical explanation contained very little in the way 
of actual explanation. Parsons' style of argument typically involved the positing of a 
logical relationship or "fit" between a specific value, norm or pattern of behaviour, and 
some more general value or set of values. This logical relationship was then taken as 
an explanation of the former. As Giddens demonstrates: "Thus, for example, at one 
point in his discussion of political power, [Parsons] traced `political democracy' - that 
is, universal franchise - to `the principle of equality before the law', which was a 
`subordinate principle of universalistic normative organization', as if this were to 
explain how or why universal franchise came into being. " (Giddens, 1995, p. 209). It 
can perhaps be argued that such an "explanation" may be seen as acceptable given the 
assumption of an unproblematic acceptance and diffusion of normative values as a 
fundamental component in the constitution of society. 
Giddens refers to the theories of Durkheim and Parsons as examples of "normative 
functionalism", whereby normative values are seen to be the fundamental constituents 
of society, and provide the means by which functions are fulfilled to meet various 
social needs. Giddens rejects functional theories, arguing that both the concept of 
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"function" and the notion of "social need" are either redundant or falsely applied 8, A 
detailed analysis of Giddens arguments regarding functional theories will be given later, 
when discussing Giddens' theory of structuration. For the moment, Giddens 
arguments will be briefly described as the notion of "functional pre-requisite" is of 
particular significance to social representations. 
Giddens argues that the notion of a functional need implies the necessity of an 
appropriate functional response, thus the identification of a functional consequence is 
taken to explain the existence of social phenomena. In this way, agency is endowed 
upon social systems, which are seen to somehow mobilise forces to produce a 
functional response. There is little concern for the intentional actions of individuals 
who are seen simply as the bearers of social relations that serve the functional need. 
Giddens argues that agency should only be attributed to actors, not to social systems 
as a whole. Thus it is not legitimate to refer to society's "needs" and the notion of 
"function" is superfluous. The identification of a functional consequence does not 
explain the existence of social phenomena. Instead it describes a relationship (between 
the functional need and the particular consequence) that requires explanation, rather 
than actually explaining it. Such an explanation would require the specification of a 
mechanism linking the functional need to the particular consequence. This mechanism 
would be in terms of the intended and unintended consequences of the actions of 
purposeful actors, for which it would not be necessary to resort to the term "function" 
at all. 
Furthermore, Giddens explains that the notion of `functional prerequisites" is generally 
tautologous, in that they are logically implied by the particular conception of "society". 
To illustrate this argument Giddens discusses two functional prerequisites identified by 
Aberle et al (1967), those of "shared cognitive orientations", and "role differentiation 
and role assignment": "In every society, `members must share a body of cognitive 
orientations' which, among other things, `make stable, meaningful and predictable the 
social institutions in which they are engaged'; and in every society, there must be 
8 For example see Giddens, 1977, ch. 2; Giddens, 1984, chs. 4,5,6; Giddens, 1992, chs. 3 and 4. 
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different roles that are regularly performed, `otherwise everyone would be doing 
everything and nothing -a state of indeterminacy which is the antithesis of society'. 
But the authors have already defined `society' in such a way as to make these 
conceptually necessary elements of it. A society is defined as a `self-sufficient system 
of action', where `action' is implicitly conceived of in the Parsonian sense as 
`meaningful' conduct oriented by shard expectations, and `system' as stably connected 
activities - exactly the characteristics later treated as if they were empirically 
independent. " (Giddens, 1977, p. 112). 
Giddens also argues that Parsons claimed that the problem of order was a major 
concern to Durkheim, which led Parsons to represent Durkheim's work as being 
progressively more dominated by the notion of moral consensus. However, Giddens 
claims, Durkheim actually showed little interest in the problem of order, and was far 
more concerned with analysing the relationships between traditional and modern 
societies. As argued when discussing Moscovici's misrepresentation of Durkheim, the 
notions of "mechanical solidarity" and "organic solidarity" demonstrate that the notion 
of consensus was not a primary concern. As described earlier, Durkheim argued that 
the further analysis of collective representations should be the task of a social 
psychology, conceived as a particular branch of sociology (and not to be confused with 
present day conceptions of social psychology); while Durkheim continued analysis of 
more "sociological" concerns such as the transition between "traditional" and 
"modern" forms of society. 
It appears that both Parsons and Moscovici have each over-emphasised the consensual 
aspect of Durkheim's work to provide support for their respective arguments. 
However, there are more significant similarities between Parsons and Moscovici (and 
Durkheim) that I would like to draw attention to. 
Durkheim explained consensus through the internalisation of values, though argued 
that further research was necessary to uncover "the laws of collective ideation" 
(Durkheim, 1974, p. 32). Parsons saw collective ideation as the solution to the 
problem of order through the internalisation of values. Parsons developed the link 
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between internalisation and normative consensus through describing values as also the 
motivating components of personality. Moscovici's concerns with regard, to social 
representations are a re-description of the problem of order: "The theory of social 
representations.. . takes as 
its point of departure the diversity of individuals, attitudes 
and phenomena, in all their strangeness and unpredictability. Its aim is to discover how 
individuals and groups can construct a stable, predictable world out of such diversity. " 
(Moscovici, 1984a, p. 44). Moscovici also attempted to deal with this through relating 
the internalisation of values with normative consensus, initially through explaining the 
mechanisms of the internalisation process. 
Both Parsons and Moscovici take norms to be the fundamental feature of social 
existence and therefore the means by which to explain the social world. Thus for each 
social change is explainable primarily in terms of changes in cultural values and norms. 
With Moscovici, the situation may appear more complicated as Moscovici appears to 
argue contradictory positions. Through the later emphasis on social relations, it may 
appear that social relations determine representations. For example Moscovici 
describes "hegemonic", "emancipated" and "polemic" representations, as the "three 
ways in which representations can become social, depending on the relations between 
group members. " (Moscovici, 1988, p. 221). However, as no means are provided for 
understanding "social relations" other than through representations, Moscovici's 
arguments can be seen to be typically circular; social change is seen in terms of 
changes in cultural values and norms9 . 
Durkheim failed to specify the mechanisms that mediated the relationship between the 
infrastructure and the conscience collective. As described earlier, this confusion led to 
the possibility of both materialist and idealist interpretations of the relationship. If the 
internalisation of values is emphasised as it is by Parsons and by Moscovici, an idealist 
interpretation is more appropriate, thus it is changes in values that directs social 
change. 
9 As described earlier, Moscovici's later emphasis on social relations is at odds with the notion of 
social representations as part of a "consensual realm", and appear to be another example of Moscovici 
making a statement to refute a particular criticism without acknowledging the contradiction and 
inconsistency that this may entail. 
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Giddens' example showed the inadequacies of Parsons' position when attempting 
historical explanation. As Giddens describes, the positing of a logical relationship 
between a specific value, norm or pattern of behaviour and a more general value or set 
of values, is taken as an explanation of the former. An almost identical situation 
occurs when Moscovici attempts historical explanation, as demonstrated in his 
explanation of the relationship between different types of individualism and historical 
periods. So, for example, "sublimated" individualism, involving specific values, norms 
and patterns of behaviour is logically related by Moscovici to the more general set of 
values embodied in the Reformation. Thus the Reformation is taken to be an 
explanation of sublimated individualism. With Moscovici's example, the argument is 
more tenuous as the very existence of a "sublimated" individualism is not clearly 
substantiated. 
Another similarity between social representations and normative functionalist theories 
can be seen through the notion of "functional prerequisites". Aberle et al's (1967) 
notion of "shared cognitive orientation" appears to be very similar to the basic idea of 
social representations. However, what is important is not a detailed comparison of 
each, but the notion of each as logically implied in the respective conception of society. 
In Moscovici's scheme, society is to be understood in terms of shared representations, 
which are then treated as if they were empirically independent. 
Thus social representations could be described as a version of normative functionalism, 
similar in some respects to the theories of Durkheim and Parsons. Social 
representations can certainly be couched in functionalist terms, with shared 
representations appearing as a functional prerequisite of society. Similarly, social 
representations and normative functionalist theories are based upon the notion of the 
internalisation of values. Thus they share an emphasis on the integration of the 
"individual" in "society", and a corresponding difficulty in dealing with sectional group 
interests and conflicts, leading to consequent difficulties in explaining social change. In 
the case of social representations, the only means for explaining conflict is in terms of 
opposing value systems but there is no means for understanding how such conflict 
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emerges, other than tautological statements, such as the following: "Representations 
adapt to the flow of interactions between social groups, as we showed in the case of 
psychoanalysis. As Communists, for instance, draw closer or move away from other 
ideological groups, the structure and content of their vision of psychoanalysis keeps 
changing. " (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 950-1). 
This statement is circular as there is no means for understanding how "Communists", 
or any other group for that matter, could alter their relationships with other groups 
other than on the basis of their representations; that is, the "drawing closer" or 
"moving away" is only to be understood in terms of the similarities of differences 
between each group's representations. So to then argue that on the basis of "drawing 
closer" or "moving away" a group's representations change is tautological. Thus 
"explanations" of social change provide little in the way of specifying mechanisms 
other than a general notion of "changes in values". 
Similarly, for social representations and normative functionalist theories, there are no 
means for understanding divergent interpretations of normative values. The respective 
emphases on internalisation preclude any notion of the adherence to norms and 
obligations being in terms of degrees of pragmatic acceptance, rather than 
internalisation. This further supports the notion of unproblematic observation of social 
phenomena common to both social representations and normative functionalist 
theories. With regard to social representations, action is assumed to be directed solely 
on the basis of the internalisation of the values that also constitute the normative 
consensus. Once the normative consensus is ascertained, for example through the 
analysis of collective phenomena, such as content analysis of group publications, its 
constituent normative understandings are then assumed to be internalised by individual 
group members. Conversely, it may be assumed that the normative consensus may be 
ascertained on the basis of individual responses, which are then taken to represent the 
normative consensus more generally. The problematic nature of observation of social 
phenomena has been discussed earlier, with respect to both social representations and 
normative functionalist theories (when considering Durkheim's work. ) 
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Conclusion. 
Both Parsons and Moscovici consider Durkheim to be a theoretical antecedent. 
Parsons considers the adherence to normative values to be the key to "the problem of 
order", and seeks to reinforce the notion of internalisation as the means to link the 
individual to the normative consensus, by elaborating the concept of the individual 
personality. Moscovici also considers the adherence to normative values to be the key 
to "the problem of order", and seeks to reinforce the notion of internalisation as the 
means to link the individual to the normative consensus. However, Moscovici pursues 
this though the notion of "social representations" and proposes a distinction between 
reified and consensual realms, necessary to sustain the consensual nature of social 
representations. Also due to the assumption of internalisation the observation of social 
phenomena is taken to be essentially unproblematic. 
However, as Harre (1984) explained, aspects of collective phenomena may not be 
available at the individual level. Nevertheless, Harre expressed the notion that it was 
perhaps possible in principle to represent collective understanding at the individual 
level 10. This led Moscovici to argue that the formal mechanisms necessary to describe 
the internalisation process, would be arrived at through the accumulation of contents. 
This marked a shift in emphasis toward the specific cognitive characteristics of 
internalisation and a correspondingly greater necessity to differentiate social 
representations from other types of thought. However, the arguments of Potter and 
Litton (1985a) and Semin (1985) showed the contents of social representations to be 
problematic also. As both the mechanisms and the contents of social representations 
were now shown to be problematic, it was necessary for Moscovici to reformulate his 
ideas. 
It is in the context of dealing with serious criticisms that Moscovici sought to 
emphasise the distinctiveness of social representations by progressively misrepresenting 
10 As described earlier, this is in the case of a collective group where "the total set of beliefs which is 
required to perform some joint public activity, each subset of which has its ultimate being as the 
fragment of the beliefs of an individual member", may only be known as an explicit totality by the 
investigator, "but its components are members' beliefs and it is clear how they are located in a 
collective. " (Harre, 1984, p. 936). 
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Durkheim. In the initial chapter in the Farr and Moscovici volume, Moscovici (1984a), 
refers to Durkheim-ian "collective representations" as "irreducible" (p. 16), as referring 
to a whole range of intellectual forms (p. 17), and as "static" (p. 18). In response to 
Harre, Moscovici (1984b) adds, "aggregating, constraining and coercive" to his 
description (p. 949); that collective representations imply a separation from individual 
representations, an opposition that is less significant to social representations (p. 945); 
and that "(a)ccording to Durkheim, it is the explicit task of social psychology to study 
the nature and genesis of collective representations", (p. 942). 
It is only after these initial critiques that Moscovici refers to collective representations 
as "homogenous" (1987, p. 516), presumably to refute Potter and Litton's referral to 
social representations as just that. Also, in his response to Parker (1987) and 
McKinlay and Potter (1987), does Moscovici state that for Durkheim the relations 
between the individual and society are mechanical, and that group cohesiveness and 
conformity are always seen as positive (p. 526). 
And it is in response to Jahoda (1988), that Moscovici states that Durkheim assigns 
individual representations and collective representations to different universes, 
requiring psychological and sociological explanations, respectively (p. 218); that 
Moscovici claims that collective representations are shared by several generations and 
reinforce reciprocal ties in a uniform way (p. 218); and that collective representations 
are only modified in exceptional circumstances (p. 218). 
It is the context of ongoing critical debate that Moscovici progressively misrepresented 
Durkheim's position, to emphasise the distinctiveness of social representations. This 
may have been considered necessary to ensure continuing interest in social 
representations, while necessary reformulation and theoretical refinement could be 
carried out. It is also in response to Jahoda (1988) that Moscovici criticises Durkheim 
for not attempting to "spell out" the "cognitive characteristics" of representations in 
greater detail (Moscovici, 1988, p. 218). However, as has been argued throughout, 
Moscovici's conviction that social representations involve specific cognitive 
characteristics has not been substantiated. 
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In light of this failure and the actual nature of Durkheim's arguments, social 
representations do not appear particularly distinct from Durkheim-ian collective 
representations. This is made more apparent when Moscovici's ideas are described as 
a variant of normative functionalism. The normative emphasis inevitably implies 
consensus, unless some mechanism is provided to explain adherence to norms other 
than through internalisation. The limitations of this normative emphasis can be seen in 
the difficulties in explaining social conflict and thereby social change. Even if attempts 
are made to deal with social relations through some notion of the differential power of 
groups, the individual is still connected to the social group, however conceived, 
through the internalisation of particular group values. The notion of unproblematic 
observation of social phenomena is also a consequence of the assumption of 
internalisation of consensual norms. 
It is necessary to acknowledge that a unitary conception of phenomena is inevitable 
due to the failure to provide a means to explain the adherence to norms other than 
through internalisation of normative values. Thus despite Moscovici's attempts to 
ward off the criticisms directed toward every aspect of social representations, and 
Moscovici's conviction that theoretical refinement is forthcoming, the notion of social 
representations is inherently limited. Social representations are a fundamentally 
tautological formulation: shared values and understanding are taken at the outset to be 
the fundamental constituents of society, but are then treated as if they were empirically 
independent. That is the basis of the many circular arguments involved when 
attempting to say anything specific about social representations other than that new 
information, knowledge or understandings are understood to some extent on the basis 
of existing information, knowledge or understandings. 
What is required is an analysis that recognises the necessity of theorising the 
relationship between the individual and the social, and also the nature of the 
observation of social phenomena, yet also incorporates an awareness of the complexity 
of the issues involved. To avoid according primacy to the normative it is necessary to 
conceive of power as fundamentally implicated in the very notion of action, and 
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thereby social interaction. These concerns are each dealt with by Giddens through his 
theory of structuration. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
GIDDENS' THEORY OF STRUCTURATION 
Introduction to Giddens. 
This chapter further explores the ideas of Giddens, as introduced in the previous 
chapter. Giddens' theory of "structuration" touches upon many aspects of social 
science and is critical of both objective and subjective approaches to social phenomena. 
In this chapter, it is seen that a reliance upon a notion of internalised normative values 
to explain social phenomena cannot be reconciled with that of an active, purposeful 
social agent. Furthermore, a direct consequence of Giddens' sophisticated theory of 
agency is the acknowledgement of the inherently contextual nature of social scientific 
enquiry. In terms of reconciling objectivist and subjectivist concerns, Giddens' 
arguments are far more sophisticated than those of Moscovici and indeed those of 
normative functionalism more generally. 
As a consequence of the far-reaching implications of the issues involved, Giddens' 
theory has generated a great deal of theoretical debate throughout the social sciences. 
However, the scope of Giddens' work has been restricted here, to focus attention to 
concerns more readily associated with social psychology. In order to develop an 
appreciation of Giddens' insights, critiques of Giddens work will be discussed. 
Criticisms relating to Giddens' notion of the duality of structure will be considered 
first, followed by responses to Giddens' own critique of functionalist arguments. 
These areas of debate relate primarily to Giddens' notion of the structuration of social 
action. These are followed by critiques reflecting empirical and epistemological 
concerns. As stated earlier, such concerns relate primarily to the observation of social 
phenomena and are direct implications of a sophisticated theory of agency. 
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The relevance of these concerns to social psychology more generally is demonstrated 
by briefly considering the work of Wilson and summarising the shortcomings of 
Moscovici's particular version of normative functionalism. 
Structuration Theory 
Introduction. 
Giddens describes Parsons' work as the most concerted effort to incorporate a theory 
of action within a functionalist framework. The primary concern for the `action frame 
of reference' is to reconcile the potential diversity in individual, purposeful conduct 
with a wider social order. This is achieved through the values which form the basis for 
social consensus being accepted and internalised by members of society, and thus 
motivating their behaviour. As described earlier, this is identical to the situation with 
regard to social representations, whereby social representations resolve the problem of 
order by enabling action and communication; with normative values also being 
internalised by group members. 
The internalisation of norms is not sufficient to explain the purposive nature of human 
conduct. Thus despite claims that action is successfully incorporated in each of these 
schemes, individuals are only treated in terms of `generally accepted' roles and 
manners of thinking. Individuals in Parsons' formulation have been described as 
`cultural dopes' (Garfinkel, 1967). There is no theoretical means for distinguishing the 
specific from the general case as the individual is explained in terms of group 
attributes. Variations from the norm can only be dealt with as a failure to internalise 
correctly, though this remains at the level of a truism as `internalisation' offers no 
means to deal with conflicting norms, or normative strain. This version of the 
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relationship between the individual and the social can therefore be seen as inherently 
limited. The emphasis on the social rather than the individual may be seen to represent 
a form of `objectivism', whereby the object (the social grouping, or society more 
generally) predominates over the subject (the purposive, knowledgeable agent). From 
the perspective of the internalisation of values, there appears to be little advance from 
Durkheim's original formulation. 
Giddens argues that attempts to provide a theory of action such as the approaches 
grouped together as "symbolic interactionism", (influenced by Blumer's interpretation 
of Mead, ) are also inherently limited, due to a failure to deal with problems of 
institutional analysis and transformation, conflict and power. These approaches can be 
seen to represent a "subjectivism", where the predominant interest is in the subject 
rather than with the nature of more `objective' social phenomena. Enduring features of 
the social environment, for example the status attached to particular social categories, 
are assumed to be generally accepted; it is against this taken-for-granted background 
that action is negotiated and meanings formed. Giddens argues that while these 
theories may be strong on action they are weak on structure, whereas the varieties of 
functionalism (in which I include social representations) are strong on structure but 
weak on action. 
Giddens argues that it is necessary to conceptualise how action, meaning and 
subjectivity relate to notions of structure and constraint. Human agency cannot be 
convincingly explained without an adequate conception of social structure, and 
correspondingly social structure cannot be convincingly explained without an adequate 
conception of human agency. However, Giddens warns against a simplistic 
combination of these two approaches whereby a symbolic interaction-oriented 
approach deals with `micro-level' phenomena involving small-scale social relationships 
and interactions, while the normative functionalism-oriented approach deals with more 
`macro-level' phenomena. This is because both approaches, in different ways make the 
same fundamental error each tends to treat norms or conventions as exemplifying `the 
social'. (Giddens, 1979, p. 256). 
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Thus neither symbolic interactionism nor normative functionalism can proceed beyond 
a notion of the `generally acceptance' of norms. Giddens argues that this is a 
consequence of a failure to deal effectively with the issue of power. For Giddens, the 
notion of power is fundamentally implicated in human action: " `action' only exists 
when an agent has the capability of intervening, or refraining from intervening, in a 
series of events so as to be able to influence their course. " (Giddens, 1979, p. 256). 
Giddens argues it is necessary to conceive of power as just as integral to social 
interaction as norms or conventions. However, power as a resource drawn upon in the 
production and reproduction of interaction must be related to power "deriving from" 
the structural characteristics of society; neither aspect of power is more fundamental 
that the other. 
To simply amalgamate the existing treatments of action and structure would 
perpetuates the dualisms between action and structure and the individual and social. 
Giddens argues that to resolve these dualisms requires a reformulation of both action 
and structure to recognise the `duality of structure'; that is, the mutual dependence of 
structure and agency: it is through the active, purposeful participation required to 
engage in social interaction that individuals both draw upon and reconstitute the 
structural features of society. `By the `duality of structure', I refer to the essentially 
recursive character of social life: the structural properties of social systems are both 
medium and outcome of the practices that constitute those systems. " (Giddens, 1982, 
p. 36). The reformulation of agency and structure that Giddens proposes to reflect the 
duality of structure is presented in the theory of structuration. 
Giddens argues that one of the major tasks of Structuration theory is to avoid either 
the "imperialism of the social object" found in macro-level theorising, such as that 
associated with functionalism, though also the "imperialism of the subject" associated 
with micro-level theorising, such as that associated with symbolic interactionism or 
ethnomethodology. For Giddens, neither forms of societal totality nor the experience 
of the individual actor is more fundamental than the other. Human social activities are 
continually recreated by social actors whereby they reproduce the conditions that make 
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these activities possible. The notions of "action" and "structure" presuppose one 
another. 
Action. 
Giddens states that "action", or agency should be thought of as a "continuous flow of 
conduct" rather than as a series of discrete acts combined together. Recognising the 
"continuous flow" emphasises that agency is located in time, in the temporality of day 
to day conduct. Giddens argues that human agents possess a specifically reflexive 
form of knowledgeability, grounded in a continuous monitoring of the continuous flow 
of social life: the recursive ordering of social practices occurs through the routine 
monitoring of the settings of interaction. The reflexive monitoring of action is 
dependent on the rationalisation of actors, whereby actors routinely maintain a level of 
understanding of their activity. For Giddens, it is essential to recognise that the 
description of an "act" or "an action" involves a reflexive moment of attention on the 
part of the actor, which breaks into the flow of action and separates any particular 
"act" from the lived-through experience of the actor. 
However, most of what Giddens refers to as, mutual knowledge incorporated in 
encounters is not accessible discursively, but is practical in character. Thus Giddens 
distinguished between discursive and practical consciousness; discursive consciousness 
refers to the ability of actors to explain their actions if asked, whereas practical 
consciousness refers to what is known but not explicitly articulated in the capability to 
"bring off' social interaction. The boundary between discursive and practical 
consciousness is not rigid, and is dependent to some extent on the learning experiences 
of the individual agent. 
Giddens explains that the notion of practical consciousness is related to the necessity 
of separating agency from intention. Actions may have consequences that stretch 
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beyond the intentions of actors. This can be appreciated by acknowledging the 
recursive character of social life: unintended consequences of acts may systematically 
feed back to become the unacknowledged conditions of further acts: "Thus one of the 
regular consequences of my speaking or writing English in a correct way is to 
contribute to the reproduction of the English language as a whole. My speaking 
English correctly is intentional; the contribution I make to the reproduction of the 
language is not. " (Giddens, 1984, p. 8). For Giddens the unintended consequences of 
intentional conduct is fundamental to the understanding of societal reproduction. 
As described earlier, for Giddens action logically involves power: to be an agent is to 
be able to intervene in the world, to "make a difference" to a pre-existing state of 
affairs or course of events. Thus Giddens refers to power as "transformative 
capacity". Resources are media through which power is exercised; they are structured 
properties of social systems, drawn upon by agents and thereby reproduced as a 
routine element of the instantiation of conduct. 
Structure. 
Giddens argues that structure is understood in the functionalist literature as involving 
the "patterning" of social phenomena, as an external constraint to human action, and 
associated with imagery such as the girders of a building. However, in structuralist 
literature, structure is conceived as "an intersection of presence and absence", whereby 
underlying codes are inferred from surface manifestations (Giddens, 1984, p. 16). For 
Giddens each of these aspects is to some extent relevant to the structuring of social 
relations. Giddens makes a distinction between `structure' and `system'. Structure 
refers to the structuring properties that are recursively implicated in the reproduction 
of social practices across time and space, or social systems. As Giddens explains, 
"social systems, as reproduced social practices, do not have `structures' but rather 
exhibit `structural properties' and that structure exists, as time-space presence, only in 
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its instantiations in such practices and as memory traces orienting the conduct of 
knowledgeable human agents. " (Giddens, 1984, p. 17). 
Thus it is through the drawing upon of structural properties that social practices may 
persist in various ways and which lend them "systemic" form. Giddens argues that the 
most important aspects of structure are rules and resources (explained below) 
recursively involved in institutions. As enduring features of social life, institutions may 
be understood in terms of the sedimentation of practices across time and space. 
STRUCTURE Rules and resources, organised as properties of social 
systems. Structure only exists as `structural properties'. 
SYSTEM Reproduced relations between actors or collectivities, 
organised as regular social practices. 
STRUCTURATION Conditions governing the continuity or transformation of 
structures, and therefore the reproduction of systems. 
Figure 1 (Taken from Giddens. 1979. p. 66). 
The figure above aids understanding of each of the related concepts within, though 
Giddens' succinct commentary further explains these relationships: "Social systems 
involve regularised relations of interdependence between individuals or groups, that 
typically can be best analysed as recurrent social practices. Social systems are systems 
of social interaction; as such they involve the situated activities of human subjects, and 
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exist.. . 
in the flow of time. Systems, in this terminology, have structures, or more 
accurately, have structural properties; they are not structures in themselves. Structures 
are necessarily (logically) properties of systems or collectivities, and are characterised 
by the 'absence of a subject'. To study the structuration of a social system is to study 
the ways in which that system, via the application of generative rules and resources, 
and in the context of unintended outcomes, is produced and reproduced in 
interaction. " (1979, p. 66, emphases in original). 
Thus, for Giddens, structure is conceived as "rules" and "resources" ; these are drawn 
upon in the production and reproduction of social action and are simultaneously the 
means of system reproduction. Giddens acknowledges that his notion of rule is to 
some extent distinctive. Rules are not to be thought of as formalised prescriptions, as 
the knowing of rule is "to know how to go on" in social encounters without necessarily 
being able to formulate discursively what those rules are. Giddens draws on 
Wittgenstein to argue that such rules avoid rigid definition not because we fail to grasp 
their definition, but because there is no real "definition" to grasp: " `ad hoc' 
considerations.. . are chronically 
involved in the instantiation of rules, and are not 
separate from what those rules `are'. " (1979, p. 68). To explicitly formulate a rule, such 
as in codified law, is to offer an interpretation of the rule which may itself have an 
effect on its subsequent application. Thus it is important to emphasise that "rules and 
practices only exist in conjunction with one another". (1979, p. 65). 
The rules of social life may be understood as generalisable procedures drawn upon in 
the enactment/reproduction of social practices. These are generally held as practical 
knowledge rather than discursively by social actors, and are used routinely in the 
course of social activity. This knowledge does not specify all possibilities but is the 
basis for a generalised capacity to act in a range of social circumstances. As shown in 
Garfinkel's ethnomethodological studies, daily interaction may be more rigidly 
structured than may appear from the ease with which such prescriptions may be 
followed. Thus it is not necessarily the case that formally codified, abstract rules, such 
as those embodied in laws are the most influential in structuring social activity. 
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Also, Giddens argues that social rules are subject to chronic disputes of legitimacy. 
This is implied in the conjunction of rules and practices, as action logically implicates 
power, and serves to separate the notion of social rule from that of rules associated 
with games, such as chess (which feature strongly in discussion of rules. ) Power is 
integral to social practices. Resources are the means whereby power is drawn upon by 
participants in social interaction. (Resources will be described in more detail when 
discussing power with respect to the "duality of structure". ) 
In this way, the structuration of social systems refers to the modes in which systems, 
grounded in the knowledgeable activities of situated actors who draw upon rules and 
resources in the diversity of action contexts, are produced and reproduced in the 
course of interaction. Structuration refers to the dynamic process whereby structures 
come into being. 
Duality of Structure. 
By the "duality of structure" Giddens explains that the constitution of agents and 
structures do not refer to independent sets of phenomena, but represent a duality. The 
structural properties of social systems are both the medium and the outcome of the 
practices they recursively organise, thus structure is not simply constraining but is 
simultaneously enabling. The knowledge that actors hold of themselves, others and of 
social conventions, is inherently implicated in the patterning of social life: "the moment 
of the production of action is also one of reproduction in the contexts of the day-to- 
day enactment of social life..... Structure has no existence independent of the 
knowledge that agents have about what they do in their day-to-day activity. " (1984, 
p. 26). However, it must be remembered that knowledgeability is always bounded: 
unintended consequences issue forth from intentional activity and thus may become the 
unacknowledged conditions of further action. 
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Giddens relates the knowledgeability of agents to structural features through the 
`modalities' of structuration. These refer to the central dimensions of the duality of 
structure in interaction and are drawn upon by actors in the production of interaction 
but are simultaneously media of the reproduction of the structural components of 
interaction. The modalities thus represent the "coupling elements" whereby strategic 
conduct may be related to institutional features. This is best explained by referring to 
how each may be subject of social scientific investigation; that is both the analysis of 
strategic conduct and institutional analysis. 
To study empirically the constitution of social systems as strategic conduct is to study 
how actors draw upon structural elements (rules and resources) in the constitution of 
interaction as a skilled achievement. The modalities are treated as stocks of 
knowledge and resources; structure here refers to the mobilisation of discursive and 
practical consciousness. However, in the case of institutional analysis, rules and 
resources are treated as chronically reproduced features of social systems. It is 
important to stress that this is a methodological distinction, rather than a substantive 
one, necessary to express the duality of structure. 
This is in contrast to functionalist theories or action-type approaches, each of which 
express a dualism rather than a duality. Thus for functional approaches, social 
causation and structural constraint are synonymous; there is no theoretical space for 
understanding social interaction as purposeful, reflexively monitored conduct. So for 
example, for Durkheim suicidal conduct could only be seen in terms of weak social 
integration. Conversely, for action approaches, institutional analysis is bracketed out 
and institutions appear as a taken-for-granted backdrop; there is no means for dealing 
with structural change. These points will be explained in more detail later when the 
notion of social roles will be examined. To reiterate the relevance of the modalities of 
structuration: "The level of modality thus provides the coupling elements whereby the 
bracketing of strategic or institutional analysis is dissolved in favour of an 
acknowledgement of their interrelation. " (Giddens, 1979, p. 81). 
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INTERACTION Communication Power Sanction / 
Morality 
(MODALITY) Interpretative Facility Norm 
scheme 
STRUCTURE Signification Domination Legitimation 
Figure 2 (adapted from Giddens, 1979, p. 82. and Giddens. 1992. p. 129). 
The classifications in figure 2 show the dimensions implicated in various ways in social 
practices. For example, the communication of meaning in interaction does not occur 
apart from either the operation of relations of power or the context of normative 
sanctions. However, Giddens is quick to remind that although all social practices 
involve these three elements, no social practice engages a single type of rule or 
resource: "practices are situated within intersecting sets of rules and resources that 
ultimately express features of the totality. " (Giddens, 1979, p. 82). 
It is necessary to relate the constitution and communication of meaning to normative 
sanctions as these express two aspects of rules as implicated in the production of social 
practices. The relations between the identification of acts and normative sanctions may 
be most easily described by reference to criminal law where for example, the 
identification of an act as murder or manslaughter influences greatly the sanctions that 
may be applied, yet also knowledge of the sanctions may influence how different 
parties may wish the act to be interpreted. This in turn implicates necessity to 
incorporate an understanding of power transactions. 
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As Giddens explains, power is expressed in the capabilities of actors to make their 
accounts `count' and to enact or resist sanctioning processes. However, as indicated 
in figure 2, these capabilities draw upon modes , of 
domination structured in social 
systems. With respect to the previous example, discrimination structured as a mode of 
domination may influence the accountability of various parties; if discrimination is 
strong, a member of a discriminated group may be judged more harshly. 
Nevertheless, it is important to remember Giddens warning against associating a 
practice with a single set of rules or resources, in this case other modes of domination 
will also be mobilised. While the two aspects of rules, constitutive and regulative, and 
the drawing upon of resources through which power is exercised, are analytically 
separable, they are each involved in the constitution of social practices. However 
separating them out analytically makes it possible to examine their interconnection: 
"Just as communication, power and morality are integral elements of interaction, so 
signification, domination and legitimation are only analytically separable properties of 
structure. " (Giddens, 1992, p. 130). 
Interpretative schemes 
Returning to the issue of the modalities of structuration, Giddens explains that 
"interpretative schemes" refer to the means whereby sense is made by actors of what 
they and others say. As Giddens explains: "Interpretative schemes form the core of the 
mutual knowledge whereby an accountable universe of meaning is sustained through 
and in processes of interaction. " (Giddens, 1979, p. 83). An important point to be 
made here is that through the reflexive monitoring of conduct, the context of 
interaction is drawn upon in the sustaining of accountability. The context of 
interaction is shaped and organised as an integral part of interaction as a 
communicative encounter. The drawing upon of physical, social and temporal 
elements recreates them as contextual relevances. "Mutual knowledge is `background 
knowledge' in the sense that it is taken for granted, and mostly remains unarticulated; 
on the other hand, it is not part of the `background' in the sense that it is constantly 
actualised, displayed and modified by members of society in the course of their 
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interaction. Taken-for-granted knowledge, in other words is never fully taken for 
granted ... 
but is produced and reproduced anew by them as part of the continuity of 
their lives. " (Giddens, 1992, p. 114). Meaning is sustained by actors routinely 
incorporating `what went before' and routinely anticipating `what will happen next' 
into the `bringing off of an encounter. The means whereby communication is 
routinely structured are modes of signification, as shown in the figure. Examples of 
these would be the semantic rules of language. 
Due to this recursive nature of social action, it can be seen that meaning does not , 
reside solely in communicative intent, as any act of communication, in common with 
action more generally, may generate unintended consequences which may feed back to 
become unacknowledged conditions of further action. Nevertheless, communicative 
intent is not irrelevant to the meaning of an act, as any action involves the reflexive 
monitoring of conduct. The interplay of meaning as both communicative intent and as 
mode of signification represents the duality of structure in the production of meaning. 
Norms 
Giddens explains that the moral elements of interaction are inherently connected with 
the constitution of interaction both as meaningful and as a set of relations of power, 
neither is more basic than any other. It will be remembered that normative or moral 
prescriptions feature strongly in the work of Durkheim and Moscovici, as described 
earlier. 
Giddens agrees with Parsons' description of the normative character of social practices 
in terms of a `double contingency', whereby the reactions of participants in an 
interaction depend on the contingent responses of the other or others, and thus is a 
potential sanction upon each participant. Thus the normative constitution of 
interaction may be seen as involving the actualisation of rights and the enactment of 
obligations. However the characteristic error of the normative functionalism of 
Durkheim and Parsons (and Moscovici) is to see normative expectation, as entailed in 
the double contingency, as the determining feature of social interaction. By treating 
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norms as "exemplifying the social", there is no means for dealing with the possibility 
that the symmetry between the actualisation of rights and the enactment of obligations 
may be broken in actual social conduct. As Giddens explains: `what is a right of one 
participant in an encounter appears as an obligation of another to respond in an 
`appropriate' fashion, and vice versa; but this tie can be severed if an obligation is not 
acknowledged or honoured, and no sanction can effectively be brought to bear. Thus, 
in the production of interaction, all normative elements have to be treated as a series of 
claims whose realisation is contingent upon the successful actualisation of obligations 
through the medium of the responses of other participants. " (Giddens, 1992, p. 114). 
In this way it can be seen that the double contingency of interaction is connected to the 
actualisation of power as well as the normative institutionalisation of conduct. If 
norms are treated as somehow more basic than other aspects of social interaction, that 
norms must be sustained and reproduced in the flow of social encounters is lost. From 
a structural perspective, if strategic conduct is bracketed, rights and obligations simply 
appear to be two aspects of norms, but from the point of view of strategic conduct 
rights and obligations have to be continually realised. 
However, the particular character of normative sanctions is indicated in the double 
contingency of interaction: normative sanctions do not inevitably follow the carrying 
out of an act, but are contingent on the reactions of others. This implicates another 
shortcoming of normatively-based approaches, that compliance with a normative claim 
may not entail a moral commitment to that obligation; in other words adherence to a 
norm may not reflect the internalisation of a value. An actor may accept an obligation 
to avoid the sanctions associated with non-compliance rather than through a moral 
commitment to that obligation. This was described earlier in the discussion of 
Durkheim, but its implications may now be more fully appreciated. There may be 
degrees of commitment to a moral obligation. As Giddens explains: "An actor may 
calculate the risks involved in the enactment of a given form of social conduct, in 
respect of the likelihood of the sanctions involved being actually applied, and may be 
prepared to submit to them as a price to be paid for achieving a particular end. " 
(Giddens, 1979, p. 87). 
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As Giddens describes, this point may seem obvious but it has wide ranging 
implications, particularly for notions of legitimation and conformity. These issues are 
relevant to Parsons' problem of order, described earlier as reformulated in the notion 
of social representations. It shows the whole "internalised value-norm-moral 
consensus" theorem that links the individual to the social in approaches influenced by 
`normative functionalism' to be unsustainable. Also it highlights the negotiated 
character of sanctions, one aspect of which is that the `calculative attitude' toward 
norms may involve efforts toward self-presentation in an effort to affect the character 
of the sanction. This is possible as the production of a normative order is inherently 
connected to the production of meaning. Another aspect of the negotiated character 
of sanctions draws attention to relations of power, that is the capability of making a 
particular interpretation of a norm `count' in interaction. Thus, Giddens explains: "The 
moral co-ordination of interaction is asymmetrically interdependent with its production 
as meaningful and with its expression of relations of power. " (1992, p. 116). It is 
important to emphasise that the operation of sanctions is a chronic feature of all social 
interaction. Sanctioning need not be discursively articulated, but may involve subtle 
adjustments in the course of a social encounter. 
Power 
As described earlier, for Giddens the notion of action is logically tied to that of power. 
As Giddens explains: "The use of power in interaction involves the application of 
facilities whereby participants are able to generate outcomes through affecting the 
conduct of others; the facilities both are drawn from an order of domination and at the 
same time, as they are applied, reproduce that order of domination. " (1992, p. 129). 
Power is a regular and routine aspect of action, thus even transient social encounters 
instantiate elements of the totality as a structure of domination. However, the exercise 
of power is not a type of act, but refer to the means whereby the meaningful and 
normative content of interaction are instantiated. Giddens treats power in terms of 
resources. This makes it possible to deal with power in the context of the duality of 
structure. Power may be seen to involve both as transformative capacity from the 
perspective of strategic conduct, yet also as domination from an institutional 
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perspective. Resources are the media through which power is exercised and structures 
of domination reproduced. Example of resources may include "the superior linguistic 
or dialectic skills of one person in conversation with another; the possession of relevant 
types of `technical knowledge'; the mobilisation of authority of `force'.. " (1992, 
p. 120). It is important to emphasise here that power does not necessarily imply the 
existence of conflict. Power and conflict may appear synonymous because power is 
linked to the pursuit of interests, and people's interests may differ. Thus while power 
is a feature of every social interaction division of interest is not. 
That power is inextricably linked with action again draws attention to the deficiencies 
of approaches that over emphasise the normative aspect of social interaction; this 
includes normative functionalist approaches, but also action type approaches such as 
ethnomethodology. The problem is that interaction is always seen as "the collaborative 
endeavour of peers", with each participant contributing equally to the production of 
interaction, in order to sustain the meaningfulness, or accountability of the encounter. 
It must be seen that distribution of power is directly implicated in `what passes for 
social reality': "the creation of frames of meaning occurs as the mediation of practical 
activities, and in terms of differentials of power which actors are able to bring to bear. " 
(1992, p. 120). Thus Giddens states that the mutual accommodation of power and 
norms is of crucial significance to social theory. 
As described earlier, for normative functionalist approaches such as those of Durkheim 
and Parsons, social order was maintained through a notion of moral consensus, with 
the individual linked to society through the internalisation of common values. Giddens 
explain why the notion of legitimation is preferable to that of normative consensus by 
reference to `value standards', defined as "any kind of normative prescription that may 
be mobilised as a sanctioning feature of interaction. " (1979, p. 102). Legitimation does 
not imply any overall consensus regarding value standards, and it allows relationships 
between value standards and sectional interests in society to be noted. The assumption 
that normative integration is a pre-requisite for a stable society is difficult to sustain, of 
course such integration is not absolute and this raises the notion of a possible criterion 
level. This is expressed with respect to social representations when critics ask how 
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many people must hold a representation for it to be social, and with what level of 
consensus. As Giddens explains: "The level of normative integration of dominant 
groups within social systems may be a more important influence upon the overall 
continuity of those systems than how far the majority have `internalised' the same 
value-standards. " (1979, p. 103). 
Social reproduction. 
For Giddens, temporality is integral to social analyses; the notion of structuration 
transcends any distinction between static and dynamic analyses. Giddens argues that 
there is a tendency, particularly in approaches influenced by functionalist notions, to 
associate `time' with social change and thus `timelessness' with social stability. This 
leads to a notion that static analyses are necessary to investigate sources of social 
stability, while dynamic analyses are necessary to investigate sources of social change. 
Such views are mistaken since "time" cannot be removed from social analyses: social 
stability refers to continuity over time. 
The notion that stability is associated with timelessness, Giddens argues, features in 
functionalist thought due to a tendency toward biological analogy. Whereas the 
structure of an organism may be said to exist separately from its functioning, social 
systems "cease to be when they cease to function" (1979, p. 62, emphases in original). 
Images associated with functionalist notions of structure such as that of the girders of a 
building are unhelpful as they are perceptually `present' in a way that social structure is 
not. 
According to Structuration theory, the potential for change is inherent in all moments 
of social reproduction. The production of society incorporates the application of rules 
and resources by skilled, knowledgeable actors in situated contexts of social interaction 
which participants must contingently `bring off. This occurs in the context of the 
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rationalisation of action, thus actors' understandings of the institutions they reproduce 
through their practices makes the reproduction of these practices possible. However, 
there is also a great deal concerning the conditions and consequences of their activities 
that affects the course of those activities. Thus, it is necessary to understand how both 
intended and unintended consequences of action are implicated in social reproduction: 
"every feature of whatever continuity a society has over time derives from such mixes 
(of intended and unintended consequences of action), against the backdrop of bounded 
conditions of rationalisation of conduct. " (1979, p. 112, emphases in original). 
Furthermore Giddens argues that the very notion of system presupposes that of social 
reproduction. Any alteration in a social system, no matter how trivial, implicates the 
totality and thus implies some degree of structural modification. Giddens illustrates 
this through the example of linguistic modification: "modifications in the phonemic, 
syntactical or semantic character of words in language are effected through and in 
language use, that is through the reproduction of language; since language only exists 
in and through its reproduction, such modifications implicate the whole. " (1979, 
p. 114). 
Role Theory. 
It is worthwhile considering Giddens discussion of the use of "role" in social analysis, 
as this has important implications for social psychology which will be drawn upon in 
more detail later. The concept of role features in functionalist approaches, such as that 
of Parsons for whom role is the means for linking the individual to the structure of the 
social system. However, it is also relevant to approaches that may appear to be in 
some opposition to functionalist approaches, such as those influenced by symbolic 
interactionism, where the individual displays and thus maintains their autonomy 
through their `performance' in the role. In each case the nature of the role is taken as 
`given'. As Giddens explains, this "often tends to perpetuate the action / structure 
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dualism so strongly engrained in social theory: society supplies the roles to which 
actors adapt as best they might. " (1979, p. 116). This represents the over emphasis on 
normative aspects and a consensual view of society, as described earlier. Thus even 
when attempts are made to deal with conflict this is explained in terms of strain 
experienced by the individual actor to meet particular role expectations. 
It should be apparent now on the basis of arguments presented earlier, that the concept 
of role is related to that of norm more generally and thus must be actualised in social 
interaction. The prerogatives and obligations associated with a roles must be analysed 
in relation to rules and resources according to the duality of structure. However, when 
role prescriptions are stripped of any "given" or consensual character, they lose much 
of their theoretical significance and must be studied as they are enacted and thereby 
reproduced, in the context of actual social practices. It is therefore not adequate to 
conceptualise the social solely in terms of roles. Giddens argues that role prescriptions 
may be thought of as a "social identity" associated with a particular social position. At 
this point it will simply be noted that this use of the term "social identity" is quite 
different from the way the term is used in the social psychological literature. The 
implications of this point will be discussed in more detail later. 
Giddens describes various situations in which the behaviour of individuals may not 
conform to role-expectations: there may be a tension between the wants of actors and 
their particular role expectations; there may be tension between the various aspects of 
a particular role expectation; there may be tension associated with the various roles 
that a particular actor may undertake; and there may be tension deriving from the 
contestation of interpretations of a particular role expectation. Of these, the last is the 
one that is the most problematic for the existing treatments of roles. As Giddens 
explains, by conferring a primacy of the normative, there is no means to appreciate that 
"role-prescriptions, like any other normative elements, are potentially subject to 
diverse `interpretations' in the context of the practical enactment of social life, and the 
power relations thus involved. All social positions, within social systems, are `power 
positions' in the sense that they are integrated within reproduced relations of autonomy 
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and dependence; contestation of role-prescriptions is a characteristic feature of power 
struggles in society. " (1979, p. 119). 
Concluding comments. 
The arguments Giddens makes with reference to structuration are primarily directed 
toward resolving various dualisms within social scientific theorising, such as those 
between the "individual" and the "social"; "action" and "structure"; and between 
"statics" and "dynamics". Giddens achieves this through his notion of the duality of 
structure. However, in the course of these arguments Giddens also identifies problems 
associated with analyses based on both "objectivism" and "subjectivism". Thus it is 
necessary to consider also the implications of Giddens arguments for social scientific 
analysis. Given that the reflexive monitoring and rationalisation of action are endemic 
to human social agents, the question arises of how these "stocks of knowledge" which 
are implicated in the constitution of society may be amenable 'to in social scientific 
investigation. 
Empirical implications 
Giddens gives his most detailed explication of the empirical implications of his 
arguments concerning structuration in the final chapter of "The constitution of 
society" (1984). This chapter has been described as a "tour de force" (Bernstein, 
1989, p. 27), and will be drawn upon in particular in this section. 
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The most relevant arguments concerning empirical research are the appreciation of the 
knowledgeability of human agents, and the fundamental nature of power to an 
understanding of action. Taking the first of these points, all human agents have 
sophisticated understandings of the conditions and consequences of their activities in 
daily life. However, much of that knowledge is embedded in practical consciousness 
and thus not immediately available in a discursive form. Nevertheless this 
knowledgeability is bounded recursively by unintended consequences, and 
unacknowledged conditions of action. The second point refers to the fact that power 
is inherently involved in the relations between action and structure. The significance of 
this is that power cannot be "tacked on" to more supposedly "basic" concepts, such as 
the "normative primacy" characteristic to both functionalist and action-oriented 
approaches. 
Giddens argues that the arguments surrounding notion of structuration suggest several 
guidelines relevant to the undertaking of social scientific analysis. One of these is that 
all research involves an "ethnographic aspect". This refers to the act of interpretation 
necessary to penetrate the knowledgeability of those whose activity constitutes the 
phenomena to be investigated. Thus it is necessary for researchers to be sensitive to 
the complex skills of knowledge agents. 
As described earlier, Giddens describes two types of methodological bracketing. In the 
analysis of strategic conduct, the mode in which actors draw upon structural properties 
in their social interaction is examined and institutional properties are taken as given; 
whereas in institutional analysis structural properties are treated as chronically 
reproduced features of social systems. Giddens points out that this bracketing is 
purely methodological and is used to express the duality of structure rather than 
ontological reality. The "predictability" associated with even the most entrenched 
institutional forms must still be "brought off' through the enactment of social 
practices. Thus unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences must be 
interpreted within the flow of intentional conduct. 
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Giddens illustrates his position by discussing the relevance of structuration-ist concepts 
using existing research. Giddens also anticipates that the usefulness of his arguments 
may be questioned when it is clear that such research can be carried out without 
reference to his arguments. Giddens counters this notion by stating that the relevance 
of structuration-ist concepts for research purposes is in their use as "sensitising 
devices", useful in the formulation and interpretation of research by stimulating an 
awareness of theoretical considerations. 
As will be seen, Giddens makes no attempt to assess the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of different approaches or methods. Giddens explicitly acknowledges this 
and explains that he is more concerned with exploring the relationship between social 
research and social critique. This issue assumes greater relevance due to logical 
difficulties in sustaining the `revelatory' character associated with empirical models of 
science. In this vein, questions relating to epistemological issues such as the 
`assessment of validity' and the notion of `generalisation' will be noted, though will be 
discussed in more detail later. 
Hermeneutic elucidation of frames of meaning (1) 
Investigation of context and form of practical consciousness (2) 
Identification of bounds of knowledgeability (3) 
Specification of institutional orders (4) 
Figure 3, (adapted from Giddens. 1984 p. 327). 
Figure 3 describes different levels of analysis relevant to social scientific research. 
Depending on the specific nature of the research endeavour, a researcher may ground 
their enquiry at each of the four levels. Giddens notes that a distinction between (1) 
and (2) on the one hand and (3) and (4) on the other is often the basis for a division 
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between quantitative and qualitative analysis. On the basis of arguments presented 
earlier relating to the duality of structure which described the need to transcend the 
subjective / objective distinction, Giddens explain why an appreciation of levels (1) and 
(2) are necessary for understanding levels (3) and (4) and vice versa. Each of the 
levels will be discussed below. 
By the "hermeneutic elucidation of frames of meaning", level (1) in figure 3, Giddens 
argues that all research involves a hermeneutic, or ethnographic "moment". As 
mentioned earlier this refers to the act of interpretation routinely implicated when 
penetrating others' frames of meaning. This consideration is inherent to any form of 
social interaction including the elicitation of empirical data. However, this may not be 
appreciated if researchers assume a common knowledgeability, or "a common cultural 
`milieu'. " (Giddens, 1984, p. 328) If this assumption is correct, a possible 
consequence is that findings may not be illuminating to those that are the subject of the 
research. If the assumption of a mutual knowledgeability is not correct, a possible 
consequence is that the research will fail to represent the knowledgeability of agents, 
and thus diminish the quality of the research. (The question of how the validity of such 
an assumption is to be assessed will be discussed later. ) 
Giddens states that those engaged in what they regard as purely quantitative research 
may not appreciate the significance of (1). They may view this level of analysis as 
purely descriptive rather than explanatory, and thus of little relevance. However, it 
must be accepted that research grounded in (1) may be generalising and explanatory if 
it is used to explain the activity of agents across a range of contexts. (The nature of 
generalisation will also be discussed later. ) 
Investigation of context and form of practical consciousness, level (2), involves 
grasping what it is that agents know as they engage in various forms of social activity. 
Here, research findings may be illuminating to subjects when expressed discursively, 
for example in ethnomethodological studies which investigate the tacit knowledge 
incorporated in routine forms of social interaction. In fact, this level may represent a 
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circumscribed field of study for ethnomethodolgy, though for other forms of research it 
is necessary to relate this practical knowledge to "broader" feature of social conduct. 
Identification of bounds of knowledgeability, level (3), involves investigating the 
bounds of agents' knowledgeability and requires an understanding of levels (1), (2) and 
(4). Identifying unintended consequences and unacknowledged conditions of action 
involves the interpretation of discursive and practical consciousness in the context of 
the reproduction of an institutional order. Specification of institutional orders, level 
(4), involves analysing the conditions of social and system integration. However, it 
must be noted that institutional orders often cut across the boundaries of "societies". 
As stated earlier, the distinction between (1) and (2) on the one hand and (3) and (4) 
is often taken as the basis for distinguishing qualitative from quantitative analysis. 
Giddens argues that this often corresponds to a further distinction between "micro" 
and "macro" levels of analysis. Those adopting a "micro-level" perspective study 
situated social encounters and are concerned with levels (1) and (2). Giddens argues 
that researchers here generally shun quantitative methods, seeing the imposing of 
artificial distinctions as failing to capture the intricacies of social encounters. 
Conversely, those researchers that are interested in "macro-level" phenomena generally 
favour quantitative methods. For them issues of individual variation are considered 
methodological issues, to be dealt with through the application of statistical techniques. 
However, such distinctions reflect the dualism of action and structure, when it is 
necessary to appreciate the interdependence of each. To illustrate the duality of 
structure, Giddens discusses a transcript of a strip of interaction to demonstrate how 
aspects of this social encounter relate to the production and reproduction of social 
institutions. 
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The interaction takes place in a courtroom and the participants are a judge, a public 
defender (PD) and a district attorney (DA). They are discussing the sentencing of a 
person who has pleaded guilty to a charge of second-degree burglary. 
PD: Your honour, we request immediate sentencing and waive the probation 
report. 
JUDGE: What's his record? 
PD: He has a prior drunk and a GTA [grand theft auto]. Nothing serious. 
This is just a shoplifting case. He did enter the K-Mart with intent to 
steal. But really all we have here is a petty theft. 
JUDGE: What do the people have? 
DA: Nothing either way. 
JUDGE: Any objections to immediate sentencing? 
DA: No. 
JUDGE: How long has he been in? 
PD: Eighty-three days. 
JUDGE: I make this a misdemeanour by PC article 17 and sentence you to ninety 
days in County Jail, with credit for time served. 
(Transcript taken from Giddens. 1984, p. 330). 
As Giddens explains, the exchange is meaningful to participants through their tacit 
understanding of institutional features of the criminal justice system. These features 
drawn upon in turn by each participant who assumes them to be mutual knowledge 
held by others. Giddens argues that this demonstrates more than simply "proper 
procedure". To "bring off' the interaction, the participants draw upon their 
knowledge of the legal system and thereby reproduce it as an institutional feature: "by 
evoking the institutional order in this way - and there is no other way for participants 
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in interaction to render what they do intelligible and coherent to one another - they 
thereby contribute to reproducing it. Moreover, it is essential to see that in 
reproducing it they also reproduce its `facticity' as a source of structural constraint 
(upon themselves and upon others). They treat the system as a `real' order of 
relationships within which their own interaction is situated and which it expresses. 
And it is a `real' (i. e. structurally stable) order of relationships precisely because they, 
and others like them in connected and similar contexts, accept it as such - not 
necessarily in their discursive consciousness, but in the practical consciousness 
incorporated in what they do. " (Giddens, 1984, p. 331, emphases in original). 
Giddens also discusses how fundamental "power" is to the "bringing off' of the 
interaction. The "acceptance-as-real" of institutional features demonstrated in the 
interaction is the basis for the legal system as an expression of modes of domination. 
Also the differential power of the participants is also reflected in the interaction. Thus 
rather than the more conventional turn-taking demonstrated in `peer interaction' , the 
judge is able to control the direction of the interaction more so than the others. This is 
accepted by the participants as it is mutually acknowledged: "The fact that the 
conversation does not have a conventional turn-taking form is made intelligible by the 
mutual acknowledgement that the judge has a certain institutionalised social identity, 
allocating him definite prerogatives and sanctions. " (Giddens, 1984, p. 332). Thus the 
duality of structure can be appreciated: the "facticity" of institutional orders is 
constituted through the situatedness of interaction, yet those institutional orders are 
also the condition of even the most transient social encounter. 
In this way it can be seen that there is no opposition between quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Both involve an act of interpretation that applies to the collection 
and interpretation of data. Thus quantitative data can be seen to be composites of 
qualitative interpretations. As described earlier, this act of interpretation may not be 
fully acknowledged by researchers using quantitative methods, who may assume that it 
is possible to deal with the issue of interpretation solely as a statistical problem. Any 
notions of "methodological imperialism" are to be avoided, both types of approach can 
be justified depending on the context of enquiry: quantitative techniques will generally 
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be used when a large number of cases are to be investigated with respect to a particular 
set of characteristics. 
As Giddens explains, "(1) and (2) are thus as essential for understanding (3) and (4) as 
vice versa, and qualitative and quantitative methods should be seen as complementary 
rather than antagonistic aspects of social research. Each is necessary to the other if the 
substantive nature of the duality of structure is to be "charted" in terms of the forms of 
institutional articulation whereby contexts of interaction are co-ordinated within more 
embracing social systems. " (1984, p. 334). Thus there is not one format for research, 
the choice of approach depends upon the specific nature of the research enquiry. This 
is the position implicated in the discussion of "methodological bracketing" described 
earlier. 
Giddens argues that structuration-ist concepts imply neither a privileging nor a 
prohibiting of specific research techniques, whether surveys, questionnaires, interviews 
or any other. However, Giddens claims empirical research may be illuminated through 
the use of structuration-ist concepts and arguments. To this end, Giddens describes 
several pieces of research to illustrate the empirical applications of structuration theory 
(1984, p. 286 - 327). Giddens anticipates the possible criticism, that if such research 
may be carried out without reference to structuration theory then his arguments are of 
little use, through the following defence: 
"There is of course no obligation for anyone doing detailed empirical research, in a 
given localized setting, to take on board an array of abstract notions that would merely 
clutter up what could otherwise be described with economy and in ordinary language. 
The concepts of structuration theory, as with any competing theoretical perspective, 
should for many research purposes be regarded as sensitizing devices, nothing more. 
That is to say, they may be useful for thinking about research problems and the 
interpretation of research results. But to suppose that being theoretically informed - 
which is the business of everyone working in the social sciences to be in some degree - 
means operating with a welter of abstract concepts is as mischievous a doctrine as one 
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which suggests that we can get along very well without ever using such concepts at 
all. " (Giddens, 1984, p. 327). 
Thus structuration theory is intended neither to be simply "applied" in research 
programmes en bloc, nor as a distinct research programme in itself. In any particular 
research context, it may not be helpful to attempt to incorporate a large framework of 
abstract concepts. Structuration-ist concepts should be used as sensitising devices, 
selectively drawn upon to aid in the formulation and interpretation of research. 
Epistemological issues 
The notion that the social sciences have the same logical form as the natural sciences is 
the position expressed by Durkheim, particularly in "The rules of sociological method" 
(1982). This position is founded on a framework of inductive logic whereby theories 
are to be constructed inductively on the basis of observation. Thus, observations are 
necessarily "pre-theoretical" as they are the basis of theory construction. However, 
when this position was applied by Durkheim, for example in his study of suicide 
(described earlier), the observation of phenomena was shown to be problematic: the 
assumption that the data were composed of observations made on the basis of 
Durkheim's own definition is unlikely. The analytic category was simply assumed to 
reflect the data, leading to "classification by fiat" (Giddens, 1992, p. 139). 
However, Giddens states that to argue that, for example a definition of suicide, could 
be constructed on the basis of elicitations from subjects is also misguided: both are 
based on a notion of the unproblematic observation of "reality", in this case "reality" 
based on the ideations of participants; in Durkheim's case, "reality" based on external 
features of conduct. In each case the framework of inductive inference remains intact: 
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observations are the basis for constructing theoretical generalisations, so are taken to 
be pre-theoretical in character. Intellectual effort is directed toward the "theoretical" 
level, the "pre-theoretical" is taken as unproblematic. 
Giddens argues that the conceptual problem basic to either approach, whether based 
on subjective ideations or objective features of conduct, is an essentially passive 
relation between subject and object which reflects a dualism between subjectivism and 
objectivism. The inductive framework is grounded on the notion of unproblematic, 
theoretically neutral observation. This was the basis of "logical positivism" that was 
subject to "devastating critique" by Popper (Giddens, 1992, p. 141). 
Logical positivism. 
Giddens acknowledges that `logical positivism' refers not to a single body of ideas, but 
involves a number of shared concerns including a notion that the natural and social 
sciences share a logical form, influenced by the ideas of Comte (1975) who was the 
first to use the term "positive philosophy", and particularly stressed by members of the 
Vienna circle 1. (Giddens, 1995, p. 136-7). 
Initially, the differentiation between science and non-science was taken to correspond 
to that between what was "meaningful" and "meaningless", through the operation of 
the "Verification principle". Early formulations of the principle stated that the meaning 
of statements consisted in the method of their verification. This proved problematic as 
the possibility arose that through improvements in empirical techniques of validation, 
previously "meaningless" statements could become "meaningful". The "verification 
principle" was amended enabling a statement to be considered "meaningful" if there 
were some means of potentially testing it. However this then placed the status of the 
1 Influential members of the Vienna circle included Neurath (1973); Carnap (1967); and Feigl (1969). 
Others, such as Schlick, Hahn and Gödel were also influential, though their works are less relevant in 
the present context. 
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"principle" into question, as its operation was no longer straightforward: the logic of 
the "principle" was founded on the notion that if a statement could not be tested then it 
should be dismissed as meaningless. As a result the "principle" was considered more in 
terms of a procedural rule than an actual principle. Nevertheless, the notion that the 
meaning of scientific concepts were always at least potentially reducible to empirical 
observations endured. 
Giddens (1995) argues that the orthodox model of science derived from a liberalisation 
of the original logical positivist doctrines which involved a distinction being drawn 
between observational statement and theoretical statements. Thus the notion of 
"meaningfulness" was no longer made directly on the basis of observational statements, 
as stated in the "verification principle". This notion was replaced by the introduction 
of correspondence rules which would provide a link between the contents of both 
observational and theoretical statements. 
The distinction between observational and theoretical statements greatly increased the 
creative scope of scientific innovation and the wide explanatory power of abstract 
theory by no longer restricting "meaning" to observation so directly. That part of a 
theoretical term which cannot be expressed directly in terms of the "observation 
language" is given meaning through its placement within a "deductive hierarchy" of 
statements, built upon a secure foundation of non-problematic observation. Giddens 
argues that the nature of correspondence rules has been controversial, precisely 
because of problems in maintaining the distinction between the theoretical and 
observation language: it has not been possible to sustain the notion that observation 
statements can be entirely "theory-free". 
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Post-positivistic philosophy of science. 
Popper 
Giddens argues that Popper's work was in many ways a radical critique of logical 
positivism. The most significant of Popper's (1959) arguments concerned the 
complete rejection of both induction and theoretically neutral observation, and the 
replacement of verification by the notion of "falsification". Popper also stressed 
boldness and ingenuity in the framing of scientific hypotheses, and a recognition of 
science as a collective enterprise. Also, Popper argued that falsification allowed for a 
clear demarcation between science and non-science, rather than attempting to show 
metaphysics (non-science) to be meaningless. 
For Popper, the principle of falsification provided the means for distinguishing the 
physical sciences from certain types of social theory, such as Marxism, psychoanalysis 
or forms of religion. Popper objected to the explanatory power of these types of social 
theory as they could be made to explain anything and everything. No type of empirical 
evidence could be used to refute the claims of these theories since they were each 
protected against counterfactual evidence, for example by concepts such as "false class 
consciousness" in the case of Marxism, "reaction formation" in psychoanalytic theory, 
or "the will of God" in the case of religion. Thus for Popper, the distinctive 
characteristic of science was not seen in terms of confirmation or verification, but in 
terms of the withstanding of empirical attempts to falsify it: 
However, for Popper, falsification also addressed a major logical flaw of empiricism: 
science was supposed to be the means to certain knowledge, yet the logical form of the 
induction of laws from observations precluded certainty due to the possibility of a 
disconfirming instance. This was the basis for Popper's famous example of a universal 
law, "all swans are white". This "law" cannot be verified with complete certainty as 
this would require access to the total population of swans, past, present and future, 
and could be contradicted by the singular instance of a black swan. 
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Popper sought to avoid the process of induction entirely by accepting as inevitable that 
no abstract proposition in a science could ever be finally verified. However, although 
logically there was no way to attain `truth', an approximation of certainty could be 
progressively achieved through the elimination of false theories. Thus scientific 
advance was possible through the empirical refutation of hypotheses. Popper believed 
that scientists should look for `unlikely" hypotheses as these would be the easiest to 
test. 
The critique of inductive logic concerned not only the testing of theories but also the 
generation of theories. There was no longer any "logic of discovery", new ideas could 
enter from any context, including the religious, or through introspection or intuition. 
This broke radically from the positivist notion of "metaphysics" as meaningless. The 
manner in which a theory was invented had nothing to do with its scientific status. By 
dispensing with the notion of inductive logic in this manner, there was also no longer 
any obligation to deal with any observation which was prior to theory as "pre- 
theoretical". This was a major disjunction with logical positivism. All observations 
were now acknowledged to be theory-impregnated, and were interpretations of facts; 
what was important was that theories were open to empirical refutation. 
Popper rejection of "positivism" in the natural sciences corresponded to his rejection of 
inductive logic in the social sciences. The notion that observations and measurements 
could be collected, and generalisations induced, leading to their incorporation within 
theories was rejected. The objectivity of science lay in its critical method of trial and 
error; this "critical rationalism" was seen as the most integral procedure of science. 
From this, the aim of the social sciences was seen as the explanation of conduct 
through the rational reconstruction of the circumstances (goals and knowledge) under 
which individuals acted, and of the consequences of their behaviour (Giddens, 1995). 
Kuhn 
Like Popper, Kuhn (1996) incorporated an understanding of the history and practices 
of science in his philosophy of science, for both science was seen as a collaborative 
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effort. Kuhn, however, noted a characteristic pattern of development within the 
natural sciences. Relatively stable "normal science", concerned with puzzle solving 
within a framework of accepted understandings was interspersed with periods of 
radicalism where previously accepted frameworks of understandings were reappraised 
and new frameworks introduced. Normal science and the periods of radical change 
were inextricably linked: through the puzzle solving activities of normal science, 
contradictions and anomalies in the existing framework emerged, which eventually 
resulted in the construction of a new framework. 
Kuhn saw these frameworks, or "paradigms", as a distinguishing feature between the 
natural and social sciences. The social sciences did not show the pattern characteristic 
of the development of science due to deep-rooted disagreements about basic premises, 
hence they did not have the basic level of agreement to constitute normal science. 
Thus to describe the social sciences as "pre-paradigm" actually discloses very little as 
this was the basis upon which the definition of paradigm was made. 
For Kuhn, normal science is integral to scientific progress. The constant critical 
assessment of basic premises of the substance and method of inquiry would serve to 
distract and detract from a concentration of effort upon clearly defined problems. This 
would block the development of knowledge of the form found in the natural sciences. 
A suspension of critical reason was a necessary condition for the successes of the 
natural sciences by enabling such a concentration of effort. 
The notion of normal science is in direct opposition to the critical reason and the 
norms of critical exchange which demarcate science from non-science in Popper's 
philosophy. For Popper normal science is detrimental to scientific progress; for Kuhn 
`normal science' facilitates scientific progress. However, normal science is a more 
accurate description of the actual practice of science than the "permanent revolution" 
implied by Popper (Giddens, 1995, p. 172). 
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Falsification 
Kuhn also drew attention to problems concerning the concept of falsification, 
particularly as it now had to account for both normal and revolutionary periods. In 
periods of normal science, scientists would often ignore or explain away results or 
observations inconsistent with the accepted paradigm. As Giddens explains, "Such 
results may be treated as compatible with a theory when initially produced, but appear 
to later workers as quite irreconcilable with it; or recognised as inconsistent with the 
theory in its current stage of development, but `laid aside' as capable of explanation in 
terms of a revised version of the theory at a subsequent date. " (Giddens, 1992, p. 144). 
Although Popper introduced falsification in order to replace induction, the issue of pre- 
theoretical observation creates similar problems for both. This may be illustrated by 
reference to the earlier example, "all swans are white". As described earlier, Popper's 
argument is that such a statement cannot be verified no matter how many confirming 
observations are made as it may be falsified by a single non-confirming instance. 
However, Giddens argues that the consideration is considerably more complex, as the 
discovery of a "black" swan may not actually constitute a falsification. Following 
Feyerabend (1965), Giddens explains, "a swan that has been painted black or dipped in 
soot, may not be accepted as a falsifying instance; nor if this were possible, would the 
discovery of a black animal born of the union of a swan and a black eagle, since this 
would not count as a "swan" even in if it were like a swan in most important respects. " 
(Giddens, 1992, p. 147). 
Similarly the statement may not be falsified by simply refusing to acknowledge any 
case of a black swan that may be found as simply not being a swan, thereby placing the 
falsifying instance outside the scope of the law. Giddens argues that the statement "all 
swans are white" presupposes theories of the origins of colour-typing and biological 
form in birds. Thus the acceptance of a falsifying instance is dependent upon the 
theoretical system or paradigm within which the description of what is observed is 
couched; and as Kuhn shows in his characterisation of normal science, theoretical 
systems routinely accommodate apparently falsifying instances. 
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Lakatos (1970) attempted to reformulate the concept of falsification by identifying and 
separating out the implications of three versions of falsification. "Dogmatic 
falsification" refers to the simple acceptance that an observed event provides an 
adequate means to refute scientific theories. This is an "empiricist" version of 
falsification, in which observation is pre-theoretical in nature: the logic of falsification 
is taken to be the same as its practice. (Popper acknowledged some difference 
between the logic of falsification and its use in actual scientific procedures. ) This type 
of falsification is taken to be unworkable due to its assumption of a pre-theoretical 
observation. 
The two remaining types were "naive" and "sophisticated" methodological 
falsification. In both of these types of falsification it the theory-impregnated nature of 
observations is acknowledged. It is accepted that theory testing involved the 
acceptance of a theoretical framework as providing unproblematic background 
knowledge. In the case of "naive methodological falsification" it is maintained that 
theories could still be refuted by way of falsifying observation. However, this view is 
also untenable because as Kuhn showed, theoretical systems were capable of 
accommodating any number of apparently disconfirming instances without suffering 
abandonment. 
"Sophisticated methodological falsification" involved additional criteria to support the 
notion of falsification by providing standards for the critical comparison of theories. 
Here, falsification would only occur where the abandoned theory was to be replaced by 
a "better" theory. A better theory would explain all that was explained successfully by 
its predecessor, yet also have "surplus empirical content" which could be corroborated 
and used to predict previously excluded or improbable facts. If these criteria were 
met, the abandoning of the previous theory would represent a "progressive problem 
shift". If not, the problem shift was considered "degenerative" and so would not 
constitute a falsification of the previous theory. However, in seeking to emphasise the 
notion of the progressive problem shift, Lakatos' position related the significance of 
refutation to falsification: "`Falsification' in the sense of naive falsificationism 
(corroborated counter-evidence) is not a sufficient condition for eliminating a specific 
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theory: in spite of hundreds of known anomalies we do not regard it as falsified (that 
is, eliminated) until we have a better one. Nor is `falsification' in the naive sense 
necessary for falsification in the sophisticated sense: a progressive problem shift does 
not have to be interspersed with `refutations'. Science can grow without any 
`refutation' leading the way. " (Lakatos, 1970, p. 121, emphases in original). 
Although Lakatos sought to support Popper, by arguing that refutation was no longer 
a necessary aspect of falsification, Lakatos' sense of falsification is now quite different 
from that of Popper, and Popper's sense of falsification (as the means for refutation) is 
now no longer a necessary criterion for the scientific status of a theory. As existing 
theories can largely accommodate anomalies, `falsification' is no longer as distinct an 
alternative to the model of inductive logic it originally opposed. It is not clear how the 
criteria for sophisticated falsification are to be applied, for example how `surplus 
empirical content' is to be corroborated, as a `paradigm shift' may alter the status of 
information previously understood as fact. Also, as a consequence of the reduced 
status of falsification, the distinction between science and non-science becomes less 
clear-cut. 
Giddens argues that regardless of the relationship between induction and falsification it 
is necessary to deny the possibility of theoretically neutral observation. In social 
scientific research it can be seen that the analytic categories used by a researcher imply 
a definite stance with regard to the phenomena under investigation. This is most 
noticeable when categories used by actors are contested, as for example in the decision 
to categorise actors as "terrorists" or "freedom fighters". Here, even the use of a 
"neutral" term implies a critical distance on the part of the researcher from the mutual 
knowledgeability of actors. 
Paradigms 
Giddens takes issue with Kuhn's notion of paradigm, particularly the clear demarcation 
and internal consistency implied in the use of the term. Giddens argues that the notion 
of paradigm seems to refer to a set of shared, taken-for-granted assumptions. In this 
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respect they may be more generically referred to as a "frame of meaning". However, 
the notion of "paradigm shift" that is said to occur in revolutionary periods of science, 
implies that paradigms are not separate "closed" systems, otherwise it would not be 
possible to move from one meaning-frame to another. Giddens argues that all 
paradigms or meaning frames are mediated by others. This applies to both the 
successive development of paradigms within science, and for an actor "learning to find 
their way" within a paradigm. 
The process of learning a paradigm or frame of meaning implicates also learning what 
the paradigm is not: "that is to say, learning to mediate it with other, rejected 
alternatives, by contrast to which the claims of the paradigm in question are clarified. " 
(Giddens, 1992, p. 151). Giddens provides the examples of Einsteinian physics and 
Newtonian physics, and Protestantism and Catholicism: each set of examples involve 
clear divergence between each element, yet also retain direct continuities, and to some 
extent each is only fully appreciated though an understanding of its relationship to the 
other. 
The process of learning a paradigm through the mediation of rejected alternatives 
implicates the contestation of interpretations, thus the boundary between what is 
"internal" to the frame of meaning and what is "external" to it must be seen as 
permeable or fluctuating. Giddens argues that analogy and metaphor play an important 
part in this process: "To become acquainted with a new paradigm is to grasp a new 
frame of meaning, in which familiar premises are altered: elements of the novel scheme 
are learned through metaphorical allusion to the old. Metaphor both produces and 
expresses... .a 
`displacement of concepts': the connection of disparate frames in a way 
which is initially `unusual'. " (Giddens, 1992, p. 155). 
In a similar vein it can be seen that there is some degree of continuity between the 
natural and social sciences, while at the same time significant discontinuities. Common 
to both is the necessity of acknowledging that there are no theory-free observations or 
data. Also, a scheme of sophisticated falsification may provide an initial "but not 
wholly adequate" means to deal with testability (Giddens, 1992, p. 158). 
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However, the discontinuities include that the social sciences stand in a subject-subject 
relation to their "field of study", not a subject-object relation as is the case with the 
natural sciences. By this is meant that the social sciences are concerned with studying 
aspects of "pre-interpreted" phenomena, where the meanings developed by active, 
purposeful agents actually enter into the constitution (and reconstitution) of 
phenomena. Thus, Giddens concludes, the social sciences involve a "double 
hermeneutic". This refers to the "intersection of the two frames of meaning, the 
meaningful social world as constituted by lay actors, and the metalanguages invented 
by social scientists" (Giddens, 1984, p. 374). 
Social scientific research depends upon a mastery of the mutual knowledge held by 
those that, through their activities, constitute the subject matter under investigation. 
This mutual knowledge can be understood as a frame of meaning, and the task of the 
researcher as involving, to some degree, "the hermeneutic elucidation of frames of 
meaning" (level (1) of the levels of analysis described earlier. ) This is the basis for the 
generation of descriptions of those forms of interaction that, though the notion of the 
duality of structure, constitute the phenomena under investigation. 
However, the generation of descriptions of acts by actors is integral to the constitution 
of social interaction and thereby social institutions: "the characterisation of what others 
do, and more narrowly their intentions and reasons for what they do, is what makes 
possible the intersubjectivity through which the transfer of communicative intent is 
realised. " (Giddens, 1992, p. 158). 
Thus every competent social actor (i. e. capable of "bringing off' interactions) is in 
some respects a social scientist, who routinely interprets their own behaviour and that 
of others in the context of social interaction. "There is no clear dividing line between 
informed sociological reflection carried on by lay actors and similar endeavours on the 
part of specialists. " (Giddens, 1984, p. xxxiii). 
The recursive nature of social life also has implications for generalisations in the social 
sciences. Such generalisations concern the outcomes of human activity; as a result the 
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causal mechanisms are inherently unstable, dependent on standard patterns of 
reasoning producing standard patterns of unintended consequence. This is not the case 
with natural sciences where the boundary conditions of laws or generalisations refer to 
causal relations that are immutable given the meeting of those conditions. In the social 
sciences, "the causal relations always refer to `mixes' of intended and unintended 
consequences of reproduced acts. Laws in the social science are historical in character 
and in principle mutable in form..... The boundary conditions involved with laws in the 
social sciences include as a basic element the knowledge that actors, in a given 
institutional context, have about circumstances of their action. " (Giddens, 1979, p, 243 
-4, emphases in original). There are no universal laws in the social sciences because 
generalisations are mutable in respect of the knowledge actors have of the 
circumstances of their own action. 
Critical response to Giddens 
As stated earlier, Giddens' concept of structuration touches upon many aspects of 
social science, and is critical of both objectivist and subjectivist approaches to social 
phenomena. Consequently it has generated a great deal of critical debate throughout 
the social sciences. It may be due to the wide-ranging issues involved, but there does 
appear to be great scope for misunderstanding the nature and implications of Giddens' 
structuration theory. With this in mind the following passage by Giddens may aid the 
discussion of aspects of the critical literature to follow. 
"Structuration theory is not intended to be a theory `of anything, in the sense of 
advancing generalisations about social reality. While this emphasis has infuriated some 
critics, it is quite necessary to any attempt to provide an ontology of social activity in 
the sense noted previously. In seeking to come to grips with problems of action and 
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structure, structuration theory offers a conceptual scheme that allows one to 
understand both how actors are at the same time the creators of social systems yet 
created by them. Critics who argue either that structuration theory provides too little 
space for free action or, alternatively, underestimates the influence of structural 
constraint (both types of criticism have been made) miss the point. The theory of 
structuration is not a series of generalisations about how far `free action' is possible in 
respect of `social constraint'. Rather, it is an attempt to provide the conceptual means 
of analyzing the often delicate and subtle interlacings of reflexively organized action 
and institutional constraint. " (Giddens, 1991, p. 204). 
Critiques relating to the duality of structure. 
Giddens' notion of the duality of structure has provoked much debate. However, 
argument has been particularly directed toward Giddens' conception of structure as 
rules and resources, and toward Giddens' alleged over-emphasis on agency rather than 
structural generalities. It is these two issues that the discussion below will be directed 
toward. 
As described earlier Giddens conception of rule is similar to Wittgenstein's (1972) 
notion of rule as knowing how to `go on' with social activity, without requiring 
discursive formulation. However, in contrast to Wittgenstein, unlike the rules of 
games, the rules which are drawn upon as structural properties are chronically 
contested, subject to rival interpretation and transformed in their very application. A 
rule has two aspects, relating to the constitution of meaning and the sanctioning of 
conduct, though a rule cannot be drawn upon in isolation from resources which 
facilitate the exercise of power. 
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Thompson (1989) argues that Giddens' notion of rule generates more confusion than 
clarification. Thompson states that it is not clear which are the rules which comprise 
social structure, neither is it clear what would count as a relevant rule. Thompson 
contends that Giddens is forcing a framework onto the notion of social structure that 
is inappropriate; Thompson states that the study of rules is not the same as the analysis 
of social structure. 
Thompson provides a number of examples to illustrate his concerns. He argues that, 
for example, while there may be rules governing the use of the noun "the Left" in 
contemporary Britain, to study these rules is not to study the social structure of 
Britain. Thompson argues that these rules may be differentiated across groups, but 
this implicates structural points of reference that are not in themselves rules. Similarly 
the restriction of opportunity may operate independently of the rights and obligations 
of agents. Thompson argues that such restrictions may operate differentially, but again 
this differential distribution cannot be understood in terms of rules. Thompson also 
states that while large organisations may operate according to rules, their structural 
features, for example as capitalist organisations, cannot be understood in terms of 
rules; the structural features may delimit the kinds of rules available. 
Thompson argues that it is due to an over emphasis on the enabling aspects of 
structure, that Giddens fails to explain how rules operate as constraints. Thompson 
argues that structural constraint may reduce the options available to an individual to 
one, such as in the situation facing propertyless individuals who must accept a job. In 
such a situation, the individual cannot "do otherwise", as Giddens states in his 
definition of agency, thus agency is dissolved. Thompson finds Giddens' notion of a 
"feasible option", given an individuals' wants and desires, as a means to deal with the 
situation where there is only one option, unconvincing. Thompson argues that it is 
Giddens' definition of agency is at the root of the problem: Giddens implies that every 
individual must be an "agent"; this is why the differential distribution of options is not 
captured in Giddens' conceptualisation. 
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Bauman (1989) similarly questions Giddens' use of rules to convey the notion of 
structure. Bauman argues that in Giddens' scheme action is governed by rules, thus 
the notion of structure is outside the realm of human action, which is now simply 
normatively given. Bauman argues that rules may be negotiated and questioned, but 
Giddens cannot deal with this provision due to the external nature of rules. 
Bauman also argues that Giddens over emphasises agency at the expense of constraint. 
According to Bauman, Giddens assumes that the lack of control that actors may 
experience over their circumstances is due to the bounded nature of their 
knowledgeability. Bauman claims that the implication of this is that if actors were to 
gain knowledgeablility, they would then be able to control their circumstances. 
Bauman suggest that Elias' (1978) notion of figuration provides a preferable 
alternative. Bauman argues that the notion of figuration stresses the interdependency 
of actors and their contexts such that the knowledgeability of actors does not affect the 
figurational logic of a situation. Bauman continues that the notion of interdependency 
constrains different actors in different ways. Even though knowledgeability may in 
principle be evenly distributed, some actors may be more able to "structure" their 
environments than others. Thus, it can be seen that Bauman's critique shares a basic 
concern with Thompson that the differential operation of constraint cannot be captured 
by the notion of rule. 
Boyne (1991) similarly argues that by focusing on the knowledgeability of individual 
actors, Giddens places too little emphasis on the notion of constraint. Boyne argues 
that the emphasis on agency is in accord with the demand of late capitalism for the 
"total adaptability and multifunctionality of individuals. " (Boyne, 1991, p. 58). Jary 
(1991) also registers his concern that Giddens shows an ontological and 
epistemological bias toward agency. According to Jary, Giddens assumes that 
"because agents construct and can and do re-construct social arrangements", that this 
reconstruction "cannot be captured by law-like propositions or general mechanisms" 
(Jary, 1991, p. 144-5). Jary argues that the question of generalisation should be left 
open, and settled in individual cases rather than in a "once and for all" manner (1991, 
p. 146). 
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Giddens' response 
In response to Thompson, Giddens explains that with regard to structuration, 
"structure" does not refer to descriptive features of social life. The continuities of 
form normally associated with the notion of structure in the social scientific literature, 
refer to the reproduction of human social processes, described by the notion of 
"system". The rules involved in social life can be thought of as "generalisable 
procedures" or conventions which agents follow. Giddens suggests Goffinan's (1981) 
notion of displaying agency as a useful illustration: according to Goffman, to be a 
human agent one must, in some sense, be in control of oneself and also display to 
others that one is in control. Thus, Giddens explains, the display of agency is not a 
rule as such, but implicates a number of conventions which agents may follow. These 
may involve posture, gesture, or perhaps vocal intonation. The display of agency is 
fundamentally implicated in the accomplishment of social activities. 
However, rules are not just involved in specifying the constituting features of social 
conduct, but are also involved in the application of sanctions. Sanctions may be very 
diffuse, as for example are many of the sanctions involved in the displaying of agency. 
Nevertheless, failure to follow conventions may also involve very formal sanctions, for 
example if such behaviour is identified as constituting mental incapacity. Agents draw 
upon rules to reproduce practices that may be strongly institutionalised; that is, deeply 
embedded in space and time. Such practices may be directly relevant to more "macro" 
phenomena, for example procedures for the displaying of agency may underpin 
pervasive aspects of social institutions, through their invoking of trust and confidence 
in particularly influential social encounters. 
Thus Giddens argues, it does not make sense to ask which are the rules which 
comprise social structure; structure only exists in and through the activities of human 
agents. Contrary to Bauman's suggestion, structure cannot be outside the realm of 
human activity. I would argue that Bauman has misunderstood Giddens' and 
considered the notion of rule solely in terms of formalised prescription; in this way 
structure may indeed be seen as external to human action. However, this is in 
contradiction to the whole notion of the duality of structure which stresses the creative 
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grasping of rules, which are applied, interpreted and transformed in particular contexts. 
All moments of reflexive attention draw upon and reconstitute rules (and resources). 
Actors may indeed distance themselves from formalised systems of rules, as Bauman 
suggests when he notes that rules may be negotiated and questioned. It is necessary to 
understand that rules that are drawn upon by actors only exist through their activities; 
with regard to the notion of distancing oneself from them, there is no stepping outside 
the flow of action. 
Bauman and Thompson use the term "social structure" to refer to the structural 
properties of social systems. Systems of interaction and social relationships 
reproduced across space and time have a stability that derives from their institutional 
character. Thus the differential capabilities, that Bauman describes as some people 
being more able to "structure" than others, or Thompson's restricted opportunities and 
options, refer to structural properties of social systems. These are not themselves rules 
and cannot be studied as rules. Bauman and Thompson are referring to relationships 
of differential power. Giddens argues that power is a fundamental characteristic of 
social systems, "although its analysis is complex, and it has both generative and 
distributive aspects" (Giddens, 1991, p. 257). Power is implicated both at the level of 
strategic conduct and at the level of social systems, though the duality of structure, and 
thus does not compromise the concepts of structure and system. 
Giddens further explicates the notion of structure as rules and resources by considering 
the examples provided by Thompson. The use of the noun "the Left", Giddens 
suggests, could be analysed as it appears in the talk of particular groups such as trades 
union leaders, or business leaders. It is doubtful that the varied use of the term could 
be subsumed under a single "rule". However, by analysing the "texture" of these uses, 
aspects of the production and reproduction of unions as organisations, and other 
aspects of industrial relations, such as relations with different levels of management or 
other trades unions, may be illuminated. Analysis of uses of the word could also be 
used to draw attention to aspects of power relations in and between such collectivities. 
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As regards restriction to the range of opportunities of actors, such as restricted entry 
to organisations such as universities, this again cannot be subsumed under the 
operation of a single rule. System reproduction implicates complexes of rules and 
resources involved in the "given-ness" of the actor's environment. These involve the 
acceptance of certain conventions as appropriate. For example, the possession of a 
qualification would be implicated as a resource to be drawn upon to enable a selection 
interview to be successfully "brought off'. This may more easily be illustrated by 
considering more generally the notion of constraint. 
Further comments 
Bauman, Boyne and Jary each argue that Giddens over-emphasises agency. Both 
Bauman and Boyne each interpret structural constraint in terms of knowledgeability: 
the options of actors are seen to be restricted due to their bounded knowledge; thus if 
agents were to acquire sufficient knowledge of the conditions and consequences of 
their actions, their options would no longer be restricted. Such a notion would indeed 
seem to over-emphasise agency, however Giddens does not argue that constraint is to 
be understood solely in terms of agents' knowledgeability. Structural constraint 
derives from the institutionalised nature of social practices in a given context of action 
in which agents find themselves. The recursive character of structure implicates the 
nature of institutions. The constraining elements are features of the given-ness of the 
social environment of action to particular agents, which through the duality of 
structure implicate structures of signification, domination and legitimation. 
Giddens only briefly responds to Bauman's suggestion that Elias' concept of figuration 
captured the interdependencies of situations more effectively than structuration. 
Giddens simply states that figuration offers no particular advantage. However, 
Bauman's suggestion was based on his assumption that Giddens conceived of 
constraint solely in terms of knowledgeability. In fact, the "figurative logic" of 
situations appears to be very similar to Wright's (after Cohen) notion of dispositional 
fact, mentioned when discussing functional arguments in the next section. I will not 
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pursue this similarity here, the main point to be emphasised is that Bauman's argument 
is based upon a misrepresentation of Giddens' position. 
Jary's argument that the question of generalisation be left 'open to be settled in 
particular cases is puzzling in that this is the position that Giddens actually takes. The 
alleged bias toward open agency refers to the potential for transformation, not actual 
transformation. Giddens argues that institutional analysis is based upon reproduced 
patterns of social relationship and unintended consequences. As the social 
relationships that constitute institutions must be continually produced (and 
reproduced), such generalisations are mutable in principle, though not necessarily in 
practice. The embeddness of practices in time and space is the basis for the apparent 
regularities of social life (and for the definition of institutions). Thus, the question of 
generalisation is indeed "to be settled" with regard to particular cases. 
Thompson also argues that Giddens fails to fully appreciate the nature of constraint, 
though his line of argument is slightly different to those already discussed. Thompson 
argues that in certain situations, structural constraint may reduce the options available 
to an agent to one, in other words to no option. In such a situation, agency would be 
dissolved. Giddens argues that the notion of feasible option presumes a range of wants 
and motivations. In this sense, constraint may indeed appear to dissolve agency. 
However, such wants and motivations are open to redefinition which may lead to the 
opening up of several courses of action. As Giddens argues that this is not simply a 
logical point but may have profound substantive implications as the basis for many 
forms of contestation and active attempts at social (structural) transformation that may 
occur as a result of such redefinition. 
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Responses to Giddens' critique of "Functionalism". 
Giddens' criticism of functionalism has been presented earlier, in the discussion of 
Moscovici's relationship to Durkheim and Parsons,, and throughout the description of 
structuration theory, via discussion of the limitations of normatively-based approaches. 
In this section, critical examinations of Giddens' rejection of functionalist arguments 
will be considered. It is generally accepted by critics that functional arguments are not 
satisfactory explanations in themselves, however it is claimed that functional arguments 
may constitute an aspect of proper explanation. This is the basic position taken by 
Wright and also Bryant and Jary whose arguments will be discussed below. These 
arguments will be discussed quite thoroughly as they have particular relevance to many 
theories in social psychology which I will argue, in a later chapter, are based on 
functionalist-type arguments. 
Giddens main contention with functionalist arguments is that they involve the imputing 
of needs to social systems (e. g. 1984, p. 294). In this way the knowledgeability of 
actors is derogated as they become the mere bearers of social relations. Giddens also 
argues that functional arguments that claim to be merely descriptive tend to slide 
surreptitiously into explanation. Giddens claims that functional arguments are only 
permissible if used "counterfactually"; that is, to identity conditions that must be met if 
certain consequences are to follow. It directs attention to a problem that requires 
explanation rather than providing an explanation itself. Giddens provides an example 
of a counterfactual use of a functionalist argument: "`In order for the occupational 
division of labour to be maintained, the educational system has to ensure that 
individuals are allocated differentially to occupational positions'. The force of `has to' 
here is counterfactual; ... understood as asking a question rather than answering one, 
it 
is entirely legitimate. " (1984, p. 296). Giddens argues that counterfactual thinking is 
"one of the main procedures of all intellectual inquiry" but must not be thought of as 
constituting an explanation in itself (1989, p. 262). 
Wright (1989) illustrates his defence of functionalist arguments through the use of a 
number of examples. In the first of these he describes Marxist discussions of racism in 
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terms of their negative consequences for working class unity. Wright acknowledges 
that even though the term "function" is not present, the argument presented is 
functionalist as the phenomenon is explained in terms of the meeting of system needs; 
that is, racism is explained in terms of its beneficial effects for capitalism. Wright 
argues that in the absence of this beneficial effect, racism would disappear much more 
readily. Thus the functional consequence, the beneficial effect, can be considered part 
of the explanation for the persistence of racism. 
Wright anticipates that Giddens may accept this point but request that the explanation 
be based on the discursive and practical consciousness of the bourgeoisie whose 
actions help to support racism, rather than in terms of functional relations. However, 
Wright argues that the effects are not a property of the consciousness of the 
bourgeoisie but of the social system: racism is a "dispositional fact" of the social 
system. 
Wright acknowledges that the term "dispositional fact" is taken from Cohen (1978) 
and borrows one of Cohen's examples to describe the notion. Wright explains that 
functional explanations in the social sciences are similar to those in biology. "The 
causal explanation for the long neck of the giraffe (Cohen's favourite example) is a 
series of specific mutations that changed the genes of short-necked giraffes. The sense 
in which a functional explanation is still appropriate here is that unless it was a 
dispositional fact of the situation of short-necked giraffes that their chances for 
reproductive survival would be enhanced by long necks, those same mutations would 
not have led to the gradual increase in the length of the giraffe's neck. " (Wright, 1989, 
p. 80). 
Thus referring to his earlier example, Wright argues that if racism did not have these 
beneficial effects, the strategies of specific actors which result in racism would not 
persist as they do. However, Wright concedes, though dispositional facts are real 
properties of social systems, they may be difficult to defend empirically, so 
counterfactual arguments may be used as support in the way described by Giddens. 
`But this does not imply that such analyses have the status simply of heuristic exercises 
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designed to point the way toward questions; claims about dispositional properties of 
social systems are a part of many answers. Functional argument, thus, can at least 
constitute part of a legitimate social explanation. " (Wright, 1989, p. 81). 
Wright continues by claiming that functional explanation is also relevant to situations 
that do not rely on actors' beliefs in the beneficial consequences of a given practice. 
Following Elster (1978), Wright argues that a functional argument is appropriate when 
explaining the profit-maximising strategies of capitalist firms. Wright explains that the 
market acts as a selective mechanism which eliminates sub-optimal strategies, such that 
eventually only firms which operate profit-maximising strategies survive. Thus a 
functional relationship is structurally ensured through the operation of the market: a 
non-intentional selective mechanism operates to produce functional relations. 
Giddens' response 
Giddens does not respond in the manner Wright had intended with regard to the 
"racism" example. Giddens argues that the identification of racism as a dispositional 
fact does not account for nor explain the persistence of racism, without additional 
explanatory support. "Racism simply happens to have the consequence of being 
`beneficial to the bourgeoisie'. The `happens to' remains to be explained. " (Giddens, 
1989, p. 261). Giddens describes two possible types of explanation: the consequences 
may be intended and deliberately pursued by individuals or collectivties; or unintended 
and the result of a feedback process no-one reflexively monitors. In actual practice 
these two types are complexly inter-related; this constitutes the `mix' of intended and 
unintended consequences of action that characterises the constitution of social 
phenomena, as described earlier. In Giddens own words: "Identifying what in fact 
`happens' constitutes the explanation of the phenomenon in question. " (1989, p. 261, 
emphases in original). 
Similarly, Giddens maintains his rejection of functionalist arguments when considering 
Wright's example of profit-maximising strategies. Thus, that firms "must" adapt to 
survive remains counterfactual if no further grounds are supplied. Giddens argues that 
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it could be the case that no firm pursues profit maximisation; it would only be if some 
firms did so that others would have to do also. Thus Giddens concludes that an 
explanation for profit-maximising is still lacking. 
Further comments 
I would agree with Giddens' arguments, but I believe that his response to the profit- 
maximising example could draw attention to another aspect of functional-type 
explanations. Wright assumes that "profit-maximising strategies" may be 
unproblematically identified. This refers not simply to a methodological issue, Wright 
acknowledges that dispositional facts may be difficult to defend empirically, but to a 
more theoretical concern. The "functional relation" between profit-maximising and the 
capitalist marketplace is actually implicit in the definition of what the capitalist 
marketplace is. Any company that survives will have by definition developed profit- 
maximisation strategies as this is the basis by which the market, as defined, operates. 
(This is similar to Aberle et al's (1967) definition of society discussed earlier. ) 
However, what actually `counts' as such a strategy is unclear. Wright's argument 
implies the unproblematic application of criteria that constitute profit-maximisation. 
But there are many possible permutations and combinations of such criteria depending 
on the parameters involved in different types of business concern. That a company 
survives does not necessarily mean it is operating optimally; even if it were this would 
not necessarily guarantee success. For example profit maximisation in the short term 
could lead to a greater susceptibility to alterations in wider market conditions, thus 
ending a firm's "survival'. The functional relation Wright specifies between profit- 
maximising and survival implies that there was only one possible means to achieve the 
outcome: that strategy must therefore have been profit maximisation. 
This point may be further illustrated with reference to Wright's functional explanation 
for the long neck of the giraffe. Wright argues that if it were not a dispositional fact of 
the situation of short necked giraffes that long necks would result in reproductive 
survival, long necks would not have developed. Again, this argument implies an 
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inevitability to the outcome. The development of long necks is not the key to 
reproductive survival, otherwise all creatures would develop long necks. Following 
Giddens' point, identifying what in fact "happened" would constitute the explanation. 
The related point I would like to emphasise is that the development of a long neck 
need not have been the only possible outcome for the giraffe's short necked ancestor. 
Development may have occurred along a range of parameters, leading to possible 
"outcomes" that may no longer appear closely related to the giraffe, (as evidenced by 
the variety of ungulate species native to Africa that share a common ancestor with the 
giraffe). Wright's argument implies that such outcomes may be unproblematically 
observed, but the identification of these outcomes is dependent on his (flawed) 
characterisation of the situation, i. e. of what constitutes a descendant of a short-necked 
giraffe; or in the earlier example, what constitutes profit-maximisation. The 
significance of this point may not be immediately apparent but the unproblematic 
observation of phenomena is very relevant to social psychology and will be discussed 
later. 
Bryant and Jary also question Giddens' "anathematization of functionalism" (1991, 
p. 23). They acknowledge Giddens criticisms, though defend the utility of functional 
arguments as an aspect of a "proper" explanation. Bryant and Jary discuss the 
example, "industrial capitalism "needs" large numbers of people either to work in 
unrewarding manual labour or to be part of an industrial reserve army of the 
unemployed" (1991, p. 23). Bryant and Jary argue that functional argument is 
acceptable as long as function is separated from cause; thus a function does not explain 
the existence of a phenomena, but the existence does serve the function. Bryant and 
Jary also acknowledge the necessity of taking account of the purposive nature of 
actors. They argue that functional argument need not "eclipse interpretative 
understanding and the analysis of purposive action" (1991, p. 23). 
Giddens does not explicitly respond to Bryant and Jary, though it is not difficult to 
evaluate their arguments. Bryant and Jary's argument that the existence of, for 
example, large numbers of manual labourers or unemployed, serve a function is 
identical to Wright's argument of dispositonal facts. Following Giddens it can be seen 
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that this does not constitute an explanation; what in fact happens would constitute the 
explanation. However, by following Bryant and Jary's suggestion to incorporate 
interpretative understanding and purposive action, the utility of the functional 
argument is greatly reduced. The functional argument is now being used 
counterfactually in the manner endorsed by Giddens as an important feature of 
intellectual inquiry: the functional argument identifies a situation which requires 
explanation; this explanation will be in terms of the meshing of both intended and 
unintended consequences of action. 
Functional arguments may be helpful when used counterfactually to aid in the initial 
formulation of a problem that requires further explanation. However, beyond this 
heuristic capability, their utility has not been substantiated. 
Critiques relating to empirical issues. 
Held and Thompson (1989) state that while structuration theory has generated much 
theoretical debate, it has been received less enthusiastically by those engaged in 
empirical research who tend to feel that structuration-ist concepts are too abstract and 
formal to be directly incorporated into empirical research (1989, p. 9). This is the 
general position taken by Gregson (1989) and Jary (1991) whose criticisms are 
discussed below. 
Gregson's criticism is directed predominantly at chapter six of "The constitution of 
society" in which Giddens provides his most comprehensive discussion of empirical 
research to date. (This chapter was also the primary source for the description of the 
empirical issues related to structuration theory, presented earlier. ) 
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Gregson points out that Giddens himself states that structuration theory must "help to 
illuminate problems of empirical research" to be of any value to social science 
(Giddens, 1984, p. xxix). Gregson argues that Giddens' guidelines for research, which 
include acknowledging both the "ethnographic moment" implicated in all social science 
research, and also the complex knowledgeability of individual agents (described 
earlier), reflect Giddens' views as to what is central to an ontology of human societies. 
Gregson claims, by emphasising the ethnographic moment, Giddens is arguing "that 
individuals' knowledge and understanding is not just alluded to but elucidated in the 
course of empirical research projects" (Gregson, 1989, p. 240). Similarly, Gregson 
claims that the emphasis on the complexity of the skills of individual agents reflects 
Giddens' model of human agency and "suggests that empirical work be alive to all that 
is contained in [Giddens conception] of agency"; thus "discursive consciousness, 
practical consciousness, the unconscious and the unacknowledged conditions and 
unintentional outcomes of action are all implicated" (Gregson, 1989, p. 240). Gregson 
argues that the guidelines lack the necessary specificity. For empirical work, the key 
questions concern"which `actors', which skills.. . and 
how we investigate these, where 
and when. " (Gregson, 1989, p. 241, emphases in original). Thus, Gregson claims, 
Giddens' guidelines reflect ontological rather than empirical concerns and thus are of 
limited use to empirical research. 
Gregson also criticises Giddens' use of existing research, which makes no reference to 
and does not appear to have been informed by structuration theory, to illustrate the 
relevances of structuration-ist concepts (as described earlier. ) Gregson argues that this 
lead to a curious situation whereby "rather than structuration theory being used to 
inform empirical work, it is certain isolated aspects of a range of projects which are 
used to illustrate certain aspects of structuration theory. " (1989, p. 242). As a result, 
Gregson argues, it is not clear what the distinctive character of a structuration-ist 
programme of research would be: structuration-concepts are either not specific to 
structuration theory or are so general that they are compatible with a variety of 
different approaches. 
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Gregson also argues that in Giddens' scheme empirical research questions alone 
determine the use of theoretical arguments. Gregson claims that this leaves no place 
for the interrogation and development of theory through empirical work: Giddens' use 
of existing empirical studies seems to illustrate structuration-ist concepts rather than to 
interrogate structuration theory. Thus Gregson refers to structuration theory as a 
"second order" theory, concerned with conceptualising general features of society, 
such as agency, structure and power. Gregson distinguishes this level from "first 
order" theory, which suggest concepts with immediate empirical application, to direct 
research projects and to be modified in the course of such work. 
Gregson argues that in this way it can be seen that structuration theory does not 
constitute a critical social theory. As it has no specific substantive implications, it 
cannot specify substantive alternatives. Gregson argues that any genuinely critical 
social theory must demonstrate its connection to empirical research by engaging with 
the concrete social world, "in a permanent rather than transitory, glancing manner" to 
explain not only what exists but also what might exist and indicate how this 
transformation is to proceed (Gregson, 1991, p. 237). Consequently, Gregson argues, 
structuration theory slides into theoretical relativism. Gregson claims that concrete 
application is the only means by which structuration theory may justify its worth and so 
avoid being "just one more voice in a theoretical sea. " (Gregson, 1989, p. 248). 
Jary (1991) bases his arguments around Giddens' "Contemporary critique of historical 
materialism" (Giddens; vol. 1,1981; vol. 2,1985). These are more substantive works, 
though Jary also discusses the empirical implications of structuration theory. It is the 
latter aspect which will be considered here. Jary's criticisms are of interest as they 
draw attention to the notion of methodological bracketing described earlier. 
Following a similar line of argument to Gregson, Jary complains that structuration-ist 
ideas do not specify historical conclusions. Such conclusion, Jary argues, would 
require detailed empirical work and the construction of specific theories. In contrast, 
the duality of structure is "not automatically an operational model or one from which a 
single set of answers can ever be expected. " (1991, p. 147, emphases in original). Jary 
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maintains that this is due to difficulties in conducting analysis in terms of both agency 
and structure. 
However, Jary argues that Mann's analysis of the "sources of social power" (1986) 
covers broadly the same grounds as Giddens, yet Mann's conceptualisation is more 
empirically straightforward for historical analysis. Jary praises Mann for placing more 
emphasis on the detailed testing of substantive claims and suggests that this may be 
because unlike Giddens, Mann's analyses need not maintain links to the general theory 
of structuration. 
Giddens' response 
In response to Gregson, Giddens reiterates that structuration theory is not in itself a 
distinct research programme, that structuration-ist concepts should be used as 
sensitising devices, used selectively when formulating research or interpreting findings. 
Giddens argues that theoretical thinking should not be expected to be linked at all 
points to empirical considerations. Empirical work requires abstract notions and 
theoretical concepts, but Giddens argues, these are drawn upon selectively and cannot 
be continually present as the term "empirical work" covers a multitude of concerns and 
objectives. Giddens' argument that research responds to contextualised enquiries is 
reflected in his refusal to privilege any particular method: "For some purposes, detailed 
ethnographic work is appropriate, while for others archival research, or the 
sophisticated statistical analysis of secondary materials, might be more suitable. " 
(1991, p. 296). 
However, Giddens points out that theory is also contextual in that some theories and 
concepts are more abstract than others. Giddens argues that structuration theory is 
relevant to empirical research as it draws attention to necessary considerations when 
formulating research or interpreting findings. Giddens makes this point clearly with 
respect to the ethnographic moment of research: "Since this is a logical point, by 
definition it does not disclose anything directly which is an option for a researcher; it 
sets out what all social investigation, without exception, involves. Yet it would be 
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wrong to say that it is without direct relevance to the conduct and interpretation of 
research. Thus someone who believes she or he is dealing only with `hard facts' - say 
in the shape of a mathematical analysis of quantitative variables - might both 
misconstrue what those `facts' are and other conclusions to be drawn from them, if the 
point is ignored. " (1991, p. 296). 
Giddens points out in the chapter from which Gregson bases her critique, that 
structuration-ist concepts were important to draw attention to " `the logical 
implications of studying a "subject matter" of which the researcher is already a part' 
and to elucidate `the substantive connotations of the core notions of action and 
structure'. " (1991, p. 296). The studies Giddens describes were selected as they 
displayed an awareness of "key emphases" formally elaborated in structuration theory, 
and, importantly, did not require recourse to functionalist assertions of any kind. 
Giddens concludes that "(s)tructuration theory is a broad perspective upon the study of 
action, structure and institutions. Its relation to empirical research is much the same as 
that of competing perspectives and schools of thought. " (1991, p. 297). Thus, while 
there is no structuration-ist programme of research, structuration theory is relevant to 
social scientific research. 
Further comments 
Giddens does not directly respond to Jary's criticisms. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, 
they merit further discussion as they implicate the notion of methodological bracketing. 
Jary's arguments overlap to some extent to those of Gregson in the call for greater 
empirical specification, however those aspects have been covered in the previous 
section so will not be discussed further. 
Jary draws attention to the difficulty of conducting analysis in terms of both agency 
and structure. This suggests that Jary has not fully acknowledged the implications of 
the duality of structure, particularly with regard to methodological bracketing. As 
described earlier, Giddens links the analysis of strategic conduct to institutional 
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analysis through "modalities" of structuration: "The modalities of structuration are 
drawn upon by actors in the production of interaction, but at the same time are the 
media of the reproduction of the structural components of systems of interaction. 
When institutional analysis is bracketed, the modalities are treated as stocks of 
knowledge and resources employed by actors in the constitution of interaction as a 
skilled and knowledgeable accomplishment, within bounded conditions of the 
rationalisation of action. Where strategic conduct is placed under an epoche2, the 
modalities represent rules and resources considered as institutional features of systems 
of social interaction. " (Giddens, 1979, p. 81, emphases in original). 
Giddens brackets strategic conduct and institutional levels of analysis precisely because 
both levels cannot be captured in the same empirical moment. This is a direct 
implication of the notion of the duality of structure. Jary seems to be arguing that 
theory should link to empirical considerations at all points in much the same way as 
Gregson. As discussed in the previous section this fails to acknowledge the autonomy 
that exists to some extent between theory and specific empirical application. However, 
as described in some detail earlier when introducing structuration theory, this 
bracketing does not represent two sides of a dualism but is a methodological device to 
deal with the duality of structure. 
Jary also states a preference for the work of Mann (1986) over that of Giddens. A 
comparison of the historical analyses of each is beyond the scope of this study. 
However, a brief description of the main points of Mann's framework merits attention 
as Mann's conception of "sources of social power" does indeed share a number of 
general concerns with Giddens' work. For example, both are ambitious and wide 
ranging in their scope: Mann's intention is no less than to provide "a history and theory 
of power relations in human societies. " (1986, p. 1). Also, Mann argues that as 
societies are not unified totalities, individuals are not constrained by social structure as 
a whole, thus it is not useful to make a distinction between "social action" and "social 
structure". (Mann, 1986, p. 1-2). 
2 In this context, "epoche" refers to some type of bracketing. 
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Mann argues that societies are much "messier" than our theories of them, but it is 
possible for theories to attempt to deal with this diversity. (1986, p. 4). Mann argues 
that a general account of society can be achieved in terms of what are referred to as the 
four "sources of social power". Mann explains that in their perpetual creation and 
pursuit of goals, human beings continually construct and reconstruct a multiplicity of 
social networks that variously implicate "ideological", "economic", "military" and 
"political" aspects. These are overlapping networks of interaction that refer to 
organisations or institutional means of attaining human goals: "Their primacy comes 
not from the strength of human desires for ideological, economic, military or political 
satisfaction but from the particular organisational means each possesses to attain 
human goals, whatever these may be. " (Mann, 1986, p. 2, emphasis in original). 
Mann operates at an organisational level of analysis, emphasising the capacity to 
organise and control people, materials and territories. Mann endorses Giddens' 
treatment of power in terms of "resources" which are the media through which power 
is exercised. However, in Mann's framework, these media are referred to as "power 
sources". Thus Mann's treatment of the "problem of order" is in these terms: "it does 
not concern value consensus, or force, or exchange in the usual sense of these 
conventional sociological explanations. The masses comply because they lack 
collective organisation to do otherwise, because they are embedded within collective 
and distributive power organisations controlled by others. They are organisationally 
outflanked. " (1986, p. 7). Again, Mann echoes Giddens' rejection of normative 
consensus and an emphasis on the constraining aspects of structure. 
Though Mann acknowledges the purposive nature of individuals, he makes no attempt 
to theorise individual motivations and goals. This allows Mann to concentrate on 
emergent organisational power sources. Mann states that purposive individuals form a 
multiplicity of social relationships whose causal sequences are too complex for any 
general theory. Thus Mann argues that the key to the importance of the power sources 
is that "(t)hey give collective organisation and unity to the infinite variety of social 
existence. They provide such significant patterning as there is in large-scale social 
structure (which may or may not be very great) because they are capable of generating 
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collective action. They are "the generalized means" through which human beings make 
their own history. " (Mann, 1986, p. 28). 
It can be seen that Mann's approach seems broadly compatible with structuration 
theory in general. Mann emphasises the inherent link between power and action, and 
the purposive nature of human social activity. Mann's framework could be described 
in terms of the duality of structure as representing an institutional level of analysis, 
where strategic conduct is bracketed out as "too complex to be theorised". Mann's 
reluctance to describe in any great detail the multiplicity of social relationships is 
entirely appropriate given the nature of his research enquiry. Nevertheless, Mann's 
framework expresses the duality of structure, not a dualism, as Mann does not attempt 
to explain social action solely on the basis of the institutional level of analysis. Thus 
Mann's approach can be seen as an example of the utility of a methodological 
bracketing which demonstrates that such a bracketing need not simply reinstate a 
dualism between action and structure. 
Gregson's and Jary's criticisms draw attention to important issues concerning the 
relationship between theory and empirical research. Giddens is correct to note that 
theory does not connect at every point to empirical concerns. This is implied in the 
discussion of the development of logical positivist philosophy. As described earlier, 
the "verification principle", which implied that theoretical concepts were reducible to 
empirical observations, was abandoned in favour of a separation between theoretical 
and observational statements, which greatly increased the explanatory power of 
abstract theory. Theoretical and observational statements were related through their 
positioning within a deductive hierarchy. Also described earlier, the fundamental flaw 
with this theory of science was that it was grounded upon a notion of non-problematic 
observation. That there is no theory-free observation has profound implications for the 
very notion of science, whether "social" science or "natural" science. 
Gregson's critique appears to be grounded within an empiricist framework, involving 
an unproblematically recurring sequence of empirical refutation and theoretical 
refinement. There is an inherent separation between theoretical and observational 
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statements and the relation between the two is not unproblematic, due to the theory 
laden nature of observation. 
Also, both Gregson and Jary (albeit to different degrees) argue that theory should be 
connected at all points to the empirical. Gregson claims that Giddens' emphasis on the 
"ethnographic moment" means that the knowledgeability of individuals must not just 
be alluded to, but elucidated also (1989, p. 240). This is not what Giddens claims, and 
as Mann's work demonstrates, while the knowledgeability of individuals must be 
"alluded to", whether it need be "elucidated" depends on the nature of the research 
enquiry. Similarly Gregson claims that Giddens' guideline referring to the 
knowledgeability of agents "suggests that empirical research be alive to all that is 
contained within [Giddens'] model of agency", which Gregson describes as including 
"discursive consciousness, practical consciousness, the unconscious and the 
unacknowledged conditions and unintentional outcomes of action. " (Gregson, 1989, 
p. 240). Jary argues that the notion of the "duality of structure" is problematic for 
research as it implies that agency and structure need to be incorporated within 
empirical studies. Mann's framework shows that this can be done; it would only 
appear problematic if Giddens' concepts regarding agency and structure were 
attempted to be transferred en bloc. 
It must be acknowledged that at a fundamental level theory cannot link at every point 
to empirical considerations. Thus, as Giddens argued, in the context of a particular 
empirical investigation, the entirety of concepts associated with a particular theory 
cannot be continually present. 
Giddens' argument that theory is also contextual is also important. Structuration 
theory is wide-ranging and many of its concepts operate at a high level of abstraction. 
Less abstract theories may appear more open to refutation, but that need not be the 
case. Certainly more abstract theories may have more scope for discussion regarding 
aspects of operationalisation and thus the interpretation of what may appear as either 
supportive or contradictory. However, this is still relevant to more "grounded" 
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theories and must be seen as a consequence of the necessarily theory-laden nature of 
observation. 
Gregson's empiricist perspective is also demonstrated in the arguments given for a 
critical grounding to theory and the notion of an empirical grounding as the only means 
to avoid a slide into relativism. These arguments have been discussed in previous 
sections but are worthy of restatement here. 
Critiques relating to epistemological issues. 
Bernstein (1989) and Bryant and Jary (1991) each express concern toward Giddens' 
treatment of the critical aspects of Structuration Theory. Their arguments concern the 
epistemological basis of structuration theory and by implication, social science more 
generally. These arguments will be discussed below and their implications for social 
scientific theory and research considered. 
Bernstein notes Giddens' apparent commitment to a notion of critique by way of 
reference: "structuration theory is intrinsically incomplete if not linked to a conception 
of social science as critical theory" (Giddens, 1984, p. 287). However, Bernstein 
claims, Giddens' arguments are beset by ambiguity, vagueness and contradiction. 
Bernstein notes that Giddens' conception of theory draws upon the post-empiricist 
philosophy of science. Bernstein argues that the characteristic feature of Giddens' 
work is a detailed critical evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of alternative 
approaches as a means to both support and articulate his notion of structuration: "In 
this respect, Giddens's [sic] approach reflects a point which has been forcefully made 
in the post-empiricist philosophy of science, i. e., we can judge the adequacy of a 
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theory - such as structuration theory - by its ability to explain what is valid and invalid 
in rival theories. " (Bernstein, 1991, p. 23). 
However, Bernstein again quotes Giddens as stating that while he is not in favour of 
grounded critique, neither is he in favour of ungrounded critique: "I don't think that 
I'd support any programme of trying to ground critical theory, but nor will I support 
the opposite, that is the idea of a purely immanent critique or ungroundable form of 
critique. I would probably work more from within a sociological conception which 
would seem to me to suggest that some things are clearly noxious and other things are 
clearly desirable and that it isn't necessary to ground them in order to proclaim this to 
be so. " (Giddens, 1982, p. 72). 
Bernstein refers to this position as "foxlike" and accuses Giddens of dodging tough 
issues (1991, p. 30). Bernstein argues that either the norms that we appeal to when 
making critical social judgements cannot be rationally justified, or else they are based 
on rational grounds. Thus, Bernstein continues, if there is a way of resolving this 
conundrum, Giddens has not shown it. Giddens displays only, what Bernstein refers to 
as a "minimalist" level of critique, such that any theoretical orientation will rule out 
some others and thus has some "critical import" (p. 30). 
Bernstein argues that it is necessary to clarify precisely the relation of social science to 
critical judgements so as to provide criteria for evaluating the practical connotations of 
social scientific research. According to Bernstein issues such as the ends to which 
social scientists apply their knowledge, to what uses their work may be put and by 
whom, must be considered. Thus Bernstein concludes, "What, if anything, is the basis 
for our critical judgements and proposals? How are we to warrant these critical 
judgements? (And who is or ought to be this `we'? )" (Bernstein, 1991, p. 33). 
Bryant and Jary (1991) argue that as a consequence of Giddens' refusal to provide 
grounds for the justification of social science, the grounds for privileging social 
scientific findings over other claims to knowledge such as those of journalists, 
politicians or prophets may not appear apparent. A further consequence is that it may 
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also not be apparent why social scientists should accept Giddens' framework above 
any others. 
Bryant and Jary state that Giddens does not attempt to ground his justification for 
social science by using what they refer to as, "one of the commoner gambits of the 
ontologist. " (1991, p. 25. This argument claims that the world must be as it is said to 
be, if not we would not have the knowledge of it that we have. Bryant and Jary rightly 
point out that such an argument is not sufficient, as it is based upon the prior 
justification of some claim to know, whether "based on experimentation, prediction, 
technological application, vindication in social practice or whatever" (1991, p. 25). 
Bryant and Jary argue that Giddens' "middle position", between the notion that there 
can be no epistemologically secure position and that it is futile to reject epistemology 
altogether, is not sufficiently justified (p. 26). For example, Bryant and Jary mention 
McLennan's criticism that Giddens does not specify "which structure, what agencies, 
in what sequences go to make up the object of enquiry of social theory" (McLennan, 
1984, p. 125, emphases in original). Bryant and Jary do not themselves advocate such 
a strong view, noting that Giddens' concepts are not unclear, though are not expressed 
clearly enough to test them. In Giddens' defence, Bryant and Jary quote Cohen 
(1986, p. 127) to the effect that structuration theory does not provide substantive 
explanatory propositions as such. Bryant and Jary then argue that it is only through 
substantive theorising that questions such as those of McLennan will be answered, as 
for example in Giddens' "A contemporary critique of historical materialism" (1981). 
Bryant and Jary argue that Giddens work is consistent with what is now known as the 
"post-empiricist" position (deriving from the debates generated by the post-positivistic 
philosophies of, among other, Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, as described earlier. ) Bryant 
and Jary summarise the major aspects of post-empiricism by quoting passages by 
Giddens and Turner (1987) and Cohen, (1986), both of which they express agreement 
with. It is instructive to reproduce those passages here as they help to orient the 
discussion to follow. 
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"(T)he idea that there can be theory-neutral observations is repudiated, while systems 
of deductively-linked laws are no longer canonized as the highest ideal of scientific 
explanation. Most, importantly, science is presumed to be an interpretative endeavour, 
such that problems of meaning, communication and translation are immediately 
relevant to scientific theories. " (Giddens and Turner, 1987, p. 2). 
On the basis of this summary, it can be seen that Giddens' arguments, as presented 
thus far, may indeed by placed within a "post-empiricist tradition". However, Cohen's 
discussion of post-empiricism is also instructive: 
"(O)ne of the most important results of post-empiricism has been to overturn the 
Cartesian duality of objectivism and relativism. While no neutral algorithm exists for 
the choice between theories... this does not assume that science is an irrational 
enterprise. Rather scientists are obligated to submit good reasons for the acceptance 
of their programme in preference to competing schools of thought. The criteria to 
which these reasons refer are established as a result of the historical development of 
the community of inquiry within which justificatory arguments are made. This implies 
a rejection of the thesis of the incommensurability of meaning between theories.. . 
On 
this basis the rational appeal to scientific criteria involves a limited degree of rational 
persuasion" (Cohen, 1986, p. 129). 
Bryant and Jary argue that it is in the context of the post-empiricist tradition that 
Giddens' ambivalence toward epistemology and his defence of social science may be 
understood. According to Bryant and Jary this suggests a division of labour whereby 
Giddens develops structuration theory while others debate the principles and practices 
of justification. 
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Bryant and Jary also refer to the work of Hesse (1980), again within the post- 
empiricist tradition. According to Hesse, Bryant and Jary argue, the 
underdetermination of theories' and the theory laden nature of accounts creates the 
possibility for theories to be justified on value-related grounds. Bryant and Jary claim 
that while in the natural sciences it may be possible to seek justification in terms of 
successful prediction or control, social scientists should refer to ethical values and 
political goals. As the "post-empiricist community" has yet to develop criteria for the 
assessment of different values, Bryant and Jary argue that it is Giddens responsibility to 
specify particular values or any other means by which to justify the claims of 
structuration theory. Bryant and Jary state that Giddens' ambivalent advocacy of his 
own theory may have hindered its reception and conclude that Giddens must establish 
a more rational grounding for the ontological claims of structuration theory. 
Giddens' response 
In response to Bernstein, Giddens distinguishes between different levels of critique 
(1991, p. 288). As emphasised by Popper, Giddens argues that at the most basic level 
disciplined inquiry implicates a community of researchers rather than isolated 
individuals, and all findings are in principle open to critical dissection and assessment. 
Giddens states that positivistic perspectives view the social sciences as a means of 
generating information about an independently given social world. Such knowledge is 
seen to be cumulative in the same way as the natural sciences, and may then be applied 
in the form of practical interventions in society. However, as they involve a "double 
hermeneutic" (described earlier), Giddens argues that social science concepts, theories 
and findings may be routinely incorporated into the events or phenomena they were 
originally intended to explain. In this way, social scientific findings may not appear 
profound because they are, in part, constitutive of society. This dramatically alters the 
3 By underdetermination of theories, I take it that Bryant and Jary are referring to arguments similar 
to those presented earlier when discussing post-positivistic philosophies of science, namely "that no 
amount of accumulated fact will in and of itself determine that one particular theory be accepted and 
another rejected, since by modification of the theory, or by other means, the observations in question 
can be accommodated to it. " (Giddens, 1979, p. 243). Also, with respect to social sciences Giddens 
argues that underdetermination is likely to be greater due to problems relating to operationalisation 
such as the replication of observations, or ethical constraints on experimental procedures (1979, 
p. 243). 
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nature of cumulative knowledge in the social sciences compared to the natural 
sciences, though by no means precludes it. 
Giddens states that the very process of social scientific research is in principle critical 
of the belief claims and activities of members of society, as described by Bernstein's 
minimal level of critique. Giddens argues that researchers cannot control the uses to 
which their findings may be put, as he explains: "'Openness to criticism' among social 
scientists inevitably implies `openness to utilization' on the part of others. " (1991, 
p. 290). Nevertheless, the way in which knowledge from a particular study may be 
incorporated within existing systems of domination may itself be a topic for research in 
its own right. 
Giddens argues that the previous arguments do not directly address the issue of "moral 
critique", which Bernstein is most anxious to discuss. This level of critique involves 
the assessment and evaluation of different courses of action, what Giddens refers to as 
"the classical problem of the relation between `is' and `ought'. " (1991, p. 290). 
Giddens states that while there may not be comprehensive rational grounds for moral 
critique, this need not imply an untenable relativism between any and all possibilities. 
Giddens argues that we necessarily operate between these two "apparently mutually 
exclusive alternatives" (1991, p. 291). It is worthwhile quoting at length Giddens 
description of his position of "contingent moral rationalism", as it indicates clearly that 
his arguments are located within the post-empiricist tradition: 
"According to this perspective, as practising social scientists, we may legitimately 
make moral criticisms of states of affairs, although we must seek to justify those 
criticisms when called upon to do so. We cannot ground moral critique in the mode of 
such justification (or argumentation) itself, and in the sense of finding `pure 
foundations' cannot ground it at all. But this does not mean that moral critique derives 
merely from whims or feelings, or that we are at the mercy of a particular historical 
conjuncture. Dialogue with any and every moral standpoint is possible, and always 
involves a fusion of moral and factual dispute. Most of the time, most of us do not 
find ourselves in circumstances of moral puzzlement when confronted with particular 
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states of affairs, in the way in which philosophical accounts of the difficulty, or the 
impossibility, of grounding moral evaluations might lead us to suppose. " (Giddens, 
1991, p. 291). 
Further comments 
Giddens' position can be seen as consistent with the post-empiricist tradition in both 
the rejection of pure foundations to knowledge, and in the acknowledgement of what 
Cohen referred to as "a limited degree of rational persuasion" in the submitting of 
good reasons for the acceptance of particular programmes of research (Cohen, 1986, 
p. 129, as quoted earlier). Further discussion of the implications of placing Giddens 
arguments within the post-empiricist tradition is relevant to the criticisms of Bryant 
and Jary. 
Giddens does not respond directly to Bryant and Jary's criticism. However, their work 
raises issues of importance and considerable complexity. The main thrust of Bryant 
and Jary's argument is that Giddens does not sufficiently justify his "middle position" 
between an acceptance and a rejection of epistemology. Bryant and Jary acknowledge 
the relevance of the post-empiricist tradition, and make reference to the arguments of 
Hesse regarding the possibility of justification on value-related grounds. I would argue 
that Hesse's recourse to values has more relevance to substantive theorising; with 
regard to structuration theory, that would be the application of structuration-ist 
concepts to substantive enquiries, more so than the theory itself. The issue of value- 
related grounds of rationalisation cannot be irrelevant to structuration theory, however 
given the theory laden nature of observation, I would argue that the adequacy of 
structuration theory may be supported through its capacity to explain what is valid and 
invalid in rival theories. This is the argument Bernstein makes, described earlier, with 
respect to Giddens' critiques of evolutionism, objectivism, subjectivism and naturalism, 
and is consistent with the notion of a "sophisticated methodological falsificationism" 
(as described earlier) in that an alternative framework is supplied. 
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Bryant and Jary's notion of a "division of labour" between those that develop theories 
and those that debate the issue of justification, together with their observation that 
post-empiricists have yet to arrive at a settled means for assessing different value 
claims, implies that Bryant and Jary imagine that it may actually be possible to devise 
such a means. This appears to misapprehend the most fundamental aspect of post- 
empiricism, that there cannot be theoretically neutral observations. That point is the 
basis for Popper's rejection of induction. To argue that there may be a means by 
which to ultimately ground comparison between competing value claims is akin to 
arguing that there may be ultimate foundations of knowledge. The central concern of 
the post empiricist tradition is to attempt to deal with the implications of there not 
being ultimate foundations for knowledge. However, that there is no "neutral 
algorithm" does not imply a slide into relativism. It is quite obvious that "anything" 
does not "go", certain "versions" of reality are accorded more significance than others; 
conversely, the evaluation of rival theories cannot simply be made on the basis of a 
critical experiment. There is no absolute alternative to Giddens' "middle position". 
Despite Bernstein's entreaties, it is to Giddens credit that he acknowledges that he is in 
no position to supply moral guarantees. Justification cannot be conferred ultimately: it 
is continually open to review in the light of competing knowledge claims. 
The empiricist approach to science, in which theories are simply refined on the basis of 
empirical findings is not sustainable. Of course empirical findings are an important and 
necessary element to any notion of science, but their relation to theory, whether in 
terms of refinement or refutation is considerably more complicated than that presumed 
by empiricist approaches. However, the notion that the only alternative to empiricist 
models is an untenable relativism is also not sustainable; again the situation is 
considerably more complicated. 
Whereas the logical positivist philosophies of science may have appeared more 
prescriptive, as those involved in their formulation sought to clearly demarcate the 
boundaries of science, the post-empiricist models appear more receptive to how 
"science" is actually carried out. (This may be a consequence of the institutionalisation 
of science globally, though it is beyond the scope of this discussion to pursue this 
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matter more fully. ) The theory laden nature of observation cannot be ignored, neither 
can it be escaped. This does not imply relativism such that there can be no notion of 
science. Everything that has been achieved under the aegis of science, all manner of 
innovation and technological accomplishment, has occurred on the basis of theory- 
laden observation. 
The relativist argument implies incommensurability; that each frame of meaning, or 
"theory", is separate from every other and thus equally valid. However, Giddens 
demonstrates that we routinely penetrate others' frames of meaning in the course of 
social interaction. As Giddens explains, the appeal to relativism "denies to us the 
possibility of doing what we know we can do - translate from one language into 
another, analyse the standards of other cultures, talk of `false consciousness', etc. The 
possibility of doing these things derives precisely from the rejection of the self-negating 
character of the relativistic position" (Giddens, 1992, p. 152). The positivist argument 
also implies incommensurability; in this case that each theory can be clearly demarcated 
and thus unproblematically compared to any other. This line of argument is flawed due 
to the impossibility of theoretically neutral observation; thus the comparison between 
rival theories may become problematic. 
Writing in 1987, Giddens and Turner argued that the orthodox mainstream in the 
social sciences, broadly characterised by a logical empiricist influence, had been 
weakened, particularly over the course of the previous two decades. This was 
attributed to the influence of writers such as Kuhn, Lakatos and Hesse. The effect of 
this new "post-empiricism" has been a diversification of approaches: whereas before 
structural-functionalist theories had only been considered examples of social 
"science", now the contribution of perspectives such as phenomenology, critical 
theory, symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology were accorded more respect. 
This proliferation of perspectives has generated much theoretical debate. Giddens and 
Turner argue that one response to this situation has been disillusionment on the part of 
some whose prime commitment is to empirical research: "[They] find in the array of 
squabbling schools and traditions confirmation of what they have believed all along: 
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theoretical debates are of little interest or relevance for those conducting empirical 
work. If social theorists cannot agree amongst themselves about the most basic issues, 
what possible relevance can questions of social theory have for those primarily 
engaged in social research? " (1987, p. 3). 
Giddens and Turner argue that this has led to a division between those researchers who 
favour the "certainty" associated with the empiricist approach, and those less 
committed to positivistic criteria and more open to "the divergent claims made by 
varying theoretical traditions. " (1987, p. 3). However, divergent claims 
notwithstanding, Giddens and Turner argue that these rival theoretical perspectives 
involve a number of common concerns. Among these are included a 
reconceptualisation of the nature of action, and an appreciation of the complexity of 
the relationship between "meaning" and social scientific explanation. 
Wilson's discussion of mathematical models 
Wilson's (1987) discussion of the role of mathematical models in social science is 
relevant here, as he describes more specifically both the role of "meaning" in the 
natural and social sciences, and also the relationship between theory and empirical 
findings in the natural and social sciences. 
Wilson argues that the natural sciences are based on an "extensional idiom", in which 
description is concerned only with the truth or falseness of statements, and for what 
objects a statement is true, "i. e. the statements extension", rather than its meaning. 
(Wilson, 1987, p. 388). This restriction enables fundamental concepts and 
propositions to be expressed in a standardised form, such as mathematical formulae or 
standard logic. Thus, Wilson argues, the "extensional idiom" is the foundation of the 
universality and generality of scientific concepts and laws, and the basis of scientific 
objectivity. 
In contrast, the "intensional idiom" is concerned with meaning rather than reference. 
Intensional statements include what Wilson refers to as "so-called `propositional 
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attitudes', such as `believes that', `says that', `wishes that', `endeavours that', `urges 
that', `fears that', and related expressions such as `wants', `is looking for"' (1987, 
p. 390). Intensional statements cannot simply be reduced to standardised formulae 
because their meaning cannot be separated from their use in particular situations. 
Wilson argues that abstraction is the essence of the natural sciences, through the 
"extensional idiom". However, Wilson claims, the social sciences are inherently 
intensional as social phenomena are constituted through the purposeful, meaningful 
actions of knowledgeable agents. Wilson himself acknowledges the convergence 
between his arguments and Giddens' notion of the duality of structure (Wilson, 1987, 
p. 396-7). Thus, social phenomena cannot be expressed solely in terms of abstract 
propositions such as mathematical formulae, as mathematics pre-supposes 
extensionality. 
However, Wilson argues that mathematical models may be appropriate to investigate 
regularities of social life; expressible in Giddens' terminology as involving patterns of 
interaction that have a degree of embeddedness in space and time. In these cases, 
intensional idioms are still involved, but are bracketed out to allow formal calculations. 
In this way, mathematical models may be powerful tools in the investigation of social 
phenomena, is Wilson explains: "we can represent certain aspects of social phenomena 
by mathematical models, sometimes very sophisticated ones, and in so doing contribute 
substantially to our understanding of how things work. However, the possibility of 
such a model arises from the fact that people in the course of their everyday lives 
employ social-structural categories as an essential resource in organising their 
activities: it is on this fact that, directly or indirectly, both the concepts employed in 
and the regularities described by a mathematical model depend. " (1987, p. 398). 
Nevertheless, Wilson stresses that however rigorously data may be manipulated, such 
computations have no meaning without the absorption of intension, both at the input 
or coding stage, and when interpreting results. Thus Wilson argues, mathematical 
models may have a heuristic use, but cannot be used as a basis for formulating 
fundamental concepts and propositions that may be expected to eventually lead to a 
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"natural science of society". It is important to acknowledge that Wilson accords great 
significance to this heuristic role. However, it is equally important to acknowledge the 
role of mathematical models is inherently limited in this way. 
Wilson supports his arguments by discussing the role of mathematical models in social 
science more specifically, namely in economics and social psychology. This aspect of 
Wilson's argument is very important as it describes the relationship between empirical 
research and social scientific theory. 
Wilson argues that economists tend to regard their discipline as a "positive science", 
and acknowledge that it may appear that fundamental concepts are indeed expressed 
mathematically. However, economic theories are effective only to the extent to which 
relations between basic concepts, such as between market conditions and behaviour, 
remains stable. Wilson claims that the laws of economics are strict logical 
consequences of the conditions necessary for the theory to apply. Consequently, 
failure of economic predictions to correspond to data does not necessarily lead to the 
abandonment, or even the modification, of the theory. It may simply be argued that 
the theory did not apply to the situation in question. "Thus, the theory of rational 
market behaviour is not viewed as disconfirmed when its predictions fail, for in that 
case it would have been jettisoned long ago; instead the conclusion is that the actors 
were not behaving rationally or that there was no market. " (Wilson, 1987, p. 400). 
Similarly, Wilson states that mathematical models are often developed in social 
psychology to represent aspects of cognitive and affective phenomena. However, the 
use of such models necessitates that all descriptions must be treated as though 
extensional. Wilson argues that the empirical relevance of the model and the cogency 
of the results depend on the researcher absorbing intensional elements such as 
meaning, at the coding stage and at the interpretation stage, for example when 
substantive interpretations are given to factor loadings. Thus, Wilson concludes, the 
value of such models is primarily heuristic, rather than as representations of 
fundamental processes. 
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I will argue in the next chapter that particular social psychological theories, primarily 
those relating to "social identity" share a similar relationship between empirical 
findings and theory as that described by Wilson with respect to economics; namely that 
the empirical support for such theories are a logical consequence of the assumptions 
regarding their application. However, at this stage, the important point to make is that 
the relationship between theory and empirical findings is not necessarily 
straightforward. As Cohen (1986) argued, the rational appeal to scientific criteria 
involves a limited degree of rational persuasion, on the basis of a historically developed 
community of inquiry. 
Conclusion 
Giddens' work is extremely relevant to any attempt to analyse social phenomena. 
Giddens provides a sophisticated theory of social action, yet also pursues the 
implications of his theorisation for the logic of social scientific enquiry. 
Giddens' notion of the duality of structure attempts to transcend dualisms such as 
those of action and structure, micro and macro, and static and dynamic approaches or 
levels of analysis. The relevance of Giddens' concepts to an evaluation of social 
representations is perhaps aided by focusing upon the relationship between action and 
structure (although of course the other dualisms mentioned are necessarily implicated. ) 
Giddens argues that structural approaches tend not to account adequately for 
intentional conduct, such that social causation is taken as synonymous with structural 
constraint. In contrast, more action-oriented approaches do not deal effectively with 
the structuring of social action and have difficulty accounting for unintended 
consequences of intentional action, and thereby structural transformation. 
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A crucial aspect of Giddens attempt to transcend the dualism of action and structure is 
the notion of methodological bracketing, and an appreciation of the contextual nature 
of any research enquiry. Thus if analysis is concerned with investigating interaction as 
strategic conduct, the focus is upon how structural elements, such as stocks of 
knowledge, are employed by actors in the constitution of that interaction. If that is the 
case, institutional analysis is bracketed. Conversely, if the focus is upon 
institutionalised features of social interaction, structural elements are treated as 
chronically reproduced; in this case strategic conduct is bracketed. It is important to 
recognise that this bracketing is a methodological device: action and structure are 
necessarily interrelated through what Giddens refers to as "modalities of 
structuration". However, in order to carry out a specific research enquiry, such 
bracketing is entirely appropriate. 
The normative functionalist theories of Durkheim and Parsons perpetuate the dualisms 
of action and structure by failing to adequately account for intentional conduct. By 
explaining the adherence to normative values through the internalisation of such 
values, the individual is subsumed within the social group. Furthermore, the 
consequent assumption of group consensus reinforces the notion of the essentially 
unproblematic observation of social phenomena. 
As described in the previous chapter, Moscovici's theory of social representations 
shares many similarities to the work of Durkheim and Parsons, and may itself be 
described as a version of normative functionalism. In this way it can be seen that 
Giddens work is far superior to that of Moscovici. Moscovici's failure adequately 
account for the structuring of social action is readily apparent in the confusion and 
contradiction generated when attempting to reconcile the transformative and 
prescriptive aspects of social representations. 
The consequences of this failure were in turn apparent in the failure to proceed beyond 
a notion of group-level consensus. Again, it is important to remember that Moscovici 
may well have been aware of the necessity of dealing with issues such as intra-group 
variability, but like Durkheim and Parsons before him, was unable to do so effectively. 
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This failure was a direct consequence of fundamental flaws in the theorisation of the 
relationship between the individual and society. Again, in common with Durkheim and 
Parsons before him, attempts to analyse social change demonstrate clearly the 
shortcomings of Moscovici's reliance upon the internalisation of normative values. 
Furthermore, the notion of methodological bracketing suggests that the attempt to 
relate social phenomena to psychological processes is an inherently limited endeavour. 
If social representations are understood, at least is some respects, to refer to stocks of 
knowledge, they may readily be treated as structural elements when analysing strategic 
conduct in situated interactions. However, to analyse such stocks of knowledge more 
generally, they must be treated as institutionalised features of social systems; that is, as 
chronically reproduced (within the scope of the particular enquiry. ) Attempting to 
explain such stocks of knowledge in terms of psychological mechanisms will simply 
lead to reiteration of the initial assumptions made regarding the chronic reproduction 
of the stocks of knowledge. The work of Wilson reinforces this suggestion. 
Giddens has been criticised for not providing a "structuration-ist" programme of 
research. However, Giddens' refusal to privilege any particular methodological 
approach is entirely appropriate given a clear appreciation of the implications of the 
duality of structure. Correspondingly, there is not a simplistic dichotomy between 
either an acceptance of an unproblematic observation of social phenomena, or else the 
acceptance of a radical relativism. Giddens explains that the situation is considerably 
more complex than a simple choice between these two alternatives. 
Consideration of Giddens' arguments provides, at the very least, a sound theoretical 
basis from which to assess attempts to develop the concept of social representations, 
and the attempt to relate social phenomena to psychological processes more generally. 
These concerns are dealt with in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS THEORY AND SOCIAL IDENTITY 
Introduction. 
Attempts to further develop the concept of social representations have continued since 
the initial critical exchanges discussed earlier, and much empirical research continues to 
be formulated in terms of social representations. Perhaps as a consequence of the ill- 
defined nature of social representations, the various attempts at refinement may appear 
quite diverse. This has led Ibanez to suggest that the concept of social representations 
has developed a "protective belt" against criticism (1994, p. 365-6). This is because 
arguments directed at a particular formulation may appear to be dealt with by another 
formulation, whose own particular shortcomings may in turn appear to be dealt with by 
another, and so on. In order to avoid this possibility, the insights gained from the 
discussion of Giddens' work in the previous chapter are invaluable. They allow both 
the merits of each particular formulation to be evaluated, and more generally the 
possibility of relating social phenomena to psychological processes. 
The attempts of Doise, Markovä, Jovcholovitch and Wagner to develop the concept of 
social representations are considered. These works were chosen both for the eminence 
of the authors, but also to reflect the different directions in which development has 
been pursued. It is argued however, that each of these formulations suffers the same 
inherent limitations, due the normative emphasis implied by the very notion of social 
representation. 
The broad notion of social identity is also considered as it has been suggested that 
integrating social psychological theories of identity with social representations would 
result in a more powerful theory and ultimately predictive capability. It is shown that 
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the scope of such prediction is inherently narrow. The arguments of Smedslund are 
also briefly considered as they draw attention to the tendency of social psychological 
theories to simply redescribe their initial theoretical assumptions, and then to 
mistakenly treat such redescription as theoretically or empirically distinct. It is argued 
that both social representations and social identity theories provide, little more than 
redescription and speculation. 
Doise 
The work of Doise is important when considering the continued endorsement of social 
representations. Doise has written extensively on both theoretical and methodological 
aspects, and has attempted to promote the empirical applications of social 
representations. To this end, particular attention will be drawn to the arguments of 
Doise, Clemence and Lorenzi-Cioldi (1993) as featured in the jointly edited volume on 
social representations. The arguments made are attributable to Doise, as evidenced in 
the considerable repetition to be found when comparing Doise's contribution to the 
volume "Empirical approaches to social representations" (Breakwell and Canter, 
1993). This latter chapter is also of interest as in it Doise responds to criticisms of the 
social representations approach. Both of these sources will be drawn upon in the 
course of this discussion. It appears that Doise attempts to reconcile the notion of 
social representations with procedures for empirical research. In this way, it can be 
seen that Doise tends to deal with theoretical issues by treating them as primarily 
methodological concerns. 
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Doise et al (1993) state that "social metasystems" involve normative, social regulations 
which organise the symbolic processes involved in social relationships (p. 2). Doise et 
al argue that social representations may be understood as "organising principles", 
which vary according to specific "insertions" in sets of social relations and which are 
seen to "control, verify and direct" cognitive functioning (p. 2). As Doise et al explain, 
"there is a symbolic interiorization of this complex interplay of social positioning - 
interiorization which is always a certain intention to achieve overall co-ordination from 
one's own viewpoint, more or less shared by the holders of similar positions" (p. 156). 
Thus Doise argues that researchers "are not looking so much for underlying mental 
structures as for communicative structures" (1993, p. 164). 
Doise et al explicitly deny the charge that social representations imply a consensual 
view of social reality by arguing that "social representations are therefore organising 
principles varied in nature, which do not necessarily consist of shared beliefs, as they 
may result in different or even opposed positions taken by individuals in relation to 
common reference points. " (1993, p. 4). Doise et al reinforce their argument against a 
"consensual view" by also stating that the research of social representations involves 
methods that explicitly look for differences between individual responses (p. 1). 
Similarly they argue that studies do not find consensus, thus attempting to understand 
social representations in terms of consensus is limited (p. 8). 
Doise et al also discuss the processes of objectification and anchoring, relating these to 
a research strategy. Objectification, which involves the concretising of the abstract, 
facilitates communication by dissociating a concept from its original context, whereas 
anchoring refers to the inclusion of new elements into familiar networks. Doise et at 
describe anchoring and objectification as "poles apart": "objectification aims to create 
truths obvious to everyone, independent of social or psychological determinism; 
anchoring denotes the intervention of such determinisms in their genesis and 
transformation. " (p. 6). 
Doise et al argue that organising principles common to groups of individuals must be 
pieced together from the raw material of collections of individual opinions, attitudes 
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and prejudices. Thus they describe three phases of data analysis. In the first phase, 
social representations are "objectified", "as a kind of collective map, common to a 
given population. " (p. 154). Secondly "variations in individual positioning with respect 
to common reference points" are to be dealt with (p. 154). Lastly, phase three `focuses 
on the anchoring of individual variations in sociological and psychosociological 
characteristics of individuals. "(p. 154). 
Doise (1993) argues that researchers in social representations are actually looking for 
communication structures and that the empirical validation of a finding is its capacity 
to organise groups of people. Doise also responds to the criticism of circularity in 
definition of the group; that is where social representations are identified from the 
group, and the representations also taken to define the group. (This argument has 
been described earlier in the discussion of Potter and Litton's (1985) critique of social 
representations. ) Doise denies this charge by arguing that there is nothing in the 
theory of social representations that prevents researchers from using other means to 
define groups, for example by using identity cards to define groups on the basis of 
nationality (1993, p. 167). 
Discussion. 
Doise's formulation adheres quite closely to "social representations" as described by 
Moscovici earlier. Co-ordination within the social "metasystem" is achieved through 
the internalisation of normative social regulations as expressed in the notion that 
cognitive functioning is governed by social regulations (Doise et al, 1993, p. 2). This is 
the basis of the notion of "common reference points". However, Doise emphasises 
that this internalisation is expressed through social relations. This diminishes the 
importance of explaining the internalisation process, enabling attention to be directed 
instead toward "communication structures". So for Doise, the emphasis is placed 
upon observable manifestations of this internalisation. Research indicates that there is 
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indeed individual variation, though as this itself is amenable to further investigation, 
there is no need to insist on consensus. 
However, Doise's position is not as straightforward as it may appear. There is some 
confusion as to the nature of the relation between the individual and the social group. 
The notion of "common reference points" implies that the individual is, to some extent, 
treated as synonymous with the group. This is evident in that organising principles are 
taken to be common to groups of individuals. In contrast, the acceptance of individual 
variation precludes such an implication: to some extent the individual is not 
synonymous with the group. Acknowledging the scope for individual variation makes 
it necessary to explain how social representations co-ordinate social relationships in the 
face of such variation. It is not clear how adherence to "social regulations" is 
achieved. With regard to "common reference points", adherence is explained by 
assuming that members of a group will represent phenomena similarly. As described 
above, that is the basis of their commonality. The problem is that, on the basis of 
individual variation, it is not clear that "common reference points" are in fact common. 
Doise's descriptions of "anchoring" and "objectification" can be seen to be 
methodologically oriented. As described earlier when discussing Moscovici's work on 
social representations, it is not clear how separable these "processes" actually are. 
Doise describes objectification as dissociating a concept from its original context, and 
anchoring as incorporating a new element into an existing framework. However, when 
a concept is dissociated it is done so by incorporating it into an existing framework: 
that is the basis of its dissociation. A dissociated concept is not simply held in some 
sort of stasis, independent of social and psychological determinism, as Doise implies; 
such "determinisms" are inescapable 1. 
Similarly, when an element is anchored, if this is done in such a way that the element 
takes a concrete form, this could be understood as objectification. A possible 
counter-argument could take the form that objectification refers to the concretisation 
' This of course is not to assume that by "determinisms", Doise is implying full determination. Doise 
is referring to the prescriptive aspect of social representations. 
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of abstract concepts, whereas anchoring refers to more concrete elements; thus 
objectification is necessary to transform a concept into a form amenable to the 
anchoring process. There is some indication that Doise may take this position himself 
in that he refers to "concepts" when describing objectification, and "elements" when 
describing anchoring. However, such an argument implies the separation between 
concept and percept shown earlier to be indefensible. The "concretising" described by 
objectification does not somehow reduce that concept to an object devoid of 
conceptual aspects; similarly the influence of conceptual understanding is not confined 
to the classification (or naming) aspect of the anchoring process, but to the very 
perception of "objects". Doise himself argues as much when he states that anchoring 
may involve a change not only to the element to be anchored, but to the anchor itself 
(1993, p. 163). 
Thus the attempt to differentiate between anchoring and objectification on the basis of 
the presence and absence, respectively, of "determinisms" is not supportable. As 
argued earlier both anchoring and objectification refer to the notion that new belief, 
knowledge or information are understood to some extent on the basis of existing 
beliefs, knowledge or information. A new concept must be dissociated from its 
original context to some extent by virtue of being perceived at all, and that dissociation 
will be influenced by existing frameworks of knowledge, however conceived. It is not 
simply that anchoring and objectification are not separable in their actual operation, 
they are analytically indistinct. For Doise to refer to objectification and anchoring as 
"poles apart" is not supportable. 
As mentioned above, Doise's description of objectification and anchoring can be seen 
as a means to justify his particular methodological approach. Doise describes his first 
phase of research as "objectification", which treats social representation as a collective 
map, common to a given group or population. Phase three corresponds to anchoring 
whereby variations are investigated through association with other characteristics. The 
first phase is therefore seen as independent of social and psychological determinism as 
the social representation is taken to be commonly held by the particular group under 
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investigation, these determinisms are only seen to affect the later stages where 
variation is investigated in its own right. 
As argued above, it is not clear on what basis this definition of commonality is to be 
made, given the scope for variation. Commonality is assumed, as the only means by 
which to explain the co-ordination of the group. This is the very basis of social 
representations as a solution to the "problem of order". Thus the organisation of 
social relationships is seen as a manifestation of the internalisation of common values. 
Such a view is a consequence of the normative emphasis inherent in the very notion of 
social representations. The structuring features of society cannot be understood simply 
on the basis of the internalisation of normative values, however described. 
Thus Doise's "first phase" does not describe a social representation if social 
representation is taken to be the means by which groups co-ordinate themselves. 
Doise appears to be investigating some notion of collective belief, for which the notion 
of individual variation is unproblematic. In these terms, Doise's methodological 
approach may have some merit. However, if consensuality, however defined, is taken 
as the basis for social structuring, such variation becomes more problematic and 
Doise's interpretations must be questioned. 
In this respect, Doise's claim that an assumption of consensuality is an indefensible 
position actually serves to undermine his own position. Doise rejects claims that social 
representations are based on consensuality by arguing that empirical studies do not 
actually find consensus. However, given that consensual values are the very basis of 
social representations as an explanation of "the problem of order", to say that studies 
do not find consensuality actually undermines Doise's approach. 
Similarly, Doise's point that researchers may define groups in ways that are not 
dictated by social representations theory, also undermines his position. Doise argues 
that groups may be defined by other means. However, unless commonality is assumed 
within the group, there are no means for explaining the adherence of individuals to 
group norms. That Doise argues that groups may be defined with no reference to the 
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theory draws attention to how problematic it may be to assume similar representations 
within a group. Any belief, or common representation found through data analysis 
need not be the means by which individuals co-ordinate their actions either within the 
group or between other groups. 
Doise appears to be investigating some notion of collective belief. That in itself is not, 
problematic. However, Doise seeks to support his interpretations by drawing upon 
social representations theory, this is problematic. Doise's explains the three phase 
approach to research as a means of understanding how cognitive functions are 
governed by social regulations. This it fails to do, the reasons for which are 
consequences of inherent failings in the social representations approach. It is 
important to recognise these limitations to correctly appreciate what merit there may 
be in any empirical study. Doise's approach may be useful for investigating some 
notion of collective beliefs; however, to claim significance for any such findings on the 
basis of social representations as an explanation of the "problem of order" is not 
supportable. 
Markovä 
Markovä also considers social representations as a response to "the problem of order": 
"It aims to discover how individuals and groups construct a stable, predictable world 
out of a set of diverse phenomena" (1996, p. 180). Markovä acknowledges the 
interdependent nature of action and structure, arguing that treatment of either as 
independent represents an inadequate, "pre-Hegelian mode of thinking" (p. 179). 
Markova defines social representations as "a symbolic social environment... expressing 
itself through the activities of individuals" (p. 179-180). Thus the theory of social 
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representations is concerned with the interdependencies of processes of both 
conscious, reflexive thinking and unconscious, habitual thinking (p. 180). 
In drawing attention to reflexive and habitual thinking, Markovä is acknowledging the 
transformative and prescriptive aspects of social representations as described earlier. 
However, Markovä discusses these aspects in the first instance by reference to the 
"social environment". For the sake of clarity in later discussion, it is worthwhile 
quoting Markovä's descriptions in some detail. Markovä argues that such social 
environments exist for people as their "ontological reality" the force of which is given 
by "people's complete lack of awareness of their existence", such that they are 
questioned "only under quite specific circumstances" (p. 180). This appears to refer to 
prescriptive aspects of the social environment. Markova also describes the 
transformative aspect: "Yet people are also agents. They have specific ways of 
understanding, communicating and acting upon their ontological realities. Once these 
realities engage their thought, people no longer re-produce and re-cycle their social 
environment unconsciously and automatically. They also cognize and experience it 
with awareness. In other words, they not only reproduce their ontological realities but 
they also engage in epistemological processes and, as a result, they change their 
ontological realities by acting upon them. " (p. 180). 
Markovä also states that in her view, "the theory of social representations is primarily a 
theory of lay knowledge" (p. 180), which "attempts to explain how lay knowledge is 
formed, maintained and changed" (p. 181), and "is also concerned with lay ontological 
realities and with lay epistemological processes" (p. 181). This marks a distinction 
between social representations and "philosophical and social-scientific theories of 
knowledge" (p. 181). Markova explains that the latter are concerned "with 
establishing whether or not phenomena are ontologically or epistemologically 
objective", `whether it makes sense to examine social objects in the same way as 
natural objects; whether social entities are ontologically independent of people... and so 
on" (p. 181). In contrast, Markovä argues that "(t)he theory of social representations 
makes no claims relating to such issues" (p. 181). So for example that social 
representations are concerned with the relationship between scientific and lay concepts, 
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is unrelated to the concerns of a "social psychological theory of scientific knowledge", 
which "would include such areas of study as the social factors that influence discovery, 
scientific communication, co-authorship and so on... Both kinds of matter are valid 
areas of study in their own rights, yet, they are clearly different. " (p. 182). 
Markovä states that social representations may appear to be similar to philosophical 
and social-scientific theories on the basis of terms that appear common to each, for 
example, "objectification", which is also used in ontological realism; and 
"construction" which is also used in social constructivism. However, Markovä claims 
that "(t)heir meanings are most certainly different, being parts of different networks of 
concepts; and indeed referring to different kinds of phenomena" (p. 182). 
Markova does acknowledge a "complementarity" and "compatibility" between social 
representations and what Markova refers to as "socio-cultural theories of knowledge" 
(p. 183-5). Markovä describes socio-cultural theories of knowledge as "critical of 
individualistic theories that ignored the social origin of human knowledge" (p. 183); 
included in this category are the works of writers such as Mead, Vygotsky and Jahoda. 
These types of theory are compatible with social representations in their 
acknowledgement of the social origin of human thought. However, according to 
Markova, they are also complementary in that socio-cultural theories "imply that in 
order to become an independent thinker, [one] must conceptually free themselves, at 
least partially from the constraints of their social environments. Education and 
scientific research encourage independent thinking, critical judgement and self- 
reliance. " (p. 184, emphases in original). By contrast, "the focus of the theory of social 
representations in on the opposite process: it is the study of how socially shared 
knowledge ensnares the individual in existing forms of thinking, prohibiting him or her 
from free thought and enforcing a particular manner of conceiving of the world, events 
and objects. The force of social representations is in their implicitness, and in the lack 
of awareness, on the part of the individual, of their existence: the less aware the 
individual is, the more powerful representations are" (1996, p. 185, emphases in 
original). 
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Thus, Markovä explains, the individual finds themselves "torn between two sets of 
processes": those of education and scientific thinking on the one hand, which 
"encourage independent thinking and an explicit expression of concepts"; and those of 
social representation on the other, which "discourages independent thinking and 
encourages a circulation of relatively stabilised and implicit ideas" (1996, p. 185). 
Markovä emphasises the "implicit" nature of social representations by marking a 
distinction between "nconscious" and "conscious" thought processes. "Unconscious 
thought processes refer to such processes that take place largely without awareness. 
They include such forms of thought that can be described as habitual, automatised, 
unreflected upon and unconscious" (p. 185), and are characterised by "implicitness and 
consensus" (p. 186). Conscious thought processes "are those of which the individual is 
aware. They can be described * as being based on reasoning, reflexion and as being 
conscious", with an emphasis upon "explicitness and rational judgement" (p. 186). 
Markova does not insist on a rigid division between unconscious and conscious 
thought processes, arguing that all forms of knowledge involve both explicit and 
implicit knowledge. 
Markovä argues that socio-cultural theories focus on the development of reflexive 
thought which "grows from unconscious or unreflexive thought" and thus results from 
"cognitive self-differentiation"(p. 187): "All knowledge is embedded in the socially 
shared cognitive experience of the social group in which the individual lives. Each 
private self-contained thought results from subtle processes of cognitive 
differentiation. " (p. 187). In contrast social representations focuses primarily on 
"forms of thought and their products of which people are largely unaware", and 
therefore is more concerned with "cognitive globalisation" (p. 187). 
Markovä explains the meaning of "cognitive globalisation" with reference to anchoring 
and objectification. Anchoring is described as making the world "simpler and more 
manageable" by "grouping events and objects together and treating them as similar or 
equivalent" (p. 187). Objectification "re-constructs an event" that may have been 
scientific or complex into something similar to what we already know, or "something 
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conventional" (p. 187). "Cognitive globalisation" can be seen as complementary to 
"cognitive differentiation" in that "(o)nce simplified, the thought will become less 
reflexive, automatised and will sink under the level of awareness. Incorporated into 
the symbolic social environment, it will circulate and re-cycle itself through 
unconscious activities of individuals. " (p. 187). Both anchoring and objectification are 
globalising in that they involve the simplification of diverse, complex thoughts into an 
implicit consensus. Markovä describes anchoring and objectification as "characteristic 
of human knowledge in general and social representations in particular.. . In the 
acquisition, maintenance and change of knowledge, globalisation and cognitive 
differentiation occur. However, while in the development of intellect and scientific 
knowledge the focus is on cognitive self-differentiation, in the formation of social 
representations the focus is on globalisation. " (p. 189). 
It can be seen that Markova characterises social representations as being concerned 
with the unconscious and habitual as opposed to the conscious and reflexive, and with 
lay knowledge as opposed to that of specialised groups such as scientists. Markova 
brings both of these characteristics to bear in her discussion of religious ideology. 
Markova's discussion was provoked in response to a criticism of objectification raised 
by Billig (1988, p. 7). According to Markovä, Billig argues that "the common sense of 
religious societies illustrates the opposite of objectification" (p. 188). Billig describes 
that when observing an ordinary bush, a "pious Jew" may be reminded of the burning 
bush that appeared to Moses and thus transform the concrete into the abstract. This is 
a reversal of the course thought is assumed to take, from abstract to concrete, on the 
basis of objectification. 
It is worthwhile presenting Markovä's response in some detail as it implicates a 
number of problematic issues. Markova dismisses Billig's example as having "little to 
do with objectification as conceptualised in the theory of social representations ... a 
religious belief which is an expression of explicit commitment and of a consciously re- 
cycled and re-experienced ideology is not a social representation in Moscovici's sense. 
Objectification in the theory of social representations means that an explicit 
commitment and a consciously re-cycled and re-experienced ideology turns into an 
i 
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implicit commitment and an unconsciously re-cycled ideology. When such an ideology 
becomes a social representation, a pious Jew, seeing an ordinary bush, may no longer 
be reminded of the "burning bush" and he or she no longer experiences a religious 
revelation. Now, his religious belief becomes his ontological reality, his taken-for- 
granted and unquestioned experience. " (Markova, p. 188). 
Markovä continues by discussing ideology more generally. "Ideology aims at explicit 
pronouncements of particular (political, religious) groups in power. In this sense, 
ideology clearly differs from social representations that are implicitly shared by lay 
people (and not by powerful groups). If, however, ideologies spread amongst lay 
people and become implicitly shared, one might consider them in terms of social 
representations. Let us remind ourselves again of the earlier example of Darwin's 
struggle both with the official religious ideology and with the social representation of a 
`god-created-world'.... Here we have both an official religious ideology coinciding with 
a publicly held social representation. " (p. 188). 
Markovä also argues that the fact that human thought operates simultaneously at 
different levels of awareness has methodological implications. What at one level may 
appear to be agreement between people may actually be revealed to be disagreement 
when the subject matter is explored in greater detail. Correspondingly, what may 
appear to be disagreement at a surface level may be revealed to be agreement when 
explored in greater detail. By combining empirical methods it is possible to evoke 
thought at different levels. 
As Markovä explains: "In word association tasks the respondents produce the first 
words that come into their minds immediately and unreflexively.... Such responses are 
likely to be stereotypes and culturally shared beliefs: something that is not thought 
about but evoked more or less automatically" (p. 191, emphases in original). Markovä 
adds that respondents may also be explicitly questioned to reveal their point of view in 
general terms; or they may be asked to apply their point of view in dealing with a 
specific problem. In these ways it may be possible to examine the different levels of an 
individual's awareness. Thus, `with respect to the structure of social representations, 
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one might be able to discover those thought contents that are relatively stabilized and 
those that are more volatile and easily accessible to consciousness. " (p. 192). 
Markovä concludes by stating that due to its multilayered nature, "human thought and 
human communication will always contain residuals in terms of what is taken-for- 
granted as a shared social reality, and what is a presupposed commonality with respect 
to interpretation. All one can do is approach these residuals rather than hope they will 
be captured in their entirety. " (p. 193). 
Discussion. 
Markovä's arguments maintain the normative emphasis that is the fundamental flaw in 
the social representations approach. Thus despite Markovä's acknowledgements of 
the interdependent nature of action and structure, and of the agency of individuals, the 
individual is still treated as synonymous with the social group. This may be observed 
in Markovä's description of cognitive differentiation and globalisation, whereby "All 
knowledge. is embedded in the socially shared cognitive experience of the social group 
in which the individual lives. " (p. 187). This "shared cognitive experience" is the basis 
for both cognitive differentiation and globalisation. Even though the notion of 
cognitive differentiation appears to acknowledge individual variation, it is not clear 
how the simplification of an object or event such that it "sinks under the level of 
awareness" will allow it to be incorporated in the social environment, as described by 
cognitive globalisation. The equating of "implicit" with "consensual" is not 
unproblematic, as will be seen later when considering Markovä's definition of social 
representations. 
Returning to the treatment of the individual as synonymous with the group, by 
reference to "objectification" and "constructivism", Markovä acknowledges that the 
same word may have different meanings by belonging to different networks. By 
arguing that the social group has socially shared experiences Markova implies that the 
212 
thinking of group members involves common networks. As has been discussed 
previously, conceptualising social groups in terms of the internalisation of normative 
values is problematic. Markovä appears to incorporate human agency, to acknowledge 
individual variation through the notion of cognitive differentiation and even to 
appreciate that "what is taken-for-granted as a shared social reality" (p. 193) cannot be 
ascertained with complete certainty. Nevertheless in attempting to reconcile human 
agency with the "forceful nature" of ontological realities, Markovä essentially follows 
Moscovici (and Parsons) in treating the "individual" as synonymous with the group 
and thereby diminishing the notion of human agency. 
Markovä's conception of social representations emphasises the prescriptive aspect: 
how the individual is "ensnared" and prohibited from free thought. This is the basis for 
the distinction between social representations and "education and scientific thinking". 
However, it is not clear that any particular type of thinking can be described as either 
entirely constraining or entirely enabling, as Markovä refers to social representations 
and scientific thinking respectively. It should be apparent from the earlier discussions 
of Giddens' duality of structure that the social environment is simultaneously enabling 
and constraining. 
Markovä associates social representations with `unconscious thought processes", with 
the habitual and constraint, and with implicitness and consensus. This is contrasted 
with "conscious thought processes" which are associated with reflexion, rational 
judgement and freedom from constraint, and with explicitness and differentiation. 
However, the individual requires conscious, reflexive thought processes to accomplish 
any thought or action, whether habitual or not. Habitual forms do not constrain in 
isolation from conscious thought; correspondingly conscious thought is not simply free 
from the constraints of existing socially shared knowledge. Markovä does 
acknowledge that all forms of knowledge involve both explicit and implicit knowledge; 
however to argue that social representations are concerned only with the constraining 
aspects of thought implies that the conscious thoughts of individuals are not relevant. 
This reflects an impoverished notion of reflexivity characteristic of approaches such as 
social representations which ultimately accord the "social" primacy over the 
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"individual". The implications of this flaw may be illustrated with respect to 
Markovä's particular formulation by referring to Markovä's discussion of religious 
ideology. 
Markovä dismisses Billig's argument on the grounds that the "burning bush" is 
consciously re-cycled and re-experienced and therefore is not a social representation. 
Markovä implies that for the religious ideology to become taken-for-granted it does 
not enter one's conscious thoughts, so for example the ordinary bush may not remind 
one of the "burning bush". According to Markovä if the religious ideology does enter 
one's conscious thought processes, and the "burning bush" is brought to mind, then it 
is a "consciously-recycled" ideology and not a social representation. However, it is 
not clear how habitual knowledge manifests itself if not through the conscious 
activities of individuals. Markovä argues that the religious belief becomes the 
individual's. "ontological reality", or unquestioned experience when the ordinary bush 
no longer evokes the "burning bush". However, if the religious belief were to become 
one's unquestioned experience, it would be more likely to be evoked than not. 
Markova's argument implies that someone who had less of a religious conviction, such 
that it was not an unquestioned reality; would be more likely to evoke the "burning 
bush" than someone who had accepted the religious belief as an unquestioned reality. 
Markovä is led into such a nonsense proposition as a consequence of her interpretation 
of the notion that the more powerful the representation, the less aware the individual. 
As argued earlier, an individual's awareness is necessarily bounded in that there may be 
unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences associated with their 
actions. Nevertheless the individual's conscious awareness cannot simply be separated 
from their activities. For Markova to imply this reflects an unsophisticated notion of 
agency and reflexivity. It must be reiterated that because a belief, religious or 
otherwise, may become habitual and unquestioningly accepted does not mean that it 
does not influence conscious thought. 
Markovä continues her discussion of religious ideology by referring to Darwin. 
Markovä argues that Darwin had to struggle against the official religious ideology and 
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the social representation of a "god-created-world". However, by questioning the 
social representation of a "god-created-world", Darwin brought the notion into the 
conscious awareness of people. According to Markova's arguments against Billig, the 
notion of a "god-created-world", would then cease to be a social representation, even 
though such a notion was still shared, to some extent. In this way, it is not clear what 
Markovä's interpretation of social representation could actually refer to: to manifest 
itself in any way, shape or form implicates some notion of purposeful social conduct, 
thus anything that may be referred to as a social representation is open to simultaneous 
exclusion on the grounds of implicating conscious awareness. This allows Markova to 
reject Billig's example as not referring to a social representation, while accepting her 
example of Darwin as doing so. Markovä may mention that all forms of knowledge 
involve both explicit and implicit thinking, however this assertion is not apparent in her 
arguments, and does not appear to be a useful means of distinguishing what is a social 
representation from what is not. 
The distinction of social representations as a theory of specifically "lay knowledge" is 
similarly problematic. Again, Markovä's discussion of ideology may be used as 
illustration. According to Markovä, shared understandings that may exist within 
powerful groups are not social representations, but ideologies. One possibility for this 
exclusion may be that there exists some threshold of "power" beyond which the shared 
understandings of a group can no longer be referred to as a social representation. This 
does not appear to be a defensible argument as there are no available means for 
understanding the operation of a such a threshold; it is doubtful that Markovi 
subscribes to such a view. The only alternative concerns Markovä's definition of 
ideology in terms of "explicit pronouncements". Thus it appears that Markovä equates 
the shared understandings of powerful groups only in terms of "explicit 
pronouncements", which presumably involve conscious thought processes, while those 
of "lay people" do not. This relates to Markovä's association of social representations 
with unawareness, described above as problematic. 
Markovä appears to use the notion of "lay", such as when referring to "lay knowledge" 
and when describing "lay ontological realities", in a similar way to Moscovici's 
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consensual realm; that is as an unproblematic, taken-for-granted feature of society. 
This is the basis for Markova's rejection of "philosophical and social-scientific theories 
of knowledge". Markovä implies that the theory of social representations takes no 
position on ontological and epistemological issues. This is simply not the case: by 
virtue of being a social-scientific theory, some ontological and epistemological position 
is taken. Markovä's claim that such issues are not relevant to social representations 
implies that "lay ontological realities" are essentially unproblematic, perhaps by virtue 
of their being generic. However, such issues are of undoubted relevance to social 
representations. This is evident in Markovä's description -of the aim of the theory of 
social representations as the discovery of how individuals construct a stable, 
predictable world: ontological and epistemological concerns such as those referred to 
by Markovä are necessarily implicated. 
The untenability of Markovä's position is evident as earlier in the paper, Markovä 
quotes Bhaskar (1986) approvingly to reinforce her argument of the interdependence 
of action and structure, yet later dismisses Bhaskar's "ontological realism" as 
essentially irrelevant. More objectionable, perhaps, is that Markova herself draws 
upon widely disparate sources in her work, such as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, 
Bahktin, Hegel, Mead and Bhaskar, yet sees fit to simply deny the relevance of 
particular approaches in so casual a manner. A fuller appreciation of ontological and 
epistemological issues would no doubt expose the inadequacies of Markovä's notion 
of reflexivity and also perhaps the whole notion of social representations. 
Further problems are evident when considering the methodological implications of 
Markova's formulation. Markovä describes the unreflexive elicitations from word- 
association tasks as "stereotypes and culturally shared beliefs" (p. 191). However, 
according to Markovä's description of social representations as unreflexive, word- 
association should be the most adequate method for studying social representations. 
Of the methods that Markovä describes, word-association is the only method that 
does not involve explicit questioning. The other methods that Markovä describes 
involve explicit questioning, which would cause respondents to become consciously 
aware of their unconsciously-held social representations, in which case they would 
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cease to be social representations. Why Markovä chooses not to refer to the results of 
word-association tasks as social representations is not clear: "stereotypes and 
culturally shared beliefs" would appear to be describable as "lay ontological realities" 
and therefore, according to Markovä's arguments, social representations. It may be 
that to do so would cause the other methods to appear irrelevant and therefore draw 
attention to the inadequacies of Markovä's definition of social representations in terms 
of unawareness. 
Markovä also accepts anchoring and objectification as distinct notions. Markovä 
describes both anchoring and objectification as globalising processes that simplify the 
world: anchoring on the basis of grouping entities together and treating them as 
equivalent; and objectification as reconstructing entities into something conventional. 
As has been described earlier, these are not distinct processes. The treating of entities 
as equivalent, which Markovä associates with anchoring, involves some degree of 
reconstruction, which Markovä associates with objectification; if the purpose is 
simplification, in both cases reconstruction will tend toward the conventional. Also, 
Markovä's attempt to apply her particular notion of objectification is shown to be 
untenable. 
In conclusion, Markovä's interpretation of social representations is problematic. 
Markovä's attempts to define social representations, on the bases of "Unawareness" 
and "lay" understanding, cannot be supported. The fundamental flaw in Markovä's 
formulation appears to be an unsophisticated notion of reflexivity. Thus despite an 
acknowledgement of the interdependency of action and structure, Markovä's 
formulation retains an essential opposition between the individual and the social, 
whereby the individual strains toward autonomy against the constraints of society. This 
is a consequence of the failure to consider power as fundamental to social action: 
social activity is seen as peer interaction, reflected in the subsuming of the. individual 
with the group. 
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Jovchelovitch 
Jovchelovitch's work is of interest as she has also attempted to deal with the 
theoretical issues concerning social representations. Of particular interest is a 
consideration of Jovchelovitch's position compared to that of Wagner, whose work is 
discussed next. Jovchelovitch argues that social representations involve an inherent 
separation between subject and object, which the representation bridges. Conversely 
Wagner argues that the representation is the object, in that a representation is realised 
in a constructive event which involves the simultaneous creation of the social object; 
consequently it does not make sense to refer to different representations of the same 
object. 
Jovchelovitch states that social representations are "concerned with the possibilities of 
common life" (Jovchelovitch, 1995, p. 82). Jovchelovitch also appears to recognise the 
ambitious scope of Moscovici's ideas by arguing that social representations theory 
"aims to resolve many dichotomies, such as those between (a) subject and object, (b) 
individual and society and (c) theory and method that have continued to plague social 
psychology. " (1995, p. 81). Jovchelovitch also notes that the individual and social are 
not reducible to each other (1996, p. 122); that social representations involve both 
constancy and change, (1996, p. 124); and that processes and structures of social 
representation may only be properly understood in relation to each other (1996, 
p. 123). Indeed, Jovchelovitch appears to have appreciated the complexity of the issues 
implicated in a notion such as social representations, as evidenced, for example, in the 
following statement: "The interplay between subjective and objective, and between 
agency and reproduction, which constitutes the social fabric is at the very heart of how 
social representations are formed. The theory must conceptualise the interplay and 
draw on consistent methodological devices to investigate it. " (1996, p. 123). 
Jovchelovitch argues that social representations "cannot simply be equated with 
representational activity", as they "are more than an aggregation of individual 
representations"; it is necessary to consider "the social as a whole" (1995, p. 92-3). By 
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considering social representations to be more than simply an aggregation of individual 
representations, Jovchelovitch asks, "how can the genesis of wholeness be explained? " 
" (1995, p. 93). Jovchelovitch states that the structure of social representations "can only 
be understood in relation to how they are formed and transformed" (1995, p. 93). 
Jovchelovitch argues that the processes involved in their formation and transformation 
are embedded in communicative and social practices, "in short, social mediation" 
(1995, p. 93). Thus it is social mediation which generates social representations; 
however, "social representations not only emerge through social mediation, but 
themselves constitute that mediation" (1995, p. 94). 
Jovchelovitch describes "objectification" and "anchoring" as "specific forms of social 
mediation of social representations, which elevate to a "material" level the symbolic 
production of a community.... To objectify is to condense different meanings - often 
threatening, unnameable meanings - into a more familiar reality. In doing so social 
subjects anchor the unknown to an institutionalised reality, and displace the established 
geography of significance which society, most of the time, struggles to maintain. They 
are processes which both maintain and challenge, which both repeat and overcome, 
which are shaped by, and yet also shape, the social life of the community. " (1995, 
p. 94). 
Thus Jovchelovitch argues that contrary to the criticisms of Potter and Litton (1985), 
"it is not the theory of social representations that confers a stable, indeed practically 
consensual dimension to significance in social life", the theory simply acknowledges 
"the tendency of societies and institutions (and even individuals) to perpetuate 
themselves -a process which also works within symbolic fields" (1996, p. 124). 
Jovchelovitch marks a distinction between these symbolic or "representational fields" 
and "semantic networks". Jovchelovitch's argument is not entirely clear, but it appears 
that representational fields refer to "the particular stock of meanings and practices that, 
in each given society, will circumscribe the action and speech of social actors" (1996, 
p. 124). However, representational fields also `Vary according to the positionings that 
different actors hold in relation to the social fabric and the web of interactions they 
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produce. " (1996, p. 124, emphases in original). Representational fields are organised 
by "semantic networks", which "retain a degree of constancy in accordance with the 
historical features of the societies in which they emerge", though which can acquire 
"diverse configurations, which differ in their complexity and in how immediate 
experience is drawn upon to represent a given object. " (1996, p. 124). Thus 
"constancy and change" are seen as "integral to the formation of social representations. 
They allow for the existence of contradictory representational fields, which interact and 
compete in the public sphere. " (1996, p. 124-5). 
The notion of social mediation is taken to be extremely significant, and allows 
Jovchelovitch to trace a number of implications for various social psychological 
concerns. Thus Jovchelovitch notes the mutuality of social identity and social 
representation: "(t)he complex interactions between self and other are the basis for 
both phenomena. There is no possibility of identity without the work of 
representation, just as there is no work of representation without an identificatory 
boundary between the me and the not-me. " (1996, p. 125). 
Jovchelovitch also attempts to deal with the issue of power. Jovchelovitch by arguing 
that social representations are "permeated permanently by relations of power", such 
that "domination operates in symbolic fields"(1996, p. 127). Jovchelovitch notes that 
"the construction of accounts, for instance, is never a neutral business... what they 
express is already the outcome of symbolic struggles that are related to the larger 
struggles of any given society. Some groups have a greater chance than others to 
assert their version of reality. The asymmetrical situation of different social groups 
must be considered seriously, for different people bring different resources to bear 
when it comes to imposing their representations. " (1996, p. 127). Jovchelovitch does 
not attempt further analysis of the operation of power, and simply states that empirical 
findings will hopefully translate into further theoretical development. 
Jovchelovitch also responds to criticisms of the notion of representations by those 
social psychologists who adopt a `post-modern stance" (1996, p. 128). Jovchelovitch 
notes Gergen's (1985) challenge to the "concept of knowledge as a mental 
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representation", and his argument that the explanatory locus of human action should 
shift "from the interior region of the mind to the processes and structure of human 
interaction. " (Jovchelovitch, 1996, p. 128). Similarly Jovchelovitch refers to Shotter 
and Gergen (1993) as emphasising the difference between `what happens `within" 
individuals, "in their heads", and what happens "between individuals" in the outside 
social world. " (Jovchelovitch, 1996, p. 128). 
Jovchelovitch agrees with Shotter and Gergen (1993) that "the explanatory locus of 
human action is human interaction or the "between" ", though contends that she does 
not understand why Shotter and Gergen "fail to use the explanatory power of human 
interaction to conceptualise the "within". " (Jovchelovitch, 1996, p. 130). Jovchelovitch 
argues that Shotter and Gergen simply reinstate the dualism "between the subject and 
the social world". This is regarded as a "false problem for social representations" as 
psychological phenomena both construct, and are constructed by, social reality. (1996, 
p. 131-2). 
This leads Jovchelovitch to forcefully argue for the importance of the notion of 
representation: "A representation, and I will repeat for the sake of argument, is the 
activity of someone, who constructs a psychic substitution of something which is alter, 
other, to oneself. The subject and object therefore do not coincide. There is a 
difference between them and in order to bridge this difference a representation 
emerges... To suggest that they accentuate the dichotomy between the individual and 
society is the same as suggesting that the individual and society are either reducible to 
each other or unrelated to each other. " (1996, p. 132-3). 
Discussion. 
Jovchelovitch's approach is noteworthy in that while it may appear to deal with the 
many complex issues relevant to social representations, it actually provides very little 
in the way of theoretical advancement and perpetuates a number of conceptual 
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confusions inherent to a normative social-scientific theory, including the notion of 
normative consensus. 
The fundamental problem is Jovchelovitch's insistence on the separation between 
subject and object. As should perhaps be apparent by now, arguing that a 
representation emerges to bridge the difference between subject and object implies a 
"pre-theoretical" object, and perpetuates the confusion surrounding the separation of 
concept and percept discussed earlier with reference to Moscovici. Jovchelovitch 
attempts to deal with this problem through the notion of the "representation field": that 
is, the common ground of shared meanings that is taken to exist within a society. This 
is the basis for Jovchelovitch's retort to Potter and Litton, that it is not the theory of 
social representation that "confers a stable, indeed practically consensual dimension" to 
social life, the theory simply acknowledges the consensus that is there, the presence of 
which is evidenced by the tendency of societies, institutions and representational fields 
toward perpetuation. Thus it can be seen that Jovchelovitch assumes that a common 
ground of shared meanings is the only means by which societies, institutions and 
representational fields could persist; that they persist is then taken as evidence for that 
common ground of shared meanings. In this way, social entities are treated as 
objective on the basis of the consensus that exists within societies. 
Jovchelovitch attempts to deal with the different positions that may be taken toward 
these objective social phenomena through the notion of semantic networks. These may 
acquire diverse configurations according to how `Immediate experience is drawn upon 
to represent a given object. " (1996, p. 124). It was remarked - earlier that 
Jovchelovitch's formulation was not clear in this respect. That is because 
Jovchelovitch refers to representational fields as common to a society, yet also as 
varying according to the positionings of different actors. The notion of 
representational field is sometimes taken to refer to some notion of "societal" 
consensus, as in the response to Potter and Litton; and at other times to refer to a 
notion of group consensus, organised into various "semantic networks" on the basis of 
social mediation, such that contradictory "representational fields" interact and compete 
in the public sphere. 
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As stated earlier, Jovchelovitch bases her assumption of a society wide level of 
consensus, as the only means of understanding social mediation. Attention may be 
drawn to the various problems associated with this formulation in the first instance, by 
considering Jovchelovitch's discussion of power. There it is acknowledged that the 
construction of accounts is "never a neutral business" (1996, p. 125). However, it is an 
inherent assumption of the unproblematic separation of subject and object that 
Jovchelovitch proposes, that the construction of accounts is neutral: social objects are 
taken to be consensually understood, variation occurs in the positions people take 
toward these "given" objects. The "version of reality" that groups may assert cannot 
simply be understood on the basis of society-wide common understandings of social 
objects; that is inherent in the notion of the "construction" of accounts. 
To acknowledge the full implications of the construction of social phenomena would 
require an understanding of the structuring of social action that is not normatively 
based, such that various constructions of social reality can be incorporated. Social 
representation cannot do this as it conceives of social structuring fundamentally in 
terms of the internalisation of normative values; consequently the potential for social 
diversity is curtailed as any such diversity must still adhere to the underlying consensus 
assumed to be necessary for social interaction to take place. This is the basis of the 
difficulties that are fundamentally insurmountable for Moscovici, and indeed for any 
normatively based theory: to reconcile the prescriptive aspects of social existence with 
the transformative capabilities of human agents. 
Jovchelovitch makes little progress in dealing with these issues, simply noting the 
relevance of both constancy and change, and the maintaining and challenging of 
"established significances" (1995, p. 94). Indeed, beyond asserting the notion of a 
fundamental level of consensus, Jovchelovitch's arguments amount to little; when this 
assertion is shown to be problematic, Jovchelovitch's arguments amount to even less. 
Jovchelovitch insists that social representations should not simply be equated with 
representational activity; that it is necessary to consider the social as a whole. 
Jovchelovitch moves directly from this assertion to a discussion of the genesis of this 
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"wholeness" in terms of the structure of social representations. Thus rather than 
consider whether it is actually appropriate to treat "the social as a whole", 
Jovchelovitch assumes that social representations indeed do so. Jovchelovitch's 
argument, that the formation and transformation of social representations are 
embedded in communicative and social practices, actually reveals very little in terms of 
how the individual, and individual representations are implicated in such practices: the 
individual is effectively subsumed within the social. However, when the notion of an 
underlying stock of societally-shared meanings and practices is rejected, little remains 
beyond Jovchelovitch's acknowledgement that the social cannot be understood on the 
basis of simply aggregating individual representations. 
Similarly, Jovchelovitch's claim that "social representations not only emerge through 
social mediation, but themselves constitute that mediation" reveals very little. "Social 
mediation" itself is understood solely in terms of social representations, as constitutive 
of the "social whole"; thus to state that social representations emerge through, and 
constitute that mediation, is not enlightening. Once again, the argument is based upon 
the notion that consensual understanding, as embodied in social representations, is a 
fundamental requirement for social mediation. When that notion is rejected, it remains 
necessary to explain the relationship between individual representations and social 
mediation; in effect to explain the relationship between the individual and the social. 
The assumption of consensus is apparent also when Jovchelovitch refers to anchoring 
and objectification as reflecting (or representing) "the symbolic production of a 
community" (1995, p. 94). Jovchelovitch's , descriptions of anchoring and 
objectification appear to undermine the distinction between the terms: Jovchelovitch 
acknowledges that when social subjects objectify they also anchor; and that both 
concern the understanding of the unknown and unfamiliar on the basis of existing 
understandings. Once again, when the assumption of consensus is seen to be 
problematic, all that remains is an idea that new beliefs or knowledge are understood 
on the basis of existing beliefs or knowledge. 
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Returning to Jovchelovitch's consideration of power, it is not apparent that further 
theoretical development is possible given that the notion of consensus severely curtails 
any conceptualisation of divergent interpretations. The elemental role of power in 
social interaction, as understood in terms of the securing of compliance, is 
fundamentally opposed to any theorisation of the social in terms of the internalisation 
of normative values. Furthermore, as described earlier when discussing the failings of 
normative functionalist theories in conceptualising change, such a conceptualisation of 
the social cannot easily incorporate any notion of sectional interests; as a result social 
change can only be explained in terms of a society-wide alteration to the consensus. 
This is evidenced in Jovchelovitch's formulation in that, theoretical discussion of social 
change is only alluded to briefly in the notion that the "degree of constancy is in 
accordance with historical features of societies" (1996, p. 124). 
Finally, Jovchelovitch's response to Shotter and Gergen must also be considered. 
According to Jovchelovitch, both Shotter and Gergen argue that human action cannot 
be understood in terms of mental representations, and that it is necessary to consider 
the processes and structure of human interaction. Jovchelovitch acknowledges that 
this is the basis of her own arguments also, though argues that human interaction may 
also be used to conceptualise what happens "within" individuals, i. e. mental or 
psychological phenomena. However, Jovchelovitch provides little in the way of 
elucidating what in fact happens within individuals, beyond an assertion that 
psychological phenomena both construct and are constructed by social reality. Again, 
the mechanism that mediates this relationship between psychological phenomena and 
social reality is seen to be consensus, in the form of internalised normative values. If 
the notion of such consensus is rejected, even that assertion is seen to require further 
explanation. 
In conclusion it appears that Jovchelovitch's formulation is fundamentally ill-equipped 
to deal with the ambitious scope of social representations theory. The basic flaw 
appears to be Jovchelovitch's contention that it is legitimate to separate subject and 
object. Once such a position is taken, social representations simply revert to a notion 
of collective belief or attitude, as positions taken by individuals or groups toward 
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objectively given phenomena. This appears contrary to any notion of social 
representations as constitutive of social phenomena. However, the separation of 
subject and object is explicable, if not acceptable, if seen as necessary to explain the 
consensus, considered by Jovchelovitch, to be a prerequisite for social interaction. In 
that case to acknowledge that social representations involve the very construction of 
social phenomena, not simply positions taken toward them, would make that notion of 
consensus problematic. As mentioned earlier, Wagner's arguments are interesting in 
this respect as he argues that social representations indeed involve the construction of 
social phenomena. 
Wagner 
As stated above, Wagner attempts to incorporate a strong commitment to social 
construction within a social representational framework. Such a claim appears 
particularly intriguing, not only on the grounds that many of those critical towards 
social representations maintain broadly constructionist perspectives (for example, 
Harre (1984); Potter and Litton (1985); Billig, Parker), but also given Jovchelovitch's 
failure to reconcile such a commitment to social construction with a notion of social 
representations. 
Wagner maintains that a concern for the constructed nature of social life is 
fundamental to the notion of social representation, and clearly separates social 
representations from more 'individualistic approaches: "Thinking about how social 
representation relates to the local world of a group sets this approach sharply apart 
from social cognition and connects it closely to current strands of theorising in social 
constructionism. " (1996, p. 95). 
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Wagner argues that a separation of subject and object entails a "strong ontological 
commitment" where the object remains external to the symbolic realm "as part of the 
so-called real world". (1996, p. 103). Wagner notes that this separation of subject and 
object is characteristic of the " vast majority" of research on social representations, and 
is reflected in the titles of such studies, for example "social representations of mental 
illness, of intelligence, of AIDS, of poverty, etc. " (1996, p. 99, emphases in original). 
Wagner argues that the separation is explicitly endorsed by Jodolet, though is explicitly 
rejected by Moscovici, at least on occasion (Wagner notes that Moscovici also appears 
to endorse such a separation. ) 
Wagner argues that "objects" do not exist in a socially meaningful way independent of 
social actors. Wagner refers to the act of representation as a "constructive event", in 
the course of which "something in the world is named, equipped with attributes and 
values, and integrated into a socially meaningful world. " (1996, p. 110, emphases in 
original). Thus, Wagner continues, "(t)here are not different social representations of 
one and the same object.... There are only different representations, full stop... 
representations are realised in a constructive event and this event simultaneously 
creates the "object". Speaking of an object independent of the representation, such as 
saying "there are various representations Ri to Rn of the object X", does not make 
much sense, since representation and object are ontologically indistinguishable within 
the constructive event. As paradox [sic] as it may sound, there is no object resulting 
from a constructive event. What is constructed is not an object, but once more an 
evidence for the intrinsic "truth" of a specific world view in a long series of ongoing 
equivalent performances. " (1996, p. 110-1, emphases in original). 
It appears that Wagner is indeed demonstrating a strong commitment to a notion of 
construction. Also, although Wagner does not explicitly comment, his position places 
into question the "vast majority" of social representations research, which reports the 
social representations " of " various entities. Nevertheless, it is not immediately 
apparent how Wagner can reconcile such a strong commitment with the notion of 
social representations; that is, to explain the structuring of these "multiple truths" 
within the ongoing production of the social realm. 
227 
Wagner's solution is simply to re-assert a notion of group-level consensus, such that 
the notion of "multiple truths" reduces to a single consensual truth. Thus, an entity 
"becomes a social object only within the group's system of common-sense in the 
course of the interactions in which actors, pertaining to a group and sharing a common 
representation with regard to what is relevant in a given context, engage in. " (1996, 
p. 110). Thus Wagner simply perpetuates the subsuming of the individual within the 
group characteristic of normative theories such as social representations. Presumably 
this again reflects a failure to conceive of social interaction in terms other than a 
normative consensus. 
The fundamental flaw in Wagner's position is that there is no attempt to deal with the 
challenges raised by a construction-ist approach in attempting to understand the 
structuring of social action, namely the incorporation of an adequate conceptualisation 
of human agency. To conceive of interaction only in terms of consensus diminishes the 
notion of agency, as individual action is oriented solely toward the perpetuation of 
consensus. Wagner makes no attempt to deal with the issue of reconciling competing 
interpretations, or rival "truths". To fully incorporate human agency would require an 
understanding of how social interaction is achieved through the purposive actions of 
individuals. 
Wagner's reliance on an assumption of consensus effectively removes intentionality 
from the individual and attributes it to the group. This is evident in Wagner's 
discussion of economic breakdown, "(s)uch events require that the affected group 
collectively copes with them by making "the unfamiliar familiar"... Collective coping 
will be first symbolical and then material. At the symbolic level it consists in initiating 
a comprehensive discourse to anchor the event and then to develop a system of 
meanings which allows to assign the event a place in the group's social world. " (1996, 
p. 112). 
That there is no means for dealing with non-agreement, or the disputing of the "truth 
of a specific world view", when considering the individuals that constitute the group, 
there is no means for understanding inter-group interaction. Wagner's only means of 
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dealing with social interaction is in terms of shared understandings, thus the notion of 
group consensus is acceptable to him as the means by which group members interact. 
However, Wagner's commitment to social construction makes the assumption that 
such understandings are shared with other groups unacceptable, thereby confining his 
version of social representations to an intra-group phenomenon. This is evident in the 
opening reference above, when Wagner states that social representations refer to the 
"local world of the group" (1996, p. 95). 
However, Wagner's formulation is not a convincing theorisation of the intra-group, 
primarily due to the assumption of a group level consensus. The narrowing of the 
notion of agency inherent in such a position is further demonstrated by Wagner when 
he states that "(s)ocial construction is always an unintended process" (1996, p. 110, 
emphases in original). This is a very particular notion of social construction indeed, 
that conceives of construction as unintended. To incorporate a notion of intention 
would require an appreciation of social interaction as contingently "brought off" by 
purposeful agents. However, Wagner apparently has no means for understanding 
interaction other than through normative consensus. As mentioned above, beyond 
perpetuation of the consensus, intention is effectively removed from the individual 
agent and attributed to the group. Wagner makes no attempt to explain the formation 
of the group consensus, simply referring to it as a process of "socio-genesis" (1996, 
p. 112). 
Wagner also rejects any notion of social representations as "things in the minds of 
people", and conceives of representation as "the significant structure exhibited in a 
series of constructive events" (Wagner 1996, p. 111). This requires a "quite 
demanding" process of interpretation on the part of the researcher to observe socially 
relevant events, such that "(w)hat appears as a relative constant across different 
contexts and people in a group makes up the representation. " (1996, p. 111). Wagner 
refers to this relative constancy as "the significant core of the social representation. " 
(1996, p. 112). However, given the assumption of consensus across group members, 
the "interpretation" required of researchers would appear to amount to little more than 
an assessment of cross-situational reliability. This can be seen in Wagner, Valencia and 
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Elejabameta's investigation of the "stable core" of social representations (1995), 
which Wagner refers to as supportive of his formulation (Wagner, 1996, p. 112). 
Wagner et al define a social representation as a "mental construct" that is "shared by 
the members of reflexive groups" (1995, p. 331). They admit that the intricate links 
between the individual and collective levels are yet to be fully understood, though they 
claim there is "an emerging agreement on how to envisage the socio-genetic process 
leading to the formation of collectively shared representations"; this is in terms of 
"some form of collective discourse" (1995, p. 332). Wagner et al argue that groups 
cope with "unfamiliar" or "disquieting" phenomena by adapting the groups' practices. 
Wagner et al refer to this as "collective problem solving", accompanied by a process of 
"collective symbolic coping", achieved through "social discourse on an interpersonal 
level and at the level of the mass media of communication. " (1996, p. 332, emphases in 
original). 
Wagner et al argue that different elements, such as ideas, characteristics, attributes and 
evaluations play different roles with regard to the represented object. Thus, Wagner et 
al argue that a "central core" of stable elements gives meaning to the whole 
representation, while peripheral elements serve to adapt a representation to different 
contexts as their "meaning and relation to each other and to the core 
elements... undergo situational change" (1995, p. 333). Thus "it is the interplay 
between core and peripheral elements which allows social representations to serve their 
pragmatic functions in everyday communication processes. " (1995, p. 346). 
The notion of consensus is deeply embedded in Wagner et al's formulation. Thus 
while Wagner et al acknowledge that "contexts do influence the content of verbal 
data", they only influence the wider periphery (1995, p. 346). However, Wagner et al 
also acknowledge that subjects may not offer any one element of the stable core at all; 
this raises, what Wagner et al refer to as, "the old problem of what is meant by 
consensus in social representation theory" (1995, p. 346). Thus Wagner et al's use of 
the term "consensual representation" requires theoretical justification. However as no 
further comment is made relating to this concern, presumably Wagner et al consider 
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their "socio-genetic" arguments to provide at least a preliminary foundation for further 
development. 
However, Wagner et al "socio-genetic" arguments cannot be accepted. Their notion 
that a common representation is a direct consequence of interpersonal and mass media 
communication explains little in the way of process. Also the acknowledgement that 
group members may not offer elements of the "stable core" draws attention to the 
deficiencies of assuming a group-level of consensus: such individuals should 
presumably not be considered part of the group, furthermore as they do not hold the 
same understandings, their interpersonal communication with group members becomes 
problematic. 
Wagner et al defend the notion of the stability of the "core", by arguing that "(i)t 
would be utterly incomprehensible as to how elements which are themselves context- 
sensitive, i. e. which change their structural relationships with varying contexts, could 
form a central core and have an organising effect upon peripheral elements. " (1995, 
p. 346). Once again this reveals the fundamental reliance upon a notion of consensus to 
explain the social world, inherent in the notion of social representation. As a result, to 
redescribe Wagner et al's above statement, it is indeed "utterly incomprehensible" how 
social interactions may be organised without a notion of context invariant 
understanding, i. e. consensus. It must be reiterated that Wagner et al's notion of 
consensus is problematic. Their assertion that there is an "interplay between core and 
peripheral elements that allows social representations to perform their functions in 
everyday communication" (1996, p. 346), offers nothing in the way of explaining how 
this in fact happens. 
In describing the rationale for their study Wagner et al argue, "that if an object is 
relevant and salient in a specific group, and as such a topic of extensive discourse, we 
should find a well-structured domain of knowledge, i. e. a social representation. " 
(1995, p. 333). Their method consists of various word-association tasks, "to give 
relatively unrestricted access to mental representations". (1995, p. 334). The "objects" 
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to be studied are the words "war" and "peace", and the subjects are described as 
"convenience" samples taken from Spain and Nicaragua (1995, p. 334). 
Wagner et al state that of the "objects" studied, the word "war" will be salient to 
subjects from both areas because "war" is mentioned in the media and "therefore part 
of the everyday discourse of many people"; whereas "peace" will be relevant only to 
the Nicaraguan subjects because they have recent experience of war, and not to the 
Spanish subjects "as peace is the norm and therefore not a salient `object' for public 
discourse. " (1995, p. 333). This is a very weak argument, particularly as Wagner et al 
state earlier in the paper that the concepts of "war" and "peace" make sense only as the 
opposite of the other, thus "on a conceptual level they do not exist independently of 
each other" (1995, p. 333). Furthermore, the Spanish samples are taken from Basque 
and Catalan regions, each of which has been associated with a degree of inter-state 
conflict, if not on the scale of that in Nicaragua; therefore "peace" may be expected to 
be salient. No mention is made of any efforts to confirm whether these "objects" are 
in fact present in public discourse in the manner in which Wagner et al claim. 
When discussing the results of the study, Wagner et al argue that "(T)he present 
research was conducted to investigate the role which a phenomenon's relevance and 
consequent collective discourse plays in the formation of social representations. " 
(1995, p. 345). However, Wagner et al do not actually perform such an investigation. 
The rationale for their study is that if an object is salient, it will be "well-structured", 
however, there is no means for understanding salience of an object, other than through 
it being "well-structured". This is a circular argument. Furthermore the study is only 
superficially related to Wagner et al's notions of "socio-genetic" processes: subjects 
are grouped solely on the basis of nationality, thus Wagner et al's "social 
representations" are taken to be held by the whole nation, presumably reflecting a 
nation-wide consensus. For the individual to be treated as synonymous with the group 
is unacceptable in itself, in this instance the "group" refers to the whole nation. 
Wagner et al's study is little more than an investigation into the structure of free word 
associations with regard to the words "peace" and "war". 
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Therefore it must be seen that Wagner et al's (1995) study provides little in the way of 
support for Wagner's (1996) differentiation between core and peripheral elements. 
Wagner et al's study has very little to do * with their own "socio-genetic" arguments, 
flawed as they are, and has even less to do with social representations as a means of 
understanding the structuring of social action. The notion of a core relates to the 
reliance on consensus as the means to explain social action and interaction. However, 
rather than relying on a generic notion of core understandings, it is more relevant to an 
attempt to conceptualise the specific understandings implicated in the accomplishment 
of particular social practices. Such a view cannot be incorporated within a normative 
theory such as social representations as there are limited means for incorporating the 
specific with the general: variation from the general, normative consensus can only be 
understood through a failure to internalise normative understandings2. 
In conclusion Wagner's claim to incorporate a strong commitment to social 
construction within a social representations framework is disappointing. Wagner' s 
claim cannot be substantiated; due to an inherent reliance on group-level consensus as 
the only means to explain social interaction, Wagner's theoretical arguments effectively 
reduce social representations to an intra-group phenomenon, and provide little in the 
way of describing specific processes; the existence of group-level consensus is simply 
taken as given. Furthermore Wagner's theoretical arguments are not consistent with 
their empirical application. Wagner's fundamental failing can be traced back to an 
inability to deal with "the old problem of what is meant by consensus in social 
representation theory" (Wagner et al, 1995, p. 347). 
2 The limited utility of the notion of "core" is also relevant to alternative conceptualisations, such as 
those of Abric (1994): the reliance upon consensus as a fundamental prerequisite for social interaction 
is still implicated. 
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Social psychological theories of identity 
It is noticeable that each of the formulations discussed in this section tend to emphasise 
the communicative aspect of social representations rather than attempting to refine the 
internalisation process. However, it has been argued that mechanisms of 
internalisation may be incorporated by linking social representations to psychological 
theories of identity, (for example, Doise, 1990; Breakwell, 1993). The most popular 
of these theories are Social Identity Theory, associated most strongly with the work of 
Tajfel; and Self Categorisation Theory, associated most strongly with the work of 
Turner. These theories will be briefly evaluated, primarily to ascertain their possible 
contributions to the development of social representations. It will be argued that these 
theories are similarly founded upon a normative account of social relations and 
therefore share similar limitations as SRT in attempting to theorise social phenomena. 
Social identity theory. 
Social identity theory is most strongly associated with the work of Tajfel, though many 
others have been associated with what is sometimes referred to as "the social identity 
tradition". Tajfel reacted against the limited utility of individualistic approaches in 
social psychology for understanding significant social issues, such as those arising from 
intergroup conflict (Tajfel, 1981, p. 403; Graumann, 1988, p. 17). Tajfel objected to the 
"hollowness of explanations of international conflict, genocide, and so on, purely in 
terms of individuality without any consideration of socio-historical factors" (Hogg and 
Abrams, 1988, p. 13). Tajfel sought to take account of intergroup relations in terms of 
group processes rather than simply individual processes: "group behaviour - and even 
more so intergroup behaviour - is displayed in situations in which we are not dealing 
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with random collections of individuals who somehow come to act in unison because 
they all happen to be in a similar psychological state" (Tajfel, 1981, p. 403). 
Tajfel's concern with understanding inter-group conflict led to the development of the 
"minimal group paradigm" (MGP), initially intended to investigate the minimum 
conditions required to elicit intergroup discrimination. The archetypal MGP study 
involved subjects being arbitrarily allocated to groups and then being asked individually 
to distribute hypothetical rewards between members of their own group and those of 
an opposing group. The example often quoted is the assigning of groups on the basis 
of an alleged preference for the artistic work of either Kandinsky or Klee (Tajfel et al, 
1971). The general finding is that the mere act of allocating people into groups, 
however arbitrary the criteria, is enough to elicit biased judgements and discriminatory 
behaviour in favour of the in-group. This is expressed as a marginal favouritism rather 
than a blatant disregard for the out-group; there is a propensity toward fairness, though 
a definite favouring of the in-group. 
The initial explanation for this in-group bias provided by Tajfel et al, was in terms of 
norms. A norm of competitiveness was thought to be made salient, perhaps due to 
associations with competitive team sports; this would lead to a desire to ensure that the 
interests of one's own group prevailed. That discrimination was not more extreme 
could also be explained in terms of norms; for example, through the operation of a 
countervailing norm of fairness. However, the limitations of this type of normative 
account soon became apparent. The fundamental problem is that in the absence of a 
means of predicting normative salience, it is only possible to explain post-hoc why a 
particular norm prevailed in a given situation. As Brown explains, "the so-called 
`explanation' becomes little more than a redescription of the experimental findings. " 
(Brown, 1989, p. 397). 
However, an alternative means of explanation was developed, which in turn formed the 
basis of Social Identity Theory (SIT). "Social identity" is understood to be that part of 
an individual's self-concept (or identity) that is defined in terms of group (or social) 
affiliations. The basic argument is that individuals favour their own group when 
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making inter-group comparisons in order to preserve or promote a positive self- 
concept; Tajfel refers to this as "the establishment of positive distinctiveness" (1978, 
p. 83). Thus the results of the MGP may be explained in terms of subjects favouring 
the in-group in order to raise their self-esteem. 
The main advantage of the social identity approach over the normative account is that 
a degree of prediction would appear to be available: a positive correlation would be 
expected between the strength of identification with a group and inter-group bias, each 
of which could be measured independently. So for example, if an individual did not 
identify strongly with a particular group, there would not be as great an opportunity to 
raise one's self esteem through association with that group in a situation of inter-group 
comparison; consequently discrimination in favour of that group would not be 
expected to be great. Correspondingly, if an individual were to identify strongly with a 
particular group, then the bias would be expected to be more marked. 
The social identity approach was supported by studies carried out in more naturalistic 
contexts. For example, Brown (1978) found evidence of in-group favouritism when 
investigating wage differentials, based upon comparisons between different groups of 
workers. Brown adapted the MGP to investigate allocation of hypothetical wage 
differentials and found that workers were willing to sacrifice an increase in absolute 
terms to their own groups' wages in order to maintain a differential advantage over a 
rival group. This would appear to support the importance of inter-group comparison. 
Similarly, Skevington's (1981) study of hospital nurses showed that higher status 
registered nurses tended to consider themselves as superior concerning task-related 
attributes such as intelligence, confidence and responsibility compared to lower-status 
enrolled nurses; though the latter group of nurses tended to see themselves as superior 
at the more interpersonal aspects of their work. However, of interest in Skevington's 
study is that each group also acknowledged the relative superiority of the other group 
on particular attributes. This is explicable within the social identity framework if it is 
accepted that specific attributes are valued by members of a particular group. In that 
case, it could be argued that task-related attributes are more significant to the high- 
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status registered nurses, whereas interpersonal attributes were more significant to the 
lower-status enrolled nurses. This would lead to in-group favouritism only on those 
attributes considered important to each particular group; the other attributes were less 
significant for maintaining self-esteem, and so superiority could be conceded to the 
rival group. 
It is through consideration of the differential significance of attributes that the 
limitations of the social identity approach become apparent. The strength of in-group 
identification is expected to be the relevant factor in explaining bias amongst group 
members; however, in the example of the groups of nurses above, the differential 
significance of attributes to each group is also relevant. The social identity approach 
does not offer any reason to expect groups to consider particular attributes as more 
significant than others other than in terms of self esteem. Therefore to explain this 
differential significance of attributes in terms of self esteem, and then to explain bias on 
those attributes also in terms of self-esteem, offers little in the way of actual 
explanation: even contradictory findings may be accommodated in this manner. 
This argument may be more clearly illustrated by referring to the studies of Brown and 
Williams (1984), Brown et al (1986) and Oaker and Brown (1986); each of which 
investigated intergroup differentiation amongst groups of workers. The general 
finding in these studies was that the relationship between group identification and inter- 
group favouritism showed great variation depending on the attribute concerned, 
ranging from positive (as would be expected from a social identity perspective), to 
non-existent, and even to negative. However, a much more powerful and reliable 
predictor of inter-group bias in these studies was perceived conflict with the out- 
group. As Brown et al explain, "what we have uncovered is that social identification 
can have quite different meanings in different group settings and is not the 
unidimensional process implied by SIT.... It now seems clear that researchers using this 
approach should pay more attention to the apparently multi-dimensional character of 
group identification and comparison... What seems to be implicated here is some form 
of group ideology which determines which dimensions of evaluation are most central 
for each group's identity" (1986, p. 310). 
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What these studies show is that inter-group bias was not demonstrated 
indiscriminately; it depended on the particular attribute and the particular situation. It 
appears that an explanation of inter-group differences must deal with the meanings 
each attribute has for members of each group. However, if it is accepted that some 
understanding of the meanings held by each group is necessary to explain in-group 
bias, it can be seen that there has actually been little progress from the original 
explanation of Tajfel et al (1971) in terms of norms: without some understanding of 
which norm or meaning will predominate in any given situation, any explanation will 
simply be a redescription of research findings. Furthermore, it would appear that an 
explanation of group conflict would be better served by investigating the nature of 
these "group meanings" without privileging a recourse to notions of self-esteem, and 
thereby social identity. 
Tajfel's appeal for the incorporation of an understanding of socio-historical factors 
when considering inter-group relations appeared to recognise the limitations of an 
"objective" view of social phenomena, as found in individualistic approaches. 
However, attempts to apply the Social Identity approach to actual situations of inter- 
group relations do not incorporate an adequate understanding of the social context. 
For example, in the study of wage differentials described earlier, the significant finding 
is the apparently perverse consequence of inter-group comparison, whereby group 
members forego an advantage in absolute terms to preserve a relative advantage over a 
rival group. An attempt to understand the nature of the social context would require 
at least some consideration of the workers' own understandings of their inter-group 
relations. This would presumably implicate the importance of relative differentials; that 
the maintenance of differentials has a meaningful significance in industrial relations was 
most likely a contributory factor in the formulation of the study. 
The reason the hypothetical allocation appears perverse is that it does not correspond 
to an "objective" view of the situation. However, it may not appear at all perverse in 
the context of ongoing systems of industrial relations in which the maintenance of 
differentials is a significant consideration; in fact, given such a context it is not 
inconceivable that the pursuit of absolute gains with no concern for the maintenance of 
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differentials could be seen as perverse. It is precisely the limitations of an "objective" 
approach to phenomena that provoked Tajfel's initial reaction against individualistic 
methods; yet it is only with reference to an "objective" view that the study is 
remarkable at all, and that the notion of self-esteem can be thought to have explanatory 
significance. To avoid an objective view, the meaning of the social context to subjects 
must be taken into account: an explanation for the workers' concern with maintaining 
differentials would need to incorporate these meanings; the notion of self-esteem itself 
offers little in the way of actual explanation. 
Social Identity Theory has nevertheless generated a great deal of interest amongst 
social psychologists, presumably due to the possibility of explaining significant social 
phenomena on the basis of psychological mechanisms. Thus there would appear to be 
a parallel with the situation concerning social representations; similarly each approach 
is fundamentally misconceived. The limitations of the SIT approach can be traced to 
the MGP. As described earlier, the MGP was originally intended to provide a baseline 
by which to observe the minimal conditions for group bias, and it was found that the 
mere act of categorisation of individuals was enough to engender bias. In the arbitrary 
world of the MGP the only consideration when investigating inter-group relations may 
indeed be the servicing of identity needs, such as self-esteem. However, to extrapolate 
from this that identity needs are the only consideration when dealing with actual inter- 
group relations is misconceived. To appreciate the complexities of the social context it 
is necessary, at the very least, to incorporate some notion of the meanings, regarding 
the particular group relations, of those concerned; if this is done, to privilege the 
contribution of some notion of self-esteem, a priori, is unnecessary. 
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Self Categorisation Theory 
The failure to proceed beyond a theory of norms is also evident in Self Categorisation 
Theory (SCT), predominantly associated with the work of Turner (for example, Turner 
et al, 1987). SCT can be seen as an attempt to further develop the notion of social 
identity, and shares with SIT the basic notion that individuals may define themselves in 
terms of their group memberships. However, SCT emphasises the role of the self- 
concept or self-categorisation in understanding group-level processes: "(t)he theory 
explains the emergence of group level processes in terms of the functioning of the self- 
concept and at the same time assumes that group processes reciprocally mediate self- 
categorisation and cognition" (Turner et al, 1994, p. 454). 
The notion of the "group" is theoretically and empirically central to SCT; group 
formation is seen as "an adaptive social psychological process that makes social 
cohesion, cooperation and influence possible" (Turner et al, 1987, p. 40). From this it 
can be seen that Turner et al are attempting to explain the relationship between the 
individual and the collective or social, and so provide a solution to the problem of 
order. Turner et al refer to the group as the "psychological group", defined in terms of 
a shared self-categorisation, which is seen as an indispensable condition for a collection 
of individuals to feel as a group: "psychological group formation takes place to the 
degree that two or more people come to perceive and define themselves in terms of 
some shared ingroup-outgroup categorisation" (Turner et al, 1987, p. 51). 
For SCT, the salience of a particular self-category is determined by an interaction 
between "accessibility" and "fit". Accessibility refers to the tendency to use those 
categories that are meaningful in terms of past experience and current expectations, 
goals, needs and values: Turner et al speak of the "readiness" of a perceiver to use a 
particular self category" (1994, p. 455). Fit has two aspects, "comparative fit" and 
"normative fit", each of which are inseparable in their operation. Comparative fit is 
defined by the principle of meta-contrast, according to which "a collection of stimuli is 
more likely to be categorized as an entity to the degree that the average differences 
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perceived between them are less than the average differences perceived between them 
and the remaining stimuli that comprise the frame of reference. " (Turner et al, 1994, 
p. 457). Normative fit refers to the notion that the similarities and differences observed 
in the operation of comparative fit must be consonant with "normative beliefs and 
theories about the substantive meaning of the social category. " (Turner et al, 1994, 
p. 457). 
Turner et al stress the dynamic nature of social judgement, such that categorisations 
vary according to the frame of reference. In this way they argue that it is not 
meaningful to think of the self as a fixed mental structure: "self categories are 
generated from an interaction between psychological principles of categorization, 
perceiver readiness, background knowledge and the social context of the perceiver. " 
(Turner et al, 1994, p. 461). Thus the content of a particular social category is shaped 
by the context of its application. 
However, while Turner et al recognise that self-categorisation is context dependent, 
the scope for variability is subject to constraint: "the use of categories and their 
meanings are governed by social norms and therefore anchored in group 
memberships... it is the shared social identity of group members which makes it possible 
for them to produce socially validated knowledge, shared beliefs about ways of 
perceiving, thinking and doing which we assume to be appropriate in terms of the 
demands of objective reality... Categories are not only cognitive structures, they are 
also implicit social norms. " (Turner et al, 1994, p. 461). This notion of "objective 
reality" is used by Turner et al to distance their arguments from social constructionism: 
Turner et al state for SCT "the emphasis on variability [is] reality-based rather than 
essentially arbitrary " (1994, p. 460). 
Turner et al also argue that self-concepts are not simply a reflection of the individual's 
social roles within a normative social structure, and thereby distance themselves from 
more objective social theories: "the social identity tradition of which self-categorisation 
theory is a part looks at society from a different perspective. The structural- 
functionalist conception of society as an organized institution characterised by 
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normative consensus is rejected for a conflict model in which the social group, not the 
social role is the basic unit. From this perspective, conformity to roles and norms is an 
aspect of psychological group membership (Turner, 1991). It is assumed that people 
define themselves in terms of their social group memberships and that they enact roles 
as part of their acceptance of the normative expectations of ingroup members. The 
concept of role is therefore subsumed under the concept of group rather than vice 
versa" (Turner, 1994, p. 461). 
Turner et al acknowledge that much of their empirical work is concerned with 
investigating the role of fit, even though "sufficient explanations" of the salience of 
social categories must also incorporate the notion of accessibility (1994, p. 456). 
However, this imbalance reflects inadequacies in Turner et al's formulation. As stated 
earlier, a central concern is the notion of group; as seen above, the individual is treated 
as synonymous with the group, as the use of self categories are seen to be governed by 
social norms, anchored in group memberships. It can be seen that normative 
understandings play a central role in Turner et al's formulation. In fact, Accessibility 
and Fit may be redescribed in terms of normative influences (as constituting both 
accessibility and normative fit), and comparative fit. Again, Turner et al acknowledge 
as much when they state that "self categories are generated from an interaction 
between psychological principles of categorization, perceiver readiness, background 
knowledge and the social context of the perceiver. " (Turner et al, 1994, p. 460). 
Given that "perceiver readiness", "background knowledge" and "social context" are to 
be understood in terms of group norms, the "psychological principles of 
categorisation" would appear to refer to the notion of comparative fit. As described 
above, Turner et al describe comparative fit in terms of the operation of "the principle 
of meta-contrast", according to which "a collection of stimuli is more likely to be 
categorized as an entity to the degree that the average differences perceived between 
them are less than the average differences perceived between them and the remaining 
stimuli that comprise the frame of reference. " (1994, p. 456). However, this "principle" 
actually reveals very little, and may be redescribed simply as "entities that are seen as 
similar are more likely to be grouped together than those that are not. " This is an 
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entirely logical statement that reveals nothing of so-called "psychological principles of 
categorisation". The meta-contrast principle can only be considered insightful 
compared to a notion of the social context as a fixed entity; even so, it simply 
redescribes the notion that the social context is not to be treated as simply given. 
Thus, Turner et al's formulation may be redescribed as expressing (once more) the 
apparently fundamental necessity of normative understanding for social action, and an 
assertion that entities considered as similar are more likely to be grouped together. 
Turner et al's arguments may appear innovative in that there is an attempt to 
acknowledge constructionist notions such as the dynamic, context-dependent nature of 
social action, and that the notion of identity as some sort of stored mental entity is 
explicitly dismissed. However Turner et al do not appreciate the implications of their 
constructionist concerns. In this respect parallels may be drawn with Wagner's 
attempt to explicitly acknowledge similar concerns with regard to social 
representations: both circumscribe their constructionist tendencies to accommodate 
their reliance upon a notion of shared group norms. For Turner et al, contradiction is 
apparent in the assertion that the variability of context is "reality based", with reality 
taken to be understandable in terms of group norms. Turner et al's argument that their 
formulation is not based upon normative consensus, because "conformity to roles and 
norms is an aspect of psychological group membership", reveals a failure to grasp the 
nature of social phenomena common to social representations researchers also: the 
notion of group consensus is unquestioned and unassailable, so much so that the 
fundamental grounding of social representations and social identity theories in notions 
of normative consensus is not acknowledged. 
It is precisely the unproblematic attribution of group norms by researchers that 
dramatically diminishes the scope for appreciating the complexities of the social 
context. As stated earlier, Tajfel argued that social psychological theories should 
account for the socio-historical features of social behaviour. However, theorisation of 
the relationship between the individual and the social context has not progressed 
beyond a notion of the shared acceptance of group norms. It is therefore ironic that 
Tajfel should have argued that "group behaviour '- and even more so intergroup 
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behaviour - is displayed in situations in which we are not dealing with random 
collections of individuals who somehow come to act in unison because they all happen 
to be in a similar psychological state" (Tajfel, 1981, p. 403), given that the social is 
conceived solely in terms of groups, which in turn are conceived solely on the basis of 
similar psychological states. 
However, Turner et al do make an important point when they note that "self-categories 
are social representations of the individual-in-context" (1994, p. 458). Indeed, given 
that categories, whether they are described as identities or not, refer to some notion of 
content, the content of social identities would appear to be readily describable as social 
representations. Jovchelovitch makes the point also, when stating that "social 
representations are a network of mediating social meanings which lends texture and 
material to the construction of identities" (1996, p. 125). It is not apparent how social 
representations could be described as distinct from social identities, particularly since 
both concepts are based upon a shared acceptance of group norms: social 
representations are readily describable as referring to the contents of social identities; 
conversely, the content of a social identity is readily describable as a social 
representation. 
Identity theories such as SIT and SCT may have appeared to provide a means for 
explaining significant social phenomena, such as inter-group conflict, in terms of 
psychological mechanisms; however it is not clear that they actually do so. As 
described earlier when considering social identity, the explanatory reliance upon a 
notion of self-esteem could only be justified if `Identity needs" were the only relevant 
consideration. This may have appeared acceptable on the basis of the MGP, however 
in real world situations individual needs are not the only consideration; the failure to 
deal effectively with the notion of constraint, as described for example in notions such 
as compliance and domination, is a consequence of conferring a primacy to normative 
aspects that is characteristic of the social identity approach. Privileging the 
explanatory power of self-esteem is only justifiable given an acceptance that social 
phenomena are reducible to identity processes or principles. However, self-esteem is 
meaningful only in terms of how it is manifested in the understandings of those 
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involved; if it is necessary for those understandings to be investigated then the notion 
of self-esteem loses much of its explanatory significance and simply becomes one of 
number of considerations. 
Integrating social identity theory with social representations theory. 
Nevertheless, research in the social identity tradition has continued to treat identity 
processes or principles with explanatory significance and predictive power. This is the 
basis for Breakwell's (1993) argument for an integration of social representations 
theory with Social-identity theory. Breakwell argues that researchers should attempt 
to understand how "intra-group dynamics and inter-group relations will direct the 
formation of any specific social representation. " (1993, p. 180). The integration of 
social identity theory and social representations would enable this, as "(s)ocial identity 
theory makes direct predictions about behaviour", for example `why a particular social 
representation takes the form that it does" (1993, p. 181). Breakwell argues that Social 
identity theory would also benefit from such an integration: "(b)y addressing the issue 
of social representation, [Social identity theory] can provide a model of the broader 
role of identity processes in directing the social construction of what passes for reality" 
(1993, p. 182). 
The capability of Social identity theory to provide direct predictions of behaviour is 
also the basis for Breakwell's claim that Social Identity theory and Social 
Representations theory reflect different paradigms. According to Breakwell, 
Moscovici "has rejected the need for formal definitions of the constructs he uses in the 
model, and avoids prediction on the basis of the model. Social-representation theory is 
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concerned largely with describing the content of representations, not with predicting 
what that content will be in any particular group context. " (1993, p. 181). 
On the basis of the arguments presented throughout this thesis, it should be apparent 
that Moscovici has not rejected formal definition and prediction as much as he has 
proved incapable of producing formal definition and prediction, given a persistent 
failure to fully appreciate the nature of the issues he is dealing with, and the consequent 
failure to resolve the many inconsistencies and contradictions in his formulation. Also, 
given the arguments of Turner et al (1994) and Jovchelovitch (1996) described earlier, 
that social identities and social representations refer to fundamentally the same 
phenomena, shared group understandings, the argument for an integration between 
Social Identity theory and Social Representations theory would appear to rest upon the 
possibility of prediction that Breakwell claims is provided by Social Identity theory. 
It is not necessary to discuss the specific nature of Breakwell's interpretation of Social 
representations theory, it is sufficient to describe it as involving social representations 
as a type of collective belief, rather than dealing with social representations as a means 
to explain adherence to norms and thus resolving the "problem of order". This is 
apparent in the clear separation between subject and object, such that Breakwell's 
discussion is directed toward issues such as understanding the diffusion of a social 
representation within a group, and the relationship between a group and the object of 
representation. The problems inherent in such an interpretation have been described 
earlier, for example in the discussion of the work of Jovchelovitch. However, the basis 
for Breakwell's claim that Social Identity provides direct prediction of behaviour 
merits further discussion. The notion of prediction regarding social psychological 
explanation is an important issue that will be discussed in more detail later. For the 
present, it is sufficient to briefly describe Breakwell's claim regarding prediction. 
Breakwell provides an example of such a prediction when discussing the salience of 
representations: "One fairly uncontentious prediction would be: the more significant 
the social representation is to the group, the more likely it will be that group 
membership will affect the individual's involvement with the representation. " (1993, 
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p. 189). However, it is not clear how a representation could be described as significant 
to a group if it did not affect members of that group: that group members will be 
involved with the representation is directly implied in the description of the 
representation as significant. Breakwell's statement is not a prediction at all, the 
statement is necessarily true by virtue of the meaning of the constituent words. 
Breakwell does describe this prediction as `fairly uncontentious", however it is not 
apparent that any other type of prediction is possible. 
Breakwell provides further examples, including "(e)ven if a social representation is 
very salient to a group and thus to a social identity, it is unlikely to be used in a 
particular situation unless that social identity is seen to be relevant to the situation. " 
(1993, p. 193). Even given Breakwell's assertion that social representations and social 
identity are distinct, this statement provides little explanatory content: if a social 
identity is not seen as relevant to a situation then is not salient, and neither are 
associated social representations, which are therefore not used; conversely, if a social 
identity is very salient then it is relevant to a situation, and the associated social 
representation will be used. It is not clear how a social representation can be described 
as "very salient" when it is not relevant, its relevance is assured by virtue of it being 
"very salient". Breakwell's statement recalls the earlier discussion of Social identity 
theory in that Breakwell's statement is only remarkable given an "objective" view of 
the situation, whereby the social representation is seen as objectively relevant, even if it 
is not so in a particular situation. As has been argued ,a 
fundamental flaw of the social 
identity approach is the failure to develop a means for understanding the operation of 
"socio-historical factors" beyond an essentially unproblematic attribution of shared 
normative understandings to a group; in effect substituting the "objective" view of 
social identity theorists for the more individualistic notion of "objective". If a social 
representation is not relevant to a situation, it is by definition not salient in that 
particular situation; that it may be "very salient" in other situations is unremarkable. 
As mentioned above, the notion of prediction will be discussed more fully in the next 
section. For the present, it is enough to state that Social Identity theory does not 
provide adequate means for predicting behaviour. In discussing Tajfel's initial 
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formulation it was shown that identity processes were mediated through the 
understandings of those under investigation. However, if those understandings were 
investigated, there was no need to privilege explanation in terms of the identity 
process. This argument is relevant to any notion of explanation or prediction of 
behaviour, however those identity processes may be conceptualised. The notion of 
prediction apparent with respect to identity processes, discussed here in relation to 
Breakwell, is not prediction at all; it is simply an expanded redescription of the 
constituent concepts; prediction or explanation would require, at the very least, some 
account to be taken of the situated understandings of those under investigation. 
Thus an integration between social identity theory and Social representations theory 
would appear to be unnecessary. Both approaches ostensibly deal with social 
phenomena in the same way; that is, in terms of shared understandings, with the 
"group" exemplifying the social, and the individual as essentially synonymous with the 
group. The motivation behind an attempt at integration would appear to be a 
misconception of the nature of both social phenomena and of each respective 
approach. 
Smedslund. 
At this point, it is worthwhile referring to the arguments of Smedslund (1995). 
Smedslund examines the semantic constraint implicated in natural language categories 
as the means for understanding how individuals make sense of the world. Smedslund 
argues that all knowledge of the world, including knowledge about psychology, 
follows from the meanings of the words used by individuals: the meanings determine 
what can and cannot be said. In this way, the conceptualising of psychological 
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phenomena is heavily constrained by language: "It makes sense to say `I want to eat 
that food because it tastes good', but it does not make sense to say `I want to eat that 
food because it tastes bad'. In order to make sense of the latter statement, one has to 
add something, for example, `I want to eat that food (which tastes bad), in order to 
demonstrate my superior willpower'. Note that constraints are encountered at every 
level. For example, it does not make sense to say `I want to eat that food (which 
tastes bad) in order to demonstrate my weakness of will'. In order to make sense of 
this, one has to add yet another piece of context, and so on. " (1995, p. 197-8). 
Smedslund argues that in its aspirations toward scientific status, psychology attempts 
to improve upon the "common sense" used by individuals, by empirically testing its 
assumptions and showing the extent to which they are true or false. However, 
Smedslund argues, researchers do not acknowledge the influence of the conceptual or 
meaning relationships between the words they use to construct their hypotheses: the 
common sense that individuals draw upon is embodied in the language that researchers 
draw upon. Smedslund claims that as a consequence, psychological research is 
"pseudoempirical", "that is, it tends to involve empirical studies of relationships which 
follow logically from the meanings of the concepts involved. " (1995, p. 196). 
To illustrate Smedslund provides a further example, "A person at a given time, wants 
to achieve a goal, and has no other wants at that time. The person knows that there 
are two alternative acts, Al and A2 leading to the goal. Al and A2 require the same 
amount of effort and the person can perform them equally well, but the person believes 
that Al is more likely than A2 to lead to the goal. No other beliefs of the person are 
involved. Given the above information, it is common sense to predict that the person 
will choose alternative Al over alternative A2. It does not make sense with the given 
information, to predict that the person will choose alternative A2, or to predict that the 
person will refrain from doing anything. It can also be said about the example that if 
the person, nevertheless, chooses A2 over Al, then the information given must have 
been erroneous or incomplete. We cannot accept that people act senselessly. The 
preceding example illustrates how common sense is built into language and allows for 
psychological predictions. " (1996, p. 198). 
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Smedslund continues that what may be regarded as common sense is in fact 
semantically unavoidable rather than being based on shared experience, and is therefore 
not susceptible to empirical testing: "(f)ailures to predict do not weaken it and 
successes do not strengthen it" (1995, p. 198). Smedslund argues that what makes a 
hypothesis plausible is the logical relationship that exists between the variables 
involved. Smedslund states that it is because psychological hypotheses are so 
overwhelmingly compelling that they are retained even in the face of disconfirming 
data. If this is the case, as shown in the above example, the procedures for testing the 
hypothesis may be seen as unreliable, such that a vital piece of "context" is seen as 
having been absent. Thus Smedslund claims, "the outcome is known in advance and 
empirical investigation is futile" (1995, p. 199). 
Smedslund continues: "The difficulty in practical prediction does not stem from 
ignorance of psychological laws, as hitherto thought, but from the lack of concrete 
information. You cannot predict what a particular person will do next because you 
don't know the person and his or her subjective. situation sufficiently well. The better 
you know the person and his or her situation, the more accurate are your predictions. 
There are no laws to be discovered. " (1995, p. 206). Thus, according to Smedslund, 
the role of empirical work lies in the investigation of local, specific conditions, not as a 
means for the discovery of laws. The only invariant principles are those that make 
sense because they follow from the meanings of the words involved and thus are not 
empirical. 
It is not necessary for present purposes to dwell on Smedslund's particular 
formulation. Briefly, Smedslund describes the inherently mutable nature of 
generalisations in the social sciences, as discussed earlier through Giddens' notion of 
the double hermeneutic. However, Smedslund does appear to over-emphasise the 
constraining aspect of language, such that language is seen as static, immutable and 
entirely determining. Also, it is important to know what knowledge would be required 
of a particular situation to enable at least some degree of prediction. Nevertheless, 
Smedslund makes important points regarding the nature of, particularly social 
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psychological theorising, that are extremely relevant when considering the notions of 
social representation and social identity. 
Final comments regarding social identity. 
As was argued earlier, the notions of social identity and social categorisation provide 
little in the way of predictive capability. Regarding social identity theory, the notion of 
self-esteem may be sufficient to explain the MGP, but not to explain real-world 
situations, where there is more to consider than simply individual needs. It is the result 
of a normative over-emphasis, and the consequent failure to appreciate notions of 
constraint and domination, that individual needs should feature so prominently: social 
action is then understood in terms of "peer interaction". However, the notion of self- 
esteem is retained as a "compelling" notion (in Smedslund's sense), which results in the 
theoretical focus shifting to an explanation of the maintenance of self-esteem rather 
than inter-group conflict. An example of this was Skevington's (1981) study of 
hospital nurses, described earlier, where it was argued that attributes may be 
differentially significant to various groups: this may be redescribed as "different groups 
have different understandings". 
As a further example of paucity of predictive capability, consider Tajfel and Turner's 
(1979) description of the strategies available to those in subordinate groups who 
cannot simply leave and join the dominant group. Tajfel and Turner argue that 
members of subordinate groups may either . restrict their comparisons on the basis of 
groups, such that comparison is made only to groups of similar status (however 
conceptualised) and the outcome of these comparisons is more favourable to the in- 
group; restrict their comparisons on the basis of attribute, such that the importance of 
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dimensions on which the group may be regarded as inferior are derogated; or they may 
directly challenge and confront the dominant group's superiority, though for such 
"cognitive alternatives" to exist there must be some perception of instability of 
illegitimacy. 
Tajfel and Turner's strategies may appear to provide the basis for analytic explanation, 
however they actually disclose very little. According to the strategies, members of 
subordinate groups may either accept their subordinate status or not. If they accept 
their subordinate status, they restrict their inter-group comparisons on the basis of 
group or attribute. However, given that inter-group comparison is described only in 
terms of those two dimensions, to say that group members may restrict their 
comparisons on either of these dimensions is not enlightening. If subjects reject their 
subordinate status, the dominant group's superiority must to some extent be seen as 
illegitimate, this is the logical implication of it being challenged. However, if subjects 
don't directly engage in challenge, and do not restrict their comparisons, it may be 
argued that a perception of instability was not sufficient to prove a cognitive 
alternative. This does not constitute prediction; it can be readily seen that every 
contingency is logically implicated, given the meanings of the terms involved. There is 
no need to resort to empirical investigation. The utility of such a framework for 
understanding inter-group relations is severely restricted as it is also logically implied 
that the individual need for self-esteem is an insufficient means for explanation, in that 
individuals are not simply free to join whichever group would most adequately serve 
those needs. 
Similarly, Tajfel's (1978) notion of the functions of stereotypes, referred to by 
Breakwell (1993), can also be described as "pseudo-empirical". The functions Tajfel 
identifies, social causality, social justification, and social differentiation, are so broad as 
to, again, logically cover every contingency: every conceivable thought regarding 
social phenomena could be classified within these categories. Again, this does not 
constitute prediction, but a description of the logical implications of the meanings of 
the constituent theoretical terms, and as such are empirically irrefutable given an 
acceptance of the theoretical framework. The important point to make is that the 
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theoretical framework is not accepted on the basis of empirical validation, but due to 
the "compelling" nature of its concepts, as a means to explain social phenomena in 
terms of psychological mechanisms. 
It is not clear that these compelling notions, however identity needs may be 
conceptualised, do actually refer to psychological mechanisms. As logical implications 
of the meaning relations between theoretical concepts, they are seen to refer to both 
individuals and groups. This may be argued to reflect the general shortcoming of 
normative approaches, in that the individual is treated as synonymous with the group, 
but is underlines the logical, "common-sensical" (in Smedslund's use of the term) 
nature of the formulations. 
Conclusion 
It was argued earlier that Moscovici did not demonstrate that social representations 
involved distinct psychological mechanisms; also that the processes of social 
representation, anchoring and objectification, were circular and disclosed little more 
than a general contention that new knowledge, information or beliefs are understood 
on the basis of existing knowledge, information or beliefs. The attempts to refine the 
notion of social representations discussed in this chapter do not provide grounds for 
altering these arguments. In light of Smedslund's comments it can be seen that social 
representations are "pseudo-empirical", based around the compelling notion that 
existing knowledge influences thought and behaviour. 
Nevertheless, regardless of whether they refer to internal mechanisms or explanatory 
principles, the fact that a detailed knowledge of the particular social context is required 
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to assess how or whether these "compelling" notions may be manifested in a particular 
situation, severely limits their explanatory potential. This applies to whether these 
compelling notions are formulated in terms of social representations or social identity 
processes or principles: as described earlier, it is unnecessary to privilege explanation 
in terms of any of these notions. Furthermore, in each approach, the "social context" 
is understood solely in terms of group norms; given this conceptualisation, the attempt 
to link psychological processes to social phenomena may be seen as acceptable. 
However, as has been argued throughout this thesis, such a normative approach is 
fundamentally flawed. 
The failure to appreciate these flaws, or to appreciate the nature of the issues involved 
in conceptualising actual social phenomena, is apparent in the persistent failure to 
recognise the consensual nature of their respective formulations, by either social 
identity or social representations theorists. This is shown for example in Turner et al's 
(1994) argument that their social categorisation approach was not based on consensus, 
because conformity to norms is seen in terms of social groups and not social roles, 
from a social identity perspective; or Wagner et al's acknowledgement of "the old 
problem of what is meant by consensus in social representation theory" (Wagner et al, 
1995, p. 347) in the case of the latter approach. It is apparent that a notion of 
consensus is considered to be a fundamental requisite for social interaction, there is no 
other means for explaining the relationship of the individual to the collective or social 
other than through the shared acceptance of group norms. This leads to the circularity 
in the attempts to explain the processes involved. The notion of consensus is so 
compelling, that it is not questioned. In the same way, other compelling notions are 
logically implied in the formulations, but not acknowledged; and are subsequently 
treated as empirical discoveries. In the cases of social representations and social 
identity, it may appear that these approaches are empirically supported, but empirically 
they are irrefutable. 
The notion of social psychology as pseudo-empirical is reminiscent of Wilson's (1987) 
arguments regarding the use of mathematical models in the social sciences, discussed 
earlier in reference to Giddens and post-empiricism. Wilson argued that the value of 
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empirical work in social psychology was reliant upon the theorisation involved in the 
formulation of studies and in the explanation of findings. With regard to social 
representations and social identity theories, the theorisation is based upon an 
inadequate notion of normative consensus and circular arguments regarding logically 
related concepts. 
There is little to guide substantive explanation beyond "compelling notions", such as 
that more similarity is to be expected within groups than between groups; and that new 
knowledge, information or beliefs are understood on the basis of existing knowledge, 
information or beliefs, in the case of social representations; or that group members 
tend to favour their own, in the case of social identity. These notions can very easily 
be described as "common-sensical" (in Smedslund's terms). This leads to substantive 
studies using these formulations providing little more than description and speculation. 
Furthermore, that speculation is largely ill-founded due to the assumptions of 
consensus, and the lack of a theoretical framework to understand social phenomena 
other than through putative psychological processes such as anchoring and 
objectification, or self-esteem. 
It must be seen that the accumulation of empirical research will not lead to the 
refinement of social representations or social identity theories. This is a consequence 
of the contradiction and circularity inherent in the respective theoretical formulations, 
which enables apparently confirmatory research to be continually produced. However, 
whilst these theories have proved resistant to empirical refutation, they have also 
proved resistant to theoretical refinement. Despite considerable theoretical debate and 
empirical accumulation over many years, neither approach has fulfilled its initial 
promise and successfully linked psychological processes to social phenomena. That is 
due to the inherent limitations in the conceptualisation of the social in terms of 
internalised normative values, common to both approaches. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE NATION AND NATIONALISM. 
Introduction. 
The substantive issues of nationalism and national identification provide a means to 
consider the contribution of social psychological theories to an understanding of social 
phenomena. This is because the issues of nationalism and national identification have 
generated theoretical debate and reflection from throughout the social sciences. Such 
alternative approaches provide a wider perspective from which to consider the attempt 
to analyse such phenomena in terms of psychological processes, than would be 
afforded from within social psychology. As described in the previous chapter, it must 
be acknowledged that to some extent, social representations and social identity 
approaches would provide a similar substantive contribution: the content of a social 
identity category of nationalism is readily describable as a social representation of the 
nation and vice versa. 
After introducing the concept of nationalism, functional approaches are considered. 
These are seen to provide little in the way of explanation, as demonstrated in earlier 
discussions of functionalism. Next the political aspect of national indentification is 
explicitly considered. The arguments of Breuilly in particular demonstrate the 
necessity of acknowledging the dynamic and inherently political nature of nationalism 
as it is incorporated in systems of social (inter)action. It is precisely due to the 
dynamic and inherently political aspects of social phenomena in general that 
approaches that rely upon the internalisation of normative values have such difficulty 
accounting for. That is why explicit consideration of issues of social change make such 
shortcomings appear more obvious. Attempts from within social psychology to deal 
with national idenfication, by Billig, Hopkins and Reicher, and Condor are briefly 
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considered. They are seen to compare poorly with anthropological approaches to 
these issues, which are generally less reliant upon the internalisation of values. The 
shortcomings of a social psychological approach to national identification are further 
considered in an empirical study, which may be found in an Appendix to this thesis. 
Nations and Nationalism. 
Nations are often considered to be a natural feature of social existence and have been 
described as the most universal and legitimate political value of our time (Anderson, 
1983). It is often accepted that there is commonality amongst members of a nation, a 
common consciousness or national identity. This is typically manifested as a 
congruence between a county's name, territory, citizens and political system that 
administers the country (Banks, 1993). Quotes such as the one below may be thought 
to be representative of such thinking: "The nation is a historically evolved, stable 
community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested 
in a community of culture. " (Stalin, 1912, as quoted by Hobsbawm, 1992, p. 9). 
However, Nairn (1988) has described nationalism as "Janus-faced", meaning that it 
embodies multiple meanings. Nationalism can manifest itself as an ideology oriented 
toward the left or right of the political spectrum; as oppositional or supportive of the 
status quo; and as expansionist or isolationist. Perhaps as a result of its multi-faceted 
nature it has been analysed from many perspectives, across many disciplines within the 
social sciences. For example, it has been theorised in terms of primordial group 
identities; local identity needs; individual identity needs; societal needs; class interests; 
sovereignty and citizenship rights; and political rationality. 
Most writers on nationalism agree that the modem sense of nation is not older than the 
18th century, developing first in Europe and then spreading around the world (e. g. 
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Mann, 1986; Giddens; 1985; Breuilly, 1992; Hobsbawm, 1992; Banks, 1993). Before 
this time there existed identifiable states which engaged in trade, commerce and war 
with each other, but there was no emphasis upon standardisation of culture beyond an 
allegiance to a monarch. As Banks (1993) points out, members of such states 
"... spoke different languages, had different `cultures', and were often rigidly 
separated. " The administrators, aristocrats and clerics had more in common with their 
counterparts in other states than they did with their subjects. In contrast, nationalism 
stresses a commonality between the rich and the poor, the urban and the rural and the 
capitalists and the property-less (Erikkson, 1993). The sole principle of political 
exclusion and inclusion is based on the national boundary, that category of people 
defined as members of the same cultural unit. 
Gellner (1983) argues that nationalism arises from the perpetual innovation and social 
movement characteristic of industrial society. For Gellner, nationalism is "about entry 
to, participation in, identification with, a literate high culture which is co-extensive 
with an entire political unit and its total population. " (1983, p. 12). Processes of rapid 
change remove people from previously established roles and identities, thus cultural 
definitions based upon an established, or reified, high culture disseminated through 
mass education and the mass media, provide the means on which to base identities. 
The high culture may draw upon real or imaginary elements of "folk" culture, though 
any "invention" is concealed in order to appear "natural". The education system offers 
the potential of access to the high culture and the population becomes more culturally 
homogenous as socio-cultural barriers are blurred. Gellner adds that the major 
ideological difference between a nation and a pre-national grouping is that members 
are part of the nation directly, rather than through some subordinate grouping (such as 
kin-group, class or occupational group. ) "Nationalist" thinkers simply describe the 
social conditions that give rise to nationalism. 
While Gellner speaks of cultural homogeneity, Anderson (1983) refers to a sense of 
"simultanaiety", as the individual gains a sense of being part of a wider community. 
This feeling is fostered by the rise of literacy and the development of the mass media. 
However, Anderson's most powerful contribution is to characterise the nation as an 
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`imagined community', whereby "even members of the smallest nation will never know 
most of their fellow members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of 
each lives the image of their communion. " (Anderson, 1983, p. 15). It is through the 
mass media and the conjunction of general and specific issues, through sharing the 
experience of unknown others, that individuals gain a sense of being part of the 
imagined community of the nation. Anderson explains that it is through a combination 
of political legitimation and emotional power that the idea of nationhood derives its 
force. The strength of the concept is evident in that people are willing to die for their 
nation. 
However Anderson identifies three paradoxes regarding nationalism: "1. The objective 
modernity of nations to the historian's eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of 
nationalists. 2. The formal universality of nationality as a socio-cultural concept - in 
the modern world, everyone can, should, will "have" a nationality, as he or she "has" a 
gender - vs. the irremediable particularity of its concrete manifestations, such that, by 
definition, "Greek" nationality is sui generis. 3. The "political" power of nationalism 
vs. their philosophical poverty and even incoherence. " (Anderson, 1983, p. 14; 
emphasis in original). 
Thus, while nationalism may glorify an ancient tradition and stress its joint ownership 
by members of a nation, it does not thereby recreate that tradition. When practices are 
reified as symbols and appropriated as national traditions, their meaning changes. 
Nationalism reifies culture by treating it as a constant, definable entity. The creation of 
an authentic national culture involves the inventive use of history to create an 
impression of continuity, to reinforce its legitimacy. The construction is directed 
toward specific, present concerns. In this way national symbols can take on very 
different meanings in the modern context than they may originally have had. (See 
Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983, for examples of the construction of traditions. ) The 
nation-state draws much of its legitimacy from demonstrating to its population that it 
represents their particular interests as a cultural unit (Erikkson, 1993). 
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Functional explanations of Nationalism. 
Many explanations of nationalism may be expressed in functional terms. For example 
those grounded in a Marxist or psychological orientation may explain nationalism as an 
instrument of class interest or as fulfilling identity needs, respectively. As Breuilly 
(1992) explains, the main functional account is in terms of modernisation, with 
nationalism providing simple, concrete labels for friends and enemies at a time of rapid 
change. As described earlier, the basic shortcoming of these types of explanation is 
that they actually set up a relationship that requires explanation rather than actually 
providing an explanation. With regard to nationalism, there are many functions that it 
could be said to serve in different situations. So, for example, to explain nationalism in 
terms of fulfilling a need for social solidarity, unless it is argued that social solidarity 
could not exist without nationalism, then it is necessary to explain how nationalism 
contributes to social solidarity. This would then constitute the explanation, which 
would not require formulation in terms of functions. 
Psychologically-oriented approaches to nationalism, such as that of Gellner (1983) 
stress the importance of a special cultural group identity, which was always there, but 
may need to be recovered. The concern is how this common identity may be sustai ed 
or created as traditional authority is eroded. As Breuilly points out, a contrast is often 
drawn between the warm, intimate spontaneous relationships characteristic of 
traditional communities and the cold, distant, calculating relationships characteristic of 
modern, industrial societies. 
For Marxist-oriented approaches, nationalism is a consequence of the uneven 
development of regions within the world-capitalist economy. For less developed 
societies, nationalism is used to mobilise the natural resource that is the population, 
politically. A common identity is created to support such action, though this is 
manipulated to serve class interests. 
An obvious criticism of the psychologically-oriented and Marxist-oriented explanations 
is that they are empirically unsupported; they simply do not fit the facts (Breuilly, 
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1992). Nationalism does not receive its strongest support from those groups thought 
to be most psychologically or materially damaged; neither is there a simple relationship 
between nationalism and economic exploitation or under-development. For example, 
nationalist movements such as the Quebecois in Canada or the Lombardy league in 
Italy represent powerful business interests, are predominantly supported by the middle- 
classes and the skilled, mobile working class. As described in earlier chapters, the 
positing of functional needs leads to a reduction of agency and a circularity of 
argument. For the psychologically-oriented explanations identity crisis is assumed, and 
nationalism is then seen as both an index of, and a response to, that crisis. Similarly for 
the Marxist-oriented approaches class interest both creates the problem and provides 
the answer. However, if the notion is not accepted in the first place, there is no 
"problem" and no need for an "answer". Each type of explanation is wedded to a 
particular form of explanation, and the theoretical baggage proves too cumbersome. 
The political aspects of nationalism. 
As Hobsbawm explains, the desire for group identity is' not in question, but nationalism 
is not.. the only possible expression. There is no agreed pattern of social, cultural and 
economic circumstance that can explain without exception why some groups have 
become nations and others have not: "We are trying to fit historically novel, emerging, 
changing, non-universal entities into a framework of permanence and universality. " 
(Hobsbawm, 1992, p. 10). 
Breuilly argues that many theorists of nationalism fail to appreciate its political 
rationality; that nationalism is invoked in a variety of ways for a variety of purposes. 
The success of a nationalism is not simply related to its power. For example the more 
weakly developed movements of the Ottoman empire achieved more than the stronger 
movements of the Habsburg empire. Similarly the nationalist movements of Germany 
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and Italy were more effective than the stronger Polish national movement. The 
development of nationalism is dependent on much more specific sets of conditions. 
Industrial development and expansion, the development of mass literacy and 
communications technology, and greater geographical and social mobility all created 
the conditions for standard national cultures. However, the general condition for the 
emergence of nationalism was the incorporation of sections of society hitherto 
excluded, into political life. So, for example, much of the development of standard 
national cultures took place after the formation of nation-states in western Europe. 
Nationalism is one response to the distinction between state and society and is an 
attempt to discard that distinction. Nationalism is not the expression of nationality. 
The defining of the nation state as the normative political unit by the most advanced 
and powerful states has had a global impact on political development, particularly 
through the legitimising of nationalist claims. In this way, regional or ethnic tension 
within states and border disputes would be expressed in nationalist terms. However, it 
is important to recognise that nationalist ideology can be seen as both a rationalisation 
of certain forms of political action and as an instrument of such action; thus it shapes 
and is shaped by the way in which political conflict is conducted. 
Breuilly rejects the notion that cultural identity can be passed down through 
generations without being affected by, or having an effect on, politics, the economy 
and the social structure. He stresses the point made by Billig and others, that identities 
and values are preserved only through action. Nationalist ideology is not simply the 
product of political calculation but it is only in terms of political action that it is clearly 
related to objectives. National identity is related to existing cultural practices, but the 
decisions as to what is relevant and how it should be used rest with the state. 
The appeal to cultural identity is often made to connect politics to significant social 
interests. Breuilly continues that nationalist rhetoric can easily be applied as the nation 
state is globally accepted as the normative political unit. Thus the proto-nationalisms 
of separatist movements in advanced, industrial societies are a blend of emotion and 
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pragmatism. Nationalism can be a major political asset. The "naturalness" of nation- 
state means that it can be drawn upon as a' powerful resource to support political 
action through reference to a "national interest". 
The difference between rhetoric and reality is often concealed through the intuitive link 
between cultural identity and self-determination. The implication is that the cultural 
group is a basic political unit, however there is no `natural' basis to politics. New 
nationalist movements may seek to generate support by stressing the legitimacy of their 
particular claim. Political capital may be made by stressing distinctiveness in terms of 
name, territory, language, culture and/or race. Thus in the case of Ireland, appeals for 
self-determination by nationalists may appear intuitively plausible. However, there is 
no simple reason to assume that the island should be administered by a single political 
system that would abolish regional variation. Breuilly points out that the intuitive 
appeal of cultural identity accompanied by policies of self-interest by major powers, 
has been more significant in determining the outcome of particular nationalist 
movements than the capacity of the movement to co-ordinate political elites and 
mobilise popular support. Conversely the appeal to cultural identity makes it possible 
for administrations to deflect criticism by blaming internal conflict on ancient rivalries 
rather than defective policy. 
An example of this is the collapse of the USSR. The subsequent applications to cede 
from the USSR have lead some to an explanation of the collapse emphasising the 
strength of national identities. However, Hobsbawm argues that changes in the Soviet 
system were not due to national tensions, but were due to the efforts of the Soviet 
regime to reform itself. This involved the withdrawal of military support from satellite 
regimes; an undermining of the central command and authority structure; and a 
subsequent undermining of the independent communist regimes in Balkan Europe. 
According to Hobsbawm, the USSR collapsed under economic difficulties, i. e. the 
failure of perestroika; nationalism was the beneficiary of these developments, not the 
cause. 
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As stated earlier, nationalism is one response to the relationship between the state and 
society; in other words between the administration and those administered. Breuilly 
reminds us that the liberal model of the sovereign, territorial state competing with 
other states in a global economic order based on a free market, and with a strong 
distinction between state and society, is itself an ideology. It does not fully describe 
reality. In the same way if there were cultural nations which, through self- 
determination, could overcome the distinction between state and society, then 
distinctive nationalist politics would continue to operate after it had achieved state 
power. However, nationalism takes two major forms: (1) strong states with market 
economies and a standard national culture. Here people identity with their state in 
situations of international conflict, but do not expect politics to be about national 
issues. (2) weaker states which cannot contain the bulk of the political community 
resulting in constant outbreaks of conflict. Stronger states may attempt to intervene 
and ensuing political conflict may be framed in nationalist terms, but it will be difficult 
to identify nationalism as a distinct type of political movement. 
Breuilly concludes that nationalism is too broad a category to be used effectively. It is 
used to refer to consciously formulated ideas, unarticulated sentiments and purposeful 
actions. These are distinct phenomena which do not stand in any necessary 
relationship to one another. As a result arguments must remain at a general level, or 
be contradicted in numerous cases. This makes it difficult to move beyond 
generalisations. Breuilly would rather the term "nationalism" was restricted to politics, 
with analysis involving the comparative analysis of specific contexts. 
National Identification. 
Gellner and Anderson both stress the "constructed" nature of the nation; for each, 
nationalism is seen to precede nations. It is this constructed-ness and the potential for 
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further construction and elaboration that is implicated in the dynamic nature of national 
identity and serves to illustrate the shortcomings of social psychological identity 
theories, described in more detail in the last chapter. Social psychological identity 
theories tend to concern themselves with universal principles of identification. With 
regard to national identification, to maintain a positive self-identity members of a 
nation will tend to produce favourable stereotypes of themselves which emphasise the 
importance of attributes on which they may claim superiority; and unfavourable 
stereotypes of other, "competing" nationalities, downplaying the importance of 
attributes at which that group may excel (as described by Billig, 1995). 
The critique of identity approaches presented earlier indicated the fundamental flaw to 
be their normative basis, manifesting itself as an unproblematic apprehension of 
normative understandings and the wider social reality. This line of argument may be 
connected to national identification by considering Tajfel's assertion that a nation will 
exist only if a body of people feel themselves to be a nation (Tajfel, 1981, p. 55). This 
is a specific example of the more general claim that groups only exist if members 
identify themselves with the group (Billig, 1995, p. 78). This more general claim is 
based upon self-identification and appears particularly problematic in the case of 
nationalism where the ascription of identity can be seen more tangibly. As shown 
earlier, identity theories cannot deal adequately with the ascription of identity. 
Discourse oriented researchers such as Billig are more concerned with the content of 
national identity. Billig deals with the apparent surge and decline in the strength of 
national identification through his notion of "banal nationalism". Billig contends 
national identity is constantly flagged in routine activities implicating both what the 
nation "is" and what it "isn't". Billig points out that even though explicit recognition 
of nationalism is usually reserved for particular ceremonial or ritualistic practices, if 
national identity were simply an individual concern there would be far more forgetting. 
"The apparently latent identity is maintained within the daily life of inhabited nations. 
The `salient situation' does not suddenly occur, as if out of nothing, for it is part of a 
wider rhythm of banal life in the world of nations. What this means is that national 
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identity is more than an inner psychological state or an individual self-definition: it is a 
form of life, which is daily lived in the world of nation-states. " (Billig, 1995, p. 69). 
Billig suggests that the psychological study of nationalism should involve the collection 
of common-sense assumptions and ways of talking in which national identity is 
`flagged up'. This data could then be used to construct taxonomies where "different 
genres and their customary rhetorical strategies" could be listed. This would allow the 
extent of flagging in different domains and in different nations to be classified and 
calculated. 
The call to construct taxonomies echoes similar suggestions from those working from 
a Discourse-analytic perspective and those from a Social Representations perspective. 
As discussed earlier, the collection of data will not simply result in an improved 
understanding of phenomena. A taxonomic approach relies upon an unproblematic 
observation of phenomena to allow reliable classification. It is not obvious how the 
dynamic nature of national identification will be captured through placement in a 
taxonomy. This is not to say that a taxonomic approach is of no use, but it is not 
viable as an end-point to research. 
Similar problems are found in the work of Hopkins and Reicher (1996). Their paper 
on the negotiation of national categories describes instances where the meanings of 
national categories are contested in the context of political debates. Like Billig they 
include a review of identity theories, but no link is made between these and their 
empirical work which remains at a descriptive level. This is perhaps not surprising 
given that identity theories are founded on an internalisation of normative 
understandings while Hopkins and Reicher emphasise the negotiated and contingent 
nature of such understandings. The data they present are interesting, and demonstrate 
the constructed nature of social categories, but once one is convinced of the 
constructed-ness there is little more to be done other than express once again the 
vague expectation of future refinement of existing theories. 
A 
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Condor (1996) similarly expresses the inability to incorporate various relevant issues 
when attempting to deal with national identification, "A comprehensive analysis of 
national identity would have to take account of complex contextual variation. This 
would include variation due to the social location of individual subjects (in concrete 
social networks, family structures); geographical, historical and ideological variations 
in the significance and meaning of national identity, and the intersections of national 
identities with gender, generational, ethnic and class identities. Such analyses would 
have to consider context-specific norms in the expression of national identity and 
contextual variations in salience. A full analysis of national self-identity would have to 
take account of the various ways in which identity may be symbolized (visually as well 
as verbally), and the possibility that, for the individual subject, national self- 
identification may exist at various levels of consciousness...... However, it is beyond 
the scope of a single chapter to engage fully with the subtleties of national 
identification. Rather I shall confine myself to discussing (as is usual amongst social 
psychologists) a set of data drawn from a few rather specific research contexts. " 
(Condor, 1996, p. 66). 
It is not clear how all of these considerations could be incorporated into a coherent 
notion of national identification; however, it is clear that Condor does not have the 
answer. Condor's statement is particularly noteworthy as it illustrates clearly that 
simply stating an awareness of relevant issues is inadequate, if such issues cannot be 
integrated theoretically. The failure to effectively incorporate such concerns into a 
coherent theoretical formulation is directly comparable to the similar shortcomings of 
Moscovici, Tajfel and Turner in this regard. 
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Anthropological approaches to nationalism. 
The issue of identification is also explored in anthropological literature. Here 
nationalism is usually related to the concept of ethnicity, though for the present 
purpose, ethnicity may be thought of as a type of group identification. The 
anthropological approaches generally show a greater degree of cultural awareness than 
those of social psychology, drawing widely on different cases of nationalism to 
investigate the nature of group identification. They may be helped by not having to 
accommodate their analyses within (flawed) abstract theoretical schemes such as SIT 
or SRT. Anthropological studies of nationalism are of great relevance to the study of 
nationalism and national identification. 
Smith (1986) states that while modern nationalism is dependent on certain social 
circumstances, it ultimately derives from the cultural homogeneity of the ethnic 
community. Smith introduces the concept of "ethnies", defined in terms of a collective 
name; a common myth of descent; a shared history; a distinctive shared culture; an 
association with specific territory; and a sense of solidarity, to explain this commonality 
(Smith, 1986, p. 21-2). The ethnie is transmitted throughout communities and across 
generations through a "core" of myths, memories, values and symbols; a "myth-symbol 
complex". However, Smith does not see the ethnie as some sort of cultural universal 
present in all contexts, but for the purposes of nation-formation, `it is vital to create 
and crystallise ethnic components'. Smith's arguments seem to have much in common 
with a social psychological type of approach in that the continuity of the group implies 
an unproblematic transmission of the ethnie. This is related to an emphasis on self- 
identification at the expense of the possibility of ascription of ethnic identity. 
Ardener (1989) examines the relationship between self-identification and ascription 
through the concept of "taxonomic space" (p. 69-70). Ardener uses this concept to 
highlight the relational and contingent nature of classification. An awareness of how 
political and social factors are implicated in classification leads to the concept of 
"hollow categories": "ethnic groups" that are needed by other "ethnic groups" for 
classificatory purposes. Thus while an identity may exist, its membership and cultural 
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contents are subject to change in response to "out-group" concerns. In this way the 
majority identity, taken to be an expression of the nation, can create a minority identity 
within the `taxonomic space' of certain classifications (Banks, 1993). Ardener 
suggests that "Norman", "Jew", "Gypsy" and "Irishman" are each examples of hollow 
categories (p. 70). However, Ardener does assert that ethnicities must be viewed from 
the "inside", now matter how tenuous their claims in objective terms. 
Chapman (1978) discusses Gaelic identity as a hollow category, "symbolically 
appropriated" by Scottish and English society and then re-appropriated and elaborated 
through the self-conscious efforts of the "Gaels" themselves (p. 262). He argues that 
the Gaels and other Celtic, but generally more peripheral, groupings were originally 
identified as oppositional categories to the emerging state nationalisms of Britain and 
France. A romantic notion of their "wildness" and "primitiveness" was elaborated 
through literature and served to highlight the civilised nature of the British and the 
French. Thus, Chapman argues, British national identity is really only concerned with 
`English-ness', it is their values, their language and their institutions that are accepted 
and celebrated. Lowland Scots can be accommodated within this identity, but the 
"highlanders" and the "Gaels" are too different, and so are used through their 
opposition to define `British-ness" or "English-ness" (p. 208-17). So, for Chapman, 
the nation's defining group is not simply another ethnic group, it is deliberately and 
self-consciously everything and nothing, its name is synonymous with the national 
name. 
Similarly McDonald (1989) notes the importance of the national centre in the invention 
of the "Celts" (p. 20). She argues that particularly in France, centralist tendencies on 
the part of the government have resulted in efforts to reinforce national unity that have 
actually served to enhance the Celtic movement by feeding into their self-identification 
as an oppressed minority. Thus through the self-conscious efforts of `Young, middle- 
class proto-nationalists", an ethnic identity may be reified into a minority nationalist 
identity (p. 21). 
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Chapman also notes how the oppositional pairing of Gaelic vs. English with regard to 
language has come to mean Scottish vs. English identity via a presumed 
correspondence between language and race. He comments how strange it is that "a 
language not understood by 98 per cent of Scottish people ...... and spoken by a people 
who have been regarded by their southern [Scottish] neighbours as barbarians, should 
now be regarded as the quintessence of Scottish culture. " (1978, p. 12). McKechnie 
(1993) concurs that the whole of society participates in the creation of peripheral 
identities and that "images of otherness located at the peripheries have played a 
definitional role for centres of power in Europe down the centuries. " (p. 118). 
Cohen's (1982,1985) anthropological studies of rural communities in Britain stand in 
some opposition to the anthropological work discussed so far. For Cohen, there is no 
national culture but many diverse, local cultures founded on a sense of belonging. The 
nation is seen as a vague impersonal force that imposes itself on local communities and 
demands linguistic and other forms of homogeneity (Banks, 1993). This is contrary to 
Anderson's claim that it is the very impersonality and transcendence of national 
identities that makes them powerful. Cohen argues that the symbols and institutions of 
the nation are only powerful to the extent that they can be imbued with local 
significance and meaning. 
For Cohen these communities are self-aware social formations that subordinate their 
complexity "within shared and relatively simple forms for the purpose of .... 
interaction 
with the outside. " (1985, p. 107). An important point Cohen makes is that although 
these communities may appear to share common features such as access to `British 
culture" of "soap operas, newspapers and politicians' rhetoric", mass media and even 
words and actions are invested with locally specific meaning. In this way the boundary 
between "us" and "them" may be invisible to the outsider who invests such media, 
words and actions with what they assume to be universally shared meanings. This can 
easily be overlooked by assuming that the use of common symbols necessarily entails a 
common interpretation (1986, p. 2). 
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Cohen argues that people assert community, whether as locality or ethnicity, when they 
recognise it as the most adequate expression of their whole selves. For example, 
Cohen states that the participation of Whalsey fishermen in a blockade of Lerwick 
harbour was not the focal point in the construction of a Whalsey identity; the Whalsey 
identity had been there all along. The creation and manipulation of the external 
boundary does not require a specific external threat. 
Cohen's work can be criticised for assuming local identity to be more authentic than 
any other. Any social grouping based on more than face-to-face interaction is to some 
extent imagined, so it is not clear whether the community level should automatically be 
privileged. Also, there is a presumption of the continuity of the local community in a 
similar way to Smith, thus the possibility that identities may have been ascribed before 
being appropriated, as described by Chapman and McDonald, is not considered. 
However by arguing that people may refer to and manipulate the same symbol under 
the misapprehension that others refer to it in the same way, Cohen's analysis connects 
to theoretical arguments regarding the problematic nature of observation discussed 
earlier. 
In the present context, it is enough to state that by explicitly acknowledging the 
implications of ascription and reappropriation of identity and variability in the 
interpretation of common symbols, the anthropological studies highlight the inherently 
political nature of identification, through the manipulation of identities and the pursuit 
of objectives. This shows the necessity for a more contingent, and thereby dynamic, 
view of national identification and its implications. It is not simply a question of 
whether Anderson or Cohen is correct regarding the strength of national symbols. It 
should be clear that a definitive answer is not to be expected. What is of interest is 
understanding how national identities may be mobilised to achieve particular ends. 
It is this political nature of identification that prompts Erikkson to compare and 
contrast "nationalism" and "ethnicity" (1993, p. 109). Both concepts are based upon a 
metaphorical kinship, such as common ancestry or ties to the mother or fatherland; and 
both are constituted in relation to others in the ways described earlier. However, 
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nationalist movements incorporate a claim to political self-determination that is not a 
feature of ethnic groupings. So, for example in McDonald's work on the "hollow 
category" of Celt, the pursuit of political self-determination galvanises an ill-defined 
ethnic identity into a political proto-nationalist movement. However, groups such as 
Irish-Americans and Italian-Americans may pursue particular concerns, but they do not 
demand state control or wish to cede from the United States of America to form a new 
state. He concludes that theories of group or "ethnic" identity cannot explain the 
emergence of nationalist movements without reference to the state. 
Conclusion. 
Breuilly's arguments emphasise the political rationality of nationalism. It is through 
action that nationalism becomes specific, as nationalist arguments are used to achieve 
particular ends, and shape and are shaped by political opposition. That is why national 
identity and its implications are dynamic. This relates to theoretical arguments in the 
previous chapters where the inherently political and contingent nature of social 
identification, and social interaction more generally, were examined. There it was seen 
that assuming the internalisation of normative values was problematic, and theories 
based upon such assumptions were correspondingly limited. Social psychological 
theories such as those associated with social representations and social identity were 
identified as being based upon such assumptions and their limitations discussed. 
By considering nationalism and national identity the limitations of such theories are 
more readily apparent. Nationalism may appear more obviously political (as seen in 
the necessity to account for political opposition) but consideration of the political 
aspect of (inter)action is fundamental to any type of social identification. Similarly, 
just as any conception of "primordial identity" was seen as particularly flawed when 
dealing with national identities, so an internalised conception of identity more generally 
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is seen as theoretically problematic. A more adequate conceptualisation of social 
phenomena requires a more sophisticated treatment of agency, such as the recursive 
model of structured action proposed by Giddens, and a corresponding 
acknowledgement of the implications of such a treatment for the observation of social 
phenomena. 
I would argue on the basis of arguments presented within this thesis that the source of 
these difficulties is a failure to move beyond a conceptualisation of the social that relies 
upon the internalisation of normative values, and a corresponding failure to 
acknowledge the implications for the observation of social phenomena. 
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CONCLUSION 
The theory of social representations has generated much theoretical debate and 
empirical research within social psychology since its initial formulation by Moscovici. 
The major significance of social representations theory is that in seeking to investigate 
social phenomena in terms of psychological mechanisms, it attempts to deal with "the 
problem of order"; that is, how social order is possible given the diversity of individual 
wills. The development of the theory was strongly influenced by a series of critical 
exchanges that followed shortly after its introduction. These exchanges were 
examined in order to evaluate Moscovici's treatment of the formidably complex issues 
implicated in the notion of social representations: these are no less than the relationship 
between the individual and the social; and the logic of social scientific enquiry. 
It is argued that Moscovici does not deal adequately with these issues, and despite 
claims to the contrary, his formulation does not constitute a departure from the 
normative functionalist theories of Durkheim and Parsons. The fundamental failing is 
the explanation of the relationship between the individual and the social in terms of 
normative consensus. The adherence to consensual norms is dealt with through the 
internalisation of normative values, such that social causation and social constraint are 
effectively treated as synonymous. This leads to circular arguments concerning the 
processes of, and distinctiveness of, social representations, as attempts are made to 
reconcile the acknowledged notion of individual variation with the inherent assumption 
of consensus. 
The tautological nature of social representations formulations leads to difficulties 
regarding the second of the complex issues, that of the nature of social scientific 
investigation. The notion of consensus is assumed, thus social representations are 
treated as axiomatic. Furthermore, as social representations are not convincingly 
linked to individuals, they are seen to be autonomous in some respects. This lends 
credibility to the notion that social representations may be unproblematically observed 
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since the representation is taken to be "out there" in the public domain. As a result, 
constructionist concerns are not adequately reflected and empirical research tends to 
constitute little more than the description of collective beliefs regarding particular 
objects. 
An important issue regarding the notion of social representations is that in appearing to 
acknowledge both objective, realist concerns and subjective, constructionist concerns, 
the impression may be given that social representations theory represents some kind of 
theoretical breakthrough that it has yet to reveal its full potential. However, a more 
sophisticated awareness of the issues involved, and of the work of Moscovici's 
theoretical antecedents, forces a reassessment of the distinctiveness of Moscovici's 
contribution. Social representations are readily identifiable as a version of normative 
functionalism, and share many of the fundamental shortcomings found in the work of 
Durkheim and Parsons. The reliance upon normative consensus is shown to be 
especially problematic when attempting to deal with social conflict, and social change 
more generally. Moscovici's theory may appear to promise more than it can deliver as 
a consequence of the contradictory positions Moscovici takes when describing social 
representations. Moscovici has continually failed to resolve this confusion; on the 
contrary, Moscovici has tended to further exacerbate such confusion. 
Giddens provides a more sophisticated treatment of these fundamental issues: the 
relationship between the individual and the social, and the nature of social scientific 
investigation. The significance of Giddens' formulation is the dismantling of the 
dualities of objectivism and subjectivism with respect to both these fundamental issues. 
Through a clearly argued theoretical engagement with the issues involved, Giddens 
successfully incorporates an appreciation of the constraining and enabling aspects of 
social structure, and the contextual nature of empirical research. The deeply involved 
treatment of these issues warns against a simplistic expectation of certain knowledge 
with regard to social phenomena. However, Giddens endorsement of post-empiricism 
denies the counter-claim that to deal effectively with the interpretative element of any 
research enquiry necessitates a slide toward an untenable relativism. Giddens' notion 
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of structuration is best used to sensitise researchers to the nature of the issues involved 
in the formulation and interpretation of social scientific work. 
It is seen that the theories of social representations and social identity are similarly 
based upon notions of normative consensus, and are fundamentally tautological in their 
formulation. However, due to the failure to appreciate the nature of social phenomena, 
and the unquestioned assumption of normative consensus as a fundamental requisite of 
social action and interaction, their inherent circularity is often not acknowledged. 
Consequently, empirical work simply. redescribes these flawed, initial assumptions: 
when considering social phenomena, the salience of categories is assumed at the outset 
and then treated as though empirically independent. In order to provide convincing 
explanations of social pheneomena, a detailed understanding of the social context is 
required; that understanding is inherently constrained due to the normative approach to 
social phenomena. As a result, it must be seen that refinement is not forthcoming 
simply on the basis of accumulating empirical data. 
Attempts to explain social phenomena in terms of psychological mechanisms are 
inherently limited due to the failure to appreciate the involvement of power as a 
fundamental constituent of social action and interaction: explanations of social 
phenomena in terms of "peer interaction" are often inadequate. A consideration of 
nationalism and national identification clearly demonstrates the limitations of 
psychological approaches to social phenomena, and allows comparison to be made to 
other social scientific approaches. The inherently dynamic and political nature of 
national identification draws attention toward the inherently dynamic and political 
nature of all social identification (and thereby social interaction more generally), 
characteristics that normative theories find difficult to capture. 
Thus it must be concluded, on the basis of the theories of social representations and 
soical identity at least, that it has not been effectively demonstrated that social 
phenomena can be adequately explained in terms of psychogical mechanisms. 
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APPENDIX 
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STUDY 
Introduction 
The aim of this study is to investigate national identification. This issue has been 
operationalised in a number of different ways within the social scientific literature, 
though perhaps the most common approach within social psychology has involved the 
direct questioning of subjects about their views as to what constitutes the national or 
cultural identity of their country or others' (for example, Condor, 1996). Such 
methods could more accurately be described as investigations of national stereotypes, 
or of collected beliefs regarding the nation. When considering the issue of national 
identification, it is relevant to investigate whether subjects characteristically think in 
terms of the nation, that is actually make use of some kind of national identification. 
The relevance or salience of the category should not simply be assumed. The term 
"national identification" is preferred to that of "national identity" because of the 
associations of the term "identity" with a fixed, internal construct; the term 
identification more clearly implies an active, ongoing process. 
To avoid an assumption of the salience of national identification it is necessary to avoid 
direct questioning of the nation or national characteristics. Instead, the salience of 
national identification may be investigated with regard to a particular issue. In the 
present study it was decided that a suitable issue was the European Union, or EU. 
There were a number of reasons why the EU was considered suitable. Firstly, the EU 
has been the subject of much media attention, so subjects could be expected to have 
some understanding of it. Secondly, as a trans-national grouping, the EU been 
discussed in the mass media with reference to explicitly national-ist concerns such as 
sovereignty and international relations, thus it is to some extent relevant to the notion 
of national identification. Thirdly, the continuing integration of Europe through the 
expansion in size and powers of the EU, may be regarded as an example of ongoing 
social change; as discussed earlier, issues of social change are useful to draw attention 
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to the limitations of normative approaches; the assumption of shared norms and their 
salience becomes more obviously problematic. 
The issue of salience is also relevant when considering the EU, as well as when 
considering national identification. It could easily be assumed that the EU is to some 
extent, uniformly salient by virtue of its presence in the national mass media. 
However, the EU would be expected to impinge on people's lives most directly 
through the effects of its policies. These policies may have a differential effect on 
areas of the country, for example the EU ban on British beef in the wake of the BSE 
crisis, would be expected to be most strongly felt in rural areas dependent on cattle 
farming; similarly the Common Fisheries Policy with regard to coastal regions where 
fishing is a major concern. Percentage turnout in European Parliamentary (EP) 
elections may be seen as an index of the relevance of the EU. Even though percentage 
turnout in EP elections is lower than that in British Parliamentary (BP) elections, there 
is still considerable regional variation, indicating differential regional significance of the 
EU. 
The incorporation of a notion of regional variation allows another means for 
investigating national identification. Critiques of the notion of national identity as an 
internal construct often contend that reference to the nation or national interests may 
be an important resource when attempting to gain support for a particular argument. 
On the basis of these arguments, it would be expected that the more salient the EU, the 
more use would be made of national identification as a resource by subjects as they 
explain their views concerning the EU. By gauging salience at a regional level, it is 
possible to draw a sample that is not restricted to a grouping for whom the EU is 
directly relevant, such as farmers or fishermen, for whom the presence of national 
identification may be more marked. 
Nevertheless, it is important to gauge whether subjects have some knowledge of the 
EU, such that their responses are not simply artefacts of the research instrument. In 
effect, it is important that an assumption that national identification is salient is not 
simply replaced by an assumption that the EU is salient. With this is mind it was 
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decided to investigate whether there would be an effect if the EU were referred to 
either in consistently positive terms, or consistently negative terms. The effects of this 
framing could also be used to further investigate regional variation with regard to level 
of agreement with both positive and negative statements. 
It was decided to sample subjects from two regions matched for voting turnout in the 
1992 BP elections (this was the most recent election at the time of the study), but with 
very different rates of voting in the last EP elections (held in 1994. ) The matching for 
voting in BP elections was crucial as this provided some measure of control for general 
political activity and awareness between the two regions, thus variation was more 
likely to reflect the differential relevance of the EU. 
The regions chosen were Truro in Cornwall and Crosby in Merseyside. Turnout for 
BP elections was 82.3 % in Truro, and 82.5 % in Crosby; UK average was 77.7 %. 
Turnout for EP elections was 44.8 % in Truro, and 32 % in Crosby; UK average was 
34.4 %. It can be seen that both areas showed above average turnout in BP elections; 
for EP elections Truro was well above the average, whereas Crosby was below. 
(Information was obtained from the Electoral Registration Officer from each area. ) 
Truro is close to many fishing communities, and the salience of the EU may be 
explained in part due to the media coverage surrounding the Common Fisheries Policy, 
which is often portrayed as being against the national interest. In contrast Crosby is 
not particularly associated with any EU related issues. It is important to emphasise 
that Truro itself is not a fishing community, though it may be expected that as a whole, 
people in the region may be less favourable toward the EU than those in Crosby. 
A postal questionnaire was chosen as the research instrument to allow access to ä 
large, randomly selected sample. Also, two versions of the questionnaire were 
produced, to allow the framing of the EU to be manipulated. 
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The aims of the study were to investigate how and whether the nation was drawn upon 
by subjects to explain their views concerning the EU; and to examine the effects of 
regional variation with regard to national identification and in attitudes toward the EU. 
Subjects 
A sample of 300 was randomly selected from each area using electoral role 
information. There were a total of 160 returns, 82 from Crosby and 78 from Truro. 
This was a response rate of 27 %. All further mention of subjects will refer to the 160 
subjects that returned questionnaires only. 
The mean age of subjects was 53.4 years, and 55 % were male and 45 % female. Sixty 
per cent of subjects had been educated to secondary level, 40 % had been to college 
or university. There were no significant differences between the samples on any of 
these subject variables. 
Design and Materials 
The study used a2x2 quasi-experimental design. Subjects were randomly selected 
from two regions and were also randomly selected to receive one of two versions of 
the questionnaire. 
The research instrument was a postal questionnaire. The survey used mainly likert- 
type scales, though effort was taken to minimise shaping of responses by inclusion of a 
"don't know" response and a recognisably neutral response, e. g. "neither for nor 
against". There was also some provision for open-ended responses. Questions and 
statements were constructed to loosely correspond to Mann's four dimensions of 
social power: the ideological, economic, military and political (or IEMP). Mann's 
formulation was discussed earlier, however it is not necessary to pay it more than the 
briefest regard here. The IEMP dimensions were used heuristically in the construction 
of questions to provide a structured format to the questionnaire. No attempt was 
made to evaluate the correspondence of questions and statements to Mann's 
formulation, as an assessment of Mann's formulation was not the purpose of the study. 
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To consider national identity, direct reference to the nation or any national grouping 
was avoided. A question was constructed to correspond to each of the IEMP 
dimensions. Each question asked subjects to consider various effects the EU was 
having for people. The phrase "people" was used to allow respondents to frame the 
questions as they pleased. Also up to this point in the questionnaire no mention had 
been made of any national category. The ideas was to provide an opportunity for any 
type of response to be made, via both a scaled response and an open-ended explanation 
for any effect the EU may be seen to be having. 
Two versions of the questionnaire were produced. The difference between the 
versions was a section manipulating framing of the EU in either a consistently positive 
or consistently negative manner. This section consisted of a statement constructed on 
the basis of recent newspaper reports to correspond to each of the IEMP dimensions. 
In version 1 of the questionnaire the four statements were unfavourable toward the 
EU, in version 2 the four statements were positive. Each statement was followed by a 
number of questions, these questions were identical in each version of the 
questionnaire. First there was a check question to make sure that the statement was 
understood by the subject to be correctly favourable or unfavourable toward the EU; 
then a question referring to the subject's level of agreement with the statement; and 
then 3 further questions related to the statement, responses to which were the means to 
ascertain whether there had been a framing effect. (A copy of each version of the 
questionnaire may be found at the end of this Appendix. ) 
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Results 
Before considering any regional differences in responses, initial analysis considered 
whether people draw on the nation when explaining how they felt about the EU. 
Open-Ended Responses 
Subjects were asked to further supplement a scaled response to a question regarding 
possible effects of the EU, loosely based around each of the IEMP dimensions. 
Tablel: Response rate for comment on open-ended questions. 
Dimension Rate of Response (%) 
Economic 75.0 
Military 66.9 
Political 76.2 
Ideological 75.0 
The rate of response was high, ranging from 66.1 % to 76.2 % 
For the open-ended questions, responses were coded on the basis of whether the 
respondent was considered to be drawing on some kind of national identification or 
not. If any explicit mention was made of "England" or `Britain", this was taken as 
evidence of drawing on the nation. Also, if any reference were made to non-specified 
collectivities such as "us", `eve" or "them", in the absence of any further elaboration 
regarding grouping, such as for instance occupational or regional, this was also taken 
as evidence of drawing on the nation. So, for example, a response such as 
"It is stabilising prices across countries to a level where less developed economies are 
gaining fairer rewards for their efforts. " 
would be coded as not drawing on any kind of national identification; whereas a 
response such as 
"We seem to be paying more to look after others. " 
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would be coded as drawing on some kind of national identification. Responses were 
coded by two judges independently and a small number of conflicting cases were 
discussed and resolved. Initial inter judge reliability was 79 %. 
Reference to Nation 
The majority of the responses made reference to a collective or group. Where 
collective responses were made, these largely drew upon the national group. The 
descriptive statistics of responses for the following are reported: 
a. non-collective / collective responses 
b. number of collective responses referring to the nation 
Table 2: Percentage of responses using non-collective or collective terms and 
level of responses specifically using reference to National group. 
Question Valid 
responses 
%age 
non-collective 
%age 
collective 
National group responses 
as %age of valid responses 
Economic 119 35.3 64.7 56.3 
Political 117 35.9 64.1 63.3 
Military 103 26.2 73.8 72.8 
Ideo- 
logical 
116 29.3 70.7 66.4 
Mean 31.7 68.3 64.7 
Whilst this would suggest that national identification is salient, further analysis of the 
nature of the national grouping responses (below) clarifies the exact use of nation. 
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Nature of Reference to Nation 
The descriptive statistics above suggest that reference to nation is common in 
responses to questions concerning the EU. However, to clarify the nature of the 
reference to the nation or national grouping, responses were rated as either referring to 
the nation in an instrumental manner, or drawing on it as a group identity. 
Instrumental use of the national category refers to responses where a national grouping 
is mentioned but the subject does not appear to identify with the category. For 
example, a response such as 
"The EU is making people a bit better of because they are freeing up trade amongst 
member states. " 
makes reference to national groupings, but does not do so in a way that could be 
described as identifying with the national grouping. However, a response such as 
"We have less say as regards our food, the seeds we sow in our gardens and how we 
name things. " 
would be described as drawing upon some form of national identification. In practice 
it was found that any other grouping apart from the nation was explicitly referred to, 
such as occupational or regional groupings. 
To investigate how the nation was referred to, frequencies of national grouping 
statements as opposed to instrumental reference to Britain in relation to the EU were 
calculated. 
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Table 3: Frequencies of instrumental and group identity references to Nation, in 
open ended responses 
Total 
Number of Instrumental Group I entity 
Question National 
Grouping 
Responses 
N 
--' 
' %age of, _, 
total'-, ------, 
N 
' 
%age of 
total 
Economic 67. 35 52.2, --'-.,,, - 32 47.8 
Political 74. 39 35 47.3 
Military 75 51 24 32.0 
Ideological 79 57 72.2 22 27.8 
Instrumental references to Britain were made more frequently than national/group 
identity references in all cases. 
Statistical analysis compared differences between responses for all 4 questions 
individually to assess whether these differences were statistically significant. Chi 
square comparison between instrumental and group identity responses yielded the 
following results: 
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Table 4: Results of Chi-Square analysis of frequencies of instrumental and 
group identity responses 
Question Chi-Square 
Value 
df Significance 
. 
Economic 0.134 1 p=0.714 . 
FY 
Political 0.216 1 =0.642t-, -, 
Military 9.720 1 p=0.002 
Ideological 15.506. 1 p<0.0005 
Whilst people did use collective references to the nation when expressing their opinion 
concerning the EU, these references more often instrumental in nature (significantly so 
in the cases of the military and ideological questions) in comparison with drawing on a 
notion of national group identity. 
Revdonal variations 
EU-related activity 
There was a significant difference between areas for only one of the questions 
regarding EU related activity. That was for the question `Do you think about the EU 
at all? ", where respondents from Truro reported doing so significantly more often than 
those from Crosby. 
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Table 5: Results oft-test analysis of Regional differences for question `Do you 
think of the EU at all? ' 
Area No. of cases Mean sd t-value Significance 
(two-tailed) 
Crosby 80 2.89 0.94 2.01 0.046 
Truro 77 2.58 0.95 
t-value ( df 155) = 2.01, p<0.05 
Evaluation of the EU 
There was a significant difference between areas on overall evaluation of the EU. 
Respondents from Truro evaluated the EU less favourably than those participants in 
Crosby. 
Table 6: Results oft-test analysis of Regional differences for Evaluation of the 
EU. 
Area No. of cases Mean sd t-value Significance 
Crosby 74 2.49 0.93 -2.07 0.04 
Truro 73 2.84 1.11 
t-value ( df 145) = -2.07, p<0.05 
Voting Attitudes and Overall Views of the EU 
There were no significant area differences for how strongly the overall view of EU is 
held, for attitudes toward the European Parliament (EP) or voting in EP elections nor 
for attitudes toward the British Parliament (BP) or voting in BP elections. 
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Effects of EU 
There were significant differences between areas when considering possible effects the 
EU may be having. There were four questions corresponding to each of Mann's 
sources of social power, significant regional differences were found on three. Also it is 
worth pointing out that these questions provided the scaled response which subjects 
were asked to supplement through the open-ended response discussed earlier. 
1) Economic 
Respondents from Truro felt the EU was making "people" more well off to a greater 
extent than those in Crosby. 
Table 7: Analysis by t-test of regional differences to economic issue question 
Area No. of cases Mean sd t-value Significance 
Crosby 80 2.89 1.03 2.01 0.05 
Truro -T 77 I 2.58 1.15 
t-value (df 155) = 0.02, p<0.05 
2) Military (interpreted in this instance in terms of state approved authority. ) 
No significant regional difference in opinions about how the EU may be making it 
more difficult to maintain law and order or less difficult. 
Table 8: Analysis by t-test of regional differences to military issue question 
Area No. of cases Mean sd t-value Significance 
Crosby 69 3.26 1.18 1.01 0.32 
Truro 64 3.06 1.10 
t-value ( df 13 1) = 1.01, p>0.05 (not significant) 
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3) Political 
Respondents from Truro felt that the EU gave people less say in how things are 
decided to a significantly greater extent to those respondents in Crosby. 
Table 9: Analysis by t-test of regional differences to political issue question. 
Area No. of cases Mean sd t-value Significance 
Crosby 70 3.51 1.31 -2.12 0.04 
Truro 73 4.00 1.21 
t-value (df 141) = -2.12, p<0.05 
4) Ideological 
Respondents from Truro felt that the EU is leading to less co-operation between 
people to a significantly greater extent than those in Crosby. 
Table 10: Analysis by t-test of regional differences to ideological issue question. 
Area No. of cases Mean sd t-value Significance 
Crosby 73 2.70 1.24 -2.12 0.04 
Truro 69 3.20 1.35 
t-value ( df 140) = -2.12, p<0.05 
Regional variation in Open-Ended Responses 
The following analysis considers whether there was any regional variation in 
i) the use of the Nation in response to questions on the EU 
ii) responses to the pro- and anti-EU framed questions 
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Variation in responses couched in terms of Nation. 
Considering those open-ended responses couched in terms of Nation, analysis of the 
use of instrumental vs group reference of nation was performed to assess whether 
there was regional variation in the type of National group responses. 
Group-wise (area) analysis of instrumental vs identity responses was performed 
applying ANOVA to data on non-collective and national grouping responses for each 
of the questions with the factor of area (Crosby / Truro). There were no significant 
effects of area on the types of references made to nation when respondents expressed 
their opinions of the EU. 
Framing effects 
Level of agreement 
Regional differences in level of agreement with the pro and anti-EU statements were 
investigated using ANOVA procedures. Of main interest were significant area effects 
and interaction effects between area and frame. Significant main effects by frame 
would indicate a difference between the pro-EU and anti-EU statements, but it is not 
clear how equally matched each pair of pro and anti-EU statements were; thus main 
effects by frame are of less interest. 
Considering the question of agreement with the statements, a2 (area) x2 (framing) 
ANOVA was applied. 
Table 11: Summary of results for ANOVA (area/framing) analysis of questions 4 
to 7. 
Question Effect of Area 
(Crosby/Truro) 
Effect of Framing 
(Anti EU / Pro EU) 
Interaction Effect",,, 
Economic No significant effect No significant effect No significant effect 
Military No significant effect p=0.012 No significant effect 
Political No significant effect No significant effect p=0.016 
Ideological No significant effect p=0.003 p=0.04 
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The following Figures 1 to 4 illustrate the data for each of the statements: 
Economic Statement 
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Figure 1: Measures of level of agreement with statement (1=strongly agree. --- 5=strongly disagree) under conditions of Anti- or Pro-EU framing.. for_ 
economic issue. 
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Figure 2: Measures of level of agreement with statement (I =strongly agree, 
5=strongly disagree) under conditions of Anti- or Pro-EU framing.. for 
military issue. 
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Figure 3: Measures of level of agreement with statement (1 =strongly agree, 
5=strongly disagree) under conditions of Anti- or Pro-EU framing for 
political issue. 
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Figure 4: Measures of level of agreement with statement (1=stronngly agree. 
5=strongly disagree) under conditions of Anti- or Pro-EU framing. for 
ideological issue. 
There were significant interaction effects when considering level of agreement with the 
statements. These were in the expected direction, and were present for the ideological 
statements (p = 0.04, df 1, F=4.305) and political statements (p = 0.016, df--1, 
F=6.03), though not for the economic and military statements. 
There was also a main effect of frame for level of agreement with the military (p = 
0.012, df=1, F=6.503) and ideological statements (p = 0.003, df=1, F=9.227). 
There were no significant regional differences. 
Subsequent Questions 
Framing effects regarding responses to questions following the framing statements 
were also investigated using ANOVA procedures. There were no significant effects. 
So, other than level of agreement, there were no significant effects associated with the 
framing of the ideological, economic, military or political statements. 
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Discussion 
When considering the general area differences, perhaps the most important finding is 
that there are differences between the areas on overall evaluation of the EU. 
Respondents in Truro were more likely to see the EU as a bad thing rather than good. 
This is in line with pre-suppositions based on the press coverage associated with the 
Common Fisheries Policy, which was generally unfavourable toward the EU. 
Also respondents from Truro thought about the EU more often than those from 
Crosby. However, there was no regional difference in terms of attitudes toward, and 
actual voting in, either BP or EP elections. This may appear strange given that initial 
selection of regions was in terms of differential rates of voting, though is explicable in 
terms of response bias. Those motivated to respond may have been more politically 
active or aware than those that did not. This result is actually quite useful as it 
removes political activity or awareness as a possible explanation for differences 
between subjects that responded from the two areas. 
The significant differences between areas when considering possible effects of the EU 
are also of interest. For the political and the ideological questions, the Truro 
respondents saw the EU as being less beneficial (leading to people having less say, and 
to less co-operation, respectively). However, for the economic question, the Truro 
respondents were more likely to see the EU as "making people more well off' than 
those from Crosby. On the basis of the generally less favourable attitudes shown by 
the Truro respondents, it would appear that the "people" that are being made more 
well off are not those that the respondents identify with. 
As for the framing effects there were significant interactions between area and frame 
when considering level of agreement with statements based on ideological and political 
dimensions, though not for the economic and military dimensions. For the ideological 
and political dimensions, respondents from Truro showed more agreement with the 
anti-EU statement and less agreement for the pro-EU statement than those from 
Crosby to a significant extent. This is in line with expectations. However, the lack of 
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any effect of framing upon responses to the subsequent questions suggests that 
respondents have some knowledge of the EU, since responses were not affected simply 
by the presentation of the EU as either consistently positive or consistently negative. 
As for the open responses, the response rate for each dimension was high, though no 
significant area differences were found. The finding that respondents, whilst often 
referring to nation in some respect, were more likely not to draw spontaneously on 
some aspect of national identification than they were to, is important. This is 
particularly so in light of the general assumption of the salience of national 
identification in the social psychological literature. It would have been very easy to 
question respondents directly about their national identities with regard to Europe; no 
doubt evidence could have been found for them. It would be very simple to assume 
such a salience, and allow this assumption to affect the formulation and interpretation 
of empirical research such that the assumption would appear to be supported. As 
such, this study was not concerned with examining in detail the content of subjects' 
responses, but with a more general notion of how and whether they draw on the 
nation. 
In the present study, it was found that when questioning respondents about a topic that 
is associated with national groupings, and to which they often respond by referring to 
national groupings, there is not conclusive support for a spontaneous national 
identification. Also, when questioning respondents from. different regions which were 
found to differ significantly in how they thought of the EU, there were no regional 
differences in national identification. This result urges caution in assuming that the 
nation is necessarily drawn upon as a resource to support one's arguments. 
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Conclusion 
To conclude it would appear that even when considering a multi-national 
confederation such as the EU, national identification is not necessarily characteristic of 
people's thinking. This is shown to be the case even when comparing areas that differ 
significantly in their attitudes toward the EU, and thus would appear to provide scope 
for national identification to be used as a resource to bolster one's arguments. These 
results support the contention that salience of a particular category or identification 
should not simply be assumed. 
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Your views on the European Union (EU) 
Instructions 
We have tried to make the questions quick and easy to answer. Most of the questions have boxes for you 
to put a cross in. Please read all of the different ways to answer. Then cross the box that is closest to how 
you think or feel. 
As an example, look at this question. 
Overall, is the EU a good thing or a bad thing? Very Good Neither good Bad Very Don't 
good nor bad bad know 
Q Q0Q Q Q 
If you think the EU is "neither a good thing nor a bad thing", cross the box under that reply. This is shown 
in the example. Or if you think the EU is "very good", cross the box under that reply. In this way we can 
quickly get an idea of what you think. 
Some of the questions give you more of a chance to write down what you think. With these questions, you 
can explain why you crossed one of the boxes. Remember there are no right or wrong answers. It's 
what you think or do that is important. Please answer all of the questions. 
Some people are quite interested in the European Union, or EU, and follow any news about it. Other 
people find that they haven't the time or they aren't interested. Below are some things that people do. Please tell me how often you do any of them. 
Q1 Very Often Some Hardly Never 
often times ever 
Think about the EU at all Q Q Q Q Q 
Read about the EU in newspapers Q Q Q Q Q 
Talk about the EU with other people Q Q Q Q Q 
Contact public officials or politicians Q Q Q Q Q 
on matters related to the EU 
ý2 Overall, is the EU a good thing or a bad thing? Very 
good 
17 
23 How strongly do you hold this view? Very 
strongly 
Good Neither good Bad Very Don't 
nor bad bad know 
QQQQQ 
Strongly Neither strongly Quite Very Don't 
nor weakly weakly weakly know 
QQQQQ 
Survey: 24 Serial : 17 Page: 1 
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The EU has been around for some time. Some people may think that it is having a big effect on things. Others 
may think that it is not having a big effect on things. Let me know what you think by answering the next set of 
questions. Each question has two parts. For the first part cross a box. For the second part you can write some 
more. Please answer both parts. If there is not enough room to write what you want, there is space on the last 
sheet of the questionnaire for you to carry on. If you do, please show which question you are answering. 
Q4 Do you think the EU is making Much A bit Doesn't really A bit Much Don't 
people more well off or less more more make a difference less less know 
well off? 
QQQQQQ 
How? 
Q5 Do you think the EU is giving people 
more say in how things are decided 
or less say? 
How? 
Much A bit Doesn't really A bit Much 
more more make a difference less less 
QQQQQ 
Don't 
know 
El 
ý6 Do you think the EU is making it more Much 
difficult to maintain law and order more 
or less difficult? 
A bit Doesn't really A bit Much Don't 
more make a difference less less know 
QQQQQ 
How? 
Z7 Do you think the EU is leading to more Much A bit Doesn't really A bit Much Don't 
co-operation between people or less more more make a difference less less know 
co-operation? 
Ej 1: 1 11 ED 0 1: 1 
How? 
Survey : 24 Serial : 17 Page :2 
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You may sometimes read about the EU in newspapers. The EU may be connected to different things in different 
ways. Newspapers say things that you might agree with or disagree with. Below are four statements that have 
been written in newspapers. After each statement are some questions. Please read each statement and then 
answer the questions below. 
Statement 1 Britain gives more to the EU than it gets back Britain is losing out. 
Q8 Do you think this statement is Strongly Against Neither for For Strongly Don't 
against the EU or for it? against nor against for know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Q9 Do you agree with this statement? Strongly Agree Neither agree Disagree Strongly Don't 
agree nor disagree disagree know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
The following questions are about changes the EU may be making to the country. 
Q10 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
to keep prices down? 
Q11 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
to protect jobs? 
Q12 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
for you to be better off? 
Much A bit Doesn't really A bit Much Don't 
harder harder make a difference easier easier know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
QQQ QQQ 
F-I El F-I QQQ 
Statement 2 This nation will never give up its right to control its own armed forces. Britain should protect it s 
own interests wherever it decides. 
Q13 Do you think this statement is Strongly Against Neither for For Strongly Don't 
against the EU or for it? against nor against for know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Q14 Do you agree with this statement? Strongly Agree Neither agree Disagree Strongly Don't 
agree nor disagree disagree know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
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The following questions are about changes the EU may be making to the country. 
ý15 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
for the country to have strong 
armed forces? 
X16 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
to stop armed conflict? 
Z17 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
for you to feel safe and secure? 
Much A bit Doesn't really A bit Much 
harder harder make a difference easier easier 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
QQQQQ 
Don't 
know 
F-I 
F71 
Statement 3 EU leaders want a say in deciding working conditions. British bosses say it should be up to workers 
and management to sort out details. 
118 Do you think this statement is Strongly Against Neither for For Strongly Don't 
against the EU or for it? against nor against for know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
)19 Do you agree with this statement? Strongly Agree Neither agree Disagree Strongly Don't 
agree nor disagree disagree know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
The following questions are about changes the EU may be making to the country. 
Much A bit Doesn't really A bit Much Don't 
harder harder make a difference easier easier know 
220 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
for people to have a say in decisions El [7 ED El 
at work? 
121 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
for people to have a say in decisions ED El ED El ED 
of the government? 
)22 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
for you to have a say in these E El El D El 
decisions? 
Survey : 24 Serial : 17 Page :4 
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Statement 4 The government should protect us from the threat of a European super-state. 
Q23 Do you think this statement is Strongly Against Neither for For Strongly Don't 
against the EU or for it? against nor against for know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Q24 Do you agree with this statement? Strongly Agree Neither agree Disagree Strongly Don't 
agree nor disagree disagree know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
The following questions are about changes the EU may be making to the country. 
Much A bit Doesn't really A bit Much Don't 
harder harder make a difference easier easier know 
Q25 Is the EU making it harder or easier El ED El El E] 
to work with other countries? 
Q26 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
for this country to be like other F-I ED El El ED El 
countries? 
Q27 Is the EU making it harder or easier 0 El E-I 13 
for you to be friendly and co-operative? 
The next questions are about the European Parliament. 
Q28 Do you think what goes on in the Very A bit Doesn't really Not very Not at all Don't 
European Parliament is important important important make a difference important important know 
to you? 
Q QQ Q Q Q 
Q29 Do you think it is useful to vote in Very A bit Doesn't really Not very Not at all Don't 
European Parliamentary elections? useful useful make a difference useful useful know 
Q QQ Q Q Q 
Q30 Did you vote in the last European Parliamentary Yes No Don't 
elections? know 
QQ Q 
Q31 Will you vote in the next European Parliamentary 
elections? 
Yes No Don't 
know 
QQQ 
Survey : 24 Serial : 17 Page :5 
The next questions are about the British Parliament. 
Q32 Do you think what goes on in the Very A bit Doesn't really Not very Not at all Don't 
British Parliament is important important important make a difference important important know 
to you? 
QQQQQQ 
Q33 Do you think it is useful to vote in Very A bit Doesn't really Not very Not at all Don't 
British Parliamentary elections? useful useful make a difference useful useful know 
QQQQQQ 
Q34 Did you vote in the last British Yes No Don't 
Parliamentary elections? know QQQ 
Q35 Will you vote in the next British Yes No Don't 
Parliamentary elections? know 
QQQ 
The last few questions are about you. 
Q36 Have you travelled to another country in the last 
12 months? 
Yes No Don't 
know 
QQQ 
If yes, please say which countries and the purpose of your visit, for example "holiday", "shopping" or "business". 
X37 How old were you on your last birthday? 
)38 Are you male or female? 
=Z39 At what stage did you finish your 
education? 
Years 
Male Female 
QQ 
Primary or Secondary or College or 
Junior school high school University 
QQQ 
What is your occupation? 
Survey : 24 Serial : 17 Page :6 
C 
Please cross this box if you DO NOT wish to be included in the lottery syndicate. ::: ] 
Thank you for your help. 
If you have any comments about the questions, please write them below. 
Also, please use the space if you did not have enough room to write what you wanted 
to for questions 4,5,6 and 7. 
Please return the questionnaire using the Freepost envelope provided. (You do not need a stamp. ) 
m 
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Your views on the European Union (EU) 
Instructions 
We have tried to make the questions quick and easy to answer. Most of the questions have boxes for you 
to put a cross in. Please read all of the different ways to answer. Then cross the box that is closest to how 
you think or feel. 
As an example, look at this question. 
Overall, is the EU a good thing or a bad thing? Very Good Neither good Bad Very Don't 
good nor bad bad know 
Q Q rx- Q Q Q 
If you think the EU is "neither a good thing nor a bad thing", cross the box under that reply. This is 
shown in the example. Or if you think the EU is "very good", cross the box under that reply. In this way 
we can quickly get an idea of what you think. 
Some of the questions give you more of a chance to write down what you think. With these questions, 
you can explain why you crossed one of the boxes. Remember there are no right or wrong answers. 
It's what you think or do that is important. Please answer all of the questions. 
Some people are quite interested in the European Union, or EU, and follow any news about it. Other 
people find that they haven't the time or they aren't interested. Below are some things that people do. 
Please tell me how often you do any of them. 
Q1 Very Often Some Hardly Never 
often times ever 
Think about the EU at all 0 Ej El El 
Read about the EU in newspapers ED 11 F-1 F-1 7 
Talk about the EU with other people ED ED ED F-I 7 
Contact public officials or politicians D El ED ED ED 
on matters related to the EU 
Q2 Overall, is the EU a good thing or a bad thing? Very 
good 
F-I 
Q3 How strongly do you hold this view? Very 
strongly 
Survey: 26 
Good Neither good Bad Very Don't 
nor bad bad know 
QQQQQ 
Strongly Neither strongly Quite Very Don't 
nor weakly weakly weakly know 
QQQ 
Serial : 16 
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The EU has been around for some time. Some people may think that it is having a big effect on things. Others 
may think that it is not having a big effect on things. Let me know what you think by answering the next set of 
questions. Each question has two parts. For the first part cross a box. For the second part you can write some 
more. Please answer both parts. If there is not enough room to write what you want, there is space on the last 
sheet of the questionnaire for you to carry on. If you do, please show which question you are answering. 
)4 Do you think the EU is making Much` A bit Doesn't really A bit Much Don't 
people more well off or less more more make a difference less less know 
well off? 
E-1 El 0 F7 ED E-: 1 
How? 
)5 Do you think the EU is giving people 
more say in how things are decided 
or less say? 
How? 
Much A bit Doesn't really A bit Much 
more more make a difference less less 
QQQQQ 
Don't 
know 
Fý 
ý6 Do you think the EU is making it more Much 
difficult to maintain law and order more 
or less difficult? 
A bit Doesn't really A bit Much Don't 
more make a difference less less know 
QQQQQ 
How? 
)7 Do you think the EU is leading to more Much A bit Doesn't really A bit Much Don't 
co-operation between people or less more more make a difference less less know 
co-operation? 
r_1 F1 El F-1 F-I 17 
How? 
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You may sometimes read about the EU in newspapers. The EU may be connected to different things in different 
ways. Newspapers say things that you might agree with or disagree with. Below are four statements that have 
been written in newspapers. After each statement are some questions. Please read each statement and then 
answer the questions below. 
Statement 1 When it comes to being well off, Britain is in 11th place in the EU. We cannot afford to stand alone 
and must co-operate to survive. 
Q8 Do you think this statement is Strongly Against Neither for For Strongly Don't 
against the EU or for it? against nor against for know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Q9 Do you agree with this statement? Strongly Agree Neither agree Disagree Strongly Don't 
agree nor disagree disagree know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
The following questions are about changes the EU may be making to the country. 
Q10 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
to keep prices down? 
Q11 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
to protect jobs? 
Q12 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
for you to be better off? 
Much A bit Doesn't really A bit Much Don't 
harder harder make a difference easier easier know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Statement 2 There can be no doubt that a joint EU armed forces will be more effective than any provided by a 
single state or country. 
Q13 Do you think this statement is 
against the EU or for it? 
Q14 Do you agree with this statement? 
Strongly Against Neither for For Strongly Don't 
against nor against for know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Agree Neither agree Disagree Strongly Don't 
agree nor disagree disagree know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
0 
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The following questions are about changes the EU may be making to the country. 
Q15 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
for the country to have strong 
armed forces? 
D16 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
to stop armed conflict? 
X17 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
for you to feel safe and secure? 
Much A bit Doesn't really A bit Much Don't 
harder harder make a difference easier easier know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
QQQQQQ 
m 
Statement 3 EU leaders wish to increase co-operation between bosses and workers over key decisions by 
setting up work councils. 
418 Do you think this statement is Strongly Against Neither for For Strongly Don't 
against the EU or for it? against nor against for know 
%Q Q Q Q Q Q 
)19 Do you agree with this statement? Strongly Agree Neither agree Disagree Strongly Don't 
agree nor disagree disagree know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
The following questions are about changes the EU may be making to the country. 
Much A bit Doesn't really A bit Much Don't 
harder harder make a difference easier easier know 
X20 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
for people to have a say in decisions El F7 El F-71 r-1 
at work? 
! 21 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
for people to have a say in decisions ED ED 0 F-I El 
of the government? 
122 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
for you to have a say in these ED ED ED E El 
decisions? 
Survey: 26 Serial: 16 Page: 4 
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Statement 4 With the EU working together, a more prosperous future for each country is 6 certainty. 
Q23 Do you think this statement is Strongly Against Neither for For Strongly Don't 
against the EU or for it? against nor against for know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Q24 Do you agree with this statement? Strongly Agree Neither agree Disagree Strongly Don't 
agree nor disagree disagree know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
The following questions are about changes the EU may be making to the country. 
Much A bit Doesn't really A bit Much Don't 
harder harder make a difference easier easier know 
Q25 Is the EU making it harder or easier Q Q Q Q Q Q 
to work with other countries? 
Q26 Is the EU making it harder or easier 
for this country to be like other Q Q Q Q Q Q 
countries? 
Q27 Is the EU making it harder or easier Q Q Q Q Q Q 
for you to be friendly and co-operative? 
The next questions are about the European Parliament. 
Q28 Do you think what goes on in the Very A bit Doesn't really Not very Not at all Don't 
European Parliament is important important important make a difference important important know 
to you? 
F-I E: 1 F-1 El El Fý 
Q29 Do you think it is useful to vote in Very A bit Doesn't really Not very Not at all Don't 
European Parliamentary elections? useful useful make a difference useful useful know 
QQQQQQ 
Q30 Did you vote in the last European Parliamentary Yes No Don't 
elections? know 
QQQ 
Q31 Will you vote in the next European Parliamentary Yes No Don't 
elections? know 
QQQ 
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Very A bit Doesn't really Not very Not at all Don't 
important important make a difference important important know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Very A bit Doesn't really Not very Not at all Don't 
useful useful make a difference useful useful know 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Yes No Don't 
know 
F-I E-1 F-1 
Yes No Don't 
know 
QQ Q 
The next questions are about the British Parliament. 
X32 Do you think what goes on in the 
British Parliament is important 
to you? 
X33 Do you think it is useful to vote in 
British Parliamentary elections? 
ý34 Did you vote in the last British 
Parliamentary elections? 
)35 Will you vote in the next British 
Parliamentary elections? 
The last few questions are about you. 
136 Have you travelled to another country in the last 
12 months? 
Yes No Don't 
know 
QQQ 
If yes, please say which countries and the purpose of your visit, for example "holiday", "shopping" or "business". 
137 How old were you on your last birthday? 
238 Are you male or female? 
? 39 At what stage did you finish your 
education? 
What is your occupation?, 
Years 
Male Female 
QQ 
Primary or Secondary or College or 
Junior school high school University 
MQQ 
v 
Survey: 26 Serial: 16 Page: 6 
m 
Please cross this box if you DO NOT wish to be included in the lottery syndicate. ::: ] 
Thank you for your help. 
If you have any comments about the questions, please write them below. 
Also, please use the space if you did not have enough room to write what you wanted 
to for questions 4,5,6 and 7. 
Please return the questionnaire using the Freepost envelope provided. (You do not need a stamp. ) 
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